Wage and Hour Law Update

Close, But No Discretion: District Court Holds Insurance Investigators Ineligible for Administrative Exemption

Noel Tripp — Tue, 07 Sep 2010 09:59:47 -0800

Recently, a federal judge in Minnesota analyzed whether the confounding administrative exemption applies to investigators employed by a “full-service investigative firm specializing in insurance defense investigations.” Ahle v. Veracity Research Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88250 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2010). In an opinion which addressed numerous other issues in the litigation, including rejecting the applicability of two other FLSA exemptions to the investigators (outside sales and motor carrier), Judge Ann Montgomery concluded that, while the investigators did perform work relating to the general business operations of Veracity and its customers (meeting the first prong of the administrative exemption test), they did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment in performing that work, and thus could not qualify for the exemption.

Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Roe-Midgett v. CC Services, Inc., 512 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 2008), Judge Montgomery observed that even though the plaintiff investigators “produced” Veracity’s product (the investigations themselves), potentially making them “production” workers as opposed to administrative workers, the administrative/production dichotomy was of little use in analyzing a service business such as defendant’s, and, more importantly:

the core business function of Veracity's clients is not to produce investigations. For example, Veracity's insurance company clients are in the business of writing and selling insurance policies. The duty of conducting claims investigations is merely ancillary to producing and selling insurance policies, and thus falls on the administrative side of the "administrative-production dichotomy”

Ahle, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88250 at * 11 citing Roe-Midgett, 512 F.3d at 872.

Judge Montgomery then turned to the final prong of the analysis: whether the investigators exercised discretion and independent judgment under the Department of Labor regulation 29 C.F.R. § 541.202. Analyzing Veracity’s investigators in light of previous FLSA decisions concerning insurance industry investigations, the Court ruled that no material issue of fact existed as to the presence of discretion and independent judgment because, “(1) Veracity's written guidelines explain in great detail how claims investigators should conduct an investigation, (2) the claims investigators are required to obtain all the facts regardless of their impact, and (3) the claims investigators do not include their own opinions, conclusions, or recommendations regarding the decision whether to pay or deny the claim.” This absence of independent analysis rendered the investigators employees who simply made “choices among established techniques, procedures or specific standards described in manuals or other sources." Thus, they could not qualify for the administrative exemption.

The administrative exemption is a persistent source of confusion, and litigation. Employers must apply its multiple-pronged exemption test with care and ensure exercise of sufficient discretion and independent judgment as to matters of significance.

Circuit Court Confirms That Bonus Structure Based On Hours Worked Did Not Negate Employer's Compliance With Salary Basis Test

Noel Tripp — Mon, 30 Aug 2010 13:35:24 -0800

The “salary basis” test is by far the most straightforward component of the white collar overtime exemptions, requiring only a fixed salary of $455/week (subject to state law) paid in compliance with the requirements of 29 CFR § 541.602. However, an employer’s use of an unusual compensation or bonus structure can still result in allegations that this requirement is not met. Such claims can arise even when the weekly payment in question far exceeds the minimum salary requirement. This was the nature of the Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful attempt to assert that the employer failed to satisfy the salary basis requirement in Bell v. Callaway, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17981 (11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2010).[1]

In Callaway, the employer hired approximately 100 “bookkeeper/accountants” to assist Callaway in the restatement of a single company’s books (HealthSouth). Their compensation arrangement is summarized below:

Plaintiffs received a guaranteed weekly salary of $1600 or more that did not depend on the quality or quantity of the work performed. This weekly salary was reduced by one-fifth of the weekly salary for every full day a Plaintiff took off from work for personal reasons during the normal workweek without substituting Paid Time Off ("PTO") [Ed.: a lawful deduction under 541.602]. But, a Plaintiff could work fewer than eight hours during any given workday without any reduction in his or her weekly salary. Second, Plaintiffs were eligible to receive additional incentive compensation (a "bonus") paid at a straight-time hourly rate based on the cumulative number of billable hours that Plaintiffs worked. Any bonus to be awarded was determined based on how many additional hours over forty a Plaintiff worked in a given week minus any "deficit" hours a Plaintiff had accumulated in past weeks. For example, if a Plaintiff worked seven and not eight hours on each regularly-scheduled workday in a given week, thus totaling 35 hours of work, he or she still earned the full predetermined weekly salary, but would not earn a bonus in a subsequent week until he or she made up the bonus-hour deficit of five hours and then worked more than 40 hours in a given week.

Id. at * 1-2.

The Eleventh Circuit, affirming the district court, rejected Plaintiffs’ claim that they were “not paid on a salary basis because the amount of their bonuses fluctuated based on the cumulative number of hours worked.” Id. at * 4. The Court noted the DOL’s regulation which allows an employer to “provide an exempt employee with additional compensation without losing the exemption or violating the salary basis requirement, if the employment arrangement also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly-required amount paid on a salary basis.” Id. at * 5 citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.604(a). Because the salary basis was met, exempt status was preserved, and the additional compensation was of no moment. The fact that the bonus was based on hours worked and subject to adjustment based on hours worked was irrelevant to the court’s analysis of salary basis compliance.

While Callaway is in line with other Circuit decisions addressing similar plans (See e.g. Havey v. Homebound Mortg., Inc., 547 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2008)(the fact that [plaintiff’s] overall compensation for quarter could be decreased due to quality errors does not render [plaintiff] a non-salaried employee if, under the employer's policy, the adjustments do not affect a "predetermined amount" [compliant with the salary basis test]), employers devising exempt compensation plans must beware of compensation arrangements that could result in assertions that rather than applying a proper FLSA exemption, they are attempting to circumvent the Act’s overtime requirement. See generallyAdams v. Department of Juvenile Justice, 143 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1998).

This decision points out the need for all employers to ensure that compensation programs for white collar-exempt employees are in full compliance with the salary basis requirements of the FLSA.

[1] Jackson Lewis partner Todd Van Dyke of the Firm’s Atlanta office represented the Defendants in Callaway.

New York Federal Court Finds Gas Station and Convenience Store Manager To Be An Exempt Executive

Noel Tripp — Fri, 27 Aug 2010 12:23:15 -0800

The subject of many FLSA actions is store managers and whether they are properly classified as exempt employees. In a recent victory for the employer community, Judge Glenn Suddaby of the Northern District of New York held as a matter of law that Express Mart properly classified its store manager in Cato, New York as exempt. Guinup v. Petr-All Petroleum Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86280 (N.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 2010).

