Toxic Tort Litigation Blog

California's Take On Mold Claims, Expert Testimony, And The Two-Part General And Specific Causation Test

William A. Ruskin — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 17:17:27 -0500

Guest Blogger M.C. Sungaila is a partner in the appellate law firm of Horvitz & Levy in Los Angeles. Her appellate work has helped shape toxic tort law in California, including the scope of the duty to warn sophisticated users of product hazards and the guidelines for admitting expert testimony at trial.

Toxic Tort Litigation Blog’s post earlier this year about a Michigan appellate court’s affirmance of an award to residents of a home overrun with mold – without any expert testimony to prove causation – raises the question: what would happen to such a claim in a more famously liberal state like California? In this instance at least, California seems more likely to come to a more ‘conservative’ conclusion than Michigan.

Expert Testimony

California not only requires expert testimony for complex causation questions; it tests the foundation for that testimony and requires trial courts to exclude expert opinions that are unsupported. See an early article describing the development of these standards by M.C. Sungaila and David M. Axelrad published in California Lawyer. The California courts of appeal have specifically considered the admissibility of expert testimony in mold cases and ruled in favor of the defendants. Most recently, in Dee v. PCS Property Management, one of the appellate divisions in Los Angeles confirmed the trial court’s ability to exclude unfounded expert testimony in a residential mold case. Darcee Dee lived in an apartment for slightly over four months. She sued her landlord and property management company for alleged physical injuries, as well as fear of cancer, from living in an apartment that purportedly had toxic mold in it. After hearing the plaintiff’s experts testify over several days concerning their opinions and the foundation for them, the trial court granted the defendants’ motions in limine to exclude most of the experts’ testimony based on a lack of foundation. The remaining portions of Dee’s claims were tried to a jury, and the jury rejected her claims. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in Dee, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding plaintiff’s experts for lack of an adequate foundation. Each of Dee’s experts sought to testify that her exposure to mold mycotoxins caused her symptoms and her susceptibility to cancer, without any evidence that she was exposed to potentially harmful mycotoxins at her residence. The court relied on the decision in another mold case, Geffcken v. D’Andrea, and distinguished its own prior decision in Roberti v. Andy’s Termite, the only published opinion to have rejected the trial court’s authority under the California Evidence Code to thoroughly analyze the foundation for expert testimony in order to determine its admissibility. For another take on the Geffcken and Dee mold decisions, see an article on the Kring & Chung LLP website.

Toxic Tort Causation Standards

While California appellate courts would be certain to require expert testimony on causation, it is not as clear how they would analyze causation in a toxic tort case. In toxic tort cases, a plaintiff must generally prove not only that a chemical or substance can cause a particular adverse health effect but also that it did cause the harm to the plaintiff. Proof of causation therefore necessarily includes a threshold determination whether, as a matter of reasonable medical probability, a particular chemical is capable of causing in humans the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff (i.e., “general causation”). If the answer is that the chemical does not possess that capacity, then the chemical cannot have been a cause of plaintiff’s harm. But if the chemical does have that capacity, then the causation inquiry (in jurisdictions like California which apply a substantial factor causation standard) becomes whether the plaintiff’s exposure to the chemical in question was as a matter of reasonable medical probability a substantial factor in causing the particular plaintiff’s harm (i.e., “specific causation”). For a helpful analysis of causation in toxic tort cases, see the excellent discussion by David E. Bernstein, a Professor at the George Mason University School of Law, in an article titled "Getting to Causation in Toxic Tort Cases". This two-step general and specific causation framework is almost universally accepted by federal courts analyzing toxic tort causation (including the Ninth Circuit, see, e.g., Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc. (9th Cir. 2008) 528 F.3d 681, 683). Trial courts in California have analyzed proof of causation in toxic tort cases along general and specific causation lines as well. California appellate courts have not, however, expressly adopted the general and specific causation distinction in a published decision. This has led to some confusion, as plaintiffs have attempted to convince courts that such a “two-part”causation test is incompatible with California’s prevailing causation standards. In Dee v. PCS Property Management, the plaintiff raised this argument on appeal, but the Court of Appeal declined to reach it because the jury had found no negligence, which made an argument about causation standards “irrelevant.” An opportunity to address the general and specific causation distinctions head-on may come later this year, however, when the Court of Appeal in Los Angeles is likely to hear argument in and decide the plaintiffs’ appeal of summary judgment in a high-profile benzene exposure case brought by former students at Beverly Hills High. The appellate docket for the case, Lee v. Venoco, is attached here. The original summary judgment decision ruled on the admissibility of expert opinion on both general causation and specific causation.

Is There A Duty To Have A Green Workplace?

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 10 Mar 2010 12:50:12 -0500

Guest Blogger Brian Molinari is the author of the Prima Facie Law Blog, and a Labor and Employment Associate at Epstein Becker & Green. Brian asks in this post whether an employer has a duty to provde a green workplace for her employees.

With the global spotlight on reducing greenhouse gases and carbon footprints, including the Obama Administration’s unprecedented attention on encouraging environmental conservation and development of renewable energy sources, it’s clear that we’re in a “go green” era.

To cut to the question posed in this blogposts’s title, the answer is “no”. There is no legal duty, at the moment, for a private employer to “go green”. Perhaps at some point in the future, statutory authority such as the federal Occupational Safety & Health Act and state and local counterparts will include “green workplace standards”. For example, with respect to the investment in “green jobs” the Department of Labor and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health are already focusing on ensuring that OSHA standards are appropriately designed and enforced to protect workers performing that type of work. At present, however, there are no mandates and instead only various governmental and non-governmental incentives for a workplace to go green.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Pew Center on Global Climate Change estimate that commercial buildings account for nearly half of all energy consumption in the U.S., and contribute to nearly half of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. The Energy Star Program, administered by the EPA and U.S. Department of Energy, attempts to encourage energy efficiency in buildings to meet strict energy performance standards set by EPA and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Federal buildings are eligible to receive a High Performance Building designation.

