New Hampshire Family Law Blog

Why You Need a Coach in your Collaborative Divorce

Kysa Crusco — Wed, 15 May 2013 21:28:33 -0500

New Hampshire collaborative practice employs an interdisciplinary model, which is fancy for saying that the professional team includes attorneys, a coach and a financial neutral. When the topic of hiring a coach comes up, I sometimes receive this feedback:

Why do we need a coach?
I already have a therapist, isn't that the same thing?
It's another expense in the process.
Let's see how it goes without one and we can always hire one later.

I intended to write a thorough and thoughful post about the need for a coach, and then found this article Do You Really Need a Divorce Coach in the Collaborative Process? by Helene Taylor. I really can't say it better myself, and it answers all the frequently asked questions. It's a must read if you are considering a collaborative divorce. I especially love her explanation of the difference between a therapist and a divorce coach:

A therapist is someone you bring your luggage to and she helps you open it up and decipher the contents; a divorce coach is someone you bring your luggage to and, without opening it, she helps you carry it across the street.

From my attorney perspective, a coach helps me do my job better and reach the end result quicker. The coach, who is far better trained in the emotional aspects of a divorce than I am, can facilitate the emotional discussions and keep lines of communication between the parties open so that the legal discussions can be more productive.

For more information about collaborative divorce, check out the information video from the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals. You can also download a free Collaborative Divorce Knowledge Kit.

Unbundled Legal Services

Kysa Crusco — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 08:22:01 -0500

Unbundled legal services, also known as limited scope representation, allow you to hire a lawyer to do certain parts of your case, instead of the traditional soup to nuts representation. Some clients choose unbundled services because they cannot afford full representation, and some advice is better than no advice. Other clients feel capable of handling certain parts of the case, but need assistance with other portions.

Unbundled services can be customized to fit your needs, and can include

Representation at a specific hearing, such as a temporary hearing
Draft proposed orders or pleadings
Attending mediation
Assisting with discovery preparations
Consulting during your case to provide assistance and advice

Payment arrangements for unbundled services can be tailored to the specific service. For example, paying a small retainer for ongoing advice, or paying for an hour at the end of a meeting to prepare documents.

Lawyers providing unbundled services will ask the client to sign a consent form that clearly spells out what services are, and are not, going to be provided, in addition to a fee agreement.

Interview: Same-sex divorces are a tiny but growing part of New Hampshire

Kysa Crusco — Tue, 09 Apr 2013 20:34:03 -0500

I had the pleasure of being interviewed by David Brooks of the Nashua Telegraph for the article Same-sex divorces are a tiny but growing part of New Hampshire. As I observed, the reasons in a gay or lesbian divorce, and the emotions that come with it, are no different than any opposite-sex divorce. The differences come from the legal issues created by DOMA and other states who fail to recognize same-sex marriage.

I learned something new from David, who was the first person to obtain same-sex divorce statistics from the State of New Hampshire. By the numbers:

Marriages Divorces

Female couples 1,628 61

Male couples 623 23

Opposite-sex couples 26,718 15,222

The article also includes an interesting side note about the male/female ratios of marriages and divorces in New Hampshire same-sex couples.

As of last month , New Hampshire has seen 1,628 female couples get married, which is 2½ times as many as the 623 male couples who have gotten married.

Over that same period, 61 female couples have gotten divorced, separated or had their marriage annulled – also 2½ times the figure for males, 23.

A part of our discussion that did not make it into the article was David's question about whether my practice was devoted solely to these gay and lesbian divorce and parenting matters. While it is an interesting area of the law that I enjoy practicing in, my hope is that DOMA will soon be overturned and there won't be any difference in the near future. Although I currently handle a large number of same-sex cases, it would be silly to exclusively devote to a law practice to an area of the law that will eventually no longer exist when marriage equality is achieved.

What to Expect: First Collaborative 4-Way Meeting

Kysa Crusco — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 19:05:38 -0500

You and your spouse have chosen the collaborative process for your divorce and hired your attorneys. Now what? The first 4-way, or 5-way if you have hired a coach, will get the collaborative process started.

Generally, you should expect to cover the following items in your first meeting:

Review and sign the collaborative participation agreement
Share your reasons for choosing collaborative for your divorce
Review the collaborative roadmap to understand each stage of the process
Discuss dates to obtain valuations, such as an appraisal for the house or business
Talk over the cost of collaborative and how it will be paid
Agree on neutrals (coach and financial)
Schedule the next meeting
Set up temporary parenting/cash flow arrangements
Put together homework list, such as preparing financial affidavit

You may feel anxious, stressed, or nervous, and that's all normal. Consider how you would be feeling if you were about to litigate and go to court for the first time. The collaborative approach won’t always be easy, but you will come out the other end better off than litigation.

2013 Child Support Guidelines

Kysa Crusco — Wed, 03 Apr 2013 21:04:36 -0500

The 2013 Child Support Guidelines have been released. Highlights of the new guidelines:

The guidelines are effective April 1, 2013
The self-support reserve has increased $31 from $1,070 in 2012 to $1,101 for 2013
For a couple with a combined gross income of $6,000, the total combined child support figure for one child increased from $1,147.90 to $1,174.51.

The Division of Child Support has a useful child support calculator that you can find here.

Modification of child support in New Hampshire

Kysa Crusco — Mon, 18 Feb 2013 12:17:57 -0500

After a final order of child support is entered, either party may seek a modification at any time based on a substantial change in circumstances that has made the original order unfair and improper. A party may also seek a modification if more than three years has passed since the date of the final order without a need to show a substantial change in circumstances.

Cases are always fact specific, and your situation may be different then the examples laid out here. Situations vary by income, expenses, new children and stepchildren, distance between the homes, or special needs of a child. The court hearing your case will examine the specific factual circumstances of your family to determine whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances that make the original order improper or unfair. Therefore, it is important to succinctly and accurately make your case for the modification.

Examples of situations that could warrant modification include:

Involuntary loss of employment.
Reduction or increase in income
Change in residential responsibility or parenting time.
Child graduating from high school or turning 18, while younger still children still require child support.
A parent returning to school. In Re Lynn.

There are several circumstances that the New Hampshire Supreme Court has ruled that modification of child support should be denied. Some of the circumstances include:

A parent’s relocation itself, without more evidence, is not a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify child support. In Re Adams.
The remarriage of either party does not as a matter of law warrant a modification of child support. Peterson v. Buxton.
Absent other circumstances, the expected growth of a child and normal cost of living increases are not substantial chances or special circumstances that justify modification. Morrill v. Millard.

New Family Division Judge and Marital Master Assignments

Kysa Crusco — Tue, 08 Jan 2013 09:29:00 -0500

The following are the new judge and marital master assignments for family cases in the Circuit and Superior Court for January 2013 through March 2013:

1st Circuit

Colebrook

Hon. Paul D. Desjardins
(most of these hearings are held in Lancaster)

Berlin

To Be Determined

Lancaster

Hon. J. Peter Cyr

2nd Circuit

Lebanon

Hon. Lawrence A. Macleod, Jr.

Littleton

Hon. J. Peter Cyr

Haverhill

Hon. J. Peter Cyr

Plymouth

Hon. Thomas A. Rappa

3rd Circuit

Conway

Hon. Pamela D. Albee

Ossipee

Hon. James R. Patten

4th Circuit

Laconia

Michael H. Garner, Marital Master

5th Circuit

Claremont

Hon. John J. Yazinski

Newport

Hon. Bruce A. Cardello

6th Circuit

Concord

Nancy J. Geiger, Marital Master
Henrietta W. Luneau, Marital Master
Michael H. Garner, Marital Master

Franklin

Nancy J. Geiger, Marital Master
Hon. Edward M. Gordon

Hillsborough

Hon. Edward B. Tenney

Hooksett

Hon. Paul S. Moore

7th Circuit

Dover

Robert J. Foley, Marital Master

Rochester

Hon. Susan W. Ashley
Robert J. Foley, Marital Master

Cheshire Superior

Hon. John Kissinger

9th Circuit

Manchester

Hon. Susan B. Carbon
Thomas G. Cooper, Marital Master
Hon. Sharon DeVries
Bruce F. DalPra, Marital Master

Nashua

Hon. Julie A. Introcaso
Hon. Michael J. Ryan

Merrimack

Bruce F. DalPra, Marital Master
Hon. Clifford R. Kinghorn, Jr.

Goffstown

Hon. Paul S. Moore

10th Circuit

Brentwood

Henrietta W. Luneau, Marital Master
Hon. David G. LeFrancois

Salem

Thomas G. Cooper, Marital Master

Derry

Hon. Lucinda V. Sadler

Portsmouth

Hon. Jennifer A. Lemire

In Re Guardianship of Matthew L: A call for non-biological parents to secure parental rights

Kysa Crusco — Thu, 27 Dec 2012 23:45:37 -0500

The Supreme Court issued an opinion In Re Guardianship of Matthew L. on December 21, 2012.

The Facts

Mary and Joan began a committed relationship in 2004. Two years later, they began to plan for a family. Mary became pregnant in 2006 through artificial insemination, and gave birth to Matthew in April 2007. In June 2007, Mary and Joan petitioned to establish a co-guardianship to secure a legal, familial relationship between Matthew and Joan.

Mary ended her relationship with Joan in March 2008, and petitioned to terminate the co-guardianship a few months later. The motion was denied in October 2009. Mary renewed her request to terminate the co-guardianship in June 2010, and the issue went to trial in December 2011. Following the first day of trial, the Supreme Court issued its opinion In Re Guardianship of Reena D. Reena D. held that a guardianship established by consent requires the guardian to bear the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision is necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor and that terminating the guardianship will adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.

The trial resumed in March 2012, and the parties agreed that Reena D. applied. Joan asked for a continuance to prepare additional evidence and hire an expert since it was now her burden of proof. The trial court denied the motion, and following completion of the trial, ruled that Joan had failed to carry her burden that the continuation of the co-guardianship was necessary to provide for Matthew essential physical and safety needs. The court terminated the co-guardianship.

The Appeal

Joan appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to grant her motion to continue and that the trial court misinterpreted Reena D. to require her to prove both that the guardianship continued to be necessary to provide for Matthew’s essential physical and safety needs and that terminating the guardianship would adversely affect his psychological well-being.

The Holding

On the first question regarding the continuance, the Supreme Court held that it could not conclude that the trial court’s ruling was an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Where the trial court has broad discretion over its proceedings, and the record showed that the trial court had access to the GAL’s investigation and report which included information from Matthew’s therapist and the parent’s co-parenting counselor, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that neither a continuance nor a new trial was required.

On the issue interpreting Reena D., the Supreme Court held that the question had not been preserved before the trial court because the general rule requires a specific and contemporaneous objection before the trial court. The court noted that “this rule, which is based on common sense and judicial economy, recognizes that trial forums should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they are presented to the appellate court. Despite affirming the appeal, the opinion provides a lengthy discussion of the parties’ arguments because they raise public policy concerns that the legislature may wish to address. The resolution before the court is left to another day.

The thrust of Joan’s argument is that by requiring her to prove both parts of a conjunctive test, instead of either part, it creates a dissimilar standard between the test to obtain a guardianship over the objection of a parent and to continue a guardianship previously consented to. For example, to obtain a guardianship when a parent objects requires the petitioner to prove pursuant to RSA 463:8, III(B) that the guardianship is necessary to either provide for the physical and safety needs of the child or to avoid adverse effects to the child’s psychological well-being. Joan argues that the termination of the guardianship should also be granted only if neither of the situations is true. She argues that “having different standards for the creation and termination of guardianships would foster instability in children’s lives, thereby contravening the entire purpose of guardianships.”

Mary, on the other hand, argues that Joan is “comparing apples to oranges.” She says that it should be easier to terminate a guardianship obtained through consent then to win guardianship over the objection of a parent. Otherwise, it would be contrary to the public policy of encouraging a struggling parent to make a difficult choice and allow for a guardianship if it will be near impossible to terminate that guardianship over the objection of the guardian.

The Takeaway

This is an interesting case in that the major, important question before the court remains unanswered despite a lengthy discussion of the issue by the court. Prior to the holding in Reena D., the trial courts generally applied a standard requiring the parent to prove that neither the physical safety of the child required supplementation of care nor would the child’s psychological well-being be impacted by the termination of the guardianship. It is a significant change to then require it to be proved that both are still true. Where a parent may be able to care for the child’s physical and safety needs without the guardianship in place, it will more often be the case where there will be a significant adverse effect on the child taken away from his caregiver who he has formed an attachment. The amicus brief filed by the National Association of Social Workers aptly points out that “just as courts have recognized that children form attachment bonds with caregivers, and do so without regard to biological or legal relationships, so they have recognized that disrupting a child’s attachment bonds can severely harm him or her.” With the burden shifted by Reena D., the legislature should act to make the test for the termination of a previously consented to guardianship disjunctive.

One cannot help feeling bad for the little boy in this case who has lost the legal relationship to one of his parents at the urging of his other parent. The October 2009 trial court order found that “Mary and Joan referred to each other both as Matthew’s mother; encouraged Matthew to look to both of them as mothers; and held themselves out to others as Matthew’s mothers.” Furthermore, that “[b]oth Mary and Joan are excellent parents. Both love Matthew tremendously and show their love for him. … [T]he GAL had no concerns with either Mary or Joan as a parent. The GAL noted that each has different qualities for nurturing Matthew.”

This case is an important example, at the expense of the well-being of this little boy, that a non-biological parent, whether in a same-sex relationship or heterosexual relationship, must secure unbreakable parental rights to protect their relationship with their child. Guardianship, at least under the Reena D. standard, does not adequately secure those rights since the legal relationship and rights that come with a guardianship can be severed. Adoption is the only means that will provide permanent security to the child and the parent.

In the Matter of Reena D: Guardian bears burden of proof in termination of guardianship established by consent

Kysa Crusco — Wed, 26 Dec 2012 23:24:35 -0500

The New Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion In the Matter of Reena D. on December 28, 2011.

The Facts

In 2002, mother and father petitioned the court to grant guardianship of their twenty-two month old daughter Reena to the paternal grandfather and his wife. The purpose of the guardianship was to allow mother and father to travel to India to start a tile business and visit with the mother’s family. The court appointed the grandfather and his wife as Reena’s guardians.

In 2003, the grandfather died and his wife was appointed as sole guardian of Reena. Later that year, the mother and father petitioned to terminate the guardianship, and then entered into a temporary stipulation with the guardian allowing the guardianship to continue while the father obtained an alcohol assessment. A hearing on the motion to terminate would be held two months after the submission of the assessment.

Six months later, the guardian moved to dismiss the motion to terminate, and the court denied the termination of the guardianship without prejudice. In 2007, the parents renewed their motion to terminate the guardianship. A trial was conducted in 2009, where the father submitted the required alcohol assessment on the first day. The trial court placed the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, on the parents to show “that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision [was] no longer necessary to provide for [their daughter’s] essential physical and safety needs” and that terminating the guardianship would not “adversely affect [their daughter’s] psychological well-being.” The court determined that the parents had failed to meet their burden and denied the termination of the guardianship.

The Appeal

The father appealed the decision denying the termination of the guardianship over his daughter. He argues that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights by requiring him and his wife to bear the burden of proof to terminate the guardianship. He asserts that it is the respondent who should have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the guardianship was necessary to provide for Reena’s essential physical and safety needs and to prevent significant psychological harm to her.

The Holding

In a guardianship established by consent, the guardian bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing “that substitution or supplementation of parental care and supervision” is “necessary to provide for the essential physical and safety needs of the minor” and that terminating the guardianship will “adversely affect the minor’s psychological well-being.” The court determined that a fit parent, that is one who has not been adjudicated unfit, is entitled to the Troxel presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interests of their child. Thus, where a guardianship has been established by consent, a parent remains a fit parent and it is the guardian who must carry the burden of proof articulated in RSA 463:15, V. The court held that the clear and convincing standard applies, which was in keeping with other holdings of the court in disputes between parents and nonparents over custody of a minor such as In the Matter of R.A. & J.M. and In re Guardianship of Nicholas P.

Because the trial court applied the incorrect burden of proof, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying the termination of the guardianship and remanded it for further proceedings.

The Takeaway

When establishing a guardianship, the parent who consents to the guardianship will have an easier path to terminating the guardianship.

An interesting issue will occur for a guardianship established by consent and adjudication. It is often the case where one parent consents to the guardianship, while the other objects and the guardianship is granted over the objection. In a proceeding to terminate the guardianship, the parent who contested the guardianship must carry the burden of proof, where the parent who consented shifts the burden to the guardian. Having different burdens in the same matter will make things interesting.

In the Matter of Mason: Debt to a former spouse is non-dischargeable in bankruptcy

Kysa Crusco — Wed, 26 Dec 2012 15:26:46 -0500

The Facts

Husband and Wife divorced, and the final decree directs Wife to pay 50% of Husband’s 2006 taxes. Wife later files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing her obligation under the divorce decree in the bankruptcy petition. She lists Husband as a co-debtor on the tax debt, and as a creditor holding an unsecured non-priority claim. Wife received a discharge from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Each spouse petitioned the IRS for “innocent spouse” relief from their federal income tax liability for 2006. The Wife’s petition was granted, the Husband’s denied.

Husband filed a motion for contempt, asking the trial court to compel the wife to pay the obligation to him as ordered in the divorce decree. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that:

[Wife] sought to have her debt to [Husband] discharged in bankruptcy. Toward [that] end, in her bankruptcy petition [Wife] noticed [Husband] as a creditor for “2010: divorce settlement” in the amount of the original debt to the IRS. [Husband] was duly noticed that he was listed as a creditor and had the opportunity to litigate the issue in the bankruptcy court. [Husband] was granted a bankruptcy and the debt was discharged.

The Appeal

Husband appealed, arguing that: 1) the trial court erred as a matter of law when it found that Wife’s obligation to pay 50% of his 2006 federal income taxes had been discharged in bankruptcy because he failed to litigate in the bankruptcy court that her obligation was non-dischargeable; and, 2) that the trial court erred as a matter of law and unsustainably exercised its discretion when it declined to award him attorney’s fees and costs.

The Supreme Court issued an opinion on November 28, 2012.

The Holding

Wife’s debt to Husband to pay 50% of his 2006 taxes was automatically non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) as a debt to a former spouse. Even if the Wife was ordered to make payments on the obligation to a third party instead of directly to Husband, it is still a debt to the spouse and therefore non-dischargeable.

The trial court did not err when it declined to award Husband attorney’s fees. The general rule in New Hampshire is that each party must bear their own costs in litigation. A prevailing party may only recover attorney’s fees when it is authorized by statute, there is an agreement between the parties allocating or awarding attorney fees, or there is an established judicial exception to the general rule. Exceptions to the general rule include:

(W)here an individual is forced to seek judicial assistance to secure a clearly defined and established right if bad faith can be established; where litigation is instituted or unnecessarily prolonged through a party’s oppressive, vexatious, arbitrary, capricious or bad faith conduct; as compensation for those who are forced to litigate in order to enjoy what a court has already decreed; and for those who are forced to litigate against an opponent whose position is patently unreasonable.

The Supreme Court noted that although it held that Wife’s position was erroneous under the law, her position was not patently unreasonable. Therefore, Husband was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.

The Takeaway

Whether a financial obligation to a former spouse is incurred by an agreement approved by the court or by court order, that obligation cannot be discharged in bankruptcy. Plan on the obligation surviving the discharge, and ask your bankruptcy attorney whether the bankruptcy court can restructure the repayment of the debt.

Vote No on Question 2: Don't politicize our courts

Kysa Crusco — Mon, 05 Nov 2012 16:14:56 -0500

Voters will be asked on Nov. 6 to approve an amendment to Part 2, Art. 73-a of the New Hampshire Constitution. If the amendment passes, the legislature would be given final say over how the New Hampshire Judicial Branch, an independent branch of government, operates. I oppose the amendment because it allows for a legislative takeover of the courts that violates separation of powers.

Allowing the legislature to dictate court procedures will politicize the courts. Court rules would be subject to change whenever the legislature meets and according to the influence of the political party in control, creating unpredictable and inconsistent procedures and outcomes.

The Nashua Telegraph opined on October 2, 2012 that “the proposed amendment makes a mockery of the system of checks and balances crucial to American government” Instead of an independent judiciary, “the Legislature would be the boss of the New Hampshire’s court system.”

I am voting no on question 2, and I hope that you will join me.

In Re Lister: No credit on child support for SSI benefits received from child's disability

Kysa Crusco — Sun, 07 Oct 2012 14:37:13 -0500

In May 2011, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its opinion In the Matter of Richard Lister and Marianne Lister.

The Facts

Father and mother have a disabled adult son who resides with mother. Doctors indicate that the son will always be dependent on others for care. Due to his disability, the son receives Supplemental Security Income (SSI) of about $450 per month (this amount is reduced from the maximum benefit of $674 due to child support that he receives and/or government housing payments). Pursuant to RSA 461-A:14, IV, the son, as a disabled adult, is entitled to child support.

In 2010, the mother filed for a modification of child support, and requested an increase in child support. The father, who did not dispute that his son was eligible for child support, requested a dollar for dollar credit on his child support payments, citing In the Matter of State & Taylor and In the Matter of Angley–Cook & Cook.

The trial court modified the father’s child support obligation, refusing the grant a dollar for dollar credit, and increased the amount of child support. The trial court distinguished the SSI benefits, pointing out that the son is the source of the benefits and not the father.

The Appeal

The father appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that State & Taylor and Angley-Cook & Cook are controlling, and require the trial court to grant him a dollar for dollar credit, regardless of whether the benefits derive from the child or the parent.

The Holding

The trial court did not err in refusing to grant a dollar for dollar deduction in child support from son’s SSI, because the SSI benefits derive from the child and not the father. The SSI payments replace some of what the son would have earned but for his disability, instead of replacing lost income of the father.

The Takeaway

While parents may receive a credit on child support when the child receives social security benefits derived from the parent, there is no deduction for benefits based on the child’s disabilities. The Supreme Court urges the trial court to consider that increases in child support can affect the child’s eligibility for SSI, as child support is considered in calculating entitlement and need.

Raybeck and Raybeck: Providing a definition of cohabitation

Kysa Crusco — Sun, 07 Oct 2012 11:38:44 -0500

The Facts

Husband and Wife divorce after forty-two years of marriage in 2005. The divorce decree divides the property and requires the Husband to pay $25,000 per year for ten years. However, the decree provided that alimony would stop if the Wife cohabitated with “an unrelated adult male.”

In 2010, the Wife moved from her home, and rented it to reduce her expenses. She moved into the upper level of a single family home that was owned by a man she met through an online dating service. The man lived on the lower floor, and they had shared space on the middle floor of the home. The Wife did not pay rent, but she did pay $300 per month for food and often cooked for him.

The Husband stopped paying alimony when he learned of the move, and Wife sought enforcement of the alimony obligation. The trial court ruled that the Wife was not cohabitating under the terms of the decree and enforced the alimony obligation.

The Appeal

The Husband appealed the trial court’s order, initially arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that the Wife was not cohabitating. However, at oral argument the Husband abandoned that argument, and instead argued that the trial court did not a have a workable definition of cohabitation and urged the court to adopt a standard.

The Holding

The Supreme Court defines cohabitation as “a relationship between persons resembling that of a marriage.” Whether two people are cohabitating will depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The Supreme Court offered guidance on factors to be considered:

Whether the couple is living together continually
What the financial arrangements between the couple are and to the extent that they are entangled, including whether there are shared expenses, to what extent one supports the other, whether there are shared investments or retirement planning, if the couple have joint bank accounts, and whether there are life insurance policies naming the other.
The extent of the personal relationship, including the intimacy of the connection, shared vacations, shared friends and social connections, and a sexual relationship (although not necessarily dispositive)
Whether the couple share and enjoy each other’s personal property, such as household furnishings, appliances, vehicles, and personal items, such as toiletries or clothing
The age of the couple may be an important consideration, which may give more or less weight to the support of one by the other and estate planning providing for children of prior relationships
Whether friends, family or the community view the couple was engaging in a personal intimate relationship

The Takeaway

The guidance provided in this case should assist a trial court in determining whether a coupld is cohabitating, even though the facts and circumstances in each particular case. Perhaps the old adage “if it walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck” is most appropriate.

Consultation Policy

Kysa Crusco — Sun, 07 Oct 2012 09:41:17 -0500

I provide free consultations to prospective clients who are interested in retaining an attorney for their legal matters. The consultation is a good opportunity to get to know each other, and see if we are a good fit. After hearing about your case, I will be able to provide you with information, feedback and likely outcomes. I can explain the fee structure and the potential costs of litigation, and answer questions that you may have. A consultation is not an appointment where I will provide court documents for your use or prepare you for a hearing.

Potential clients often ask if I will provide a phone consultation, and the answer is generally no. I like to meet with potential clients face to face, and it is often important to review paperwork such as court orders, a lease, or financial records. That is a difficult task over the phone. I will consider phone consultations for clients who live outside of the state but are looking for New Hampshire counsel on a case by case basis.

Although the consultation is free, I require a credit card to secure your appointment. Unfortunately, it has been my experience that sometimes people who schedule appointments do not show up. Therefore, my policy is to have a credit card on file at the time the appointment is scheduled, and in the event that you do not show up for the appointment, a $175 missed appointment fee will be charged to your credit card. There is a 24 hour cancellation policy; however, in the event of an emergency such as illness, inclement weather, or car trouble, exceptions will be made to the 24 hour rule so long as you call prior to the appointment time.

Please feel free to call the office at 603-627-3668 to schedule an appointment.

New Hampshire same-sex divorce: What you need to know

Kysa Crusco — Thu, 19 Jul 2012 00:07:00 -0500

Please check out my recent You Tube video on the topic of same-sex divorce in New Hampshire. We'll review length of marriage considerations, parenting rights for same-sex couples, and special property distribution issues in divorces for same-sex partners.

Top 5 things birth mothers should know about New Hampshire adoption

Kysa Crusco — Tue, 17 Jul 2012 00:15:43 -0500

If you are a birth mother considering adoption, these are the top 5 things you should know about New Hampshire adoptions:

You have the right to have an attorney help you through the adoption process and you will not be charged for attorney services. The adoptive parents pay for your legal fees, but the attorney will work for you.
Birth mothers can receive reasonable birth-related. expenses after choosing an adoptive family which are paid for by the adoptive parents
You can be as involved as you want in the selection of your child's adoptive family and you can choose the degree of openness of the adoption.
You have the right to change your mind about adoption at any time until the consent becomes final. You will not be able to legally relinquish your rights to your baby until 72 hours after the child is born.
Adoption can be a difficult emotional process, and you do not have to go through it alone. An experienced attorney will help you through the legal process, and you are entitled to counseling to assist you with your feelings about the adoption.

If you are a birth mother considering adoption, please contact me at anytime, and I will get back to you right away to answer your questions and meet with you at your convenience at your home, at the hospital or at my office.

The Facts about Petitions to Terminate Parental Rights

Kysa Crusco — Mon, 09 Jul 2012 20:53:25 -0500

Petitions to terminate parental rights involve fundamental parental rights and responsibilities. Because the statutory grounds to terminate must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the judge must also find that it is in the child's best interests, it is important to understand the legalities and make sure that your case is well-presented. For more information, call Crusco Law Office, PLLC at 603-627-3668.

The temporary hearing: A critical phase of your case

Kysa Crusco — Fri, 22 Jun 2012 07:00:00 -0500

Continuing the series of You Tube videos, this edition discusses a very important hearing in your case: the temporary hearing. Watch to find out why, and what you need to do to be prepared and help achieve a good result.

Here are the forms you need for a divorce temporary hearing with children:

Thanks to Jeremy Collins at Ellipsis Entertainment, you were great to work with on this series!

Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin: Change in beneficary does not violate anti-hypothecation order

Kysa Crusco — Thu, 21 Jun 2012 07:00:00 -0500

The New Hampshire Supreme Court recently issued an interesting opinion in the matter of Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin. It is not a traditional family law case, ie divorce or parenting, but rather a constructive trust matter. Nevertheless, the holding has ramifications in the family division.

The Facts

Husband files for divorce from wife. Family court issues an anti-hypothecation order, which restrains the parties “from selling, transferring, encumbering, hypothecating, concealing or in any other manner whatsoever disposing of any property, real or personal, belonging to either or both of them.” While divorce is pending, husband changes his beneficiary on his life insurance and retirement accounts from Wife to their children. Husband dies before divorce is accomplished. Wife sues children in Superior Court seeking to impose a constructive trust to recover the proceeds from the life insurance and retirement accounts. Superior Court dismisses wife’s claims against children.

The Appeal

The wife appealed the trial court’s decision dismissing her petition, arguing that the husband’s change in beneficiaries from wife to children violated the anti-hypothecation order and required the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the wife over the proceeds. The wife also argues that the husband violated the order when he changed beneficiaries because those actions hindered the trial court’s ability to distribute the assets according to the purpose of the anti-hypothecation order.

The Holding

The court holding is interesting, and contrary to the conventional wisdom that changing beneficiaries on insurance or retirement accounts violated the anti-hypothecation order. Instead, the Supreme Court declared that the plain language of the anti-hypothecation order that required the parties to refrain from disposing of property allowed the husband to make the changes to the beneficiaries, and in no way impeded the family division from making an order requiring the husband to name the wife as beneficiary. The Supreme Court reasoned that the wife did not possess a vested property interest, and absent a property interest, there could be no violation of the order. Therefore, the wife could not base the imposition of a constructive trust on the alleged violation of the anti-hypothecation order.

The Takeaway

At a temporary hearing, or in a temporary agreement, it is important to secure an order that each party shall name the other as the beneficiary on their existing life insurance, retirement plans, and/or survivor benefits and shall make no changes to those designations while the divorce is pending.

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Elter-Nodvin v. Nodvin: Change in beneficary does not violate anti-hypothecation order