Plaintiff Guinup was the store manager for Store 360, a combination convenience store and gas station. In her claim for overtime, she did not dispute that three of the four requirements for the executive exemption were met: namely, that she; 1) was paid on a salary basis and earned at least $455 per week; 2) customarily and regularly directed the work of two or more employees; and 3) had the authority to hire or fire employee or in the alternative make recommendations as to hiring and firing which received particular weight. Id. at * 17-18. Rather, Plaintiff argued that as a store manager she did not meet the requirement that her “primary duty [be] management of the enterprise in which the employee is employed or of a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof.” Id. citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.100.

The Court then reviewed the four factors utilized to determine whether an employee’s primary duty is management: “[1] the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other types of duties; [2] the amount of time spent performing exempt work; [3] the employee's relative freedom from direct supervision; and [4] the relationship between the employee's salary and the wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the employee.” Id. In holding that each factor militated in favor of exempt status the Court observed that Plaintiff’s duties included:

interviewing and hiring new employees, scheduling, training, writing performance evaluations, reporting employee and customer injuries to corporate, discussing sales performance and promotions with corporate, conducting surveys of competitors' gas prices and convenience store business, and controlling "shrink." Plaintiff was also responsible for making recommendations to corporate regarding product ordering and pricing, new hire pay rates, employee discipline and termination, and certain Store 360 security measures. Furthermore, Plaintiff accepted phone calls at home from her subordinates at Store 360 regarding incidents that arose at Store 360 when she was not working.

Id. at * 21.

Based on these duties, the Court observed that “Store 360 could not have operated successfully unless Plaintiff performed her managerial functions.” As the most senior on-site employee, the Court found she was relatively free from supervision on a day-to-day basis even if she had an “active” Area Supervisor because, inter alia, the Area Supervisor was responsible for ten stores. Finally, based on the Court’s estimate of the compensation of Plaintiff’s assistant manager, Plaintiff was paid approximately 31.7% more than that employee, her highest-ranking subordinate.

While the Guinup decision is favorable to employers, the applicability of the executive exemption continues to be a fact-sensitive, highly technical analysis with divergent court opinions. Whenever a managerial employee is not the highest ranking on-site employee (as Guinup was), particular care must be taken in assessing applicability of the exemption. And even if the employee is the highest rank on-site there must be significant exercise of managerial duties. All retail employers must focus on this issue.

California's Highest Court Rules That Employees Do Not Have A Private Right of Action Under Tip Misappropriation Statute

Noel Tripp — Tue, 17 Aug 2010 07:24:05 -0800

As analyzed in more detail here, the California Supreme Court recently ruled that the California labor code provision prohibiting employers from taking or sharing in tips left for employees by customers – Cal. Lab. Code § 351 (“Section 351”) – does not provide private litigants with a right to sue their employers directly for alleged misappropriation of tips. Lu v. Hawaiian Gardens Casino, Inc., No. S171442 (Aug. 9, 2010).

In Lu, the defendant casino required card dealers to segregate 15 to 20 percent of their tips, which the casino deposited into a tip pool account for distribution to designated employees who provide services to customers. Employees who received these segregated tips included chip runners, poker tournament coordinators, poker retention coordinators, hosts, customer service representatives, and concierges.

The California Supreme Court took up Lu, after both the trial and first appellate court held that Plaintiff Lu had no private right to sue under Section 351, to settle a conflict with another intermediate appellate court which held that a private right of action existed under Section 351. See Grodensky v. Artichoke Joe’s Casino. The court addressed the limited question of whether Section 351 created a private right of action for employees. Without ruling on the legality of the defendant’s tip pool policy, the Court found no private right of action for employees under Section 351, either explicitly or implicitly. However, the Court observed that employees can still pursue Section 351 relief through the Labor Commissioner, or sue for allegedly misappropriated tips under common law or other statutory theories.

Employers should continue to draft and administer their tip pooling policies carefully, in light of federal and state laws and regulations. This point is underscored by the fact that the FLSA provides a private right of action and 100% liquidated damages plus loss of any taken tip credit for misappropriated gratuities.

Federal Court Finds Time Spent On-Premises On-Call During Lunch Breaks Non-Compensable

Noel Tripp — Mon, 16 Aug 2010 14:54:14 -0800

The FLSA requires that employers pay employees for all work time, as well as for any time that the employee is “engaged to wait.” An employee is “engaged to wait” when the employee is idle, but is constrained with respect to engaging in personal activities. Thus, the employee’s time is deemed to be “for the benefit” of the employer. Examples may include time spent waiting to respond to on-site incidents, monitoring a work location, or maintaining a presence in a particular area for public safety reasons,. When the employee is deemed free to pursue personal interests, the employee is “waiting to engage”, and need not be compensated. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa recently issued a decision analyzing and applying the “engaged to wait” concept to lunch breaks in regard to security employees required to remain on-premises and on-call during their meal period.

Aiken v. Catholic Health Initiatives, No. 4:07-cv-018, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79782 (S.D. Iowa 2010), concerned private security guards who worked on the premises of defendant’s hospitals. The security guards were allotted 30 minute unpaid meal breaks pursuant to defendant’s written policy and practice. However for the duration of this break they were required to: (1) remain on-premises; (2) carry their hospital radios;, and (3) respond to any incidents or assignments in the hospital, should they arise. If a security guard was unable to take a full thirty-minute meal break during his/her shift due to an incident, the employee was instructed to notify their supervisor so that they could be paid for the entire thirty-minute period. The security guards sought compensation for these unpaid meal periods under the FLSA

The court held that the security guards were not “engaged to wait” during this time, but rather were free to pursue personal interests, such as making personal calls, playing card games, and surfing the Internet, and therefore their meal breaks were not compensable. Although the court acknowledged that the employer derived some benefit from the security guards’ “deterrence value” when they remained on premises—especially considering that each hospital had only one security guard per shift—it nonetheless found that the “predominant benefit” of the meal break fell to the employees themselves.

Interestingly, the security guards argued that they were free to pursue personal activities during extensive “down time” during their compensable work hours, and therefore the activities pursued during “working time” and during the meal breaks were indistinguishable and, thus, equally compensable. The court flatly rejected this argument, finding such time was plainly not work, even if the employer chose to compensate for such personal time during the actual workday.