In addition, commercial real estate and private companies are leading the green charge through voluntary compliance with standards set by a private, nonprofit membership organization, the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC). The USGBC’s LEED® (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) Green Building Rating System™ awards points for satisfying specified green building criteria. The six major environmental categories of review include:

Sustainable Sites
Water Efficiency
Energy and Atmosphere
Materials and Resources
Indoor Environmental Quality and
Innovation and Design

A building, or unit therein, can be certified as LEED Silver, Gold, or Platinum based on the total number of points earned within each LEED category. For example, our firm’s Miami and Los Angeles offices are in buildings with LEED Gold certification. It was reported two days ago that a high profile commercial property investment company will spend up to $10 million retrofitting its properties for environmental sustainability. LEED can be applied to all building types including new construction, individual unit commercial interiors, core & shell developments, existing buildings, homes, neighborhood developments, schools and retail facilities. In addition, LEED for Healthcare was released in early 2008.

In sum, the green movement has not yet resulted in mandated private employer obligations. Notwithstanding the lack of affirmative duty to do so, however, based on information provided by the USGBC and EPA there are many pragmatic benefits that employers should consider for greening their workplaces:

Monetary: Funding and tax incentives
Energy Efficiency: Using energy more efficiently may save operating costs on utility bills over the life of the building; reduce the cost per unit on manufactured goods and services; and enhance resale and lease value of real estate
Environmental Efficiency: Reducing environmental impact may reduce waste materials and disposal costs, water usage, chemical use and disposal costs; encourage recycling and reuse of materials; develops local markets for locally produced materials, saving on transportation costs and develops economy-of-scale price reductions
Human Efficiency: Improving indoor environment, producing healthier places to work leading to increases productivity; reduction in absenteeism; boosting morale and corporate loyalty (also through creation of corporate “green teams”), and reduction in employee turnover
Goodwill: Green Buildings often receive high profile notoriety and increased public perception of goodwill toward employees and the community.

Louisiana Appeals Court Rejects NORM Class Action

William A. Ruskin — Tue, 09 Mar 2010 12:23:42 -0500

On January 28, 2010, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the New Orleans trial court’s denial of class certification in a series of putative class actions involving alleged exposure to Normally Occurring Radioactive Material (“NORM”) on industrial property located in , Louisiana, which had been used for oilfield pipe and equipment cleaning operations for over forty years. Although class certification was rejected on multiple grounds, the decision relied in large part upon the Louisiana Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Ford v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 703 S.2d 542, which involved alleged exposures from hazardous materials from several distinct sources. As in Ford, the class action failed because the Harvey plaintiffs alleged toxic exposures as a result of pipe cleaning activity on the non-contiguous property of three separate and distinct landowners – Rathborne, Grefer and ITCO – over a forty-six year period, with varying amounts of pipe cleaning taking place at different times in different locations (in almost checkerboard pattern) by different companies. Ford stands for the proposition that only mass torts arising from a single common cause or disaster are appropriate for class certification.

How did pipe cleaning cause the alleged NORM exposure? Pipe cleaning involves the mechanical reaming of the inside of oilfield pipe to remove scale or crust that builds up on the interior of the tubing to the point where the scale impedes the flow of oil up the pipe. The scale, formed from natural elements, gradually clogs the pipes that are inserted deep into the ground during the course of petroleum production. At some point, it was determined that the scale inside the pipe contained material determined to be radioactive, with varying half-lives (time for half of the atoms of a radioactive substance to decay), which is called “NORM” or “TERM,” an acronym referring to Technologically Enhanced Radioactive Material. When precisely the oil industry knew or should have known that pipe cleaning could result in occupational exposure to NORM is hotly disputed. The plaintiffs allege that over the decades this pipe cleaning occurred in Harvey, “toxic dust” (NORM/TERM) was deposited in their neighborhoods and was the source of various diseases and illnesses.

What I find interesting about the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is its rejection of the trial court’s determination that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement of the Louisiana Class Action Statute, which was a primary basis for the trial court’s denial of class certification. The trial court found that there was not sufficient numerosity because so many potential class members had already opted out, citing other lawsuits in which 3,748 individuals, a large percentage of the putative class, were involved. These so-called opt-outs were represented by several outspoken plaintiff lawyers, who did not want to see a class certified. The Fourth Circuit ruled that it was premature to opt out of a class before it was certified. A plaintiff could not opt out of a class that did not yet exist. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the numerosity requirement had been met. However, the Fourth Circuit held that sufficient commonality for class certification was not present. In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that the broad diversity of the diseases and ailments of the plaintiffs underscored the inadequacy of the class representatives representation, leading the court to conclude that there was no typicality. The Harvey TERM plaintiffs complained of diseases ranging from common cold symptoms to reproductive problems and many different forms of cancer. The plaintiffs' strategy at both the trial court and appellate level was to argue that the court should not be required to conduct a rigorous analysis of whether the facts satisfied the class action requirements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court confused a motion to certify a class with a trial on the merits, essentially asserting that it had made too many "factual findings". However, the Fourth Circuit soundly rejected this argument, citing the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision inBrooks v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 2008-2035, *6, 2009 WL 1425972 (La. 05/22/09), which recognized the "essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the district court's inherent power to manage and control pending litigation." Brooks, 08-2035 at p. 11, 13 So 3d at 554

Does Niagara Mohawk Lower The Bar For CERCLA Plaintiffs?

