E-Discovery Law Review

Score One for Plaintiffs in Battle Over Discoverability of Facebook

Calli Varner — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 12:31:13 -0800

In the most recent decision to come out of Pennsylvania regarding the discoverability of social media, a Philadelphia judge denied a defendant’s request to gain access to a plaintiff’s Facebook page.

In Martin v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Co., Case No. 110402438 (C.P. Phila. Dec. 13, 2011), the plaintiff, a pedestrian, was hit by a vehicle driven by a third-party tortfeasor. The plaintiff collected the policy limit from the third-party’s insurer and then demanded the Uninsured Motorist coverage from her own insurer, the defendant. During her deposition in October, defense counsel asked the plaintiff if she used Facebook, to which she responded that she did. Upon asking for her password, defense counsel was met with an immediate objection. In return, defense counsel filed a Motion to Compel such information. Counsel for the plaintiff responded in opposition, arguing that any information on the plaintiff’s Facebook is not relevant to her claims or injuries and does not contradict her claims. In a one-page, single-line Order, Judge Manfredi agreed and denied defendant’s Motion.

This decision follows a November ruling from Judge Walsh, who determined that information posted on the plaintiff’s Facebook page was relevant and not privileged, and therefore discoverable. See Largent v. Reed, Case No. 2009-1823 (C.P. Franklin Nov. 8, 2011); see also www.ediscoverylawreview.com/2011/12/articles/opinions/post-at-your-own-risk-pennsylvania-court-permits-discovery-of-information-on-personal-facebook-profile/. Largent, along with two other defense-friendly decisions, Zimmerman v. Weis Markets Inc., Case No. CV-09-1535 (C.P. Northumberland May 19, 2011) and McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway Inc., Case No. 113-2010CD (C.P. Jefferson Sept. 9, 2010) got the defense bar out to a 3-0 lead on the discoverability of information posted on Facebook. While the Martin decision scores a big point for plaintiffs, it demonstrates that there is still a lot of uncertainty in the law surrounding the recent phenomenon of social media and its relevance to civil litigation.

Top Ten E-Discovery Lessons For 2011

MaryTeresa Soltis — Thu, 29 Dec 2011 12:28:19 -0800

As we bid adieu to 2011, the news and entertainment world is a flurry with the year’s greatest hits and most memorable, or un-memorable, moments. In the spirit of the season, and with homage to the great David Letterman, here are our Top Ten E-Discovery Lessons as addressed by the courts – and this Blog – this past year:

10. Know Your Responsibilities

In-house and outside counsel have a duty to ensure that their clients comply with e-discovery obligations. In- house counsel’s failure to give notice to preserve documents; provide criteria as to what should be saved; review documents being discarded; and failure to review existing document retention policies led to e-discovery sanctions. See “I’m Responsible To Do What?” posted On Aug. 18, 2011.

9. Know When The Duty To Preserve Arises

The duty to preserve electronic evidence arises once a party “reasonably anticipates litigation.” Whether and when a party reasonably anticipates litigation depends on many factors, including but not limited to, who within the defendant organization anticipates the litigation, the clarity of the threat, and when privileged documents are created and labeled as such. See “When Does The Duty To Preserve Electronic Evidence Arise,” posted on Aug. 10, 2011.

8. Know When To Issue A Litigation Hold

A litigation hold should be issued when a party is reasonably aware that it will be a party to litigation. For a plaintiff, triggers could include filing a complaint, seeking advice of counsel, or sending a cease and desist letter. For a defendant, triggers could include receiving a summons or complaint, receiving official notice of a government investigation, or receiving notice of an accident, or receiving discovery requests. See “Litigation Holds, Take 1,” posted on Aug. 12, 2011.

7. Know What A Litigation Hold Should Cover

A Litigation Hold should describe the litigation in general terms with understandable language, and avoid legal terms at all costs. It should broadly state where relevant data and information could be located and it should provide instructions on how to preserve relevant information. The consequences of non-compliance and the importance of not destroying or altering relevant information should be discussed. See “Litigation Holds, Take 2,” posted on Aug. 16, 2011.

6. Know Your Sources Of Potentially Relevant Information

Explore all types of data. For example, this year, courts in Pennsylvania ruled that text messages and Facebook posts are discoverable. See “When Are Text Messages Admissible,” posted on Oct. 7, 2011; “Post At Your Own Risk,” posted on Dec. 5, 2011. See also When An Employee Tweets, posted on Sept. 7, 2011.

5. Know The Standards Governing Production And How They Are Applied

Courts have applied the proportionality standard with much variation in 2011. For example, in Pippins v. KPMG, the court ordered the defense, who had already spent over $1,500,000 in preservation costs, to preserve the hard drives of over 7500 potential class members. The court reasoned that there were too many unknowns, such as the ultimate length and cost of preservation, the relevance of the information on the hard drives, and the outcome of the motion for class certification to allow the hard drives to be destroyed. See “Weighing Burdens And Benefits In Hard Drive Preservation Dispute,” posted on Oct. 31, 2011.

In I-Med Pharma Inc v. Biomatrix, Inc., by contrast, the court did not require the plaintiff to produce documents from “unallocated space” (i.e., the area where deleted files and temporary data are stored) because of the overwhelming cost in terms of time and money to do so and because the requesting party failed to show a likelihood that relevant and non-duplicative information would be recovered. See “The Importance Of Negotiating With Your Adversaries,” posted on Dec. 23, 2011.

4. Know The Consequences Of Non-Compliance

Sanctions in the form of adverse inferences, admitted facts, default judgment and fines continued to be levied in 2011. For example, the deliberate destruction of evidence despite knowledge of a Litigation Hold provided grounds for a default judgment. See “Document Preservation: Spoliation And The Ultimate Sanction,” posted on Nov. 14, 2011.

Another court, faced with defendants who were “unsophisticated in the requirements of litigation and preservation” rather than willfully destructive and who produced 7 computers, 10 hard drives, and 23 CDs of documents, concluded that the plaintiff had “plenty of information upon which to pursue their claims” and required a stronger showing of bad faith before granting a default judgment. See “Document Preservation: Spoliation And The Ultimate Sanction,” posted on Nov. 14, 2011.

A defendant’s refusal to disseminate a Court Order to preserve electronic evidence led to an adverse inference and a presumption of relevance when electronic discovery is willfully destroyed. See “E-Discovery Abuses Result In Permissive Adverse Inference Instruction,” posted on Dec. 23, 2011.

A defendant who failed to: issue a litigation hold; conduct any email search; or seek its IT department’s assistance; and, instead, instructed employees to delete electronic documents at least ten times during the litigation was fined and ordered to file a copy of the court’s memorandum and order with its first pleading or filing in every case in which the defendant was involved for the next five years. See “Ensuring Discovery Compliance: Sanctions Relating To Past, Present And Future Adverse Parties,” posted on Sept. 22, 2011.

3. Know The Electronic Discovery Obligations of Non-Parties

In Tender v. Cremer, New York’s Appellate Division ruled that while a non-party need not provide discovery of ESI from sources that are not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost except upon a showing of good cause, such good cause exists when the information at issue goes directly to the plaintiff’s claim. Under Tender, nonparties served with subpoenas for deleted ESI may not rely on the fact that the data has been deleted in the course of its normal business as a means for avoiding the costs of complying with the subpoena. Instead, the nonparty should undertake an active investigation into whether the data can be retrieved, the difficulty of such retrieval and the concomitant costs. See “Cost-Benefit Analysis Adopted By The New York Supreme Court For Determining When A Nonparty Must Undertake The Burden And Expense Of Recovering Deleted ESI,” posted on Sept. 27, 2011.

2. Know When Electronic Discovery Costs Can Be Recovered

Over $500,000 in costs related to processing native files, restoring back-up tape files, hosting and storing documents in electronic databases, scanning hard copy documents, de-duplicating documents, and filtering documents to capture the documents containing the agreed-upon search terms were awarded to prevailing defendants. See “Prevailing Parties May Recover E-Discovery Costs Under The Federal Rules,” posted on Aug. 30, 2011.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (which allows the court to award a prevailing party in a patent dispute reasonable attorney’s fees in “exceptional cases”), a plaintiff was sanctioned nearly $500,000 for litigation misconduct after adopting a policy that it would not retain relevant documents. See “Cost Recovery Toolbox: Exceptional Cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285,” posted on Aug. 19, 2011.

28 U.S.C. § 1920, similarly, was used to reimburse successful defendants for over $367,000 in e-discovery costs. These costs included those incurred by third-party vendors to produce the requested electronic documents. The court deemed these services to be “an indispensable part of the discovery process” and their costs to be recoverable. See “Recovering E-Discovery Costs In Federal Court,” posted on June 16, 2011.

1. Know Thyself

Know the rules, your obligations, and when they are triggered. Know your company and the types of ESI you produce and store. Know how to be flexible and transparent with the E-Discovery process to comply with the rules in a manner that is reasonable, proportional, and cost effective.

It has been our pleasure to bring you this E-Discovery Law Review this year and we look forward to continuing to keep you up to date in 2012. Please accept our best wishes for a happy and healthy New Year and, as always, Happy Reading!