In rejecting Plaintiffs’ claims and holding that neither 1) the potential to have to perform work nor 2) the actual performance of work on an occasional basis converted all meals breaks to compensable time, the court did note that if the security guards’ meal breaks were interrupted with a high level of frequency then the meal breaks could potentially be considered working time. However, the interruptions here were too infrequent to rise to that level, and regardless employees were paid whenever they notified their supervisors of a meal break interruption,.

Employers who wish to require employees to remain on-call during meal periods must be cautious of state laws and ensure that any such on-call time does not regularly restrict employees from engaging in personal activities.

Seventh Circuit Upholds Pro-Employer Method of Overtime Calculation for Misclassified Employees

Noel Tripp — Fri, 06 Aug 2010 12:11:56 -0800

The Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and one half times their regular rate of pay for any hours worked in a workweek in excess of 40. United States Department of Labor regulations, as set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 778.114(a), allow an employer to utilize the fluctuating workweek (“FWW”) method of overtime payment. Pursuant to FWW, in determining overtime due, an employer divides the weekly wage by the total number of hours worked during the week and then pays additional half-time for overtime hours. The more overtime hours worked, the lower the regular rate of pay and the overtime due for each overtime hour.

One would think that if a salaried employee is found to have been misclassified as non-exempt, this same formula should be applied in determining any overtime due. However, while the federal appellate courts have applies such formula, some district courts have taken the position that any overtime must be calculated by dividing the salary by 40 to determine the regular rate and paying 1.5 times the regular rate for all overtime hours. The difference in calculations can be significant as demonstrated by the following examples.

SALARY: $1,000

HOURS WORKED: 50

Half-time calculation (FWW): $1000/50 hours = $20/hour regular rate of pay/2 = $10 times 10 overtime hours -=$100 due

Time-and-a-half calculation: $1000/40 hours = $25/hour regular rate of pay X 1.5 = $37.50 times 10 overtime hours = $375 due

The difference between the amounts of overtime due under these two calculation methods is always at least three-fold. As the number of hours in the workweek increases, the spread between the two methods grows.

Earlier this week, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit endorsed the first FWW-type calculation. See Urnikis-Negro v. Am. Family Prop. Servs., — F.3d. —, No. 08-3117, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 16126 (7th Cir. 2010). In finding this method of overtime calculation appropriate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the parties “had a ‘clear and mutual understanding’ that [the employee’s] weekly salary of $1,000 was meant to compensate her for however many hours she worked, not 40 or some other number.” Id. at *18. Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit referred to an article published by Jackson Lewis partner Paul DeCamp (head of the Firm’s Wage and Hour Practice Group and former Wage and Hour Administrator for the United States Department of Labor) and associate Jacqueline C. Tully, Half-Time or Time and a Half? Calculating Overtime in Misclassification Cases, 278 Fair Lab. Stds. Handbook for States, Local Gov’t & Sch. Newsl. 3 (Nov. 2008). The Court specifically relied on this article for the proposition that the “proper focus in calculating [the] regular rate of pay for [a] misclassified employee is on whether [the] parties intended [a] fixed salary to compensate [an] employee for all hours worked in [a] work-week or solely for [the] first 40 hours.” Id. at *45.

The employee argued that “use of the more employer-friendly FWW method gives employers an incentive to misclassify employees as exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements or otherwise withhold overtime pay, as they will be little the worse off if and when sued to enforce the statute’s requirements.” Id. at *55. In response, the Seventh Circuit stated that the district court awarded liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and costs to the employee, thereby causing the employer to endure penalties for miscategorizing her as an exempt employee.

As with many other wage and hour issues, courts have not been fully consistent even when determining the regular rate is based on salary divided by total hours worked. Some courts have taken the position that time and a half the regular rate is due for all hours over 40 and not just additional half time. Further confusing the issue, some of these courts divide the salary by 40 hours to determine the regular rate, while others still use the total hours worked. These calculations are not supported by regulation but generally based on the court’s view of the equities.

While this issue may ultimately need to be resolved by the Supreme Court, this is a helpful decision for employers, especially those within the Seventh Circuit. It also reminds employers to reiterate to all salaried employees that their salary covers all hours worked. The Court’s reference to the article published by Jackson Lewis attorneys also demonstrates that the Firm is at the forefront of legal analysis and theory in the wage and hour arena, the forum that continues to pose the highest level of risk related to workplace compliance.

Circuit Court Reiterates That State Wage and Hour Laws Need Not Mirror FLSA

Noel Tripp — Thu, 05 Aug 2010 12:58:25 -0800

As discussed here, the FLSA contains a provision relating to the compensability of time spent donning and doffing uniforms, when the compensability of such time is addressed in a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). However, even where a unionized employer through a collective bargaining agreement is not required to pay for such time, if the time is otherwise compensable under state law, the FLSA is no defense, held Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit this week. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15960 (7th Cir. Wis. Aug. 2, 2010).

Spoerle concerns the compensability of time spent putting on and taking off “safety gear, such as steel-toed boots and hard hats, plus a smock that keeps other garments clean” as well as hair nets and beard nets” at an Oscar Mayer plant in Wisconsin. Id. at * 2. The Court noted that it “takes a few minutes at the start of every day to put these items on, and a few more at day's end to take them off.” Id. Kraft Foods and the union agreed that this time is not compensable. Id. at * 2-3. However, Kraft Foods also conceded within the context of Spoerle that, but for the existence of a CBA, the time in question would be compensable under Wisconsin’s state wage law.

As observed by the district court and reiterated by the Seventh Circuit, 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) of the FLSA states:

No provision of this chapter . . . shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter …. No provision of this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter.

This provision codifies an unequivocal proposition: the FLSA does not prevent states from enacting wage laws which provide greater rights to employees. The Court also specifically noted that 203(o) by its plain language is limited to calculating hours worked “for the purposes of sections 206 and 207 of this title.” Id. at * 5. Finally, as explained by the Court, the existence of the CBA did not itself preempt the state wage law because state rules that disregard, rather than interpret, collective bargaining agreements are not preempted by federal labor policy. Id. citing Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988).

Spoerle highlights the need for every organization to develop a full and complete understanding of both the FLSA and all relevant state wage and hour laws. Employers with multi-state operations must be particularly careful to mind the niceties of individual state laws.

