Terry Lenamon on the Death Penalty

Jodi Arias Trial: Arizona Death Penalty Law and Mitigating Circumstances

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Sat, 18 May 2013 20:01:14 -0500

As readers know, Terry Lenamon is a nationally known expert in mitigation trial work on death penalty cases. For those watching the media coverage of the Arias' case, the work to which Terry has dedicated his life is exemplified in the stage that this trial entered when the jury verdict returned with a guilty verdict.

Here are some reference materials that those following the Jodi Arias' trial as it enters the sentencing phase may find helpful.

Jodi Arias is scheduled to take the stand on Monday as her mitigation counsel puts on their case for why the jury should exclude capital punishment for her in the death of Travis Alexander

For those following along with the media coverage next week:

The Arizona Legislature has passed legislation (A.R.S. § 13-751) that requires two things to be found by the jury before a person can be sentenced to death in that state:

1. proof beyond a reasonable doubt of at least one aggravating circumstance as set forth in Arizona law (A.R.S. § 13-751(F): read that law here) and

2. finding that there are "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Mitigation is defined as evidence relevant to “any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense." (A.R.S. § 13-751(E): read that law here.).

The Arizona Supreme Court has published its Capital Sentencing Guide online and further information is provided there, including a discussion of case law pertaining to mitigating circumstances in death penalty sentencing trials.

Both the statute and the court opinions discussing and ruling upon mitigation will be applicable to the mitigation case presented by the defense team.

Maryland Abolishes Death Penalty: Sixth State in 6 Years To End Capital Punishment

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Tue, 07 May 2013 17:49:53 -0500

Last week, the Governor of the State of Maryland signed a bill presented to him by the Maryland legislature and with his signature, the death penalty was abolished in Maryland.

In doing so, Gov. Martin O'Malley brought Maryland into the history books as the sixth state in as many years to do away with capital punishment. If you're keeping score, these six states are shown below in dark purple (thanks to the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty for this great infographic).

Now, Maryland becomes the 18th state to abolish the death penalty. As for the five people who set on Maryland's Death Row, unfortunately the new law does not automatically alter their sentencing - but Governor O'Malley has stated on the record that he will be reviewing their cases, one by one, as he considers using his power to commute their death sentences.

Meanwhile, as we posted earlier and as FoxNews points out this week, at the same time that Maryland abolished capital punishment, the Florida legislature has decided to speed up executions in the Sunshine State.

Florida Timely Justice Bill Goes To Governor's Desk: Bad News for Florida to Put Executions on a Fast Track

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 01 May 2013 13:36:14 -0500

The Senate has passed the Timely Justice Bill and now all that it needs to become Florida law is the approval of Florida Governor Rick Scott.

Today, there is an excellent piece in the Sun Sentinel on what this means to justice in the Sunshine State: it's written by Gary Stein and it's worth your time to read.

Go here to read "Florida's fast track death penalty bill is blood-thirsty form of justice."

If that doesn't sway you that this fast tracking executions might not be the best thing to do, then consider the arguments made by former Florida Death Row resident Seth Penalver this week, a man acquitted last December after serving a good part of his life under the penalty of death for a crime he did not commit.

Read Seth Penalver's story here.

Read Seth Penalver's message to Governor Rick Scott about the Timely Justice Bill here.

Have your own message for Governor Scott? Click here to reach him by email.

Great Death Penalty Infographic from California Innocence Project

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 24 Apr 2013 15:43:03 -0500

Embedded from CA Innocence Project

Checking the Status of 2013 Bills Dealing with Death Penalty Before Florida Legislature

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 17:56:13 -0500

For details on these bills, check out our post from last month.

Out of the three the proposed "Timely Justice Act" seems to be moving forward with some strength, as Senate Bill 1750 has been scheduled on the Appropriations' Committee agenda tomorrow morning (04/18/13, 9:00 am, 412 Knott Building, Tallahassee, Florida in case you're interested).

The other two bills (Senate Bill 1022 and House Bill 4057) have not moved much, though the House bill is related to the Timely Justice Act of Senate Bill 1750.