The Importance of Negotiating with Your Adversaries: New Jersey Federal Court Spares Plaintiff a Large-Scale Document Review

F Brenden Coller — Fri, 23 Dec 2011 12:04:24 -0800

We live in a digital world where smartphones are the norm and email access is seemingly as important as food and water. This increase in usage of email and the amount of electronic data requires companies to develop ways to collect and store a significant amount of data. Inevitably, this data will have to be searched, reviewed, and produced to opposing parties in the event of litigation and often at great cost to the producing party. Fortunately for one plaintiff, however, this is a cost that it will not have to incur.

In I-Med Pharma Inc. v. Biomatrix, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141614 (D. N.J. Dec. 9, 2011), Judge Debevoise was asked to consider whether the plaintiff was required to produce documents from so-called “unallocated space” areas on its computers, namely, the area of the computer where deleted files and temporary data are stored. The parties stipulated that the defendants would hire an expert to conduct a “forensic investigation” and keyword search of the plaintiff’s entire computer system, using over 50 search terms. This search was not limited to specific custodians or time periods and, in the unallocated space alone, the search terms yielded an estimated 65 million “hits,” or 95 million pages of files. In light of this, the Magistrate Judge modified a previous order, which required the plaintiff to produce the results of the forensic investigation and allowed the plaintiff to exclude data from the unallocated space.

In reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s modification, the Court acknowledged the overwhelming burden to the plaintiff if it had to review the documents from the unallocated space. The Court further explained that a “privilege review of 65 million documents is no small undertaking” and that “[e]ven if junior attorneys are engaged, heavily discounted rates are negotiated, and all parties work diligently and efficiently, even a cursory review of that many documents will consume large amounts of attorney time and cost millions of dollars.”

The Court also recognized that the defendants did not show the likelihood that relevant and non-duplicative information was stored in the unallocated space. Additionally, the Court found that the money the defendants spent to obtain the data “pale[d] in comparison” to the cost the plaintiff would incur to review the data.

Finally, the Court addressed the proposed search terms and discussed five factors to consider when analyzing whether those terms were reasonable: “(1) the scope of documents searched and whether the search is restricted to specific computers, file systems, or document custodians; (2) any date restrictions imposed on the search; (3) whether the search terms contain proper names, uncommon abbreviations, or other terms unlikely to occur in irrelevant documents; (4) whether operators such as ‘and’, ‘not’, or ‘near’ are used to restrict the universe of possible results; [and] (5) whether the number of results obtained could be practically reviewed given the economics of the case and the amount of money at issue.” The Court examined all of these factors and stated that although the plaintiff should have “known better than to agree to the search terms . . . the interest of justice and basic fairness are little served by forcing Plaintiff to undertake an enormously expensive privilege review of material that is unlikely to contain non-duplicative evidence.”

The plaintiff in I-Med Pharma Inc. was fortunate in that the Court did not force it to review and produce all of the data in the unallocated space. Not all parties, however, will always be as fortunate. When negotiating with the adverse party regarding the search terms to be utilized for a document production, the following steps may avoid situations similar to those facing the parties in I-Med Pharma Inc.:

· Know your client’s data system. This may be the most obvious, but most important, advice. To negotiate effectively, you must know certain aspects of the data storage system, such as how much data is contained there, how many potential custodians exist, how long is data retained, and where potentially duplicative data resides.

· Negotiate for the use of restricting terms. This is especially true with frequently used words. For example, in I-Med Pharma Inc., one of the search terms was the word “return.” Negotiate for the use of search operators, such as “and,” “not,” or “near” in an attempt to further limit your results.

· Do a sampling first. If possible, run a search with proposed terms to determine what types of “false positives” may result. This will enable the parties to further analyze the negotiated search terms and their effectiveness.

· Determine relevant time periods and custodians. Limit searches to only those individuals who had a role in the subject matter of the litigation and to only that time period in which relevant documents may exist.

· Be willing to seek the Court’s assistance. I-Med Pharma demonstrates the efficacy of seeking the Court’s involvement early on to limit the costs associated with e-discovery. When doing so, however, make sure you have done your proverbial homework and are able to educate the Court as to your client’s data systems and what the search proposed by the opposing side truly entails.

E-Discovery Abuses Result in Permissive Adverse Inference Instruction

Catherine Hamilton — Fri, 23 Dec 2011 07:07:59 -0800

At 3:40 on the morning of April 3, 2003, Tamara Greene, an exotic dancer, was shot multiple times and killed while sitting in a car at the intersection of Roselawn and West Outer Drive in Detroit. According to the complaint filed by Greene’s next of kin in Flagg v. City of Detroit and Kwame Kilpatrick, (E.D. Mi. Nov. 7, 2005), the head of the Internal Affairs Department of the Detroit Police Department was fired a mere nine days following Ms. Greene’s murder. It is alleged he was dismissed for investigating a party at the Mayor’s mansion, known as the Manoogian Mansion, during which exotic dancers, including Ms. Greene, performed. As a result of this firing, the Flagg complaint alleged that members of the Detroit Homicide Department refused to investigate the Greene murder case for fear of losing their jobs. The Flagg complaint further alleged that the case was labeled “cold” only eleven months following the crime, which falls well short of the two-year period typically required by the cold case squad. Most shockingly, plaintiffs contend that the Police Department deliberately avoided sending the spent casings and bullets collected from the crime scene to the appropriate agency to determine if they came from the gun of a Detroit Police Officer. Against this backdrop, we examine the decision rendered by Chief Judge Rosen in this case on October 5, 2011 in which he finds that the defendants deliberately deleted relevant emails in bad faith and failed to disseminate a Court Order to preserve evidence to the appropriate city departments. 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114772 (E.D. Mi. Oct. 5, 2011). Judge Rosen’s searing opinion highlights several key electronic discovery issues, including the presumption of relevance that will attach where discovery is destroyed willfully and the parameters of the permissive adverse inference sanction.

Judge Rosen initially adopted the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen recommending that the Court give a permissive adverse inference instruction at any eventual trial to sanction the electronic discovery abuses of defendants, including the destruction of incoming and outgoing emails to and from the accounts of former Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick, his Chief of Staff, former “corporation counsel” and the former Chief of Police. The Report also found that the City failed to advise the appropriate City Departments of the Court’s Order to preserve relevant evidence. Id. at *5. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants objected to the Report.

Defendants “express[ed] confusion” as to the basis for the Magistrate’s conclusion that the lost emails were relevant – a finding necessary for an adverse inference instruction – given that the four individuals whose accounts were deleted testified that they did not send any emails concerning the homicide investigation. Id. at *6. Judge Rosen agreed with the Magistrate that “the law expressly dictates a finding of relevance where, as here, it is determined that evidence has been ‘destroyed in bad faith (i.e. intentionally or willfully”).” Id.

Next Defendants argued that the evidence did not support the Magistrate’s finding that the City and its counsel failed to take action to disseminate to the appropriate City Departments the Court’s March 5, 2008 Order to preserve evidence. Defendants pointed to the Chief of Staff’s knowledge of the Order as evidence that the Order was distributed. The Court concluded, however, that there was nothing to suggest her knowledge was a result of any action by the City or its in-house counsel. Defendants also relied on the testimony of the former Police Chief that she was advised of the Order and prepared a memo to the Detroit Police Department advising them of it. The Court, however, discredited the Chief’s testimony given that she was unable to recall the date of the memo and whether it was actually based on the March 5, 2008 preservation Order. The Court also found suspect the fact that the Chief testified that her outside counsel was involved in preparation of the memo despite the fact that he did not enter an appearance on her behalf until April 7, 2008. Id. at 9.

The City argued its “corporation counsel” disseminated the March 5, 2008 Order with the assistance of an outside law firm that was acting as its co-counsel at the time. However, the testimony of the “corporation counsel” contradicted this argument. He testified that he never discussed the order with the Mayor, did not communicate with outside counsel regarding the Plaintiffs’ motion to preserve evidence, believed that the outside law firm would have been responsible for handling the requirement to preserve, and that he did not know what the City might have done in response to the Order. According to the Court, this testimony “disproves” the position that the March 5^th Order was disseminated by its corporation counsel.

The City then attempted to prove that the March 5^th Order was disseminated because it was able to produce some emails from the Police Chief and two police officers. The Court held that “if the City’s in-house attorneys stood idly by as emails were deliberately destroyed in contravention of this Court’s express order – to say nothing of the more general duty of all parties to preserve evidence that is relevant to pending litigation – they should hardly pat themselves on the back for any emails that were overlooked or otherwise survived this effort.” Id. at 14.

Next, the City challenged the appropriateness of the imposition of a permissive adverse inference instruction, essentially claiming the punishment did not fit the crime. The City argued that the sanction was too steep given that the reason for the lost emails was unknown. The Court reasoned that the “short answer to this, as Plaintiffs recognize, is that the City, through its attorney Mr. Schapka, filed papers in this case affirmatively stating that ‘upon their resignations during February of 2008, Beatty and Kilpatrick’s email accounts and collected emails whether in-coming or out going, were deleted and purged from the electronic storage system.” Id. Thus, the finding of willfulness and bad faith of the defendants was based on the evidence. The Court reasoned that “it is difficult to read the City’s present objections as anything other than a continuation of the persistent effort by the City and its in-house counsel to avoid taking responsibility for egregious conduct that has seriously undermined the truth-seeking mission of civil litigation.” Id. at 18.