Different Circuit, Different Result: Fifth Circuit Upholds Independent Contractor Classification Under FLSA

Noel Tripp — Fri, 30 Jul 2010 05:32:07 -0800

As discussed here, here and here, the issue of independent contractor classification under wage, unemployment, tax and other laws is omnipresent, continuing to arise in litigation and legislative reform. In a rare victory for employers in this regard, this week the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (encompassing Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi) affirmed a district court’s decision that an individual performing work as a “splicer” (one who installs, cuts, repairs, and tests various high voltage cables) was properly classified as an independent contractor under the FLSA. Thibault v. BellSouth Telcoms., Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15267 (5th Cir. 2010).

The Thibault case arose from BellSouth’s efforts to rebuild its telecommunications grid in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Unable to directly employ sufficient splicers to complete the huge volume of needed repairs, BellSouth contracted out some of the work. In fact, demand was so great that the contractor (Directional) subcontracted to a second entity (Parker), which in turn entered into a contractor agreement with Plaintiff Thibault. While Thibault was not an experienced splicer, he had extensive technical knowledge from a previous career, and operated his own business in his home state of Delaware.

The Court described Thiabult’s work on the BellSouth repairs as follows:

In October, Thibault filled his trailer home with water and food, and the two men drove to Louisiana. From October 4, 2005 to January 6, 2006, Thibault worked as a splicer. In that time, Thibault made $ 51,628. Everyday, Thibault was required to report to Kenner Yard, a property rented by BellSouth. At the first meeting, Thibault claims that a Parker supervisor informed them that they would be paid sixty-eight dollars an hour, would work at least eighty-four hours a week and would get a per diem and a place to park his motor home. Every day, Thibault showed up to Kenner Yard, and was assigned a specific splicing job in New Orleans. BellSouth engineers created the overall rewiring plan for New Orleans. BellSouth supervisors designated the specific jobs to be done daily, and assigned Directional supervisors to distribute the assignments. When Thibault received his assignment, he was then required to take his truck to the job and work on the problem he was assigned. When completed, Thibault would return to Kenner Yard and would be assigned another splicing job. He worked in thirteen-day intervals with a one-day break in between. While Parker paid Thibault, BellSouth had to approve all vacation and break time. On January 6, Parker laid off Thibault. Directional offered Thibault a job as a splicer, working directly for Directional, but Thibault declined. Instead, he returned to Delaware, and has not worked as a splicer since. Thibault brought this suit against Parker, Directional, and BellSouth for overtime pay under the FLSA, breach of contract, and Louisiana wage law statutes.

Id. at * 4-6.

In analyzing the “economic realities” of the arrangement between Thibault and the contracting entities, the Court noted that: 1) the relationship did not have a high degree of permanence as Thibault intended to return home to Delaware; 2) Thibault was subject only to limited supervision in his performance of the splicing work; 3) Thibault possessed a high degree of technical skill and initiative; and 4) Thibault had a high degree of investment in the tools necessary to be a splicer (bucket truck, cable splicer, pump, ventilator, ladder, climbing belt, harness, hard hat, safety vest and other miscellaneous tools), and controlled his profit or loss by managing his expenses while stationed in Louisiana. Furthermore, Thibault was a sophisticated business man with an independent business who was not economically dependent on splicing work.

While Thibault is a favorable decision and positive news for employers within the Circuit, it is important to note that the Plaintiff in the case possessed a high degree of skill, sophistication and autonomy: important components for creating a defensible independent contractor relationship.

New York State Appellate Court Reinforces Limitations on Exempt Employees' Ability to Assert New York State Labor Law Claims

Noel Tripp — Mon, 26 Jul 2010 13:13:23 -0800

Like many states with state wage and hour laws, the New York Labor Law contains certain unique provisions. One such provision is Section 198-c, which addresses an employee’s right to recover “wage supplements” such as reimbursement for expenses, health, welfare and retirement benefits and vacation, separation or holiday pay.. Section 198-c expressly provides that its provisions shall not apply to any person in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity whose earnings are in excess of nine hundred dollars a week. The New York State Appellate Division, Second Department, reiterated this exclusion this week. Section 198-c’s limitations are a valuable defense for New York employers when defending claims brought by excluded employees for such wage supplements because if such claims are excluded from Labor Law protection, there is no ability for the plaintiff’s counsel to recover attorney’s fees or statutory liquidated damages. See Fraiberg v 4Kids Entertainment, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 6158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't July 20, 2010).

The relevant facts in Fraiberg are simple. Fraiberg, the controller of a business that ceased operations, asserted both a contract claim and a Labor Law Claim under Section 198-c for, inter alia, alleged unpaid severance. Affirming the trial court, the appellate court agreed that Fraiberg demonstrated a contractual entitlement to severance. However, reversing the trial court, the Second Department granted summary judgment to the employer on Fraiberg’s claims under Section 198-c for severance, attorneys’ fees and liquidated damages. The court stated that since plaintiff acknowledged at her deposition that she worked in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity and earned in excess of $900 per week, the defendant “established that…she could not assert a claim [under 198-c] to compel the payment of the severance package.”

While not relevant to the court’s holding, in dicta, the court stated that the New York State Court of Appeals decision in Pachter v. Bernard Hodes Group, Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 609 (N.Y. 2008) stands for the proposition that executives may bring claims for unpaid wages under Article 6 of the New York Labor Law. Article 6, which includes Section 198-c, allows recovery for any unpaid wages not paid per the parties’ agreement as well an award of liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees. Many read Pachter as merely stating that the deduction from wages provision of Article 6, specifically section 193, applies to executives but that executives generally cannot assert claims for unpaid wages under Article 6.

Like many other states, New York has detailed state wage and hour laws with many nuances. All employers with New York State operations must ensure they recognize obligations and defenses not only under the FLSA but also applicable state laws.

California Appeals Court Issues Pro-Employer Ruling Regarding Wage Statement Compliance

Noel Tripp — Fri, 23 Jul 2010 06:02:20 -0800

The surge of state wage and hour claims continues in California. Among the numerous California Labor Code provisions which has been the subject of repeated litigation is California Labor Code § 226(a) (“226”), which creates specific requirements concerning the content of employee wage statements. Included among its provisions is a requirement that wage statements indicate the “total hours worked by the employee, except for any employee whose compensation is solely based on a salary and who is exempt from payment of overtime.” Last month, a California appeals court analyzed this statute in the context of a claim brought by a non-exempt co-manager, who claimed that her wage statements violated this 226 requirement. Morgan v. United Retail, 2010 Cal. App. LEXIS 1194 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. June 23, 2010).