Will the Timely Justice Act become Florida law?

It's still too soon to tell, but there are lots of people out there that are in favor of speeding up the execution process -- for more, check out this Miami Herald coverage of the pending legislation.

Amnesty International's New Video: the Death Penalty in 2012

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 17:50:25 -0500

Fletcher v. JAC: April 2013 Attorneys Fee Opinion from the First District Court of Appeals in Florida

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 13:13:40 -0500

The continuing battle over indigent defense attorneys fees in death penalty cases continues in the State of Florida as a new opinion has come out of the 1st District Court of Appeals, Fletcher v. Justice Administrative Commission (read the opinion here).

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted and the case remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the attorneys' fees award with specific instructions given that "...If the trial court determines that an award greater than the statutory cap is justified, it should make the appropriate findings to support the award."

From the court:

While we are sensitive to the court’s budgetary concerns and the need to keep the courthouse doors open and thus preserve access to courts, these concerns must be balanced with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to appointed, conflict-free counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305 (Fla. 2012). .....

Rick A. Sichta and Susanne K. Sichta of Jacksonville appeared on behalf of the Petitioner in the case while Stuart L. Hartstone and Terence M. Lenamon of The Florida Capital Resource Center filed as friends of the court (Amicus Curiae).

We've placed Terry's amicus brief together with its Appendix into the Terry Lenamon Online Library. Just click on the Library image in the left sidebar or click below to read those documents.

Gideon v Wainwright Decision Has Anniversary Today: Right to Counsel for Indigent in Felony Cases Ruling 50 Years Ago

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Mon, 18 Mar 2013 10:09:51 -0500

On March 18, 1963, the United States Supreme Court opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright came down, and with it the right to counsel for those who cannot afford their own lawyer began to be respected and protected in this country.

In celebration of this historic precedent coming out of the State of Florida, and given the reality that there will be lots of discussion on the ramifications of Gideon v. Wainwright (pro and con) in other media, here is the majority opinion from the case itself, written by Justice Hugo Black all those years ago:

______________________________________

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1983)

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner was charged in a Florida state court with having broken and entered a poolroom with intent to commit a misdemeanor. This offense is a felony under 337*337 Florida law. Appearing in court without funds and without a lawyer, petitioner asked the court to appoint counsel for him, whereupon the following colloquy took place:

"The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case.

"The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by Counsel."

Put to trial before a jury, Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman. He made an opening statement to the jury, cross-examined the State's witnesses, presented witnesses in his own defense, declined to testify himself, and made a short argument "emphasizing his innocence to the charge contained in the Information filed in this case." The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and petitioner was sentenced to serve five years in the state prison. Later, petitioner filed in the Florida Supreme Court this habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction and sentence on the ground that the trial court's refusal to appoint counsel for him denied him rights "guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the United States Government."[1]

Treating the petition for habeas corpus as properly before it, the State Supreme Court, "upon consideration thereof" but without an opinion, denied all relief. Since 1942, when Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, was decided by a divided 338*338 Court, the problem of a defendant's federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court has been a continuing source of controversy and litigation in both state and federal courts.[2] To give this problem another review here, we granted certiorari. 370 U. S. 908. Since Gideon was proceeding in forma pauperis, we appointed counsel to represent him and requested both sides to discuss in their briefs and oral arguments the following: "Should this Court's holding in Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455, be reconsidered?"

The facts upon which Betts claimed that he had been unconstitutionally denied the right to have counsel appointed to assist him are strikingly like the facts upon which Gideon here bases his federal constitutional claim. Betts was indicated for robbery in a Maryland state court. On arraignment, he told the trial judge of his lack of funds to hire a lawyer and asked the court to appoint one for him. Betts was advised that it was not the practice in that county to appoint counsel for indigent defendants except in murder and rape cases. He then pleaded not guilty, had witnesses summoned, cross-examined the State's witnesses, examined his own, and chose not to testify himself. He was found guilty by the judge, sitting without a jury, and sentenced to eight years in prison. 339*339 Like Gideon, Betts sought release by habeas corpus, alleging that he had been denied the right to assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Betts was denied any relief, and on review this Court affirmed. It was held that a refusal to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant charged with a felony did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which for reasons given the Court deemed to be the only applicable federal constitutional provision. The Court said:

"Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such denial." 316 U. S., at 462.

Treating due process as "a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights," the Court held that refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circumstances in the Betts case was not so "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness" as to amount to a denial of due process. Since the facts and circumstances of the two cases are so nearly indistinguishable, we think the Betts v. Brady holding if left standing would require us to reject Gideon's claim that the Constitution guarantees him the assistance of counsel. Upon full reconsideration we conclude that Betts v. Brady should be overruled.

II.

The Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." We have construed 340*340 this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.[3] Betts argued that this right is extended to indigent defendants in state courts by the Fourteenth Amendment. In response the Court stated that, while the Sixth Amendment laid down "no rule for the conduct of the States, the question recurs whether the constraint laid by the Amendment upon the national courts expresses a rule so fundamental and essential to a fair trial, and so, to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." 316 U. S., at 465. In order to decide whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is of this fundamental nature, the Court in Betts set out and considered "[r]elevant data on the subject . . . afforded by constitutional and statutory provisions subsisting in the colonies and the States prior to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the national Constitution, and in the constitutional, legislative, and judicial history of the States to the present date." 316 U. S., at 465. On the basis of this historical data the Court concluded that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." 316 U. S., at 471. It was for this reason the Betts Court refused to accept the contention that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel for indigent federal defendants was extended to or, in the words of that Court, "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment." Plainly, had the Court concluded that appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal defendant was "a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." it would have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court, just as the Sixth Amendment requires in a federal court.

341*341 We think the Court in Betts had ample precedent for acknowledging that those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are fundamental safeguards of liberty immune from federal abridgment are equally protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This same principle was recognized, explained, and applied in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), a case upholding the right of counsel, where the Court held that despite sweeping language to the contrary in Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), the Fourteenth Amendment "embraced" those " `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,' " even though they had been "specifically dealt with in another part of the federal Constitution." 287 U. S., at 67. In many cases other than Powell and Betts, this Court has looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment makes them obligatory on the States. Explicitly recognized to be of this "fundamental nature" and therefore made immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First Amendment's freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for redress of grievances.[4] For the same reason, though not always in precisely the same terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment's command that 342*342 private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,[5] the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,[6] and the Eighth's ban on cruel and unusual punishment.[7] On the other hand, this Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), refused to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment made the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment obligatory on the States. In so refusing, however, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, was careful to emphasize that "immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states" and that guarantees "in their origin . . . effective against the federal government alone" had by prior cases "been taken over from the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption." 302 U. S., at 324-325, 326.

We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights. Ten years before Betts v. Brady, this Court, after full consideration of all the historical data examined in Betts, had unequivocally declared that "the right to the aid of 343*343 counsel is of this fundamental character." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 68 (1932). While the Court at the close of its Powell opinion did by its language, as this Court frequently does, limit its holding to the particular facts and circumstances of that case, its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel are unmistakable. Several years later, in 1936, the Court reemphasized what it had said about the fundamental nature of the right to counsel in this language:

"We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 243-244 (1936).

...

And again in 1938 this Court said:

"[The assistance of counsel] is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.. . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not `still be done.' " Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 462 (1938). To the same effect, see Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444 (1940), and Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U. S. 329 (1941).

In light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that "one charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel, must be furnished counsel by the State," conceded that "[e]xpressions in the opinions of this court lend color to the argument . . . ." 316 U. S., at 462-463. The fact is that in deciding as it did— that "appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, 344*344 essential to a fair trial"—the Court in Betts v. Brady made an abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents. In returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice. Not only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. A defendant's need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama:

"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be 345*345 heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 287 U. S., at 68-69.

The Court in Betts v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other States, has asked that Betts v. Brady be left intact. Twenty-two States, as friends of the Court, argue that Betts was "an anachronism when handed down" and that it should now be overruled. We agree.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further action not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

Will Florida Juries Need Unanimous Vote for Death Penalty? Senate Bill Gains Speed in Tallahassee to Change Florida Law

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 13 Mar 2013 12:47:16 -0500

Right now, in Florida, it's shocking but true that not everyone on the jury has to agree on execution of the defendant as punishment for the crime before that recommendation can come forward from the jury room.