Plaintiffs similarly objected to the adverse inference instruction claiming that a more severe sanction, such as entry of a default judgment or a mandatory adverse inference instruction, were warranted. But the Court agreed with the Magistrate’s conclusion that these sanctions would “give the Plaintiffs an undeserved evidentiary windfall.” Id. It further reasoned that, given the lengthy discovery period and the voluminous records produced therein, it would be difficult to conclude that the deleted emails from the 10 month period at issue were likely to provide information not otherwise available. Id. at 27.

In connection with the adverse inference instruction, the City further complained that a permissive adverse inference instruction will permit a jury to engage in “speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 18. While the Court acknowledged that it prefers that factual findings made by a trier of fact be based on the record, it reasoned that the City’s destruction of the emails “thwarted this goal.” Id. It reminded the City that the permissive adverse inference instruction allowed the City to argue that the “inferences proposed by Plaintiffs are implausible and should be rejected.” Id.

In sum, this opinion offers guidance concerning the imposition of the adverse inference instruction as a sanction for the deliberate destruction of electronic discovery and the refusal to properly disseminate a Court Order to preserve evidence.

Federal Court Gives Metadata Experts a Break

Lisa Myers — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 13:27:10 -0800

New technologies have meant new crimes and new civil liability. Although forgeries, forensic analysis, and criminal cover-ups are as familiar as Sherlock Holmes, electronic data has created an entirely new means of falsifying evidence and necessitated specialized investigative methods. In response, government agencies have started entirely new investigative divisions and companies involved in their own private investigations or litigation have been forced to hire special experts.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida recently ruled on the reliability of a digital forensic expert’s report. In Coqina Investments v. Rothstein and TD Bank, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120267 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011), the court was presented with allegations of electronic forgery in a civil case. As part of the litigation, the court was asked to rule on several traditional Daubert motions seeking to exclude the testimony of various traditional types of experts, rendering opinions on financial damages and accounting practices. The plaintiff also sought to exclude a new type of expert, who was offering an opinion in support of defendants’ claims that certain electronic documents were e-forgeries.

Plaintiff argued that defendants’ expert’s opinion was unreliable and should be excluded because the expert reviewed only a sample of plaintiff’s data set. After reviewing the expert’s methodology and report, the Coquina Court ruled that defendants’ expert had “employed a sound metadata analysis” and, therefore, would be permitted to testify about the emails that he identified as forgeries. The fact that the metadata expert did not review every document in the large dataset went to the weight of the evidence and did not undermine the reliability of the expert’s conclusion that the emails that he analyzed were e-forgeries.

The Coquina Court’s commonsense approach to this complex issue sets an important precedent in metadata analysis. Electronic discovery and document productions often easily encompass hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of documents. Metadata analysis is a very complex area of science, requiring experts to interpret facts for fact-finders. Requiring a metadata expert to analyze every document is not only unnecessary, it would be paralyzing. Allowing metadata experts to testify based on their analysis of a sample of documents strikes an appropriate balance in allowing the expert to assist the trier of fact while also allowing the opposing party to question the weight to be given to that expert’s testimony.

Post at Your Own Risk: Pennsylvania Court Permits Discovery of Information on Personal Facebook Profile

Calli Varner — Mon, 05 Dec 2011 11:46:48 -0800

A Pennsylvania court recently decided that information posted by a party on their personal Facebook page is discoverable. Largent v. Reed, Case No. 2009-1823 (C.P. Franklin Nov. 8, 2011) arose out of a chain-reaction automobile accident in which the plaintiffs, who were riding a motorcycle, were hit by a minivan that was hit by the defendant. Plaintiffs claimed serious and permanent physical and mental injuries, pain, and suffering as a result of the accident.

During the deposition of one of the plaintiffs, defense counsel discovered that the plaintiff/deponent had a Facebook profile that she regularly accessed. The defendant then accessed Plaintiff’s public profile and saw posts that contradicted her claims of serious injury. Specifically, Defendant claimed that Plaintiff posted several photographs that showed her enjoying life with her family and a status update about going to the gym. Defense counsel requested access to Plaintiff’s Facebook page, but Plaintiff refused to voluntarily disclose any information about her profile. In response, Defendant moved to compel Plaintiff to disclose her Facebook username and password. Plaintiff opposed the Motion, arguing that the information sought was irrelevant, did not meet the threshold under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.1, and that access to her information would cause unreasonable embarrassment and annoyance.

Court of Common Pleas Judge Richard J. Walsh began his opinion with a lengthy description of Facebook as the site that “helps you connect and share with the people in your life.” Judge Walsh pointed out that the site has more than 800 million active users, 50% of whom are active on the site daily. Although he acknowledged that Facebook has privacy settings, Judge Walsh emphasized that users must take “affirmative steps” in order to prevent their information from being shared with the public.

The Court then turned to the issue at hand - whether and to what extent such “private” information is discoverable in a civil case. With respect to relevancy, the Court pointed out that Pennsylvania has a “slight” relevancy threshold pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 4003.1. Under this standard, the photographs depicting Plaintiff with her family and status updates about exercising at the gym are “clearly relevant” because they might prove that Plaintiff’s injuries do not exist or that they are exaggerated.

The Court found that Plaintiff’s Facebook information is not privileged. Information on Facebook is shared with third parties and, thus, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. In addition, Pennsylvania law does not recognize a confidential social networking privilege. As Judge Walsh explained, “[o]nly the uninitiated or foolish could believe that Facebook is an online lockbox of secrets.” Further, Plaintiff’s information was not protected by the Stored Communications Act, which prevents the government from compelling Internet Service Providers (ISP) from disclosing information about their users because the information was sought directly from Plaintiff, who is not an ISP.

Finally, the Court concluded that Defendant’s request was not unreasonably embarrassing or annoying and disagreed with the claim that Defendant’s request is akin to asking Plaintiff to produce all of her personal mail. Since Plaintiff’s postings were never truly private, there could not be any unreasonable embarrassment in producing the postings in litigation. The Court also determined that the request would not cause unreasonable annoyance, because Defendant would bear the entire cost of investigating Plaintiff’s Facebook information.

As Judge Walsh points out, social networking is a recent phenomenon and these issues are just beginning to infiltrate the courts. Although relatively few courts have spoken on this issue, the standard is becoming clear: Post at your own risk.

ESI in the Criminal Context: A Call for Clarification

Calli Varner — Wed, 16 Nov 2011 06:46:15 -0800

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set the stage for electronic discovery in civil cases, there is no such express regime in the criminal context.

The absence of such a standard became evident in a recent case in the Western District of New York. In United States v. Briggs, 2011 WL 4017886 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2011), defendants were charged with several counts related to the distribution of cocaine. The criminal investigation leading to these charges involved court-authorized interceptions of cellular telephone communications indicating that the defendants were allegedly engaged in drug trafficking.

In its voluntary discovery, the Government furnished defense counsel with disks containing thousands of pages of documents relating to these communications using the IPRO program routinely used by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in cases involving multiple defendants. Defendants claimed this reported data had problems with omissions and inaccuracies resulting from the collection and management system used. The defendants also objected to the Government’s failure to provide the data in the “most useful form that is readily available” and claimed the “.tiff” files received could not be sorted or searched. The appropriate format, according to the defendants, was either the “.pdf” or native format. The Government, in response, refused to provide the files in these formats arguing that the cost of reproduction was prohibitive, that it had already produced the particular data requested by defendants, and that it should not bear the burden of reproduction merely because it would be more helpful or useful to the defendants.

Examining this issue, the court began by pointing out the absence of a standard in criminal cases for the production of ESI. While Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the general authority ordering the manner of production in criminal cases, provides that, “[a]t any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief,” it does not specify the manner in which such production should be made. The court, therefore, turned to two other jurisdictions addressing criminal prosecutions involving extensive document production. In United States v. O’Keefe, 537 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2008), the United States District Court of the District of Columbia, conceded that there was no criminal equivalent to, and, thus, applied, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. In United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit refused to require the Government to reproduce electronic materials in the format requested by the defendant because the defendants had ready access to the information and documents as they were kept in the usual course of business.

Applying these rules, the court determined that the Government was the party “better able to bear the burden of organizing these records for over twenty defendants in a manner useful to all.” The court mandated that the Government must reproduce its disclosure in a searchable format (PDF), or in the native format. The court based its decision on the rationale that the Government is in the better position to organize the mass of information in a manner that is searchable by the defense because: (1) the Government already compiled this electronic information from its various native forms into a common electronic database and; (2) rather than have each defendant compile the data involving that party or repeat the expense of reproducing the entire Government production, the Government should bear this burden. In making this decision, the court made it clear that it was not adopting Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in all criminal cases, as in O’Keefe, rather it was applying it in only this case.