William A. Ruskin — Mon, 08 Mar 2010 16:48:05 -0500

On February 24, 2010, the Second Circuit issued an important CERCLA contribution decision in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2010 WL 626064. Over the last 100 years, the site at the heart of the decision, the Water Street Site in Troy, New York has, according to the Court, “played host to various industrial activities including a coke plant, a steel manufacturing facility, a manufactured gas plant and a petroleum distribution facility,” all of which uses “led to the release or disposal of toxic substances, many subject to liability under CERCLA.” In its holding, the Second Circuit ruled that a contribution plaintiff need not establish the precise amount of hazardous material discharged or prove with certainty that a PRP defendant discharged the hazardous material to get their CERCLA claims past the summary judgment stage. Has the Second Circuit significantly raised the bar for defendants seeking summary judgment in private cost recovery cases? That is the thesis of Steven G. Jones in an article titled, “Second Circuit Makes Summary Judgment More Difficult to Obtain for Defendants in CERCLA Contribution Actions,” dated March 5, 2010. Jones contends that some CERCLA defendants, faced with a long and complex trial, may be more inclined to resolve their cases in mediation if it is less likely that a CERCLA defendant will be able to obtain dismissal through summary judgment prior to trial. In reversing the federal district court in the North District of New York, the Second Circuit relied on its prior precedent in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d. Cir. 1993), which decision represented what the court described as a purposeful lowering of the liability to be a PRP and a relaxed CERCLA liability standard. It also cited the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Tosco Corp. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 216 F.3d 886, 892 for the proposition that “CERCLA liability may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances as opposed to direct evidence.” Thus, in my view, Niagara Mohawk is less an expansion of existing CERCLA case law in the Second Circuit as much as it is a rebuke to the trial judge, who arguably did not apply the correct standard in the first instance.

Cas Holloway Brings Energy And Vision To NYC's DEP

William A. Ruskin — Tue, 02 Mar 2010 18:38:01 -0500

On February 26, 2010, the New York League of Conservation Voters (“NYLCV”) hosted an Eco-Partners Breakfast with New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) Commissioner Cas Holloway, DEP's energetic new commissioner. Mayor Bloomberg appointed Mr. Holloway to head DEP in November 2009 after a year long nation-wide search. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Holloway served as a Senior Advisor and Chief of Staff to Ed Skyler, New York's Deputy Mayor for Operations. Mr. Holloway, a former Cravath associate who earned an undergraduate degree at Harvard and a law degree from the University of Chicago, brings to the position a rare combination of political savvy and operational know how that should serve DEP well. Although DEP has a $1,000,000 budget and a staff of over six thousand, it often flies below the radar screen. DEP performs four basic functions. (1) First and foremost, it is a water utility. It is responsible for the supply, distribution and treatment of New York City’s drinking water. Unlike California, which delegates the supply and treatment functions to different agencies, both functions fall within DEP's aegis in New York; (2) DEP is a customer service agency. It more or less determines the price of water; (3) DEP is a capital projects agency. For example, it is building at a cost of $6,000,000,000 the third underground tunnel that will carry drinking water from upstate to millions of New Yorkers; and (4) DEP is an environmental regulator on, among other things, air and water issues. Based upon his first few months on the job, Cas Holloway appreciates the importance of working with various stakeholders and interest groups. On February 25, 2010, Mayor Bloomberg, Mr. Holloway's agency, NYS Department of Environmental Conservation and several environmental groups announced an agreement-in-principle to significantly improve the health of Jamaica Bay through sewage treatment plant upgrades and investments in marsh restoration. As a result of the agreement-in-principle, DEP headed off a potentially costly Clean Water Act litigation arising from the alleged failure of its four sewage treatment plants to prevent nitrogen discharges to the bay. Mr. Holloway described the resolution of the Jamaica Bay dispute as a "paradigm shift" and a case study for how he hopes DEP will resolve future disputes. Up next for Mr. Holloway is the threat to water quality in the New York City Watershed posed by natural gas companies seeking permits to exploit valuable natural gas deposits in the Marcellus Shale through the extensive use horizontal drilling and hydrofracking. All New Yorkers should wish Mr. Holloway well in addressing this new Watershed concern.

Health Problems Due to Long Term EMF Exposure Doubtful

William A. Ruskin — Tue, 23 Feb 2010 14:40:44 -0500

According to recent reports in the Greenwich Time, Greenwich, CT state legislators are proposing a bill that would prohibit building cell towers within 750 feet of a school or day care because of a perceived health risk from electromagnetic radiation. However, some Cos Cob, CT residents believe that the cell towers should not be permitted within 5,000 feet of any schools, day cares and elderly homes due to health concerns. Reportedly, the cell tower bill has been proposed by Rep. Fred Camillo, R-151st District, and supported by fellow Reps. Livvy Floren, R-149th District, Lile Gibbons, R-250th District, and Sen. L. Scott Frantz, R-136th District. There is no good evidence that attending school near a cell tower, such as the one proposed, creates a health risk. During the 1980’s, some plaintiff lawyers ballyhooed electromagnetic field (“EMF”) litigation as the “new asbestos.” A series of well-funded EMF trials were litigated against various electric utility companies around the United States in the 1990’s. After the presentation of the scientific evidence, judges and juries uniformly rejected plaintiff health claims. The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) website contains a great deal of reliable scientific information concerning health effects from radiation exposure from cell towers, cell phones, microwave ovens and hair dryers. According to the CDC, the risk is extremely low. The low frequency radiation that those fields emit may have a biological effect, but do not cause adverse health effects, according to the website of the World Health Organization (“WHO”), which has devoted years of study on EMFs. So what is a biological effect? WHO’s literature explains that “biological effects” may include “listening to music, reading a book, eating an apple or playing tennis,” none of which cause health effects. WHO's conclusion is that there is no health risk to the EMF radiation to which the public is exposed. Thus, contrary to popular hysteria, there is no evidence that proximity to EMFs can “fry” a person’s brain or cause cancer. If our legislators are going to propose EMF safety precautions, they should base their proposals on strong science rather than fear. The "dose" or exposure from cell tower EMFs can be measured and quantified. Once that “exposure” is known, it is then necessary to look to the scientific literature to evaluate the likelihood of a health risk from that exposure. If EMF radiation posed a health risk to everyone living near a cell tower, it is a no-brainer that all cell towers should be dismantled--not just those near schools and day cares and homes for the elderly. The cell tower issue has always been about diminution of property value and aesthetics; it is not about our health!

Why Discuss E-Discovery In A Toxic Tort Blog?