As recited by the court, the alleged unlawful wage statement contained the following information:

For employees who did not work any overtime hours during the pay period, their wage statements listed the total regular hours worked by the employee, which equaled the total number of hours worked. For employees who worked overtime hours during the pay period, their wage statements separately listed the total regular hours worked and the total overtime hours worked by the employee. However, the statements did not add the regular and overtime hours together and list the sum of those hours in a separate line.

Plaintiff Morgan’s claim, which had been rejected by the trial court on summary adjudication, was that this failure to combine non-overtime and overtime hours and provide a “separate line” indicating total hours constituted a violation of 226.

The appeals court, after noting that no Court had previously analyzed a wage statement which “separately lists the total number of regular hours and the total number of overtime hours worked by the employee,” reviewed the existing decisions analyzing 226’s “total hours worked” requirement. Observing that the cases finding 226 violations focused on the inaccurate or misleading nature of the wage statements in question (such as wage statements providing an “average” number of hours worked, as opposed to actual hours worked), and citing a recent federal decision dismissing a 226 claim on a similar theory (Rubin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 599 F.Supp.2d 1176 (N.D.Cal. 2009)), the Court held that the failure to provide a separate line with the total hours did not constitute a violation. The Court rejected plaintiff’s contention that a violation occurred because the information provided was insufficient to calculate proper overtime, observing that the plaintiff and other putative class members were paid by the hour, and not on a “salary, commission, or piece-rate basis.”

Morgan provides some much-needed clarity regarding an employer’s obligations under 226. Inclusion of the “separate line” in wage statements (as Morgan indicates United Retail later did), reduces uncertainty and legal risk.

Wage and hour compliance is a constant struggle due to the need not only to comply with the FLSA but also with all applicable state laws.

Ninth Circuit Decision Highlights Concerns With Independent Contractor Classification

Noel Tripp — Thu, 22 Jul 2010 07:42:48 -0800

In a decision reiterating important independent contractor issues for employers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals last week reversed a lower court decision holding that certain delivery drivers were properly classified as independent contractors under various provisions of the California Labor Code. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14279 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010).

At the trial court level, Judge Ronald M. Whyte of the Northern District of California concluded that the drivers, although residents of California providing delivery services in California, were independent contractors under the laws of Texas, the governing law set forth in the drivers’ “Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services” agreement with EGL, a nationwide provider of logistics services. In a footnote, the court further held that “[t]he result would be no different if California law governed.”

Reversing the decision, the Ninth Circuit observed that ‘[w]hether the Drivers are entitled to those benefits [under the Cal. Lab. Code] depends on whether they are employees of EGL, which in turn depends on the definition that the otherwise governing law--not the parties--gives to the term ‘employee’” (emphasis added). The Circuit Court held that the parties’ selection of Texas law to “govern” the contract applied only to disputes about interpretation of the contract (i.e, Texas contract law), not the application of employment statutes like the California Labor Code. Simply put, the Circuit Court held that the drivers’ claims under the Cal. Labor Code did not “arise” from the contract (i.e., did not call primarily for interpretation of that contract) – the contract was simply relevant evidence relating to their claims of employee status. Finally, the Court reversed Judge Whyte’s ruling that the drivers were independent contractors (even under California law) because, in the Court’s view, he “did not apply the relevant factors [for IC status] identified by the Supreme Court of California to the facts in this case.”

While the Appellate Court’s failure to recognize the choice of law clause may not be relevant to most employers, the central holding and vital takeaway is very straightforward: independent contractor status is generally narrowly construed and currently under intense scrutiny. Further some aspects of the relevant analysis vary not only from state to state but from statute to statute. Additionally, and critically, the intent of the parties as reflected by the parties’ agreement is often of little importance to an administrative agency’s or court’s analysis, as Narayan clearly demonstrates.

All employers, and especially those with multi-state operations, must focus on the propriety of their organization’s use of contractors. A more detailed analysis of this issue can be found here.

USDOL Issues Guidance On Employers' Obligation to Provide Breaks to Nursing Mothers

Noel Tripp — Tue, 20 Jul 2010 13:26:54 -0800

As previously reported here, the recent Health Care Reform legislation includes a provision, which became effective immediately upon passage of the Act, requiring employers to provide breaks for employees to express milk for nursing children. The USDOL issued a fact sheet this week explaining its view of an employer’s obligations under this enactment. The highlights are below and the full government Fact Sheet can be viewed here.

· The requirement only applies to non-exempt employees however the DOL notes that state laws with similar requirements may cover all employees;

· The break time need not be paid as long as the individual is completely relieved of work duties and the activity does not occur during an otherwise paid break period;

· Reasonable break time must be provided for up to 1 year following birth. There are no set rules regarding frequency or length and each situation stands alone;

· An employer is required to provide a location shielded from view and a private bathroom will not suffice. The space need not be dedicated but must be made available immediately when needed; and

· Employers with under 50 employees can assert an undue hardship defense, however, there is no guidance as to whether this is determined on a location by location or employer-wide basis. Forthcoming regulations from the USDOL will hopefully clarify this issue.

All employers must ensure compliance with this new legal mandate.

Federal Court Upholds Collective Action Waiver in Arbitration Agreement

Noel Tripp — Mon, 19 Jul 2010 07:24:32 -0800

As the surge of wage and hour collective actions continues, one strategy utilized by employers to avoid such multi-plaintiff litigations is the use of arbitration agreements with class/collective action waivers. In essence, such provisions mandate that an employee arbitrate any wage and hour and other (subject to certain limitations) disputes on an individual basis. Arbitration agreements containing these provisions prohibit individual and collective court actions as well as class/collective arbitration proceedings. While there are potential hurdles to the enforceability of these agreements -- such as consideration, unconscionability and even (as discussed here) the National Labor Relations Act – in general an arbitration agreement with a well-drafted class/collective action waiver is enforceable as to wage and hour claims. A recent decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, upholding such a class/collective action waiver is instructive. See Johnson v. Carmax, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70700 (E.D. Va. July 14, 2010).