Briggs is a clear example of the need for a more uniform regime for ESI in criminal cases. According to the court, the Justice Department appears to have at least one working group considering the “best practices” for ESI in criminal cases. Until then, each court faced with a motion to compel criminal discovery with ESI data will have to devise its own scheme for ESI discovery based on the limited rules governing the criminal context at this time. Defendants, then, are best advised to be prepared and willing to seek the court’s involvement early on to ensure that the production of ESI is reasonable, proportionate, and manageable so as not to cripple their efforts in defending against criminal liability.

Document Preservation: Spoliation and the "Ultimate Sanction"

Diana Lin — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 10:50:16 -0800

The proper preservation of electronic data for discovery has become an increasing source of contention between parties. Two recent cases illustrate the importance of mindfully preserving electronic data during discovery.

In Gentex Corp. v. Sutter, No. 3:07-CV-1269, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122831 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2011), the district court granted default judgment to the plaintiffs in a spoliation action. Gentex Corporation sued two of its former employees, Brad Sutter and Patrick Walko, for violating non-disclosure agreements. Gentex claimed that Sutter and Walko copied proprietary files when they left the company and shared them with a rival company, Armor.

In response to the suit, Armor implemented a litigation hold and instructed employees to preserve “all paper documents and electronically stored information concerning the Company’s relationship with Brad Sutter and his work while at the Company.” Armor also obtained a consulting firm to help preserve documents relevant to the litigation.

Sutter, however, began destroying evidence despite knowledge of the litigation hold. Sutter scrubbed his computer, explaining that he did so “because he was scared because Gentex had sued him.” Sutter destroyed all CD-ROMs containing Gentex information that he possessed and purposely destroyed a thumb drive after his deposition. Sutter also deleted numerous email messages when he was printing them for production to Gentex.

Similarly, Walko knowingly deleted documents relating to Gentex files on his computer. Walko claimed that various supervisors, including Sutter, instructed him, “Do what you have to do to clean up. If you need to clean up, clean up.”

Gentex’s expert concluded that the deletions were “intentional and coordinated and designed to circumvent the duty to preserve documents.” The district court agreed and found that Gentex had presented sufficient evidence to show that Sutter and Walko engaged in willful spoliation. The court ultimately determined that granting default judgment to Gentex was the “least onerous” sanction corresponding to the willfulness of the spoliation, given Sutter and Walko’s “unabashedly intentional destruction of relevant, irretrievable evidence.”

By contrast, another court facing similar facts refused to levy the ultimate sanction. In Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. JFS Dev., Inc., No. C09-0175, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110671 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 27, 2011), the court determined that “a stronger showing of bad faith [was] required” before it would grant default judgment to the plaintiffs. In that case, plaintiff investors sued the developers of a proposed hotel for fraudulent inducement. Following a protracted discovery dispute, plaintiffs sought default judgment against one of the defendants for failure to comply with discovery requests and for intentional destruction of evidence.

The defendant previously produced seven computers, ten hard drives, and 23 CDs for inspection and copying. Although the plaintiffs’ expert extracted over 34,000 relevant documents from these sources, the expert concluded that external drives that had been connected to the laptop were missing. Additionally, the expert contended that a large number of relevant documents, folders, files, and emails had been targeted for strategic deletion. The expert, however, conceded that several innocent explanations existed for the deletions and missing drives.

Citing an Eighth Circuit decision, the district court determined that there was no proof that the defendant intentionally engaged in spoliation. As an initial matter, the court seemed impressed by the sheer volume of documents that plaintiffs had already recovered from the defendants. The defendant had initially produced 875 documents followed by an additional 2,700 pages, not to mention the 34,000 documents extracted from various hard drives and computers.

Additionally, the court found that plaintiffs had not met the relevant legal standard. To warrant any sanction, much less a default judgment, the court had to find: 1) intentional destruction indicative of a desire to suppress the truth; and 2) actual prejudice to the other party resulting from the spoliation. Here, the court deemed the defendant to be merely “unsophisticated in the requirements of litigation and preservation of documents” rather than willfully destructive. Further, the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice, as “[i]t would seem that Plaintiffs have plenty of information upon which to pursue their claims.” In denying the motion for sanctions, the court simply stated, “I believe a stronger showing of bad faith is required.”

While a default judgment represents the ultimate sanction in spoliation cases, destruction of electronic evidence can result in sanctions running the gamut from claim dismissal and suppression of evidence to an adverse inference and attorneys’ fees and costs. As the district court judge in Gentex observed, “I am especially conscious of the deterrence value of harsh sanctions in cases like this where the crucial evidence exists in electronic form, and a party may destroy its opponent’s case with the mere click of a button.” These two cases teach us to beware the fine line that distinguishes behavior worthy of a default judgment and behavior that is merely vexatious.

Weighing Burdens and Benefits in Hard Drive Preservation Dispute

Brian Kint — Mon, 31 Oct 2011 12:26:00 -0800

Although deleted data can be recovered – perhaps at significant cost – destroyed data is likely gone forever. Perhaps it is for this reason that a recent federal court was reluctant to apply a strict proportionality test to a preservation dispute.

In Pippins v. KPMG LLP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116427 (S.D.N.Y. Oct 7, 2011), the court denied the defendant’s request for a protective order to limit its preservation obligations. A group of plaintiff sued their former employer alleging that the employer deprived them of overtime pay by purposefully misclassifying them as exempt employees under federal and state employment laws. These plaintiffs moved for class certification, causing the court to stay discovery until it ruled on the certification question. This stay necessitated that the employer indefinitely preserve the hard drives of over 7,500 potential class members.

After racking up over $1,500,000 in preservation costs, the employer sought a protective order, arguing that the burden of preserving the hard drives was disproportionate to the benefit they might provide and that there were less burdensome methods of preserving any relevant information on the hard drives. While cautioning against the application of a proportionality test in preservation disputes, the court assessed three factors in evaluating the employer’s duty to preserve the drives.

First, the court looked to see if the material was relevant. The former employees believed that the drives contained information relevant to the dispute, such as job responsibilities and hours worked. The employer, on the other hand, argued that similar information was contained in sources such as human resources files and time records. It was not entirely clear exactly what information was on the drives, however, because the employer had not allowed anyone to inspect them. This uncertainty, along with the extremely broad concept of relevance, led the court to conclude that the employer could not establish that the material was not relevant.

Second, the court looked to see if the material on the hard drives was created by or for “key players,” namely, people likely to have relevant information. The employer argued that only the named plaintiffs were key players because they purported to represent the entire class. The court disagreed. It reasoned that not only was every former employee a potential plaintiff in the class action, but also that the employer was on notice that the hard drives could contain material relevant to future litigation even if the class was not certified and, thus, had a duty to preserve the hard drives in either situation.

Finally, the court considered whether the continuing preservation merely maintained information that was available from other, less burdensome, sources. The employer argued that the information was duplicative because it also was contained in a variety of other sources, and because the former employees could testify to their job responsibilities. Nevertheless, the court found that the unofficial information on the hard drives could supplement the official information in the employer’s records. As a result, the information on the hard drives was deemed to be not duplicative.

On balance, the court ruled that the employer had to continue to preserve the hard drives. In the end, there were too many unknowns, such as, the ultimate length and cost of preservation, the relevance of the information on the hard drives, and the outcome of the motion for class certification, for the court to weigh the benefits and burdens in a satisfactory manner. The finality of the destruction that would have accompanied the protective order likely led the court to err on the side of preservation.

Note that the duty to preserve potentially relevant information is much broader, and arises much earlier, than the duty to produce information that is relevant and responsive to discovery requests in pending litigation. The Pippins decision speaks only to the preservation phase of electronic discovery and does not address the scenario where additional potentially relevant information continues to be created and stored on various hard drives after initial preservation efforts are complete (or, stated another way, the issue of the ongoing creation and preservation of electronic data). Businesses may be able to avoid these costs and potential pitfalls by encouraging, if not requiring, employees to save data, not on their individual hard drives, but in a central location that is backed-up on a daily basis. In an ideal scenario, any potentially relevant information would be stored on a back-up and shared server and, at most, duplicate that which is contained on individual hard drives. This may eliminate, or provide strong arguments in favor of eliminating, the need to, and cost of, preserving multiple hard drives multiple times.

When Are Text Messages Admissible? The Pennsylvania Superior Court Explains.

Mike Zabel — Fri, 07 Oct 2011 10:50:23 -0800

In today’s electronic age where text messages, instant messages and e-mails have, to a large degree, supplanted traditional written correspondence, courts are increasingly called upon to apply longstanding evidentiary rules to society’s newer methods of communication. A recent opinion, however, from the Pennsylvania Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Koch, No.1669-MDA-2010, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2716 (Sept. 16, 2011), suggests that the more things change, the more they stay the same.