William A. Ruskin — Mon, 25 Jan 2010 15:06:24 -0500

In In toxic tort cases where plaintiffs have questionable liability claims, serving burdensome e-discovery demands on defendants often threatens to change the focus of the case from the merits of the claim to a spoliation of evidence sideshow that focuses on the efforts of the defendant to preserve and produce electronically stored information ("ESI"). To avoid traps for the unwary (potentially both corporate defendants and the law firms that represent them), this blog will occasionally provide e-discovery guidance and reference information. The Electronic Discovery Reference Model or ERDM is one such authoritative reference. The ERDM is an industry group that establishes practical standards and guidelines for ESI, including its identification, collection, processing, review, analysis, storage and production. The ERDM also provides helpful information on the triggering events, which may give rise to a duty to preserve or disclose email, documents or other data in conjunction with a pending or future legal proceeding. (According to ERDM, It is the point at which the party or the law firm may become liable to meet certain standards, the violation of which can result in any number of unfavorable outcomes depending upon the forum). Ensuring that both you, as counsel, and your client, have a firm understanding of how these triggering events work is an important first step in approaching ESI issues in litigation. EDRM's trigger discussion expands upon some of the following concepts: (1) The duty to preserve and disclose data may be triggered by a judicial order, a discovery request, or mere knowledge of a pending or future proceeding likely to require data; (2) The scope of data to be preserved or disclosed is determined by the subject matter of the dispute and the law and procedural rules that a court or other authority will ultimately apply to resolve it. In general, data is potentially discoverable if it is relevant to the disputed transaction or may lead to relevant data; and (3) Failure to preserve or disclose discoverable data may result in serious penalties. To minimize this risk, diligent steps must be taken to identify all potentially discoverable data in the client's possession or control.

ESI In New York State Court Practice

William A. Ruskin — Tue, 19 Jan 2010 17:11:14 -0500

Are defendants in New York product liability and toxic tort litigation better off in federal court than in state court? Federal court discovery rules certainly are more liberal than state court discovery rules. There, plaintiff’s experts are subject to deposition and, if appropriate, Daubert challenges. In contrast, state court provides only minimal expert disclosure. However, state court rules concerning the production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) may be more favorable to corporate defendants litigating in state court. In state court, the general rule is that the requesting party pays for the defendant’s ESI retrieval. In federal court, the court will apply “proportionality” concepts, and balance the importance of the discovery with the burden on the producing party. Thus, the result of the burden shifting analysis is somewhat more complex and subject to more variables. As reported in this space on November 4, 2009, (“Cost Allocation of E-Discovery in NY Trial Courts”), the Joint Committee on Electronic Discovery, convened by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, has recommended that the legislature amend the CPLR to address time-consuming ESI disclosure disputes. The new proposed CPLR rule is expected to address a litigant’s duty to preserve ESI in anticipation of litigation; the scope of that duty; and the scope of ESI production.

An article in Kramer Levin’s Electronic Discovery Update (January 2010), “Cost Shifting in New York: Forum Makes All the Difference,” discusses the background of the general presumption in state court that the requesting party pays for the cost of discovery. Although the CPLR does not explicitly apply this presumption to ESI costs, New York state courts have followed this presumption when deciding how to allocate e-discovery costs. In Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consult. Corp., for example, the court found that “… cost shifting of electronic discovery is not an issue in New York, since the courts have held that, under the CPLR, the party seeking discovery should incur the costs.” Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consult. Corp., 4 Misc.3d 1019(A), 2004 WL 1949062 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. Aug 18, 2004). In contrast to state court practice, the standard under federal jurisprudence is less clear cut. The Hon. Shira Scheindlin (SDNY) has articulated a multi-factored balancing test, which has been influential in guiding determinations of when the cost of producing “inaccessible” data should be shifted to the requesting party. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Kramer Levin Update observes that a recent New York trial court opinion declined to apply this federal approach, stating that it was “not empowered – by statute or case law – to overturn the well settled rule in New York state that the party seeking discovery bear the cost incurred in its production.” T.A. Ahern Contractors Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of the State of N.Y., 2009 WL 806779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. Mar. 19, 2009). Citing the policy behind the rule, the court observed that the requester-pays standard gives a party “a strong incentive to formulate its discovery requests in a manner as minimally burdensome as possible.” I predict that the differences between state and federal ESI practice will narrow in the near term, possibly with the promulgation of a CPLR rule, and that New York will ultimately adopt a more federal approach modeled on the influential Sedona Conference Working Group template. However, for the present, a New York state court plaintiff runs the risk of incurring substantial costs in demanding burdensome ESI from a corporate defendant. Be careful what you wish for!

Is DEC Ill-Equipped to Oversee Marcellus Shale Natural Gas Drilling?

William A. Ruskin — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 16:08:30 -0500