In Johnson, plaintiffs filed an FLSA collective action in federal court. The employer moved to dismiss, asserting that each plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement requiring resolution of all disputes on an individual basis through arbitration. In granting the employer's motion, the Court relied on the plain language of the relevant documents which "clearly prohibit Plaintiffs from bringing their claim in this Court and furthermore from pursuing this claim on a collective basis in any forum."

The Court rejected Plaintiffs' assertion that the failure of the relevant documents to mention "collective actions" mandated denial of the motion stating that the documents both specifically referred to FLSA claims being covered and mandated arbitration on an individual basis. Plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable also was not given credence by the court. Judge James R. Spencer stated that the presence of "alleged unequal bargaining" power based on the fact that the agreement was a condition of employment was insufficient to demonstrate unconscionability. Similarly, the court held that since all remedies available to each plaintiff through a collective action are available through an individual arbitration proceeding: "[r]equiring Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims individually does not diminish either the remedial or protective functions of the FLSA."

All employers must not only be vigilant in regard to wage and hour compliance but also constantly analyze potential strategies to limit the breadth of potential actions and properly implement such strategies. In fact, in another decision issued the same week in the very same federal district, an employer was unable to foreclose potential collective arbitration of wage claims. Davis v. Terminix International Co., 09-CV-00309 (E.D. Va. July 15, 2010). In Davis, the arbitration agreement did not expressly address collective action claims, and referred generally to the parties’ obligations being governed by North Carolina’s arbitration statute. The Court scheduled a hearing to determine whether the arbitration of the wage claims should proceed on a “consolidated” (i.e., collective action) basis with the approximately 30 opt-in Plaintiffs.

Of course, use of an arbitration agreement poses numerous other considerations for employers.

Federal Court Holds Federal Aviation Law Does Not Preempt Skycaps' Claims For Gratuities Under Pennsylvania Law

Noel Tripp — Fri, 16 Jul 2010 10:11:02 -0800

While a significant percentage of employees’ claims for gratuities emanates from the food service and hospitality industries, other industries, including Aviation, are not immune. Baggage handlers in Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania all have asserted claims challenging industry tip practices, alternatively alleging that the amounts paid by customers for curbside check-in are gratuities (which allegedly have been misappropriated by the employer) or that they are service charges which discourage the payment of additional gratuities (thereby decreasing their compensation below the minimum wage). In a recent decision, a federal court ruled that the Federal Airline Deregulation Act does not preempt the plaintiffs’ Pennsylvania state law claims for service charges allegedly misappropriated by their employer. Thompson v. US Airways, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59088 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 2010).

In Thompson, the plaintiff skycaps alleged that the airline’s 2005 imposition of a mandatory $2 fee per bag (paid to the airline) caused a sharp decrease in tip income, causing their income to dip below the minimum wage and serving as a functional misappropriation of tips. Id. at * 4. As a threshold legal matter, the airline argued that the plaintiffs’ claims for wages under state law would have a "forbidden significant effect" on airline prices, and thus were preempted by the federal law (which was designed to ensure that states did not undermine federal airline deregulation through state regulation). Analyzing three different decisions on the issue with different reasoning from federal courts in Massachusetts, Judge Gene Pratter denied the airline’s motion to dismiss and determined that a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs would simply result in a modification of baggage handling practices, and would have only a tangential, remote impact on price, if any.

While the court’s decision did not address the merits of the Thompson skycaps’ claims, the litigation reminds .all employers of tipped employees of the need to ensure legal compliance and transparency in regard to gratuity practices.

Will Supreme Court Elect to Resolve Scope of Outside Sales and Administrative Exemptions?

Noel Tripp — Fri, 09 Jul 2010 09:20:30 -0800

In a much-awaited decision, earlier this week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a New York District Court and held that pharmaceutical sales representatives are not exempt outside sales or administrative employees. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., No. 09-0437-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 13708 (2d Cir. July 6, 2010). The Court concurred with and deferred to the position of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, who appeared as amicus curiae or “friend of the court” at the appellate stage, and stated that “the Secretary of Labor’s interpretations of her regulations are entitled to “‘controlling’ deference unless those interpretations are ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” In essence, the Second Circuit held that the representatives do not meet the outside sales exemption because “where [an] employee promotes a pharmaceutical product to a physician but can transfer to the physician nothing more than free samples and cannot lawfully transfer ownership of any quantity of the drug in exchange for anything of value, cannot lawfully take an order for its purchase, and cannot lawfully even obtain from the physician a binding commitment to prescribe it[,] . . . it is not plainly erroneous to conclude that the employee has not in any sense, within the meaning of the statute or the regulations, made a sale.” In a similarly narrow interpretation of the FLSA, the Second Circuit, again deferring to the Secretary’s view, held that the representatives’ duties do not demonstrate the necessary exercise of independent discretion and judgment as to matters of significance for application of the administrative exemption, and performance of those duties required only skills gained through training

A petition for review likely will follow and the scope of the exemptions may need to be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, in light of conflicting authority including the Third Circuit’s contrary decision applying the administrative exemption to pharmaceutical sales representatives. See Smith v. Johnson & Johnson, 593 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2010)

For a more detailed analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision, click here.

[UPDATE]. On July 19, 2010, another district court within the Third Circuit relied on the Johnson & Johnson decision to hold that pharmaceutical sales representatives qualify for the administrative exemption. Jackson v. Alpharma, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72435 (D.N.J. July 19, 2010). The ever-growing and sharply divided body of authority regarding applicability of the administrative exemption in the pharmaceutical industry make In Re Novartis a candidate for Supreme Court review. We will continue to monitor developments in the case.

New York Federal Court Denies Early Summary Judgment Motion as to Exempt Status of Financial Analyst

Noel Tripp — Thu, 08 Jul 2010 14:35:29 -0800

One commonly held misconception in wage-and-hour law is that all investment professionals in the financial industry are categorically exempt from overtime pay. In a decision contrary to such assumption, Judge Denise Cote of the Southern District of New York recently denied summary judgment to a boutique investment bank as to the exempt status of a financial analyst, and conditionally certified a class of similarly situated financial analysts, permitting the Plaintiff to invite them to join the case. Henderson v. Transp. Group, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66109 (S.D.N.Y., Jul. 1, 2010).