According to Koch, a party seeking to admit a text message as evidence at trial faces authentication requirements similar to those of a party seeking to admit a handwritten letter. A letter, for example, may bear Mr. Smith’s signature, or be printed on Mr. Smith’s stationery, but that signature may be forged, or the letterhead copied. Typically, some further authentication is needed to show that the letter is what it purports to be – i.e., a statement made by Mr. Smith. Under Koch, the same principle applies to text messages: the mere fact that a text message came from Mr. Smith’s cell phone number is an insufficient basis to admit that text message as a statement made by Mr. Smith. Additional evidence of the sender’s identity is needed.

In Koch, the trial court admitted testimony and a transcript of thirteen drug-related text messages obtained from a cell phone that the defendant admitted belonged to her. The defendant objected, claiming there was no evidence substantiating that she was the author of the text messages, nor was there evidence that the drug-related texts were directed at her, because Commonwealth witnesses testified that another person was using the defendant’s cell phone at least some of the time. At trial, a police detective further conceded that: the author of the drug-related text messages could not be ascertained; that some of the messages referred to the defendant in the third person and, thus, were not written by the defendant; and that some text messages had been deleted. The defendant was ultimately convicted on two drug-possession charges.

The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the text messages because the messages were improperly authenticated. In determining the standard for the authentication of text messages, the Superior Court looked to several recent appellate opinions from around the country, as well as its own opinion in In the Interest of F.P., a Minor, 878 A.2d 91 (2005), a case that addressed authentication of instant messages. From these cases, the court concluded that “e-mails and text messages are documents and subject to the same requirements for authenticity as non-electronic documents generally.”

Establishing authorship of an e-mail or text message, the court observed, can be difficult because e-mail accounts and cell phones are not always exclusively used by the person to whom the e-mail account or cell phone belongs. In the light of this, the court held that “authentication of electronic communications, like documents, requires more than mere confirmation that the number or address belonged to a particular person. Circumstantial evidence, which tends to corroborate the identity of the sender, is required.”

Turning to the facts of the case, the court found that evidence showing that the defendant had written the text messages found on her phone was “[g]laringly absent.” The court noted that there was no confirming testimony from the senders or recipients of the disputed messages and no contextual clues within the messages themselves that revealed the identity of the sender. The court also rejected the idea that the defendant’s physical proximity to the cell phone when it was seized was probative of the defendant’s authorship of the text messages made days or weeks earlier. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that the admission of the text messages was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

With Koch, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has made clear that an individual’s mere association with an e-mail account or cell phone number is an insufficient evidentiary basis for admission of a text message, e-mail, or instant message. A party seeking to introduce electronic communications at trial should be prepared to produce circumstantial evidence that corroborates the identity of the supposed sender. Koch provides some guidance as to what that circumstantial evidence might be: testimony from the sender or recipients, or contextual clues within the message itself. Merely identifying the phone or account from which the message came, however, is not enough.

Cost-Benefit Analysis Adopted by the New York Supreme Court for Determining When a Nonparty Must Undertake the Burden and Expense of Recovering Deleted ESI

Catherine Hamilton — Tue, 27 Sep 2011 05:54:03 -0800

The production of electronically stored information (“ESI”) that has been deleted is potentially very expensive and time consuming. Often outside computer forensics experts are required to assist with the recovery of the deleted data and the routine business of the party is disrupted while resources are allocated to the recovery process. These are now commonplace burdens of parties involved in litigation. Whether these burdens should be placed on a nonparty with relevant ESI was recently addressed by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court. In Tener, M.D. v. Cremer, M.D., et al., 2011 NY Slip Op. 06543, 2011 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6421 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 22, 2011), the court, acknowledging that it was charting new territory, addressed for the first time “the obligation of a nonparty to produce electronically stored information (ESI) deleted through normal business operations.” Id. at 2.

The nonparty was New York University and the computer at issue was located at Bellevue Medical Center. The plaintiff, a doctor, claimed that someone using the NYU computer posted a comment about her on a website known as Vitals.com. The plaintiff served a subpoena on NYU seeking the identity of all persons who had accessed the internet via the subject IP address on the date that the comment was posted. Id. NYU did not produce any information in response to the subpoena and the plaintiff moved for contempt. NYU claimed that the “computers that simply access the web through NYU’s portal appear as a text file listing that is automatically written over every 30 days.” Id. According to NYU, it lacked the “technological capability or software, if such exists, to retrieve a text file created more than a year ago and written over at least 12 times.” Id. In response, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of a computer forensics expert who opined that software with the capability to retrieve the deleted data did exist.

The lower court denied the plaintiff’s contempt motion. It held that NYU did not have the capability to retrieve the deleted data and incorrectly concluded that “this allegation is unrefuted as a reply affidavit contradicting such allegation has not been supplied.” Id. at 3.

On appeal, the Appellate Division reasoned that “ESI is difficult to destroy permanently.” Id. at 4. Rather, “[d]eletion usually only makes the data more difficult to access.” Id. Thus, the “discovery rules contemplate data recovery.” Id. For instance, guidelines developed by the Commercial Division for Supreme Court, Nassau County (the “Guidelines”) “suggest that the parties be prepared to discuss ‘the need for certified forensic specialists and/or experts to assist with the search for and production of ESI.” Id. The Guidelines further explain that “ESI is not to be deemed inaccessible based solely on its source or type of storage media.” Id. Rather, “[i]naccessibility is based on the burden and expense of recovering and producing the ESI and the relative need for the data.” Id. Thus, the Guidelines advocate a cost-benefit analysis when discovery of deleted ESI is sought.

Adopting the Guidelines’ cost-benefit analysis, the Appellate Division highlighted their similarity to the Federal Rules. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1)(D), a nonparty “need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the person identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” However, the Federal Rules give the federal courts the power to order the production of such information upon a showing of good cause and subject to the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C), which considers, among other things, the burden and expense of production in relation to its likely benefit. Id. at 5.

The Appellate Division further reasoned that exempting inaccessible data from discovery “might encourage quick deletion as a matter of corporate policy, well before the spectre of litigation is on the horizon and the duty to preserve it attaches.” Id. A cost-benefit analysis eliminates the incentive to permanently delete information as a matter of course to protect it from production. Additionally, a cost-benefit analysis gives “the court the flexibility to determine literally whether the discovery is worth the cost and effort of retrieval.” Id. at 6.

The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff had demonstrated “good cause” for production of the deleted ESI, which had the potential to identify the person who posted the comment and potentially defamed the plaintiff. Given the showing of “good cause”, the court concluded that a cost-benefit analysis must be undertaken to determine whether the retrieval of the information was warranted. It therefore remanded the case to the lower court because the record did not provide enough information for a proper analysis. Id.

On remand, the Supreme Court was instructed to hold a hearing to determine “(1) whether the identifying information was written over, as NYU maintains, or whether it is somewhere else, such as in unallocated space as a text file; (2) whether the retrieval software plaintiff suggested can actually obtain the data; (3) whether the data will identify the actual person who used the internet on April 12, 2009 via the IP address plaintiff identified; (4) which of those persons accessed Vitals.com and (5) a budget for the cost of the data retrieval, including line item(s) correlating the cost to NYU for the disruption.” Id. The Appellate Division further instructed that the cost-benefit analysis should take into account the fact that NYU is a nonparty. Finally, in the event the Supreme Court determines that the benefits of production outweigh its costs, the court held that the plaintiff should bear the costs.

This decision is noteworthy because it clearly defines the analysis the New York state courts must undertake when determining whether a nonparty is required to expend the time and resources to recover ESI that has been deleted. Upon a showing of good cause, a court will analyze the costs of recovering the information against the need for the deleted information. The fact that a nonparty is the entity in possession of the deleted data and the one burdened with recovering the data is a factor to be considered by the court.

Under this decision, nonparties served with subpoenas for deleted ESI may not rely on the fact that the data has been deleted in the course of its normal business as a means for avoiding the costs of complying with the subpoena. Instead, the nonparty should undertake an active investigation into whether the data can be retrieved, the difficulty of such retrieval and the concomitant costs.

Ensuring Discovery Compliance: Sanctions Relating to Past, Present, and Future Adverse Parties

F Brenden Coller — Thu, 22 Sep 2011 03:38:27 -0800

Monetary sanctions, attorneys fees, and adverse inference jury instructions are the more common type of sanctions imposed on litigants for the spoliation of evidence, or not producing relevant documents. Recently, however, a court has increased the severity and impact of sanctions by applying them not only to current litigation, but also to a party’s future litigation, with the effects lingering for years to come.

The Underlying Suit

“Any competent electronic discovery effort would have located this email.” These words were written in an opinion by a United States District Judge in the Eastern District of Texas, filed on March 1, 2011, in Green v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-372, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20353 (E.D. Tex., Mar. 1, 2011)

Green involved a product liability suit in which the requirement of a flame arrester was in dispute. The jury returned a defense verdict, and the plaintiff collected a low settlement amount as part of a high-low settlement agreement. During discovery in a subsequent case with the same defendant and plaintiff’s counsel, counsel learned of documents that were not produced in Green. The plaintiff then filed a motion for sanctions against the defendant in Green and a motion to re-open the Green case. While the court denied the motion to re-open because the statute of limitations had expired, the court did impose sanctions for the discovery abuse.