According to a report issued by Cornell Law School, the State of New York’s blueprint for Marcellus Shale development proposes 187 new regulatory activities necessary for the oversight of natural gas drilling, but the blueprint does not explain how DEC will carry out these activities. Cornell’s report concludes that DEC does not have the manpower to appropriately regulate economic development in the Marcellus Shale Formation. According to Adjunct Professor Keith Porter at Cornell Law School, “There is no way they [DEC’s Division of Mineral Resources] have enough people to visit the sites to make sure conditions are met.” The Cornell study notes that DEC’s proposals require firsthand inspections and the development of detailed spill prevention plans on a site-by-site basis. The proposals also involve assessing and monitoring water resources to ensure they are not damaged by the gas industry’s need for huge volumes of fresh water to stimulate gas production in the fracking process. This process involves shooting millions of gallons of chemical solutions into each well, which then regurgitate brine and wastewater with chemicals, heavy metals and naturally occurring radioactivity. For their part, industry proponents point to New York’s strict regulations and a strong track record by industry. Environmental advocates challenge industry claims, pointing to hundreds of incidents and complaints involving natural gas and oil drilling buried in the DEC’s hazardous spills database. However, it was reported on January 11, 1010 that DEC Commissioner Pete Grannis had asserted in a letter to Assemblyman William Parment, a member of the legislature's Environmental Conservation Committee, that reports of accidents relating to natural gas drilling in New York have been overblown and taken out of context. Without additional DEC inspectors, says Professor Porter, Marcellus Development “will rely on self-compliance.” Environmental advocates point to the water contamination and regulatory violations that plagued the operations of Cabot Oil & Gas in Dimock, Pennsylvania as an object lesson. The Cornell study summarizes the proposed regulatory obligations DEC sets forth in the draft Supplemental Generic which include, among other things, protecting water resources such as New York’s portion of the Great Lakes Basin; reviewing permits for equipment and structures that might disturb surface water bodies such as rivers and streams or potentially impact aquatic wetland and terrestrial habitats and water quality; impacts to wetlands; aquifer depletion arising from proposed groundwater withdrawals for high-volume hydraulic fracturing; reviewing major water withdrawals and approved diversions in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin under the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Water Resources Compact; comprehensive storm water pollution prevention plans and review of permits to address storm water runoff and storm water discharges; industrial activities, including addressing potential sources of pollution and determining when drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations are completed; surface spills and releases at the Well Pad; drilling rig, fuel and tank refueling activities; groundwater impacts associated with well drilling and construction; private water well testing; infrastructure control from waste transport to road spreading; and, not least, protecting New York City’s subsurface water supply infrastructure. The import of the Cornell Law School study is that New York can build an elaborate regulatory scheme designed to protect the environment, but unless there are enough of the right people to enforce the regulations and ensure that they are being rigorously adhered to, the regulations do not amount to much.

Environmental & Economic Interests Clash Over Marcellus Shale

William A. Ruskin — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 13:54:31 -0500

Environmental groups and proponents of economic development and natural gas exploration are on a collision course of competing economic and environmental interests involving an enormous untapped reservoir of natural gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation. That the Marcellus Shale Formation lies in part across economically depressed regions in upstate New York and Pennsylvania, in urgent need of an economic boost, only adds fuel to the dispute. At the heart of the controversy lies the New York City watershed, pristine waters in upstate New York counties that provide the drinking water for millions of people in New York City. The Marcellus Shale Formation sits underground and stretches southwest from New York through Pennsylvania, and into West Virginia and Ohio. According to experts at Penn State University, the Marcellus Shale Formation is the largest known shale deposit in the world. Recently developed extraction techniques in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are expected to provide an additional boost to the productivity of Marcellus gas wells. Terry Englander, a geoscience professor at Penn State University, estimates that recoverable reserves in Marcellus Shale could be as high as 489 trillion cubic feet! The Draft 2009 New York State Energy Plan recognizes the great potential benefit to New York from development of the Marcellus Shale natural gas resource. But what environmental safeguards should accompany this monumental enterprise?

On December 23, 2009, the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) (not to be confused with theNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation or "DEC"), called for a prohibition on natural gas drilling in the New York City watershed, urging that, “[N]natural gas drilling and exploration are incompatible with the operation of New York State’s unfiltered water supply system and pose unacceptable risks for more than nine million New Yorkers in this City and State.” According to DEP’s Final Impact Assessment Report, drilling in the watershed requires invasive industrialization and would create a substantial risk of chemical contamination and infrastructure damage. In particular, the DEP’s report singled out the high-volume hydrofracking and horizontal drilling as posing significant environmental risks. Clearly, measures will be taken to protect the watershed, but the devil will be in the details. A Congressional Research Service report, released on September 9, 2009, examines gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale region. The report acknowledges that groundwater contamination from improper drilling and casing is a risk. Water sources in New York listed as "primary" or "principal" aquifers may be at risk, according to the report, due to the permeable "unconsolidated sand and gravel deposits" in northern Pennsylvania and southern New York because of short distances from the land surface to the water table.

A Primer On New York Product Liability Law

William A. Ruskin — Thu, 14 Jan 2010 14:26:29 -0500

Michael Hoenig’s Product Liability column in The New York Law Journal, “Complexities Abound In Product Design Claims” (January 11, 2010), provides an excellent primer on the law of product liability in New York state and a good discussion of the leading cases. (NYLJ.com requires a subscription to access. If you cannot download the article, Mr. Hoenig will post the article within a couple of weeks on his law firm's web site). Mr. Hoenig devotes the body of his article to a recent Appellate Division, First Department decision, Chow v. Reckitt & Colman Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 00013 (App. Div., 1st Dept., Jan. 5, 2010). There, a split First Department upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant manufacturer of of a drain cleaner called "Lewis Red Devil Lye", which blinded the plaintiff during an attempt to unclog a floor drain in the kitchen of the restaurant where he worked. Applying the Court of Appeals standard in Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co, the court examined the 'risk-utility balancing' calculus, which often lies at the heart of a defective design product liability inquiry. In addition to Mr. Hoenig’s “refresher” survey of the law of product design liability, he directs his readers to the commentary issued by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Association of Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, particularly PJI 2:120. For further reading, a thoughtful discussion of PJI 2:120 appears in a 2008 article "New Design-Defect Jury Instructions: Catching 'Denny' " by Stephen R. Blacklocks, a partner in Hunton & Wiliams' New York office. As Mr. Hoenig states in the conclusion of NYLJ article, “Mastery of the legal principles – our survey merely scratches the surface – is indispensable in perfecting one’s advocacy.” When your client next assigns you a new case for you to defend, take a few minutes to review Mr. Hoenig's primer to remind yourself just how many hurdles plaintiff's counsel needs to overcome to make out a prima facie case of design defect.

No General Causation? No Specific Causation? No Problem!

William A. Ruskin — Fri, 08 Jan 2010 17:14:23 -0500

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reported on December 31, 2009, that a Michigan Appeals Court affirmed a mold exposure verdict for $303,260, finding that expert testimony was not necessary under Michigan State law to prove either general causation or specific causation. In Genna v. Jackson, Mich. Ct. App., No. 285746, the Michigan Court Of Appeals (Oakland Circuit Court) affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's post-judgment motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a new trial. Based upon a review of the decision, it is not disputed ( at least by this writer) that defendant's negligent conduct resulted in substantial flooding in the plaintiffs' home and the gross mold contamination that resulted. Plaintiff's microbial expert identified two molds in the home--penicillum and aspergillus--which he testified at trial could affect human health and pose safety issues. Plaintiffs' children began to experience what the court described as "flu-like symptoms including: diarrhea, vomiting, congestion and nosebleeds". Over a period of months, these symptoms worsened and the symptoms did not respond to aggressive treatment. Plaintiffs did not call an expert to testify that these symptoms were the result of the mold contamination. Nonetheless, the appeals court held that plaintiff did not have to demonstrate that the alleged toxin is "capable" of causing injuries like those suffered by the children, let alone requiring the plaintiffs to prove that these children's symptoms were caused by mold exposure. The court reasoned as follows: "This is not a complicated case: the children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and the children recovered". Thus, the court based its decision on "circumstantial evidence that would 'facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation'." With due respect to the appellate panel, which was obviously impressed with the graphic description of "patches of mold of all different colors all over the walls and ceilings in her kitchen, family room and dining area", this is a really bad decision and a potentially dangerous precedent in Michigan! It is a mistake to base toxic tort causation on a temporal relationship,i.e., the "children were removed from the home, the mold was discovered, and children recovered." Flu-like symptoms can be caused by......well, the flu. That the children's symptoms went away could signify that they had recovered from a prolonged bout of the flu. Based upon this court's reasoning, the children's illness could have been caused just as easily by lead paint poisoning, contamination of their drinking water, VOC's emanating from their carpeting, formaldehyde in the walls....or just a really bad allergic reaction to the family's cats. Did anyone check the family furnace for carbon monoxide gas? It is not as if the symptoms that the children suffered from were unique to mold "poisoning". Moreover, no one appears to have apprised the trial court that it is not unusual that the antibiotics the children were administered did not cure a viral infection! We also suffer from flu-like symptoms all the time. It is not unusual, particularly in the frigid month of February in Royal Oak, Michigan, when this incident occurred, for these symptoms to occur and to persist in the absence of an exposure to toxic mold. The court faults the defendant for not submitting "any scientific evidence that the mold in her condominium could not have caused plaintiffs' injuries." (emphasis theirs). And since when does the burden in a negligence case shift to the defendant, and to prove a negative no less?

Climate Change Science in the Courtroom

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 16:24:55 -0500

Two electrifying Circuit Court of Appeals cases handed down in 2009 may set the stage for climate change litigation in the years to come. The decisions are Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., et al., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, et al., 585 F.3d 855 (5^th Cir. 2009). In both cases, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the federal district court and held that the plaintiffs had pleaded adequate facts to permit their cases to proceed. Therefore, unless the United States Supreme Court weighs in and reverses this growing momentum in climate change litigation, it is likely that federal trial courts will be grappling with all of the issues surrounding climate change liability, not least of which will be the science. Did defendant oil and coal producers, chemical companies and coal-using companies bring down the wrath of Hurricane Katrina on the Mississippi plaintiffs? What scientific evidence will be marshaled by plaintiffs to support their allegations? These are the questions that the Comer court will have to grapple with. The very idea that a corporate entity could be found legally responsible for unleashing the catastrophic power of a hurricane would have been unthinkable even ten years ago. Leaving aside epochal issues of public policy, justiciability and theology, the science surrounding climate change litigation will figure prominently in these lawsuits.

An excellent article on scientific issues in climate change litigation, Issues of Proof in Climate Change Litigation, by Francis J. Menton, a partner at Willkie Farr & Gallagher, appeared in The New York Law Journal (12/29/09). Mr. Menton’s discourse, commencing with the issuance in 2001 of the Third Assessment Report (“TAR”) from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) and bringing us up-to-date, reads like a Dan Brown conspiracy thriller, replete with conflicting claims and allegations of scientific fraud, data distortion, revelations by whistle blowers, and spoliation of evidence. On the one hand, the climate change plaintiffs allege that there exists a “clear scientific consensus that global warming has begun and that most of the current global warming is caused by emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide from fossil fuel combustion.” On the other hand, there are those who deny that there is any consensus and that the entire hypothesis of human-caused or “anthropogenic” global warming is an “urban myth.” Undoubtedly, there will be Daubert–driven debates on both general and specific causation in the global warming litigation.

Expert Reports Ghostwritten By Counsel

William A. Ruskin — Mon, 28 Dec 2009 17:39:13 -0500

Over the years, I have become an enormous fan of Michael Hoenig, a partner at Herzfeld & Rubin, who writes the Products Liability column in The New York Law Journal. More than any other product liability commentator, Mr. Hoenig has served as a muse and inspiration. His columns are thoughtful and well-written.

Mr. Hoenig’s column titled, “When Attorneys Ghostwrite Experts’ Reports,” published December 14, 2009, is a case in point. Shortly after the column appeared, I prepared a motion for filing in the EDNY to disqualify an adversary’s expert after he confessed in deposition to not preparing his own expert report. In his article, Mr. Hoenig poses the following questions: How much attorney involvement in the drafting of experts’ reports is permissible? Must the entire work product be that of the expert? Or, at the other extreme, would it be acceptable for an attorney to draft the entire expert’s report with the expert “adopting” it? And, if at least some lawyer input is tolerable, then what is the boundary line between permission and perdition? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) calls for disclosure of experts retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony and which “must be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness.” Mr. Hoenig discusses the federal district court case law discussing the circumstances under which an expert’s failure to prepare his own report might lead to his being barred from testifying at trial. In evaluating the individual facts presented to determine Rule 26 compliance, courts will most likely base their decisions not on who actually penned the report but, rather, whose opinions and analysis the report contains. One federal district court has held that “substantial participation” by the expert in the preparation of the report is required. Even if your motion to disqualify the expert altogether does not succeed, if you can demonstrate to the trial court that much of the expert’s report was ghostwritten by your adversary, the court may be more kindly disposed to your Daubert arguments. After all, if the expert cannot be bothered to write his own report, how painstaking can his methodology be?

No Interlocutory Appeal To Protect Attorney-Client Privileged Documents

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 12:21:48 -0500

The United States Supreme Court yesterday held, in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, No. 08-678, that a party may not immediately appeal court discovery orders that require the disclosure of documents and information covered by the attorney-client privilege. This holding resolves a split in the circuits and will change the law in at least the DC and Ninth Circuits. The unanimous Court rejected the argument that attorney-client privilege disclosure rulings are different from other kinds of orders because once the privilege is lost, it cannot ever be restored. The Court (in Justice Sotomayor's first opinion) noted that the ultimate remedy lies in reversal and a new trial at which the materials at issue would not be disclosed. Justice Sotomayor stated:

"The question before us is whether disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, we hold that they do not. Postjudgment appeals, together with other review mechanisms, suffice to protect the rights of litigants and preserve the vitality of the attorney-client privilege."

This is not a particularly revolutionary decision. After all, the Court has, for several terms, been narrowing interlocutory appellate rights as, at the same time, also requiring specific pleading (see, e.g.,Ashcroft v. Iqbal) in an effort to reduce expensive litigation proceedings. Moreover, at oral argument in the case, the primary issue came down to whether the attorney-client privilege was sufficiently important to warrant interlocutory appeal when balanced against the policy interests of the finality rule. Why, the justices asked, should the attorney-client privilege be given greater deference than trade secrets, for example? My D.C. partner Stuart M. Gerson notes that for practitioners, both litigators and others who may be involved in investigations later subject to litigation, the significance of this holding is that heightened attention should be given to how privileged information is recorded to minimize the impact if that information is later disclosed. As a safeguard against disclosure, Stuart adds, experienced litigators and investigators tend to write cryptically and briefly, if at all, when they take notes. If one is inclined to take the formal statement of a witness to lock him or her into a particular rendition of fact, it should be done with the expectation that the statement very well may ultimately be disclosed, even if the statement is made in the context of an Upjohn investigation. Of course none of this changes the prevailing rule that attorney-client privilege can only be overcome upon a showing of critical necessity. However, courts dislike privilege and frequently misapply the law. So, be careful out there.

National Suture Class Action Rejected

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 02 Dec 2009 12:38:56 -0500

The Mass Tort Defense Blog reported recently that the North Carolina federal district court overseeing the MDL concerning panacryl sutures declined last week to certify a proposed national class action in In re Panacryl Sutures Products Liability Cases, 2009 WL 3874347 (E.D.N.C. 11/13/09). The decision is a significant one for pharmaceutical and medical device MDL practitioners because the court's reasoning in denying class certification is broadly applicable to other medical device products. It is increasingly rare for plaintiffs to obtain class certification in medical device litigation and this case is no exception. Panacryl Sutures are synthetic, braided, absorbable surgical sutures, designed to remain in a patient's body for 24-36 months after surgery to provide wound support. Various plaintiffs alleged that Panacryl Sutures were defective in that they allegedly caused a high rate of foreign body reactions when used as directed. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate warning of the dangers associated with the devices. Plaintiffs eventually filed a motion to certify a National Class Action. The Panacryl sutures were the subject of a 2006 recall by FDA.

In his blog post, Dechert's Sean P Wajert, discusses the various rationale underlying the court's decision not to certify a national class. In evaluating the requirements under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b), the court considered the impact that the laws of the various states where plaintiffs reside would have on the proposed class. Considering Rule 23(a)(3)'s "typicality" requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had not considered the varying substantive laws governing every class member. Considering to Rule 23(b), the court found that in class actions governed by the laws of several states, variations in state law often overwhelmed common issues. The court held that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate by "extensive analysis" that the laws of interested jurisdictions did not pose "insuperable obstacles" to class certification. As Mr. Wajert points out, courts have generally found that common questions of fact do not predominate in medical device products cases. In the Panacryl Sutures litigation, the sutures were used in a variety of surgical procedures, which required different techniques and skill sets on the part of the surgeon and presented different risks of post-operative complications. Thus, it is not likely that any class would have been certified due to a lack of predominance of common issues, let alone a national class. For a further discussion of the policy and legal considerations that warrant denial of class actions in pharmaceutical and medical device litigation, take a look at the enthusiastic discussion of the decision in the Drug and Device Law Blog authored by Jim Beck and Dechert and Mark Herrmann at Jones Day.

No Medical Monitoring Without Physical Harm

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 09:31:31 -0500

BNA Toxics Law Reporter reported this morning that a Rhode Island trial court in Providence rejected a claim for medical monitoring by the mother of a child suffering from lead poisoning, in the absence of any physical manifestation of harm related to the diseases that plaintiff's expert contends the child is now at greater risk of developing. Although the court found that the plaintiff had submitted sufficient medical evidence to permit her to sue for compensatory damages for her son's alleged cognitive deficits due to lead exposure, she failed to prove that her son manifested a sign or symptom of the diseases for which she believed medical monitoring was warranted. In denying the claim, Judge Alice Bridget Gibney, in Miranda v. Dacruz, R.I. Super Ct., No. PC 04-2210, 10/26/09) held that, "This Court is not persuaded to open the damages flood gates to indefinite future monitoring". Judge Gibney distinguished the case before her from Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled last month that a medical monitoring claim by long-term smokers related to the early detection of lung cancer could proceed. In that case, Judge Gibney noted, plaintiffs exhibited sub-cellular or other physiological changes, which although not symptoms of a disease, are warning signs. I believe Donovan sets a dangerous precedent. The "damages flood gates" that concerned Judge Gibney are more likely to open if the burden of medical monitoring plaintiffs is reduced to demonstrating a sub-cellular or physiological change rather than an injury or disease. Under this loosened standard, a sun tan, a skin blemish, a sneeze or elevated cholesterol could justify permitting a medical monitoring claim to proceed.

Lone Pine Orders--Shutting The Door On Frivilous Toxic Tort Suits

William A. Ruskin — Tue, 10 Nov 2009 14:58:13 -0500

A Lone Pine Order is a case management tool that requires toxic tort plaintiffs to produce credible evidence to support a key legal component of their claim prior to the commencement of pre-trial discovery. As Niall A. Paul and Timothy D. Houston of Spilman Thomas & Battle write in a recent IADC Newsletter article titled, "Checking Meritless Mass Tort Claims at the Door--Lone Pine Case Management Orders Reinforce the Obligation of Plaintiffs' Counsel to Have a Case Before Filing Suit," a Lone Pine Order should be designed to weed out frivolous claims "before a defendant is forced to undergo the financial rigors of protracted discovery and invest hundreds of thousands of dollars and irrecoverable time only to face the stark reality that plaintiffs are devoid of credible evidence--to establish exposure, injury or causation." In light of the the enormous defense costs consumed in document production and pretrial and the increasing emphasis by in-house counsel on cost control in toxic tort litigation, it is surprising that Lone Pine Orders are not sought by defense counsel more frequently than they are. A Lone Pine Order can require the plaintiffs to produce credible evidence on the issues of (1) exposure; (2) causation; and (3) damages. However, that may impose a greater burden on plaintiffs' counsel than some courts, particularly state courts, may be willing to require early in a litigation. However, I have had success in identifying a single issue--my client's best issue--and seeking a Lone Pine Order on that sole issue rather than on multiple issues. For example, in the Happyland Social Club Fire Litigation, which case arose from the deaths of some 87 people at an illegal social club in New York City on March 23, 1990 (see photo above), defendants obtained a Lone Pine Order on the sole issue of product identification. Plaintiffs' theory of the case was that the defendants' products were fire initiators, fire promoters or, alternatively, emitted toxic fumes when burned. The contents of the social club were stored by Plaintiffs Steering Committee in a huge warehouse in lower Manhattan. The Catch-22 for plaintiffs was that if a product was in the warehouse more or less intact, it could not have burned and contributed to the deaths of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the product was consumed in the fire, there was no way of identifying the product or its manufacturer. As a result, plaintiffs were not able make a proper product identification in many instances, pursuant to the Lone Pine Order and, consequently, many defendants were dismissed from this Bronx state court case. It is unlikely that a state court judge in the Bronx would have entered a more onerous order. In every instance were they are employed, Lone Pine Orders foster judicial economy and substantially reduce the litigationn costs for all parties. In In re Vioxx, 557 F.Supp. 2d 741 (E.D.La. 2008), the federal district court in Louisiana observed that Lone Pine Orders also reduced the litigation expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel in prosecuting mass tort actions.

Toxic Telephone Poles?

William A. Ruskin — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 17:38:44 -0500

In a first-of-its-kind litigation, the Ecological Rights Foundation ("ERF") has alleged in a Complaint brought in federal district court in San Francisco that Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) is in violation of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). ERF alleges that the treatment of PG&E's utility poles treated with pentachlorophenol ("penta"), a wood preservative, has resulted in contamination of groundwater and surface water throughout four counties in Northern California -- Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Francisco, including San Francisco Bay. The suit implicates all of the estimated 300,000 utility poles that support Northern California's electrical power grid. Does ERF expect a court will order that all of those utility poles be taken down and replaced with poles comprised of an as-yet-to-be-invented-space-age-material that does not require chemical treatment, never deteriorates, causes no environmental harm and does not cause hazardous waste to be emitted during manufacture?

In an article posted on its website, Foley & Lardner, which has been tapped by PG&E, cautions that this lawsuit potentially has far-reaching implications. The Milwaukee-based law firm notes that millions of utility poles throughout the country are treated with penta or other preservatives, which are necessary to keep the utility poles from deteriorating and to keep electricity and telephone service flowing to homes and businesses. Significantly, they observe that the environmental impact of the penta-treated poles was examined in great detail by the USEPA when the use of penta-treated wood poles as utility poles was approved. By approving the use of penta, USEPA found that penta did not cause the significant environmental harm now alleged by ERF. If ERF is successful in San Francisco, where might this type of litigation lead?

Apart from the serious policy considerations at issue here, ERF's lawsuit will have to overcome significant legal hurdles, including for starters: (1) that under CWA, ERF must demonstrate that each individual pole is a "point source". It may be difficult to argue with a straight face in federal court that PG&E should have obtained a permit for each discharge from every pole--all separate violations of the statute: and (2) that under RCRA, ERF must demonstrate that PG&E is a generator of solid waste that presents "an imminent and substantial endangerment to the environment. The defendants are not the applicators of the material. The sub-text of the litigation appears to revolve around ERF's unhappiness over USEPA's past decision making concerning the use of Penta on utility poles. If so, ERF take it up with USEPA and leave our fragile power grid alone!

Cost Allocation Of E-discovery In NY Trial Courts

William A. Ruskin — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 13:51:38 -0500

The Manual For State Trial Courts Regarding Electronic Discovery Cost-Allocation, authored by the Joint E-Discovery Subcommittee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, is required reading for any New York state court litigator involved in e-discovery. The Manual is intended to assist New York State judges and court personnel in managing issues relating to the cost of discovery of electronically stored information, or "ESI'. As state court decisions on e-discovery cost allocation are likely to reference the Manual, practitioners are well-advised to familiarize themselves with the Manual now. The authors cite one study that found that between 58% and 90% of litigation budgets are devoured by document review. The issue of who pays for e-discovery--the requesting party or the responding party--often involves sums of money above and beyond the damages sought by the claimant. As a result, litigation costs drive cases to settle that should not settle on the merits. Although New York law mandates that the requesting party pay the costs of discovery, there is authority in New York law for requesting parties to seek protective orders aimed at shifting all or part of the ESI costs to the producing party.

Of interest to practitioners outside New York, the Manual provides an overview of ESI burden and expense, and cost-shifting rules, adopted in states across the country. This discussion, as well as a review of federal case law, suggests that New York is not "going it alone" but is drawing on the principles developed at the Sedona Conference and in leading cases such as Zubulake, which provides a seven-factor balancing test for determining cost allocation.