As a financial analyst, Plaintiff Henderson worked as the junior member of an investment team consisting of financial analysts, associates and vice presidents. Financial analysts, although the junior members of the bank’s deal teams, participated in all major tasks, including “(1) making telephone calls and sending emails to prospective investors in order to market transactions, (2) assisting in the development of financial models using Microsoft Excel spreadsheets, and (3) developing term sheets to finalize a deal.” Henderson received a starting salary of $35,000 per year, sufficient to satisfy the “salary basis” prong of the exempt status test.

The Court acknowledged throughout the opinion that these tasks could give rise to the requisite discretion and independent judgment necessary to qualify for the administrative exemption, but denied the motion based on the bank’s failure to provide specific evidence of how financial analysts exercised discretion in carrying out these tasks. The Court wrote:

“The defendants have not, however, submitted evidence describing the specific tasks performed in providing that support and assistance and in creating term sheets. Similarly, with respect to financial modeling, the defendants' witness opines that ‘[p]utting together such a file is a sophisticated and dynamic process changing frequently in reaction to market and investor demand.’ But the witness does not describe, for example, what, if any, alternatives, variables, or considerations must be weighed to create or apply the model, how an analyst is expected to react to "market and investor demand," or what authority analysts possess to decide any matter of significance.”

Because this evidence of the nature and extent of the analysts’ discretion was lacking, the court denied summary judgment. This decision is consistent with other authority within the Circuit finding summary judgment inappropriate in applying the administrative exemption to analysts. See e.g. DiFilippo v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)(denying summary judgment as to applicability of administrative exemption to Government Clearance Analysts).

Henderson is the most recent in a series of decisions pointing out concerns with a uniform exempt classification of financial services employees. Industry employers should review their current classifications of financial professionals as exempt or non-exempt as litigation of classification issues in the industry is expected to continue.

District Court Finds Commercial Window Washing Company To Be a "Retail or Service Establishment", But Questions Whether Compensation Received Is a "Commission"

Noel Tripp — Tue, 06 Jul 2010 09:29:38 -0800

Litigation regarding what constitutes a “retail or service establishment,” under the “7(i)” or “retail sales” exemption continues. We recently reported a district court decision applying the exemption to employees selling precious metals. See La Parne v. Monex Deposit Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59768 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2010). Just a couple of months later, another district court analyzed the applicability of the exemption, this time to a company that provides window washing services primarily to commercial high rise buildings that are paid for by a management company, not the individual tenants. Alvarado v. Corporate Cleaning Service, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62378 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2010).

The Court explained that to fall within the definition of a retail or service establishment, two requirements must be met: (1) the establishment cannot earn more than 75% of its revenue from goods or services that are provided for resale; and (2) it must be recognized as retail in the particular industry. Plaintiffs argued the window washing services were resold (and not retail) because the defendant did not contract directly with the commercial or residential tenants to provide the service, but instead, with management companies, who then recovered the cost of such work either through rent, property management fees, or assessments. Therefore, the services were bought by the management company and then resold to the tenants. The Court rejected this assertion, and held the building management companies were “merely conduits,” or agents facilitating the purchase of window washing services, not middlemen reselling window washing services.

The Court also found the services were “recognized as retail in the industry” because they were sold to the general public (even though most of their customers were commercial clients, not residential clients, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that the exemption only applies to residential sales); the services met the “everyday needs of the community”; the services were provided at the end of the stream of distribution; and the defendant did not engage in manufacturing. The Court also held the mere fact the services were sold to corporate accounts with multiple buildings (as opposed to individual owners or those with a single building), did not transform the sale to a “wholesale” transaction. The Court also rejected plaintiffs’ argument that providing proposals to customers estimating the cost of the services were not “retail” transactions, finding such proposals are not akin to competitive bidding (which Department of Labor regulations state are not recognized as retail).

Nevertheless, despite holding plaintiffs were employed by a “retail or service establishment,” the Court denied summary judgment to the employer finding a question of fact existed whether plaintiffs satisfied another requirement necessary to establish the exemption—being paid more than 50% in commissions. Plaintiffs were paid using a point system, whereby they were compensated based on the number of jobs completed. Each job was assigned a number of points based on the number of windows washed. Thus, the quicker and more efficiently the plaintiffs worked, the more they earned per hour. The Court held a commission exists when there is some relationship or correlation between compensation paid to the employees and the amount charged to the customers. The court found questions of fact remained regarding whether a true nexus existed between pay received and the amount charged to the customer based on evidence produced by the plaintiffs that on occasion, the labor cost charged to a customer did not fluctuate based on the number of points.

Employers relying on the 7(i) exemption under federal law should review the relevant regulations and cases to ensure that the business qualifies as a “retail or service establishment” and that the compensation it provides is a “commission” as defined in the case law.

Store Managers Are Always Exempt - Aren't They?

Noel Tripp — Thu, 01 Jul 2010 07:23:17 -0800

In a case involving retailer Dollar General, another federal judge has refused to hold as a matter of law that a retail store manager is an overtime-exempt “executive” for purposes of the FLSA. Judge James Jones denied summary judgment to Dollar General in Hale v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62584 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2010) based upon his “fact-intensive inquiry as to each prong of the five-factor [exemption] test.” Id. at * 8.

Plaintiff Hale had served as a full-time clerk and then an assistant store manager before her promotion to store manager. Even though the parties agreed that as store manager Hale satisfied the salary basis test for exemption, and that “her work included the regular direction of two or more employees,” Plaintiff testified that she spent only ten percent of her time – six hours per week – on managerial tasks and the remainder of her time “performing menial labor: cleaning restrooms, scrubbing floors, checking out customers, and stocking shelves.” Id. at * 9. She further claimed that Dollar General’s policy of limiting her quota of labor hours for non-exempt employees forced her to run the store by herself or with a skeleton crew a large percentage of the time.

Consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s similar decision in Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2008), the Court determined that “[b]ased upon the applicable five-prong test, a reasonable juror could determine that Hale's primary duty was not management.” This test examines: (1) "the amount of time spent in performance of [*6] managerial duties"; (2) "the relative importance of the managerial duties as compared with other types of duties," (3) "the frequency with which the employee exercises discretionary powers"; (4) "his relative freedom from supervision"; and (5) the relationship between the employee's "salary and the wages paid other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the supervisor." Id at * 5-6 citing Morgan. On this last issue, the Court observed that based on Plaintiff’s testimony that she worked 60-70 hours per week, a factual question existed as to whether the “effective rate” at which she was paid was actually less than that paid to the non-exempt employees who reported to her.

This highly technical attack on the use of the executive exemption in retail stores has divided courts, but highlights both the technical nature of the exemption and the need to ensure that for purposes of the FLSA an exempt “executive’s” primary duty is management and that such primary duty is reflected by documents such as evaluations and disciplinary notices.

[UPDATE] On July 8, 2010 a second district judge echoed the reasoning in Hale, denying Dollar General’s motion for summary judgment in another misclassification case brought by a store manager in Missouri. Kanatzer v. Dolgencorp, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67798 (E.D. Mo. July 8, 2010). In Kanatzer, the judge found material issues of fact as to all four factors set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).

NYSDOL Update: New Hire Notification and Permissible Wage Deductions

Noel Tripp — Tue, 29 Jun 2010 10:59:57 -0800

Employers with New York State operations must ensure they understand the New York State Department of Labor's current position as to new hire notices and wage deductions.

New Hire Notices

As previously reported here, since October 26, 2009, New York state employers have been obligated to notify all new hires in writing of their hourly rate, overtime rate (if applicable) and payday, and receive a written acknowledgment of such notification. The Department has issued model forms for various types of pay structures, all of which can be found on the Department's website, but continues to advise employers that use of the model forms is not mandatory. One of the Department's model forms is directed to new hires the employer intends to treat as exempt employees, and both the form and its accompanying instructions require employers to list the exemption applicable to such employees. However, this form and its accompanying instructions were not fully consistent with the general guidelines for compliance, also posted by the Department on its website. Such guidelines simply stated that the exemption “should” be listed; it did not make doing so mandatory.

Recently, the Department modified its general guidelines and now consistently advises that the exemption must be listed for exempt employees on the new hire notice. In order to comply with the Department’s position, employers must ensure they carefully analyze the appropriate exemption(s) prior to listing them on any notice to ensure such statement is accurate. It is important to note however that this new directive goes beyond the statutory requirement contained in Section 195 of the Labor Law, although the statute does provide the Department with the right to issue "requirements as to content and form."

Wage Deductions

In addition to permitting deductions "in accordance with the provisions of any law or any rule or regulation issued by any governmental agency", Section 193 of the Labor Law permits deductions "for the benefit of employee" as long as such deductions are authorized in writing. Over the years, the Department, through opinion letters, has advised that this language permits deductions for various issues (such as wage overpayments and repayment of loans) as long as the employer obtained written consent and limited such deduction to 10% of gross wages for the payroll period.

However, since 2006, based on New York State Court of Appeals’ decision in Angello v. Labor Ready, the Department has consistently narrowed its interpretation of the phrase “for the benefit of the employee.” For example, in a 2007 opinion letter, the Department stated that in order for a deduction “for the benefit of the employee” to be permissible it must be a deduction which benefits the employee which is also similar to those enumerated in the statute (i.e., insurance premiums, pension or health and welfare benefits, contributions to charitable organizations, payments for United States bonds, payments for dues or assessments to a labor organization). Thereafter, through opinion letters, the Department modified its prior position as to the legality of certain wage deductions, such as a deduction from a final paycheck to cover used but unaccrued paid time off, and deductions for loan repayments and wage overpayments. The Department now states that such deductions are impermissible regardless of the employee's written consent. Based on the Department's consistently evolving, highly-protectionist pro-employee position, employers should carefully review their wage deduction practices in New York State.

Every business with New York operations should review these wage and hour compliance issues with counsel to ensure compliance.

Account Executives Responsible For Selling Precious Metals Exempt Under 7(i)

Noel Tripp — Fri, 25 Jun 2010 10:59:39 -0800

The Fair Labor Standards Act contains an exemption from overtime for employees of a “retail or service establishment” who earn at least 1.5 the minimum wage for all hours worked and more than 50% of their compensation from commissions. This exemption is often referred to as the “retail sales exemption” or “7(i) exemption,” referencing the section in which it is codified. Often the difficulty in applying the exemption lies with determining which establishments fall within the definition of a “retail or service establishment” and which do not. Department of Labor regulations provide a long list of retail non-retail establishments, but several courts have noted the list does not provide any rationale for distinguishing retail and non-retail and is of limited assistance. See e.g., Martin v. The Refrigeration School, Inc., 968 F.2d 3, 7 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992).

Recently, a California District Court was faced with the question of whether account executives responsible for selling precious metals (e.g., gold and platinum) to customers via phone were employed by a “retail or service establishment,” and thus exempt from overtime under the 7(i) exemption. Parne v. Monex Deposit Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 59768. Relying on the definition of a “retail or service establishment” contained in the 13(a)(2) retail and service exemption [now repealed], the Court explained a retail or service establishment is one that (1) does not earn more than 75% of its revenue from goods or services that are provided for resale; and (2) is recognized as retail in the particular industry.

In applying this definition, the Court first held that even though customers typically bought metals for investment purposes with the ultimate goal of reselling them for a profit (some customers did not even take possession of the metal), the precious metals were not goods provided for “resale,” as contemplated by the statute, because the metals were not sold with the understanding the metals would be immediately resold. Second, despite competing evidence regarding whether the industry viewed the Defendant as a retail seller (plaintiffs argued the Defendant was similar to a brokerage house), the Court held that summary judgment was still proper because the Defendant satisfied the standard courts have used in determining whether a particular establishment is “recognized as retail”—it sold goods to the general public; it did not take part in the manufacturing process; it provided a product that served the everyday needs of the community; and, it sold goods at the end of the stream of distribution. The factor that presented a “close[] question,” according to the Court, was whether selling precious metals served the “everyday needs of the community”. After noting that cases lack a unified approach in answering this question, the Court held “everyday needs” means “basic” or “integral” needs of members in the community, and collecting and investing metals fell within this standard.

As wage and hour cases continue to be an active area of litigation, the different prerequisites for application of the 7(i) exemption, including which services and goods also meet the “basic” or “integral” needs of the community, will likely continue to be litigated. Before utilizing the exemptions, employers relying on the 7(i) exemption, should review the relevant regulations and case law to ensure that their business qualifies as a “retail or service establishment”.