Florida and Alabama juries don't need unanimous votes to recommend the death penalty. That may change.

Florida Senate Bill 148 (SB148) looks to be gaining steam up in Tallahassee -- and if SB 148 is passed, then Florida's death penalty process will change.

If SB 148 becomes law, then Florida death penalty cases will have to have every single juror voting in favor of the death penalty before the defendant can face a sentence of death. Right now, Florida requires all jurors to agree on the verdict of guilty (unanimous verdict) but in sentencing, not all jurors have to agree on the death penalty in order for the jury to recommend capital punishment to the judge.

CBS-Miami is reporting that this bill almost came up for vote in the Florida Senate's Criminal Justice Committee last week, but the clock ran out - so look for a vote within the next week or so.

Florida Legislature Considering Death Penalty in SB1750, SB1022, and HB4057

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Fri, 08 Mar 2013 14:46:46 -0500

The Florida Legislature opened for business this week, and the 2013 budget session will continue for the next 9 weeks as lawmakers up in Tallahassee bicker and fight and vote on new laws for the State of Florida, many of which will go into effect this summer.

Among them are these bills dealing with capital punishment in the State of Florida:

1. Florida Senate Bill 1750 - SB1750

Postconviction Capital Case Proceedings; Citing this act as the "Timely Justice Act;" providing that the capital collateral regional counsel and the attorneys appointed pursuant to law shall file only those postconviction or collateral actions authorized by statute; removing a request to the Supreme Court to adopt by rule the provisions that limit the time for postconviction proceedings in capital cases; providing procedures that apply if an inmate seeks both to dismiss a pending postconviction proceeding and to discharge collateral counsel, etc.

Senate Committee References: Judiciary (JU) , Appropriations Subcommittee on Criminal and Civil Justice (ACJ) , Appropriations (AP)

Last Action: 03/07/2013 Introduced -SJ 185

Effective Date: Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall take effect July 1, 2015, contingent upon voter approval of SJR 1740 in the General Election of 2014.

2. Florida Senate Bill 1022 - SB1022

Death Penalty; Deleting provisions providing for the death penalty for capital felonies; repealing provisions relating to prohibiting the imposition of the death sentence upon a defendant with mental retardation; repealing provisions relating to determination of whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment for a capital drug trafficking felony; deleting provisions relating to preservation of DNA evidence in death penalty cases, etc.

Senate Committee References: Judiciary (JU) , Criminal Justice (CJ) , Appropriations (AP) , Rules (RC)

Last Action: 03/05/2013 Introduced -SJ 73

Effective Date: July 1, 2013

3. Florida House Bill 4057 - HB4057

Criminal Proceedings: Repeals provisions relating to capital postconviction proceedings, order in which closing arguments are given, grounds for death warrant, sentencing orders in capital cases; postconviction review in capital cases; repeals provisions relating to commencement of capital postconviction actions, capital postconviction claims, & sanctions in postconviction proceedings; deletes provisions relating to legislative intent concerning adoption of rules concerning acceptance of guilty pleas & effect of certain postponements for speedy trial purposes; deletes provisions relating to development of uniform order of supervision form, providing for imposition of sanction following revocation of probation or parole, allowing for offenders under supervision to be charged for urinalysis testing in certain circumstances, & providing for payment plans & establishment of priority orders for payments.

Effective Date: upon becoming a law

Last Event: 1st Reading on Tuesday, March 05, 2013 11:59 PM

To follow these bills as they proceed through the session, click on the above links to the tracking sites found on the Florida House and Florida Senate web pages.

Florida Execution of Larry Eugene Mann Scheduled for April 10, 2013

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Tue, 05 Mar 2013 15:02:56 -0500

Florida Governor Rick Scott has signed the death warrant for Larry Eugene Mann, who sets on Florida's Death Row after being convicted of kidnapping and first degree murder of Elisa Nelson, 10 years old, in November 1980.

The Execution of Larry Eugene Mann is currently scheduled by the Florida Department of Corrections for 6 pm on April 10, 2013.

Image from Florida Department of Corrections Inmate Population Details (online here).

Texas and Ohio Still Have Active Execution Schedules; Other States - Not So Much.

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 27 Feb 2013 14:20:52 -0500

With thanks to Amnesty.org for keeping track of the national execution schedule (correct as of February 6, 2013), let's consider what is going on in the United States right now. In all the states that allow for capital punishment, consider this:

There are 27 executions scheduled from March 1, 2013 to December 31, 2015 right now in the United States.
One is in Arizona (Edward Schad on 3/6) and one is set in Oklahoma (Robert Thacker on 3/12).
The rest are all in Texas and Ohio.

That's right: due in no small part to the efforts of Terence Lenamon (as discussed here in prior posts), there are no death penalty executions scheduled this year, or in 2014, or in 2015, in the State of Florida.

Here are the Executions Scheduled in Texas and Ohio:

OHIO

3/6/2013 Frederick Treesh

5/1/2013 Steven Smith

8/7/2013 Billy Slagle

9/25/2013 Harry Mitts, Jr.

11/14/2013 Ronald Phillips

1/16/2014 Dennis McGuire

3/19/2014 Gregory Lott

5/28/2014 Arthur Tyler

8/6/2014 William Montgomery

10/15/2014 Raymond Tibbetts

1/7/2015 Warren Henness

05/14/15 Jeffrey Wogenstahl

TEXAS

4/3/2013 Kimberly McCarthy

4/09/2013 Ricky Lewis

4/10/2013 Rigoberto Avila

4/16/2013 Ronnie Threadgill

4/24/2013 Elroy Chester

4/25/2013 Richard Cobb

5/7/2013 Caroll Joe Parr

5/15/2013 Jeffrey Williams

5/21/13 Robert Pruett

7/16/13 John Quintanilla

07/18/13 Vaughn Ross

7/31/2013 Douglas Feldman

03/12/15 Robert Van Hook

Terence Lenamon in the News: Back to Back Death Penalty Cases

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Sun, 24 Feb 2013 14:38:28 -0500

As reported earlier here on the blog, Terence Lenamon was successful in his arguments to keep Vernon Stevens off of Florida's Death Row as Mr. Stevens was sentenced to life imprisonment earlier this month.

Meanwhile, news coverage of the James E. Bannister murder case out of Ocala earlier this month had Terry Lenamon's co-counsel reporting to the trial judge that Terence Lenamon could not be actively participating in the Bannister proceeding because he was busy in the Stevens case.

Added to that, explained Tania Alavi, she and Terence Lenamon were also co-defense counsel in the pending Florida death penalty murder case against Michael Woods, set for trial later in 2013 - and it's assumed that the Woods trial may be delayed in order for the Bannister case to proceed.

Here is Terry Lenamon's Opening Statement in the penalty phase of the Stevens trial:

No Death Penalty for Vernon Dwayne Stevens: Defense Lawyer Terence Lenamon Victorious Over Capital Punishment Sought by State of Florida

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 13 Feb 2013 14:29:04 -0500

Terry Lenamon just finished a six week trial in Florida, where state prosecutors were seeking the death penalty for Vernon Dwayne Stevens. Mr. Stevens, however, will not face capital punishment: Terence Lenamon's arguments for mitigation were successful and a life sentence was reached.

For details, check out the following documents in the Terry Lenamon Online Library, from Cause No. 07-00068CF, State of Florida v. Vernon Dwayne Stevens in the Circuit Court of the 20th Judicial District in and for Hendry County, Florida:

1. Terry Lenamon's Penalty Phase Opening Statement

2. Prosecutor's Closing - Part One

3. Prosecutor's Closing - Part Two

Congratulations to Terry Lenamon on a job well done - and another victory against the Death Penalty!

When will QEEG Brain Mapping Get Widespread Respect in Courtroom?

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 23 Jan 2013 13:37:43 -0500

This week, the Miami Herald ran an article discussing the current state of QEEG technology as a means to study the human brain and understand how the brain works and how it can be permanently damaged.

However, the article was more than a dry discussion of scientific methodology. Reporter David Ovalle wrote about how QEEG brain mapping was successfully presented by Terry Lenamon in the Grady Nelson death penalty trial, having been approved for use by the jury by the Honorable Jacqueline Hogan-Scola.

You can read the article, "Use of controversial ‘brain-mapping’ technology stymied in Florida courts," online for free at the Miami Herald web site.

Here's the thing: QEEG brain mapping is still controversial and prosecutors are still fighting hard against its admission by death penalty defense attorneys who are wanting to use the brain mapping technique in mitigation evidence.

While Terry Lenamon was successful in getting the brain mapping of Grady Nelson as a factor for consideration in his trial, other defendants have not been able to use QEEG in their trials.

Meanwhile, QEEG brain mapping continues to garner respect in the medical community. Consider this video (it's long, almost an hour - be forwarned here!) where Retired Brigadier General Dr. Stephen Xenakis discusses uses of QEEG brain mapping in the treatment of several conditions suffered by post-combat servicepersons.

Report Released on Judge Who Had Private Communications with Prosecutor During Death Penalty Trial: Result, Suspension

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Thu, 10 Jan 2013 12:15:06 -0500

The Report has been released in the disciplinary proceeding involving former Broward County, Florida judge Ana Gardiner (see our earlier post for details) and you can read the report in its entirety at Terry Lenamon's Online Library.

Here's a key paragraph from the Report, which results in a recommendation that the former trial judge receive a one year suspension of her Florida law license:

The Respondent's failure to disclose her social encounter with the
prosecutor, the significant emotional relationship that developed during the
pendency of the trial, and her extensive telephone and text message
communications tainted the entire legal process. The Respondent's argument that
there were no discussions about the trial, only an appearance of impropriety and no
reversible error in the trial misses the point. Due process embodies the
fundamental concept of fairness, and "especially in a death penalty case, [the
proceedings] must both be and appear to be fundamentally fair. Steinhorst v. State,
636 So.2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1994). [Emphasis supplied.] The public's perception of
fairness and impartiality of the judiciary is the bedrock of our legal system.

Repeal of Death Penalty in Maryland - Will It Happen This Week? Media Reports That It's Getting Close

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 09 Jan 2013 10:11:34 -0500

Up in Maryland, there are some folk who are fierce in their efforts to get the Maryland death penalty statute overturned this year. Today, news reports out of Baltimore are that their efforts have brought things down to one, single vote needed to get their proposal through the state senate.

Then, things will move to a floor vote. What if the law passes?

Well, Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley is ready for it. He's been against capital punishment for a long time, and he's been a force in getting things to this juncture.

If the state legislature opts to repeal the Maryland death penalty statute, this is one governor who will not do anything to keep that repeal from going forward. He'll celebrate it as a victory.

Is the repeal being driven by dollars and cents?

To some extent, apparently. Whatever the reasons, odds are high that capital punishment will soon be no more in the State of Maryland.

Image: Maryland Governor O'Malley, who has been quoted as believing the Maryland death penalty is "a waste of money" and "ineffective."

New York Times Begins New Year With Editorial Against the Death Penalty

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Wed, 02 Jan 2013 10:58:21 -0500

The New York Times began 2013 with an editorial published today that details the reasons for its public stance against capital punishment in America.

You can read the editorial here.

Happy New Year from Terry Lenamon!

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Sun, 30 Dec 2012 14:13:57 -0500

Death Penalty Information Center Report 2012: Florida Has Most Death Sentences This Year

Terry Lenamon / Reba Kennedy — Thu, 27 Dec 2012 16:24:24 -0500

The Death Penalty Information Center has compiled its annual report on capital punishment in the United States.

According to the DPIC, the four states of (Florida (21), California (14), Texas (9), and Pennsylvania (7)) accounted for 65% of the country’s death sentences. Texas, however, led the nation once again in the number of executions, with fifteen people being executed this year in the Lone Star State.

Click on the image to read the full report: