Pennsylvania Labor and Employment Blog

COBRA Subsidy Extended...Again...And Again?

Adam Santucci — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 08:59:54 -0500

On March 3, 2010, President Obama signed the Temporary Extension Act of 2010 (.pdf) into law. The Act provides for the continuation of the extended unemployment compensation benefit program and the availability of the COBRA premium subsidy, which expired February 28, 2010. The COBRA premium assistance program was extended to allow those involuntarily terminated through March 31, 2010 to receive the 65 percent premium subsidy. More information regarding the COBRA premium subsidy was posted on our blog on January 6, 2010.

The Act also clarifies that if an individual has a COBRA qualifying event due to a reduction in hours, and is later involuntarily terminated, then the involuntary termination must be treated as a qualifying event and the employee must receive a new, appropriate COBRA notification.

Finally, the Act clarifies certain interpretative guidance, and indicates that certain portions of the Act are retroactive.

Employers and Plan Administrators should be sure to incorporate these changes into their COBRA notification procedures and COBRA notices.

Congress is also said to be considering a bill that would extend the COBRA premium subsidy program further.

Keep Supervisors Out of Harassment Policy Reporting Procedures

Adam Santucci — Tue, 02 Mar 2010 08:46:21 -0500

Oftentimes, it seems like the requirements of the law conflict with long held workplace beliefs, and in some cases common sense. One staple of workplace dogma is the notion that employees should always bring issues to supervisors first, so that issues can be addressed, and hopefully resolved, at the lowest possible level. According to the law, however, when it comes to discriminatory harassment, supervisors should be left out of the loop.

A recent case, Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.(PDF), illustrates this point. In JetBlue, the Company had a policy that allowed employees to bring complaints to their immediate supervisor, Human Resources, or any member of management. The plaintiff, a former employee at the time she filed her suit under Title VII, alleged that her former supervisor had created a hostile work environment by, among other things, making sexual comments, grabbing her and other women, and tickling women. While she was employed, the Plaintiff only complained about this alleged harassment to the supervisor.

The Company argued that reporting the harassment only to the supervisor, the same person engaging in the alleged misconduct was not reasonable, and therefore, the Company was entitled to rely on the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to discriminatory harassment claims. The Faragher/Ellerth defense is a defense against liability that is available to employers in certain circumstances if two conditions are met. First, the employer must take reasonable measures to prevent and quickly correct any harassing conduct; and second, the employee must unreasonably fail to take advantage of the preventative or corrective measures available. The trial court agreed with the Company that the former employee's failure to report the alleged harassment to another point of contact was unreasonable, and dismissed her harassment claim.

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, rejected the Company's argument. The Court of Appeals stated that the former employee's allegations made out an actionable hostile work environment claim based on sex, and went on to hold that employees do not have to shop around for someone to address their complaints. Instead, whether an employee reasonably took advantage of the employer's complaint reporting procedure will be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Court of Appeals determined that in this case, a jury could find that the former employee's actions were not unreasonable because she was following the Company policy by reporting the conduct to her supervisor.

There were some additional facts in this case that were detrimental to the Company's argument. However, it still provides a reminder that insufficient harassment policies will prevent employers from asserting the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, which is a means for having harassment claims dismissed. The Gorzynski decision makes it more difficult to get harassment claims dismissed early, because the Faragher/Ellerth defense will now be judged on a case-by-case basis, at least in the Second Circuit.

Even though this decision is not controlling in Pennsylvania courts, Pennsylvania employers should take time to review their discriminatory harassment policies, including sexual harassment policies, and ensure that supervisors are not designated as a reporting point of contact. Instead, reporting points of contacts should be limited to Human Resource staff and upper management personnel, and employees should be directed to utilize alternative points of contact if one point of contact is the alleged harasser.

EEOC Issues Proposed Regulations Defining Employers' Affirmative Defense Under ADEA

Kelley Kaufman — Fri, 26 Feb 2010 11:56:55 -0500

On February 18, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing the meaning of the “reasonable factors other than age” defense under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or job applicants based upon their age, but protects only those employees or applicants who are 40 years or older. In addition, the ADEA provides employers with statutory defenses, which include provisions for a “bona fide occupational qualification" defense and a “reasonable factors other than age” defense.

The “reasonable factors other than age” (RFOA) defense precludes liability for actions otherwise prohibited under the ADEA so long as the employment decision is based upon reasonable factors other than age. The EEOC's NPRM takes into consideration two relatively recent United States Supreme Court cases, Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratories, which each evaluated disparate impact claims under the ADEA. Disparate impact claims involve the allegation that an employer’s practice, although neutral on its face, has a discriminatory impact on a protected class – under the ADEA, workers aged 40 years or more.

Specifically, and with the Supreme Court’s Smith and Meacham holdings in mind, the EEOC proposes to revise the federal regulations to illustrate that under the RFOA defense, the evaluation of an employer’s practice “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular situation and whether the employer acted prudently in light of those facts.” Thus, the EEOC’s proposed approach attempts to balance employers’ rights to make reasonable business decisions with the ADEA’s goal of protecting older workers from facially neutral employment practices that disparately impact their employment. In addition, the proposed amendments provide guidance as to the factors that will be considered in evaluating an employer's facially neutral practice under the ADEA.

What is a “Reasonable Factor”?

The NPRM first addresses the key “reasonableness” requirement of the RFOA defense. Under the proposed amendments, the RFOA defense “requires evidence that the challenged practice was reasonably designed to further or achieve a legitimate business purpose and was reasonably administered to achieve that purpose.” As this language suggests, both the structure of the employment practice and the way in which it is implemented affect its reasonableness. Further, this "reasonableness" analysis requires consideration of what the employer knew – or should have known – about the impact the practice would have when it took the action. Thus, an employer cannot hide behind a lack of knowledge – and a reasonable employer will evaluate its process to determine whether it will have a disparate age-based impact.

The EEOC included in its proposed amendments a non-exhaustive list of factors relevant to a determination of the “reasonableness” of an employer's practice. The proposed factors will serve to provide some guidance to employers in evaluating the susceptibility of an employment practice to attack under the ADEA. The factors include whether, and to what extent, the employer took steps to accurately define and apply decision-making factors – for example, through the training, guidance, or instruction of its managers. Other considerations include the extent and severity of the resulting harm to the protected class, and whether the employer had other options available.

Importantly, the EEOC is careful to note in the NPRM that these factors do not require an employer to adopt the employment practice with the least severe impact on members of the protected class. This is in contrast to the more stringent "business necessity" test available for Title VII discrimination claims. Under the RFOA defense, the availability of a less discriminatory practice will not – standing alone – make the employment practice unreasonable; however, employers should be aware that it will be considered a relevant factor in determining “reasonableness” under the RFOA defense.

Factors “Other than Age”

Under the NPRM, the RFOA defense would require that employers base an employment practice on a non-age factor – i.e., seniority or salary. As the EEOC notes in the NPRM, although these factors may often correlate with age, they are “analytically and factually distinct from age.” On the other hand, an employer’s “unchecked” use of subjective criteria related to age-based stereotypes may not be distinct from age.

The proposed amendments to the federal regulations include another non-exhaustive list of factors, which may be relevant to an assessment of whether an employer's facially neutral practice is based on a non-age factor. The factors include the extent to which the employer gave supervisor's unchecked discretion to assess employees subjectively, and whether supervisors were given guidance or training in the non-discriminatory application of the evaluation factors.

The NPRM cautions that employers who give supervisors unchecked discretion to engage in subjective decision-making should be well aware that an age-based disparate impact might result. In response, employers should make the effort to objectify evaluation criteria wherever possible in such situations and take steps to train supervisors for awareness (and avoidance) of age-based stereotyping. Employers should be aware that giving supervisors such unfettered discretion to make employment decisions may also subject them to liability not only for disparate impact claims, but also for disparate treatment claims under the ADEA and other employment discrimination laws.

Employers: Prepare to Review and Update Your Practices Now

The EEOC will consider any comments received on or before April 19, 2010, prior to adopting final regulations regarding the ADEA’s statutory RFOA defense. Although the proposed regulations outlined above are not yet final, employers can take steps now to shore up their practices and to prepare for these anticipated changes to the RFOA defense, particularly in a reduction-in-force (RIF) context.

Pennsylvania employers should be poised to update their applicable policies and procedures, using the proposed regulations and the factors included therein, to provide some guidance. In addition, employers can be prepared to provide training to their managers and other decision-making personnel once the rules become final.

Civil Rights Division Announces Plan to Target Public Employers

Adam Santucci — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 18:16:14 -0500

During his recent State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama confirmed the news that some employers feared. During his address, President Obama stated that the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) will begin aggressively pursuing employment discrimination claims. The President's statement reiterated the CRD's December 2009 message to Congress that they will be increasing prosecution and litigation efforts in this area.

In December 2009, Thomas E. Perez, assistant attorney general for civil rights, announced the CRD's intention to file more class action "pattern or practice" discrimination suits against state and local governments. Class action suits involve large groups of plaintiffs, and the term "pattern or practice" refers to alleged widespread discrimination, typically when dealing with decisions involving new hires or promotions. In a typical case, the CRD will allege that an employment practice, such as a test or physical ability requirement, unlawfully discriminates against a certain protected class of individuals because fewer members of that class are selected. This makes public employers who hire large numbers of employees each year, for example prison guards or police officers, susceptible to discrimination claims based on latent defects in their selection methods or tests.

In addition to seeking a variety of remedial damages in these cases, such as priority hiring and reforming an organization's hiring and promotion procedures, the CRD also will pursue monetary damages. Mr. Perez also announced his intention to pursue other types of claims against employers, such as those arising Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), which protects reemployment rights of employees serving in the military. Mr. Perez also mentioned Project Civic Access, which seeks to enforce compliance with the public accommodation provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act by sending investigators to evaluate state and local government facilities. The heightened focus on enforcement efforts already has begun to increase investigation, prosecution and litigation in each of these areas.

The CRD's renewed focus on vigorous enforcement and prosecution of cases, without any testimony regarding an actual increase in the number of violations, is consistent with the renewed focus on enforcement within the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and other federal agencies under the Obama Administration. State and local governments that come under investigation by the Department of Justice, the CRD, or any other federal government agency should seek legal counsel early in the process to ensure the investigation proceeds in a lawful manner and the potential damages available, if any, are limited.

Public Employers Beware: The Other Religious Discrimination Claim

Adam Santucci — Sun, 17 Jan 2010 17:19:37 -0500

As a public employer, your actions are considered the actions of the government or the “state.” This dual persona brings with it additional obligations and challenges that private employers do not face. Some of these obligations include the requirement to provide due process rights to employees, and the challenges include a seemingly endless variety of lawsuits that your employees may bring against you. Lawsuits unique to public sector employers include unreasonable search and seizure challenges, including e-mail and text message based challenges, free speech challenges, and alleged violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from endorsing any particular religion and, in fact, endorsing religion at all. In a recent case involving the Establishment Clause, Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Association v. Clarke, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found that a county sheriff violated the Establishment Clause by having a Christian organization deliver a faith-based presentation to employees at mandatory meetings. The court concluded that the Sheriff, by introducing the Christian group and allowing them to speak at mandatory employee meetings, either endorsed the group or at the very least, gave the appearance of endorsing the group. This endorsement constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause, and the Sheriff’s Department was ordered to cease and desist from further violations and was also required to pay over $38,000 in fees and costs.

While it may seem like an easy decision for most savvy Human Resource practitioners to avoid supporting one religion over another in the workplace, this is something that still occurs outside of the watchful eye of HR. It is true that Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Association is an extreme case, but it is still a good reminder that as a public employer, you must avoid showing preference toward one religion over another. Because this message does not always trickle down to all supervisors and managers, the facts of this case serve as a good reminder to briefly discuss at your next executive staff meeting or supervisor and manager training session.

COBRA SUBSIDY EXTENDED AND NEW COBRA NOTICES REQUIRED

Adam Santucci — Wed, 06 Jan 2010 14:03:17 -0500

On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which expanded health care insurance benefits under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). The ARRA granted individuals involuntarily terminated from employment between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009, a subsidy to cover 65 percent of their monthly COBRA premiums for up to nine months. The subsidy is available for individuals with an annual income of less than $125,000 (single) or $250,000 (joint filers). Individuals earning between $125,000 ($250,000 joint) and $145,000 ($290,000 joint) are eligible for "phased-in" assistance.

Under the ARRA, plan administrators are not only responsible for providing notice of the subsidy to eligible individuals, they must also pay the cost of the subsidy up front. The plan administrator may then file IRS Form 941 to claim a payroll tax credit in the amount of subsidies paid. In other words, employers must front 65 percent of eligible individuals' COBRA premiums in exchange for a credit against their payroll taxes.

UPDATE! On December 19, 2009, President Obama signed the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations Act (Act), which extends the COBRA premium subsidy provisions and places additional notification requirements on plan administrators. The Act provides eligible individuals with an additional six months of subsidized coverage, extending the availability of the COBRA premium subsidy from nine to 15 months. The Act also allows individuals involuntarily terminated on or before February 28, 2010 to receive the subsidy, extending the original eligibility deadline of December 31, 2009, by two months. Employees involuntarily terminated in January and February 2010 will now be eligible for the subsidy.

Furthermore, if an individual was eligible for the COBRA premium assistance under the original ARRA, and that eligibility already expired, then that individual may receive the continued premium subsidy retroactively. In order to take advantage of the retroactive coverage, the individual must pay 35 percent of the premium by February 17, 2010, or within 30 days of receipt of the extension notice described below, whichever is later. If eligible individuals already have paid the full COBRA premium, then the plan administrator must either refund the over payments or credit future premium payments.

The Act also contains additional notification requirements that require plan administrators to provide eligible individuals with information regarding the extended subsidy.

By February 17, 2010, plan administrators must issue new notices to any individual who was assistance eligible on or after October 31, 2009. Individuals who experience an involuntary termination of employment on or after December 19, 2009, must receive a notice containing updated information regarding the subsidy within the normal time frame for providing COBRA notification. Additionally, individuals eligible for the COBRA continuation coverage who are in transition, meaning those eligible individuals whose initial premium assistance period of nine months expired before December 19, 2009, must be provided notice of the extended subsidy within 60 days of the beginning of their transition period. This notice must be given to those in transition regardless of whether they paid the full premium amount to continue coverage, or whether they ceased paying COBRA premiums. In addition to describing the extended premium assistance available, the notice must contain information on the availability of retroactive coverage.

The new and updated notices must contain information regarding the following:
• the extension of benefits from nine months to 15 months;
• an explanation that the eligibility period runs through February 28, 2010;
• that qualified beneficiaries have the right to reinstate coverage retroactively by paying subsidized premiums by February 17, 2010 (or by 30 days after the notice is provided); and
• that a refund is available to those eligible individuals who paid the full amount of the COBRA premium.

It is unclear whether the IRS or the Department of Labor plans to issue any model notices as with the notices required by the ARRA. The Act, however, does make clear that rules governing the new notices will be similar to the notice rules contained in the ARRA.

In summary, via the extensions provided in the Act, individuals involuntarily terminated between September 1, 2008 and February 28, 2010 are eligible for up to 15 months of COBRA premium assistance. The premium subsidy ends when the individual is eligible for other group coverage or Medicare, after 15 months of receiving premium assistance, or when the maximum period of COBRA coverage ends (typically 18 months), whichever is first. Appropriate notice regarding the availability of the extended premium assistance must be given to all eligible individuals.

Pennsylvania Based Employees May Be Entitled to Overtime for work in Foreign Countries

Adam Santucci — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 14:22:39 -0500

Recently, the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania delivered some potentially bad news to Pennsylvania employers. In Truman v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., the Court held that an employee may be entitled to overtime payments for time worked in foreign countries under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law. The plaintiff, Michael Truman, worked for D.B.A., Inc. for a little over a year, and during that time worked in both England and in Canada. Truman sought overtime pay for overtime hours he worked in excess of 40 hours per week in both England and Canada.

At the summary judgment stage, the Truman admitted that he was not entitled to overtime payments under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) which specifically exempts work in foreign countries from overtime pay entitlements. However, Truman argued that under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act he was entitled to such overtime payments because the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act provided for benefits exceeding those under the FLSA. The Court stated that unlike the FLSA, there was no specific exemption for working in foreign countries under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act. The Court also noted that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania previously held that work in other states by Pennsylvania-based employees was covered by Pennsylvania Law. The Court concluded that there is nothing within the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act that restricts the benefits of the Act to work performed within the United States.

The Court also noted that the FLSA allows for state laws to provide greater protection than allowed under the FLSA, and therefore, there was no preemption issue in this case. The Court noted that there was no implied foreign work exemption under the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act, and therefore, for Pennsylvania residents working for Pennsylvania-based employers, there is no exemption from overtime pay requirements for work in foreign countries. The Court said that the analysis under the FLSA and the Pennsylvania laws is only identical if the language of the FLSA and state laws is identical. In this case, the analysis was different because the language was not identical, and therefore, the Court allowed the Plaintiff to move forward on his claim that he was entitled to overtime pay for hours worked in a foreign country under Pennsylvania law.

This decision has the potential to be costly for some Pennsylvania employers. How the courts will define who is a Pennsylvania resident and who is a Pennsylvania based employee for purposes of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Law and the Pennsylvania Wage Collection Act is unclear. These, and other issues, will need to be defined by the Courts in the future. In the meantime, employers are well advised to review their compensation practices in light of this decision.

Third Circuit Distinguishes "Sexual Stereotyping" from "Sexual Orientation" Discrimination

Michael Moore — Tue, 01 Sep 2009 15:28:27 -0500

In Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., the Third Circuit reversed a district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of an employer on a claim of gender stereotyping discrimination. The claim was brought by an admittedly homosexual employee who alleged he was subject to gender discrimination, retaliation and religious discrimination based on his effeminate actions and mannerisms. The Third Circuit acknowledged that Title VII does not protect employees from discrimination based upon their sexual preference, but may allow claims for gender stereotyping. The Third Circuit noted that a “gender stereotyping” claim was first recognized by the Supreme Court as a viable cause of action in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

In reversing summary judgment, the Third Circuit held that

"…every case of sexual orientation discrimination cannot translate into a triable case of gender stereotyping discrimination, which would contradict Congress’s decision not to make sexual orientation discrimination cognizable under Title VII. Nevertheless, [an employer] cannot persuasively argue that because [an employee] is homosexual, he is precluded from bringing a gender stereotyping claim. There is no basis in the statutory or case law to support the notion that an effeminate heterosexual man can bring a gender stereotyping claim while an effeminate homosexual man may not. As long as the employee — regardless of his or her sexual orientation — marshals sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude that harassment or discrimination occurred “because of sex,” the case is not appropriate for summary judgment."

The Court's decision raises obvious issues for employers in dealing with sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims. Employers cannot automatically assume the sexual orientation claims will be dismissed by a court as unprotected under Title VII. The allegations of discrimination must be evaluated in light of gender stereotypes.

In Prowel, the employee alleged the following facts in support of his claim:

"Prowel identifies himself as an effeminate man and believes that his mannerisms caused him not to “fit in” with the other men at Wise. Prowel described the “genuine stereotypical male” at the plant as follows:

[B]lue jeans, t-shirt, blue collar worker, very rough around the edges. Most of the guys there hunted. Most of the guys there fished. If they drank, they drank beer, they didn’t drink gin and tonic. Just you know, all into football, sports, all that kind of stuff, everything I wasn’t.

In stark contrast to the other men at Wise, Prowel testified that he had a high voice and did not curse; was very well-groomed; wore what others would consider dressy clothes; was neat; filed his nails instead of ripping them off with a utility knife; crossed his legs and had a tendency to shake his foot “the way a woman would sit”; walked and carried himself in an effeminate manner; drove a clean car; had a rainbow decal on the trunk of his car; talked about things like art, music, interior design, and decor; and pushed the buttons on the nale encoder with 'pizzazz.'"

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Small Employers may not be Liable for Employment Discrimination

Michael Moore — Wed, 22 Jul 2009 10:21:43 -0500

In Weaver v. Harpster, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that small employers (three or fewer employees) may not liable for acts of employment discrimination. Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), employers with four or more employees are prohibited from discriminating against their employees on the basis of sex. At common law, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason unless that reason violates a clear mandate of public policy emanating from either the Pennsylvania Constitution or statutory pronouncements. In this case, the Court addressed the intersection of the PHRA and the public policy exception to at-will employment, namely, whether an employer with fewer than four employees, although not subject to the PHRA's prohibition against sexual discrimination, nevertheless is prohibited from discriminating against an employee on the basis of sex. Because the PHRA reflects the unambiguous policy determination by the legislature that employers with fewer than four employees will not be liable for sex discrimination in Pennsylvania, the Court concluded that a common law claim for wrongful discharge, resulting from sex discrimination, will not lie against those employers.

The Court's seven justice majority continued its support for the employment at-will presumption by declining to recognize an additional public policy exception based on Pennsylvania's statutes or Constitutional protections. The two justice dissent would have found a public policy exception to the at-will employment presumption based on both the PHRA and Pennsylvania Constitution. Small employers should keep in mind that they escape coverage of the PHRA, but may be covered by local ordinances prohibiting employment discrimination.

PA Department of Insurance Provides Mini-COBRA Guidance

Michael Moore — Wed, 15 Jul 2009 09:31:24 -0500

Pennsylvania's Mini-COBRA law became effective July 10, 2009. The law provides COBRA-like medical insurance continuation to employees who work for smaller business not covered by the federal law. The Department of Insurance clarified some of the coverage issues and provided a model notice for covered businesses to provide to employees. Employees who elect Mini-COBRA may also be eligible for a 65% premium assistance provided by the federal stimulus legislations. Fortunately, small business will not need to "front" the premium assistance payment because Pennsylvania's Mini-COBRA law places the obligation on the insurer.

President Obama focuses on Immigration Compliance and Enforcement

Michael Moore — Fri, 10 Jul 2009 16:42:20 -0500

The President and Vice President met with a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders in late June to discuss one of today's most contentious issues – immigration – and how to go about reforming the broken immigration system. One of the White House's focal points for immigration reform is enhanced enforcement efforts. The President noted that the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Labor are working to crack down on employers who are exploiting illegal workers.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is launching a new audit initiative by issuing Notices of Inspection (NOIs) to 652 businesses nationwide - which is more than ICE issued throughout all of last fiscal year. The notices alert business owners that ICE will be inspecting their hiring records to determine whether or not they are complying with employment eligibility verification laws and regulations. Inspections are one of the most powerful tools the federal government has to enforce employment and immigration laws. This new initiative illustrates ICE's increased focus on holding employers accountable for their hiring practices and efforts to ensure a legal workforce.

The Department of Homeland Security announced that the Administration will push ahead with full implementation of the rule requiring use of E-Verify by government contractors, which will apply to federal solicitations and contract awards Government-wide starting on September 8, 2009. The federal contractor rule extends use of the E-Verify system to covered federal contractors and subcontractors, including those who receive American Recovery and Reinvestment Act funds. DHS also announced it will scrap the Social Security No-Match Rule, which has never been implemented and has been blocked by court order, in favor of the more modern and effective E-Verify system. On July 8, the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill that will require federal contractors to use the government’s voluntary electronic employee verification system known as E-Verify. The spending bill also extends E-Verify for three more years.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) also recently announced that the Employment Eligibility Verification form I-9 (Rev. 02/02/09) currently on the USCIS Web site will continue to be valid for use beyond June 30, 2009. USCIS has requested that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approve the continued use of the current version of Form I-9. While this request is pending, the Form I-9 (Rev. 02/02/09) will not expire. USCIS will update Form I-9 when the extension is approved. Employers will be able to use either the Form I-9 with the new revision date or the Form I-9 with the 02/02/09 revision date at the bottom of the form.

Prohibition on Excessive Overtime in Health Care Act effective July 1, 2009

Michael Moore — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 09:49:42 -0500

The Prohibition on Excessive Overtime in Health Care Act (Act 102) became effective on July 1, 2009. Health care facilities covered by the law include hospitals, ASCs, hospices, long-term care facilities and other inpatient facilities, but it excludes private physician offices and group practices. Employees protected by the law include all nonsupervisory employees involved in direct patient care activities or clinical services, including individuals employed through a temporary service or employment agency. Physicians, physician’s assistants, dentists, and job classes with no direct patient care are excluded from the overtime limitations.

A health care facility cannot compel a protected employee to work more than an agreed to, predetermined and regular daily shift exclusive of “on call” time, unless one of the following exceptions applies:

the employee voluntarily agrees;
there is an unforeseen emergent circumstance but as a “last resort”, after exhausting other staffing options and giving the employee one hour arrange for family care alternatives;
the extended work is required to complete a patient care procedure already in progress, but only if the employee’s departure would have an adverse effect on the patient.

Employers are permitted to have agreed upon, predetermined and regular shifts greater than 8 hours; however, an employee who volunteers to work more than 12 consecutive hours shall be entitled to 10 hours off duty but may waive the entitlement. Employers may not retaliate against employees who refuse to accept work in excess of the limits. Employers who violate the law are subject to fines ranging from $100 to $1000 per violation.

The Department of Labor and Industry has posted a FAQ on its website summarizing common compliance questions. There is also a summary of the law.

Supreme Court Rejects choice of Lawsuits Defense

Michael Moore — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 08:37:58 -0500

A governmental employer cannot throw out a employment promotion test because it thinks that the test results have a disparate impact against a minority group unless there is a "strong basis in evidence" to believe it will be liable for discrimination unless it rejects the test results. Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer’s decision that is based on race even if the employer will be sued regardless of which group it favors.

In Ricci v. DeStefano, the City of New Haven, Connecticut used a validated test to select firefighters for promotion. However, the results the promotion examination to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions showed that white candidates had scored higher than other minority candidates. Strong public opposition to use of the test followed. Confronted with arguments both for and against certifying the test results—and threats of a lawsuit either way—the City threw out the results based on the statistical racial disparity.

White and Hispanic firefighters who scored well on the exams but were denied a chance at promotions by the City’s refusal to certify the test results, sued the City, alleging that discarding the test results discriminated against them based on their race in violation of Title VII. The City responded that had it certified the test results, it could have faced Title VII liability for adopting a practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the City, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed holding that City discriminated against the White and Hispanic firefighters who passed the test because there was not a strong basis in evidence to throw out the test scores in response to their disparate impact. The City conducted hearings on the test results and determined that there was a statistical adverse impact on minority employees. This showed that there was at least a prima facie case of disparate impact. However, this fear of litigation alone cannot justify the City’s reliance on race to the detriment of individuals who passed the examinations and qualified for promotions. To reject the test, the City needed to go further and show that the exams at issue were not job related and consistent with business necessity, or if there existed an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative that served the City’s needs. Based on the record the parties developed through discovery, there was no substantial basis in evidence that the test was deficient in either respect.

Under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional, disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action. The Court’s analysis held that the City’s actions would violate Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition absent some valid defense. All the evidence demonstrates that the City rejected the test results because the higher scoring candidates were white. Without some other justification, this express, race-based decision-making is prohibited. The question, therefore, is whether the purpose to avoid disparate-impact liability excuses what otherwise would be prohibited disparate-treatment discrimination.

The Court held that certain government actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are constitutional only where there is a “strong basis in evidence” that the remedial actions were necessary. The same interests are at work in the interplay between Title VII’s disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions. However, the Court gave little other guidance on how employers may use tests in the hiring and promotion processes.

Pennsylvania Enacts "Mini-COBRA" requiring Insurers to offer Continuation of Health Coverage Options for Employees of Small Businesses

Michael Moore — Wed, 24 Jun 2009 11:20:46 -0500

Effective July 10, 2009, medical insurers covering small employers in Pennsylvania will be required to offer COBRA-like continuation coverage to qualified employees and their eligible dependents. The new law covers small employers who have between two and 19 employees on a typical business day during the preceding calendar year.

The so-called mini-COBRA coverage expands on the federal COBRA law that covers employers with at least 20 employees and allows employees who are involuntarily terminated to qualify under a federal economic stimulus law for a 65% federal subsidy of both COBRA and mini-COBRA premiums.

Like the federal law, qualifying events for coverage under the new Pennsylvania mini-COBRA are loss of group coverage due to termination of employment, death, divorce or marital separation. However, there are some key differences between the federal COBRA and Pennsylvania’s mini-COBRA law, some of which are as follows:

Under the Pennsylvania law, an employee or dependent must have been continuously covered by medical insurance for three months prior to termination of coverage and may not be covered or eligible for coverage under another medical plan or Medicare.
Under the Pennsylvania law, continuation coverage must be extended for nine months; under federal COBRA law, coverage is available up to 18 months when employment is terminated and 36 months in situations involving death, divorce or legal separation.
Under the Pennsylvania mini-COBRA law, beneficiaries can be charged a premium up to 105% of the group rate; federal COBRA beneficiaries can be charged a premium of up to 102% of the group rate.
Pennsylvania mini-COBRA obligations apply to insurers; federal COBRA applies to employers that provide medical coverage through self-insurance or insurance products.

Employers and insurers will need to provide notices to employees and dependents of the provisions of the new law as well as their rights to elect continuation coverage upon the occurrence of a qualifying event.

Supreme Court Age Discrimination Decision in "Mixed-Motive" Cases Invites Legislative Reversal

Michael Moore — Fri, 19 Jun 2009 09:22:16 -0500

The United States Supreme Court decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. creates a rift between the treatment of so called "mixed-motive" cases under the ADEA and Title VII. Under Title VII, an employee may allege that he suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible considerations—i.e., a “mixed-motives” case. If a Title VII plaintiff shows that discrimination was a “motivating” or a “ substantial” factor in the employer’s action, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that it would have taken the same action regardless of that impermissible consideration.

The Supreme Court declined to apply the mixed-motive burden shifting to ADEA cases holding that a plaintiff bringing an ADEA disparate-treatment claim must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.

Congress amended Title VII to explicitly authorize discrimination claims where an improper consideration was “a motivating factor” for the adverse action, see 42 U. S. C. §§2000e–2(m) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B),while leaving the ADEA language unchanged. The Supreme Court viewed this omission as a congressional policy statement and declined to recognize the so called "mixed motive" analysis in ADEA claims. However the Courts' opinion invites Congress to fix the discrepancy by legislatively negating the Court's decision much like it did in with both the ADA Amendments Act and the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act:

Unlike Title VII, the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a motivating factor. Moreover, Congress neglected to add such a provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII to add §§2000e–2(m) and 2000e–5(g)(2)(B), even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several ways, see Civil Rights Act of 1991, §115, 105 Stat. 1079; id., §302, at 1088.

Expect Congress to harmonize the treatment of Title VII and ADEA claims so that the mixed motive analysis applies to both. Congress should really fix the differentiation between age discrimination cases and other discrimination claims. For some reason unknown to me, Congress placed protections from age discrimination in the Fair Labor Standards Act (governing topics like minimum wage and overtime) rather than just adding "age" to the list of Title VII's protected classifications. As a result, federal age discrimination claims have different rights, procedures, and damages.

Employers should Protect Registered Trademarks and Company Names from Appropriation on Facebook

Michael Moore — Fri, 12 Jun 2009 09:15:51 -0500

On June 9, Facebook, the social networking website, publicly announced that beginning Saturday, June 13 at 12:01 a.m. U.S. EDT, it will allow users to adopt personalized username URLs (e.g., facebook.com/yourname). Trademark owners who want to prevent their trademarks from being registered as a Facebook username URL by another Facebook user should take action as soon as possible and preferably before Saturday.

According to a release by our Intellectual Property Group, it is suggested that once a URL is assigned to a user it cannot be transferred, and under the new Facebook policy it can never be used again, even by the rightful owner of the trademark. Trademark owners who might someday consider marketing through Facebook are encouraged to reserve their trademarks before Saturday, June 13 when the general registration opens.

Trademark owners can reserve their trademark on the Facebook platform by submitting relevant information to Facebook through its trademark protection contact form, available at Preventing the Registration of a Username | Facebook. It appears that a separate form is required for each trademark and registration number. Facebook promises to then advise the trademark owner when the username URL is available for the owner to adopt.

Who is a "Management Level Employee" for Imputing Notice of Co-worker Harassment to an Employer?

Michael Moore — Tue, 09 Jun 2009 16:00:07 -0500

An employer's liability for co-worker harassment exists if the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action. In other words, an employer may be liable for non-supervisory co-worker harassment if the employer was negligent in failing to discover the co-worker harassment or in responding to a report of harassment. Knowledge of a sexually hostile work environment arises when a "management level employee" obtains enough information to raise the probability of sexual harassment in the mind of a reasonable employer.

In its decision in Huston v. The Proctor & Gamble Paper Products Corp., the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an employee’s knowledge of allegations of co-worker sexual harassment may typically be imputed to the employer in two circumstances:

"where the employee is sufficiently senior in the employer’s governing hierarchy, or otherwise in a position of administrative responsibility over employees under him, such as a departmental or plant manager, so that such knowledge is important to the employee’s general managerial duties. In this case, the employee usually has the authority to act on behalf of the employer to stop the harassment, for example, by disciplining employees or by changing their employment status or work assignments. The employee’s knowledge of sexual harassment is then imputed to the employer because it is significant to the employee’s general mandate to manage employer resources, including humanresources;" or
"where the employee is specifically employed to deal with sexual harassment. Typicallysuch an employee will be part of the employer’s human resources, personnel, or employee relations group or department. Often an employer will designate a human resources manager as a point person for receiving complaints of harassment. In this circumstance, employee knowledge is imputed to the employer based on the specific mandate from the employer to respond to and report on sexual harassment."

The court went on to clarify that mere supervisory authority over the performance of work assignments by other co-workers is not, by itself, sufficient to qualify an employee for management level status unless the worker has a mandate generally to regulate the workplace environment. This reasonably bright line test should help employers to avoid allegations of constructive knowledge of workplace problems; provided, job descriptions clearly define the employee's job duties. Employers should examine generalized policy statements that create a "duty" to report workplace harassment or mistreatment.

E-Verify Rule for Federal Contractors Delayed until September 8, 2009

Michael Moore — Tue, 09 Jun 2009 13:23:10 -0500

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) announced the third postponement of the implementation of the final rule requiring federal contractors and subcontractors to begin using E-Verify system which is now delayed until Sept. 8, 2009.

The Civilian Agency Acquisition Council and the Defense Acquisition Regulations Council (collectively known as the Federal Acquisitions Regulatory Councils) will published an amendment in the Federal Register on June 5, 2009, postponing the applicability of the final rule until Sept. 8, 2009. The rule was first published on Nov. 14, 2008 requiring federal contractors and subcontractors to agree to electronically verify the employment eligibility of their employees. I previously summarized the rule in "E-Verify Final Regulations Issued Requiring Government Contractors and Subcontractors to Verify Employment for New and Existing Employees who Perform Contract Work."

May Unemployment Rate increases to 9.4%

Michael Moore — Fri, 05 Jun 2009 10:44:05 -0500

The Bureau of Labor Statistics numbers for May show the national unemployment rate reaching a 26 year high to 9.4% up from 8.9% in April. The number of unemployed persons increased by 787,000 to 14.5 million. Since the start of the recession in December 2007, the number of unemployed persons has risen by 7.0 million, and the unemployment rate has grown by 4.5 percentage points.

Unemployment rates rose in May for adult men (9.8%), adult women (7.5%), whites (8.6%), and Hispanics (12.7%). The jobless rates for teenagers (22.7%) and blacks (14.9%) were little changed over the month. The unemployment rate for Asians was 6.7% in May, not seasonally adjusted, up from 3.8 percent a year earlier.

The BLS statistics by job class and sector continue to show weakness in the construction, manufacturing, wholesale/retail and leisure/hospitality sectors. All sectors are as follows:

Sector of the Economy	Unemployment Rate for May 2009	Unemployment Rate for April 2009
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction	13.3%	16.1%
Construction	19.2%	18.7%
Manufacturing	12.6%	12.4%
Durable goods	13.2%	12.8%
Nondurable goods	9.0%	11.8%
Wholesale and retail trade	11.9%	9.0%
Transportation and utilities	8.5%	9.0%
Information	9.5%	10.1%
Financial activities	5.7%	6.0%
Professional and business services	10.9%	10.4%
Education and health services	4.9%	4.6%
Leisure and hospitality	11.9%	10.2%
Government workers	3.1%	2.6%

Employment Law implications of Obesity and BMI after the ADA Amendments Act

Michael Moore — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 14:47:49 -0500

The ADA Amendments Act re-wrote the definition of disability so that it will likely include obesity-related health conditions and perhaps obesity itself as a protected disability. Before the ADA Amendments, being overweight and even obese was not generally considered a "disability". For example in EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., a court determined that non-physiological morbid obesity was not a protected disability.

The EEOC is considering regulations regarding the equal employment provisions of the ADAAA. In December 2008, the EEOC commissioners deadlocked along party lines on whether to approve former Chair Naomi Earp’s proposed regulations. According to the EEOC’s agenda, a notice of proposed rulemaking will be issued by August of this year. I predict that obesity will become a protected disability requiring employers to reasonably accommodate the condition. I also expect that the correlation between BMI and obesity will be challenged by agruing that disqualifying an employee based on a high BMI consistitutes "regarded as" disability discrimination.

The ADA changes have important implications for businesses including employment discrimination claims, health plan design, and wellness program administration. There are several issues that merit discussion when examining obesity such as following.

What is Body Mass Index (BMI)? BMI has become the unofficial scientific measure for assessing obesity. BMI is a function of height and weight (BMI calculator). The Center for Disease Control classifies a person who has a BMI of less than 18.5 as underweight; normal is 18.5-24.9; overweight is 25-29.9; obese is over 30; and extremely obese is over 40.

What is the BMI analysis telling us about our weight? A Report by the Trust for America's Health recently disclosed statistics about obesity trends. In the Report, Pennsylvania had the 24th highest rate of adult obesity with 25.7 percent of its population having a BMI over 30. The Report correlated obesity figures with other factors like Diabetes and Hypertension rates. It also noted levels of admitted physical activity (or inactivity). Twenty-Four percent of Pennsylvanians admit no physical activity.

How good is BMI as a measure of obesity? Martica Heaner points out the limitations of BMI in her posts BMI Blues and Is Body Mass Index a Bad Measure?:

The BMI works well for research purposes, but doesn’t necessarily translate precisely to the individual. Unfortunately, it tends to convey that people that exercise regularly, for example, are overweight, when they are not actually overfat. A fit person tends to have more muscle, so their body weight is a reflection of body fat as well as muscle and other lean tissue.

Since the problem with being overfat is that health risks are increased, a BMI in the overweight range is probably not a negative indicator for a fit person. Regular exercise, low body fat and increased muscle mass are all factors that tend to outweigh any health risks suggested by a higher BMI.

Is there correlation between high BMI and bad health? According to the CDC, the BMI ranges were established based on the health consequences associated with obesity as determined by different BMIs. Some, like Paul Campos in his book, The Obesity Myth, challenge this conclusion. However, the correlation between high BMI and bad health is quickly becoming an assumption.

Other than being incorrectly labeled "overweight" or "obese", why should we care whether BMI is a accurate health status predictor? BMI is fast becoming the legal standard for determining whether someone is "obese" and therefore a "health risk". Those with high BMIs can face increase cost and eligibility barriers for certain employee benefits.

Individual insurance policies for life, disability and medical insurance almost universally use underwriting procedures that take into account BMI as a basis for determining insurability and premium. A survey by the Texas Office of Public Insurance Counsel found that insurance company individual health plan underwriting guidelines used BMI as a basis to deny coverage, charge a higher premium, and offer less coverage. The California Insurance Commission has made comments alerting consumers about BMI as a basis for insurance denial.

Some group health plans are community rated and not subject to medical underwriting. These plans calculate premium based on the expected claims of the community not the individual employer group. Other group health insurance programs can be subject to medical underwriting in which BMI analysis and other factors will be used to price the coverage for the group. An employer with a compliment of employees with potential for high claims (including high BMI) will face higher premiums or denial. Likewise, self-insured medical plans that utilize stop loss coverage may undergo medical underwriting where BMI will be factored into the rate for reinsurance.

Group health plan wellness program incentives may be keyed to BMI targets for premium discounts and other incentives. The availability of incentives to those with high BMI is subject to limitations including situations when it is "unreasonably difficult" or "medically inadvisable" for a participant to attempt to achieve the BMI standard.