The Defendant’s Failure to Conduct Adequate Discovery in Green

After 2004, the defendant had just one employee, Mr. Chrisco, who was responsible for searching for, and collecting, documents relevant to the litigation. Mr. Chrisco would meet with the defendant’s national counsel, go through the claims, and develop an understanding of what he would be searching for. He would then go to various departments, explain what he was looking for, and ask the departments to look for, and collect, documents. As the litigation was about flame arresters, any documents pertaining to that subject were relevant.

This is where Mr. Chrisco’s preservation and collection efforts ended and where his employer’s e-discovery troubles began. The defendant did not “institute a litigation-hold of documents, do any electronic word searches for emails, or talk with the IT department regarding how to search for electronic documents.” As a result an email entitled “FW: Flame Arrester,” of which Mr. Chrisco was a recipient, was never produced. Not disclosing this email showed “the gravity of [the defendant’s] discovery violations for failing to produce relevant documents.”

The court found it even “more shocking” that this email could have been discovered by a simple word search for the “obvious term,” flame arrester. Even worse was that the individual tasked with the defendant’s e-discovery efforts, Mr. Chrisco, admitted to being “about as computer . . . illiterate as they get.” The court concluded that one did not have to look any further than not searching for the phrase, “flame arrester,” to determine that the defendant did not make a reasonable effort to produce relevant documents.

The court also found that the defendant did not properly preserve documents. Instead of issuing a litigation hold, the defendant asked employees to delete electronic documents at least ten times during the two year period that the defendant was in litigation. Moreover, the defendant rotated its backup tapes every two weeks, causing any deleted emails to be permanently deleted.

Imposition of Sanctions

The court imposed three sets of sanctions against the defendant, each seemingly more severe than the previous. First, the court fined the defendant $250,000 to be paid to the plaintiff, the amount by which the court estimated the plaintiff was damaged by not seeing the documents during settlement discussions. Second, the court sanctioned the defendant an additional $500,000, which was to be tolled for thirty days. The court agreed to lift this fine if, in those thirty days, the defendant was able to prove that it issued a copy of the court’s memorandum and opinion to any plaintiff in each lawsuit in which it was involved for the past two years, or in which it is currently involved. Third, the court ordered the defendant to file a copy of the court’s memorandum and order with its “first pleading or filing” in any case in which the defendant was involved, “whether plaintiff, defendant, or in another official capacity,” for the next five years.

No litigant would want an e-discovery violation to be a recurring nightmare, as it was for the defendant in Green. The following are some ways that a party may fulfill its e-discovery obligations and avoid the result in Green.

• Put the Right Employees in Charge. Strategically choose the individual or individuals that are in charge of collection efforts in house (for example, do not choose an individual who is not familiar with the company’s technology).

• Take Advantage of Counsel’s Expertise. Engage in communications with counsel who has experience and expertise in e-discovery issues. This will ensure that obligations at each stage of the process are complied with and can be defended later.

• Issue Litigation Holds. Make sure that a plan is developed to identify triggering events that would give rise to the obligation to issue a litigation hold to your employees and ensure that the litigation holds are promptly issued and include a specific instruction not to delete documents.

The court’s sanctions are becoming increasingly harsh. The sanctions in Green had the same effect as publishing the defendant’s e-discovery violations in a newspaper. The above guidelines can help you avoid becoming the next headline.

When an Employee Tweets

David J. Walton — Wed, 07 Sep 2011 11:17:36 -0800

Another day. Another TWITTER event. This time it involves the National Football League. Last week, star running back Arian Foster sent a copy of a MRI image showing his severely injured hamstring to all of his followers by TWITTER. His “tweet” included an explanation of where his hamstring was specifically damaged.

The problem is that NFL teams fight hard to keep this type of information private. Foster is one of the top running backs in the league and his availability for the first week of the season, which starts next weekend, was in question. NFL teams often guard this information zealously. They do not want the opposition to find out how injured their players are. Even if a player is not going to play, NFL teams want their opponents to have to prepare as if Foster or another star player would be available.

There is also the gambling angle. The league administration has strong and very specific rules about the disclosure of injury information. Teams must be accurate in the disclosure of their information so that other teams aren’t prejudiced. This, of course, is used by the gambling industry to make sure that the betting lines are accurate. One can only image how quickly the betting line moved before the Houston Texas operator after Foster sent his MRI to the world. Once can also imagine that his MRI was viewed by the team physicians for the other 31 other teams in the league, including the Texans first opponent, just to determine the likelihood that Foster was going to be able to play. On the way to work this morning I was listening to sport talk radio show, were one of the commentators, an ex-NFL player said that Foster’s MRI showed his opposition exactly where they needed to hit him to do the most damage.

On the same show, they interviewed Brian Kelly, the head coach of the Notre Dame Fighting Irish football team, about his players’ use of TWITTER. During his interview, he made a great point. He said that TWITTER and Facebook and other forms of social media are here to stay. You cannot tell players, even college ones, that they can’t use it. So, instead, he teaches them how to manage it.

Employers should use the same approach. Don’t try to prohibit outright use of TWITTER by your employees. Social media is here to stay. I recently read an article that predicted that -- in three to five years -- e-mail accounts run by social media sites will be used for 80% of the business e-mail in the world. This is stunning. One can only imagine the implications.

Social media isn’t going any where and TWITTER, much to the chagrin of many, isn’t going anywhere either. Employers should assume that their employees will use TWITTER an outright prohibition on TWITTER and social media is doomed to fail.

Players must also adopt a specific policy. This policy must specifically identify the company that should not be disclosed by employees by either via TWITTER or other forms of social media. The policy is important because it gives fair notice to employees that their conduct may result in termination.

If you ever tried a case in front of a jury, you quickly realize the jurors are not interested in applying the technicalities of the law. Juries are interested in fairness. After they issue a verdict and they walk out of the courtroom, they want to feel like they spent their time dispensing justice, not legal technicalities.

This is why a policy is so important. It is inherently fair to fire an employee for using TWITTER after they have been advised in writing that doing so could result in their termination. Fair notice is an essential element of the fairness that juries look for when they are deciding cases. This is why a policy is so important.

Like Coach Kelly, employers should train their employees on the right way to use TWITTER and other forms of social media. Just like with email, employees must assume that every “tweet” will end up on the front page of The New York Times. As everyone knows, “tweets” are potentially discoverable. “Tweets” could be saved for several months or even longer on Blackberries, iPhones and iPads. During this training, employees must also be told that they need to avoid the impulse to TWITTER right away about a work event. You can’t take a tweet back; there is no “pullback” button. Once a tweets is on the internet, its there forever. Employees should be encouraged to be very judicious in their work-related “tweets”, to the extent they are even authorized to do them. And before pushing the send button, employees should to think about the way a potential “tweet” could be used against them or use of other competition.

To protect their confidential information, employers should also monitor the use of TWITTER and other forms of social media. To protect confidential information in the courts, employers must prove that they took reasonable efforts to protect the secrecy of that information. For certain types of employers who know that their employees essentially engage in social media and are authorized to do it for some business purposes, these employers should actively monitor the internet to make sure that their confidential information and trade secrets are not being disclosed by their employees to the rest of the world.

In the same vein, employers must be very careful to limit access to the most secret information to a small group of employees. As Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s founder and CEO stated, privacy in the world is essentially dead. Keeping this in mind, employers should work their IT departments to make sure that their most confidential information is protected by limiting internal and external access; by setting up the data so that it cannot be transferred, copied, and/or printed; and by using software that easily tracks who accesses the document, when and what has been done with it.

So, once again, though the world of TWITTER can provide valuable insight for employers. The NFL literally spends millions of dollars trying to protect information regarding players injuries. Players are often told not even to tell their family about their injuries because teams will fear that this information will be divulged. Now, because of an iPhone and TWITTER, the world can see a very clear picture of Arian Foster’s MRI showing a significant injury to his hamstring. And there is no way for him to pull it back. This is the kind of story that keeps most employers up at night, and it’s an important lesson for us all.

Prevailing Parties May Recover E-Discovery Costs Under the Federal Rules

Robert Chu — Tue, 30 Aug 2011 18:30:33 -0800

The Clerk for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently ruled that there is a heavy presumption that prevailing parties may recover certain e-discovery costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) allows prevailing parties to submit bills of costs for certain expenses, enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920, for taxation by the Clerk against the non-prevailing parties. For example, that statute provides for the taxation of costs related to obtaining copies of transcripts and printing. More significantly, the statute provides for the taxation of “[f]ees for exemplification and the cost of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). While the term “exemplification” is undefined, federal district clerks have traditionally awarded, as exemplification and copying costs, those costs related to the production of paper documents, photographs, models, maps, blow-ups, charts, and diagrams.

In expanding the categories of production costs recognized as “exemplification” expenses, the Clerk of Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Hank’s Beverage Co. v. Ajinomoto Co., Civ. No. 06-cv-1732 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 26, 2011) (slip op.), awarded to the prevailing defendants e-discovery exemplification costs totaling over $500,000. These costs, which do not include the fees incurred by counsel in reviewing the documents, were related to the production of documents, such as processing native files, restoring back-up tape files, hosting and storing documents in electronic databases, scanning hard copy documents, de-duplicating documents, and filtering the documents to capture the documents containing the agreed-upon search terms. The court described these allowable expenses as the “costs of hiring a private company that possesses the technology to search for, and/or to recreate, copies of evidence in electronic form, for the purpose of making the alleged facts contained in the exhibits more clear to the finder(s) of fact . . . .” The court explained that such costs are justified for taxation because “generally, neither attorneys nor employees of attorneys are competent to conduct such a search, or to recreate such documents in paper format.”

The Clerk in Hank’s Beverage further explained that there is a heavy presumption that “the 'prevailing party' automatically is entitled to costs as a matter of course once it has been shown that the costs sought are arguably of the types of costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” With this heavy presumption, the Clerk cannot, for example, disallow costs because the losing party is indigent or because the suit was brought in good faith. The “heavy presumption” of automatic taxation exists because the taxation of costs, as opposed to attorney’s fees, is simply “ministerial.” Likewise, since the award of costs is not punitive, the prevailing parties need not demonstrate any bad acts of their adversaries. The Clerk, however, may find that the prevailing parties are undeserving of such costs for their own bad acts or improprieties.

The Clerk’s willingness to treat e-discovery costs as taxable against the non-prevailing party will likely give pause to parties with e-discovery intensive cases. Prevailing parties, in submitting their post-trial bills of cost, should be mindful to request the taxation of e-discovery costs by the Clerk after a victory.

Cost Recovery Toolbox: Exceptional Cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285

Michael Broadbent — Fri, 19 Aug 2011 07:09:18 -0800

In a recent post on this blog, fellow contributor Mike Zabel addressed how a prevailing party might recover the costs of e-discovery in litigating disputes in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, No. 2009-1308, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15650 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit highlighted another avenue for litigants in patent cases to recover costs based on discovery violations, affirming sanctions of nearly $500,000 for litigation misconduct. Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court may award the prevailing party in a patent dispute reasonable attorneys fees in “exceptional cases.” Plaintiff Eon-Net engaged in improper tactics and made a habit of filing nuisance infringement cases – well over one hundred of them in total – but the court began its exceptional case discussion with Eon-Net’s “retention policy.”

Eon-Net adopted a policy that it would not retain relevant documents and destroyed important documents pursuant to that policy. Indeed, Eon-Net’s principal testified that “I don’t save anything so I don’t have to look.” Flagstar, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15650, at *18. Eon-Net’s approach actively rejected any duty to save documents related to the infringement claim upon which the suit was brought and violated its duty to preserve evidence during prior lawsuits on the same patents. Id. Based on this misconduct, as well as Eon-Net’s improper legal tactics, the court affirmed a costs award that approached $500,000.

Discovery sanctions under Rule 37 and prevailing party costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 allow litigants to recoup discovery costs in certain circumstances. The threat of sanctions under either of those rules should be sufficient to keep parties from engaging in outrageous conduct such as the conduct of the plaintiff in Flagstar. When an opposing party engages in such tactics, however, parties to patent litigation should keep the “exceptional case” rule in mind as another tool for recovering costs lost due to discovery misconduct.

I'm Responsible To Do What? Counsel's Affirmative Duty To Ensure Compliance With Litigation Holds

F Brenden Coller — Thu, 18 Aug 2011 10:51:28 -0800

A corporate defendant discovers that it will be subject to litigation, yet it actively destroys probative, relevant evidence. Many of us have read, or heard of, opinions where judges have punished a spoliating-defendant by issuing sanctions anywhere from an adverse inference instruction to an entry of default judgment. In recent years, however, it is not only the client that has felt the weight of the responsibility in discovery matters. Starting with Zublake v. UBS Warburg (“Zublake V”), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), courts all over the country have emphasized the duty placed on counsel—both in-house and outside—to ensure that clients comply with their discovery obligations.

Many courts have quoted Zubulake V’s famous line, stating that counsel “must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched.” In Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 05-cv-1958, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 911 (S.D. Ca., Jan. 7, 2008), for example, the Southern District of California found Qualcomm’s counsel responsible for a “monumental discovery violation” because counsel “did not conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm’s document search and production.”

This responsibility is not restricted to outside counsel. In Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16900 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000), the court recognized that in-house counsel did not establish any meaningful document retention program. In-house counsel failed to: 1) give notice to employees to preserve documents; 2) provide criteria as to what should and should not be saved; 3) review any documents that were being thrown away; and 4) review existing practices related to document retention.

Although both in-house and outside counsel can be, and have been, sanctioned for failing to adequately monitor their clients’ compliance with discovery obligations, the following are some steps that can be taken to avoid this result:

• Be proactive. Identify the triggering events that give rise to the duty to preserve. Once that obligation is triggered, issue a timely and comprehensive litigation hold.

• Communicate effectively and often. Do not assume that employees understand what the litigation entails, what their obligations are under the litigation hold, or what documents may be relevant to the litigation.

• Identify and interview key employees. Focus on employees who are likely to have relevant information to: educate them as to the case; learn about, and preserve, relevant information; and ensure compliance with your litigation hold.

• Contact opposing counsel. Explain your process for collecting relevant information to opposing counsel. If the other side has any issues with your process, it is better to resolve these sooner rather than later.

• Communicate frequently. Do not assume that once you issue a litigation hold, your obligations are fulfilled. Do frequently follow-up to ensure that all employees are preserving potentially relevant documents and data.

• Consider the Court’s involvement. One of the clearest ways to ensure that your clients’ discovery obligations, and yours, are fulfilled is to ask the court to set specific standards with respect to the scope and duration of preservation and how data will be reviewed and produced. Being willing to seek court intervention early on will educate the court as to the volume of information and the cost involved and may lead the court to set limits on ongoing preservation and document production.

The responsibility for compliance with the rules with respect to discovery is shared between the client and their counsel. In-house and outside counsel and the various custodians of potentially relevant information need to work as a team and keep the lines of communication open to ensure that their obligations are fulfilled. This allows all involved to comply with their discovery obligations and to identify key documents—favorable and unfavorable—early on and develop their litigation strategy accordingly.

Litigation Holds, Take 2

Rachel S. Fendell — Tue, 16 Aug 2011 05:16:19 -0800

Once a litigation hold has been drafted, the next steps are to effectively issue, implement, and monitor the hold. These steps are equally critical to ensuring a litigation hold is successful.

6. How is an effective litigation hold notice issued?

· An effective litigation hold notice cannot be issued unless, and until, key personnel are identified and informed. This includes personnel in a company’s IT department who are responsible for overseeing the preservation of electronic documents. Also, designate one contact person for all preservation related questions. This ensures that information is provided to personnel in a consistent manner.

· The litigation hold MUST be in writing! Many courts require that a litigation hold be in writing in order to be valid. Similarly, ask personnel to complete written acknowledgements, detailing receipt of the litigation hold notice, their understanding of the hold notice, and their agreement to comply with the hold notice.

· When issuing the litigation hold, effective communication is key. Describe the litigation in general terms with understandable language, and avoid legal terms at all costs. Broadly state where relevant data and information could be located. Provide instructions on how to preserve relevant information. Finally, explain the consequences for non-compliance, particularly the importance of not destroying or altering relevant information.

7. How should the litigation hold process be maintained and reviewed?

· A litigation hold is not static. It is a continuing obligation, of which personnel constantly should be reminded. Send reminder notices and encourage personnel to ask questions if any exist. Always consider whether new players or data is involved. Continually document the steps taken to implement and monitor the litigation hold. Depending on the situation, an entity may have a responsibility to utilize outside counsel to monitor the litigation hold process.

8. When and how should a litigation hold be released?

· A litigation hold may be released when a party no longer is reasonably aware of the possibility of litigation. When releasing the hold, contact all parties who received the original litigation hold notice, and notify them that their obligations under the hold have ceased. At this time, any document destruction policies may be reintroduced.

· Examples of when a litigation hold should be released include the withdrawal of a complaint, the completion of a deal, and the exhaustion of the appeals process.

9. Are litigation holds discoverable?

· Normally, litigation holds are not discoverable. However, litigation holds can become discoverable if questions or concerns surround a party’s efforts to preserve relevant information. This is why documenting the litigation hold process is crucial.

Litigation Holds, Take 1

Rachel S. Fendell — Fri, 12 Aug 2011 07:42:30 -0800

Developing, drafting and implementing a litigation hold are critical to the e-discovery process. A litigation hold ensures that all relevant information is preserved and later helps to ensure that discovery can be responded to efficiently, accurately, and appropriately. Accordingly, a successful litigation hold reduces the possibility of sanctions during the e-discovery process.

This first post on litigation holds, provides answers to questions about the beginning of the litigation hold process. The second post, will more thoroughly address the actual implementation of the hold.

1. What is a litigation hold?

· During a litigation hold, parties to the litigation preserve, keep, and store potentially relevant information. Parties also must suspend any document destruction policy they follow, for both printed and electronic documents.

2. When should a litigation hold be issued?

· A litigation hold should be issued when a party is reasonably aware that it will be a party to litigation. For a plaintiff, triggers could include filing a complaint, seeking advice of counsel, or sending a cease and desist letter. For a defendant, triggers could include receiving a summons or complaint, receiving official notice of a government investigation, or receiving notice of an accident, receiving discovery requests.

3. Are litigation hold policies and practices necessary?

· Yes! Before litigation even arises, it is necessary to implement litigation hold policies and train employees on those policies. Have a process, follow the process, implement the process, and document the process!

4. What types of issues should be identified before issuing a litigation hold notice?

· First, a party needs to identify types of electronically stored information that could contain relevant information. Types of electronically stored information range from data stored on computers (laptops and desktops), to cell phones, to personal data devices (Blackberries, Iphones, etc.), to voicemails. A party also must identify where this data physically is stored and whether the data has multiple storage locations.

· Second, a party needs to identify the players. Players are any individuals who might have been a witness to a relevant event, or individuals who otherwise were exposed to information surrounding a relevant event. Always consider whether the individuals surrounding key players, especially secretaries and assistants, would have relevant information.

5. How should the litigation hold process be developed?

· Parties can freely decide how to collect relevant data. In considering the scope of the litigation hold, there are many factors to consider such as the: cost to gather data; number of key players involved; locations of players involved, need to secure an outside expert; location of data; types of data; and accessibility of the data.

When Does the Duty to Preserve Electronic Evidence Arise?

Catherine Hamilton — Wed, 10 Aug 2011 06:10:12 -0800

The duty to preserve electronic evidence is triggered once a party “reasonably anticipates” litigation. Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Pension Committee of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Securities, LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). At that point, parties have an obligation to suspend their routine document retention and destruction policies and implement a “litigation hold” to safeguard all relevant evidence. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reaffirmed the “reasonably foreseeable” standard in Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. 09-1263, 2011 WL 1815975 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2011). The Court of Appeals explained that the standard is an objective one, “asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would have reasonably foreseen litigation.” Id. at *6. Significantly, the Court in Micron rejected the argument that “litigation be ‘imminent, or probable without significant contingencies’” in order to trigger the duty to preserve. Id. According to the Court, this argument is based on “an overly generous reading of several cases” and is at odds with the flexible reasonably foreseeable standard. Id.

The “reasonable anticipation” principle is now well-established but not easily applied as it is necessarily shaped by the factual nuances of the parties’ dispute. Thus, although it is easy to conclude that a defendant has a duty to preserve electronic evidence once it is served with a summons and complaint, the duty to preserve is often triggered in the pre-litigation stage. This is because the duty to preserve is triggered once the defendant is aware of a credible threat of litigation, which is often before a complaint is filed. Determining the date that the party knew or should have known that litigation is reasonably foreseeable is often a subject of dispute. Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10-761, 2011 WL 291077 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011).

Some guiding principles, however, are clear. For large organizations, it is clear that more than one or two employees must reasonably anticipate litigation in order to trigger the duty. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus, in Toussie v. County of Suffolk, No. 01-6716, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93988 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2007), the Court reasoned that the duty to preserve electronic evidence did not arise until the complaint was filed. The Court reasoned that, although a “handful” of employees expected the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, “there was no evidence to suggest that a substantial number of key personnel anticipated litigation prior” to such time. In Viramontes, the fact that the plaintiff’s supervisor suspected that the plaintiff might sue, based on a pre-litigation letter written by the plaintiff complaining about the supervisor’s allegedly rude behavior, was not enough to find that the defendant-company should have reasonably anticipated future employment discrimination litigation. 2011 WL 291077 at *4. The court reasoned that the letter did not assert that the plaintiff might bring employment discrimination claims and, in fact, it suggested a “non-litigious resolution” to the plaintiff’s complaints regarding her supervisor’s behavior. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act were not filed until ten months later.

The indications that litigation may be forthcoming must be more than “vague” statements and the “mere existence of a dispute does not necessarily mean that parties should reasonably anticipate litigation[.]” Goodman v. Praxair Servs., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 510 (D. Md. 2009). Thus, a demand letter may be a sufficient warning that litigation is on the horizon and a letter advising that an attorney has been retained will certainly trigger the duty to preserve. Id. at 511. Conversely, letters written in the midst of the parties’ dispute do not necessarily trigger the duty. In Cache La Pourdre Feeds, LLC v. Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 244 F.R.D. 614, 622 (D. Colo. 2007), a letter stating that its purpose was to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff’s trademark rights and “determine whether this situation can be resolved without litigation” did not trigger a duty to preserve. These cases demonstrate that the determination of the trigger date on the duty to preserve is a fact-intensive inquiry.

Also of note is the inter-relationship between the timing of the duty to preserve and application of the work product privilege. In Siani v. State Univ. of New York at Farmingdale, No 09-407, 2010 WL 3170664 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010), for example, the plaintiff argued the defendant had a duty to preserve evidence a full year prior to the filing of the complaint because the defendant retained a law firm at that point to represent it in connection with the plaintiff’s allegations of ongoing discrimination. The defendant was hard-pressed to argue to the contrary given that it had marked documents as protected by the work-product privilege around that same time. Id. at *5. The Court reasoned that the “commonsense conclusion” dictated that if “litigation was reasonably foreseeable for one purpose in January 2008, it was reasonably foreseeable for all purposes.” Id.

In conclusion, whether and when a party reasonably anticipates litigation, thereby, triggering the duty to preserve electronic evidence depends on many factors, including but not limited to, who within the defendant organization anticipates the litigation, the clarity of the threat, and when privileged documents are created and labeled as such. A reasoned evaluation of all factors is needed and the organization is under a duty to re-evaluate should new information present itself.

Discovery in the Age of Cloud Computing

Michael Broadbent — Mon, 27 Jun 2011 01:29:00 -0800

During the last decade, individuals and business have changed the way they manage their data by moving this data management offsite – otherwise known as cloud computing. This differs from the old model of information management that, more or less, mirrored the pre-computing era, meaning that an employee’s file might be kept in a cabinet in a Human Resources (“HR”) office or stored on a company’s in-house server. With cloud computing, however, that same employee file may be stored hundreds or thousands of miles away from the HR officer who needs to review it – or the IT officer tasked with preserving that data for potential litigation.

Cloud computing outsources data and software management, migrating it from the local to the global by providing instant access over the internet. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, cloud computing has five primary characteristics: (1) “on-demand self-service,” or the ability to call up stored data or capabilities as needed; (2) broad network access through a variety of platforms; (3) pooling resources providing “location independence”; (4) “rapid elasticity” in the distribution of computing capabilities, and (5) “measured service,” or service-appropriate control and optimization by the cloud system manager rather than the local user.[1] It is the pooling of resources and the measured service managed by third-parties that pose the greatest risks during e-discovery.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties must produce copies or descriptions of documents in their possession, custody, or control. By using cloud services, a potential litigant has placed a third-party in the way of important data. That party, however, may not relinquish control over that data and it must be preserved and, possibly, produced. Control of that data could be set forth in the service contract between the cloud provider and the user.[2] Control could also be found because a party has the practical ability to access and obtain the documents from a third-party.[3] As a result, and to avoid a misstep during discovery, clients and counsel need to fully understand the agreements governing important data and the actual technology through which the cloud data is accessed.

Parties employing the cloud are also at risk that certain electronically stored information may be overwritten or subject to routine deletion. Moreover, it may not be technologically or commercially feasible for a cloud service provider to prevent routine maintenance when relevant data is pooled with that of thousands or millions of other users. Without significant guidance on the interplay between cloud computing and any safe harbors for good-faith conduct, potential litigants need to be cautious during discovery to take all reasonable and feasible steps to preserve and produce responsive data. Similarly, litigants and their counsel should remember that discovery should be candid, cooperative, and transparent.[4] Failing to timely disclose or address issues raised by cloud computing may result in sanctions that could have been avoided.

Cloud computing creates new layers of uncertainty for businesses or individuals who may later be involved in litigation. Although the data may be stored elsewhere, parties will likely have “control” over that which is stored in the cloud and will often bear the same responsibilities with respect to preservation and production as they would for files kept on site. Cloud users should routinely assess their risk by reviewing which data and which services are being migrated to, or are currently in, the cloud. Similarly, cloud computing should be taken seriously from its inception. Parties should conduct their due diligence on potential providers, review agreements and policies, and preempt any risk that saving money now will cause serious costs in court. If litigation arises that may involve cloud data or software, parties should be vigilant in preserving that data and documenting this, and all efforts taken to comply with discovery requests.

[1] Peter Mell and Tim Grance, NIST, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing 1 (2009), available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-def-v15.pdf.

[2] See, e.g., Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 354 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (finding that City maintained control over text messages preserved by cell provider “pursuant to its contractual relationship”).

[3] See, e.g., In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that control is often interpreted broadly).

[4] See, e.g., Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-CV-01644-REB-CBS, at 25 (D.Co. Feb. 8, 2010) (order on pending motions), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/tsc_cooperation_proclamation (endorsing Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation).