China-U.S. Trade Law

GLASS HOUSES 玻璃房子

Dr. Elliot J. Feldman — Thu, 04 Mar 2010 13:04:56 -0600

One of the most troubling features of the growing tensions between China and the United States is that both countries legitimately have a lot to complain about, and typically they are the same things. Three issues are particularly conspicuous at present and at the core of difficulties in the trade relationship – the definitions and status of “market” and “non-market” economies; the role of governments as owners of strategic economic sectors and retaliation over grievances arising from that role; and cyberattacks. When China and the United States criticize each other, they often are launching their complaints from inside glass houses, fortifications especially vulnerable to retaliation.

Market Economies

Almost every member of the World Trade Organization, and even countries (such as Russia) that are not, for international trade purposes are considered “market economies.” The designation is important because the rules of fair trade are written to promote markets, rewarding market transactions and penalizing conduct judged to distort markets. The distinctions emerged at the dawn of the Cold War when the rules enabling private enterprise to compete with state-directed economies were written.

State economic interventions, according to world trade rules, distort markets. State-directed economies – “non-market economies” (“NMEs”) – are inherently distorting. World trade rules deal with them through exclusion, denying them entitlement to the benefits of favorable assumptions.

Although China agreed, when it acceded to membership in the WTO in 2001, that it was not yet accepted as a market economy, it did not expect such recognition to be far behind. Now, nearly a decade later, it seems nowhere in sight, and largely because of objections raised by the United States.

The United States sees too much state direction in the Chinese economy. National plans are reinforced by regional and local planning. State-owned enterprises are dominant, particularly in the most important sectors of steel and energy production. State-owned banks control most lending. Tax schemes systematically favor designated sectors. Utilities providing manufacturers with energy are state-owned. There is no private ownership of land. And today, most important of all, currency is tied to the dollar and does not trade freely in international markets.

China does not see its economy this way. State enterprises are enterprises whose profits go to all shareholders, who are the people of China and not small investing bands of capitalists. They are controlled by boards with mandates to operate competitive, profitable businesses. Banks, controlled by the state, protect the state’s interests, and thus avoid reckless and feckless lending that can jeopardize whole economies. Labor is mobile and subject to competition. Land tenures in Britain, and some other Commonwealth countries, are based on the theory that the Crown owns all of the land, but thriving markets in land tenures exist. No one claims that the Crown’s ownership of all of the land in these countries suggests they are not market economies. The dollar began to float freely and trade on international exchanges less than forty years ago, and no one suggests that prior to the collapse of Bretton Woods the United States was not a market economy. In China’s view, all the people of China are the shareholders of the economy at large, but no less capitalistic in their support of competition and free enterprise. Most observers of China today remark on the Chinese worship of money, no less than in traditional capitalist societies.

The American indictment of China as an NME is defended now from inside a glass house. After the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the federal government in the United States took large ownership positions in many key banks. The government took effective ownership of the automobile industry. The Congress of the United States endlessly writes tax laws to favor one industry or another, especially the larger ones dependent on exports. Property is private, but government institutions set the terms of ownership and all of the financing that makes ownership possible. And the government in the United States intervenes in the economy regularly to create and save jobs, regulating the labor market, encouraging companies to hire labor and discouraging dismissals.

Neither China nor the United States is an ideal market economy. The distinctions might not matter practically, representing different paths to the acquisition and distribution of the benefits of commerce, except that they do in the application of trade laws. China thinks itself stigmatized by its designation as an NME, and it is disadvantaged in international trade.

Until 2006 there was at least a trade-off. Trade law, as applied everywhere, recognized that state intervention in the economy could not be market-distorting if there were no market. Consequently, trade remedy actions based on subsidy allegations could not be initiated, both because there was no way to measure a subsidy in the absence of market prices, and because a subsidy by definition must distort a market and in an NME there is no market to distort.

In late 2006, the United States began to have things both ways. It said China was enough of a market economy to justify bringing subsidy cases against its exports, yet not enough to shed its designation as an NME. Ever since, China has been manifestly subject to a deliberately unfair trade regime. Yet, when China takes exception, it does so from within its own glass house, and not only because of the conditions that shaped American views in the first place.

Even as China began in 2006 to defend its practices in the United States, its conduct tended to reinforce the indictment instead of refuting it. Instead of acknowledging that it had little control over regional and local governments, their “planning” or their commercial practices, the central government, citing to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, asserted that all governments reported to it. Instead of acknowledging difficulty in amassing information demanded by U.S. authorities in trade investigations, it tried to answer questions without verifiable information. Instead of leaving private enterprises in China to find counsel and defend their own interests, the government convened supposedly independent chambers of commerce and largely directed the management of China’s legal defenses. It relied principally on the advice of Chinese lawyers with very limited knowledge of U.S. law. All these actions tended to convince American investigators that China is state-run and not ready to be considered a market economy.

As a practical matter, this issue has lost most of its importance. U.S. authorities have developed methodologies that would reach the same conclusions about fair trade even were China now recognized as a market economy. But symbolically this issue remains critical.

China’s Retaliation: Mutual Accusations Of Subsidies

Exhausted, perhaps, by the apparent futility in its claim that it should be recognized as a market economy, China has adopted an alternative strategy, accusing the United States of similar market deficiencies. China now formally accuses American exports of being subsidized in an economic system marked by substantial state involvement.

China does not deny that the development of its automobile industry has been heavily subsidized. Instead, China argues that it has graduated from subsidization. This view, however, neglects the history of international trade disputes centered on the privatization of state enterprises that followed on the collapse of Communist regimes. The United States accused all such enterprises, especially in the steel industry, of continuing long-term benefits, arguing that privatization could not extinguish the value of subsidies unless the sale of the state enterprise took place at a full market price. The United States placed the burden of proof that no subsidies passed through from the state to the private enterprise on the foreign private enterprise, a burden virtually impossible to bear because of inadequate documentation.

China, perhaps preemptively, has accused the U.S. automobile industry of exporting subsidized vehicles to China. As we discussed on December 1, 2009 on this blog, the countervailing duty investigation launched in November 2009 arises from a petition that argues the American automobile industry is in historic decline and survives only due to massive government subsidization. The central problem of these accusations, however, is that they are hurled from a glass house. The United States will now almost certainly accuse China of subsidizing the automobiles China is gearing up to sell to the United States. Hence, while the industries in both countries are trying to develop fuel efficient automobiles that will eliminate carbon emissions, thereby serving mutual objectives related to saving the planet, trade laws in both countries already are impeding direct competition based on the quality of the product.

China’s action, contending that the United States does not produce automobiles through free market enterprise, is a transparent retaliation for the American insistence that China is a non-market economy. However, this action carries the disagreement forward into the terrain of the future, where China and the United States need most to cooperate.

Cyberattacks

The United States has complained for a long time that China has subjected American defense and security establishments to incessant and invasive cyberattacks. These complaints took on a new character and dimension when Google complained that a coordinated Chinese assault on Google customers included an invasion of the accounts of Chinese dissidents. Google, already criticized for accepting Chinese government censorship that affects the internet in no other country, found the latest attacks intolerable. Google threatened to leave China.

The Google-China confrontation led Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to deliver a major speech on “internet freedom” that called for international condemnation of China. Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School professor and former senior Justice Department official in the Bush Administration, responded quickly in The Washington Post: “[T]he problem with Clinton’s call for accountability and norms on the global network,” Goldsmith wrote, “is the enormous array of cyberattacks originating from the United States. Until we acknowledge these attacks and signal how we might control them, we cannot make progress on preventing cyberattacks emanating from other countries.”

The cyberattacks from China are presumed to be state-directed because of the state control and censorship of the internet imposed on companies such as Google. Attacks from the United States are presumed, at least by Americans, to be the work of private individuals, free-lancers, the sort of people who fill e-mail boxes incessantly with spam. Goldsmith accepts this orthodoxy, noting that “Scores of individuals and groups in the United States design or employ computer payloads to attack government Web sites, computer systems and censoring tools in Iran and China. These efforts are often supported by U.S. foundations and universities, and by the federal government. Clinton boasted about this support seven paragraphs after complaining about cyberattacks.”

Boarding Up The Glass Houses

China surely knows at least as much about what is happening in its cyber sphere as Professor Goldsmith. The American complaint about Chinese interference with the internet appears well-founded, as is the American complaint about China’s control of its economy and China’s subsidization of industry. But each of these complaints is launched from a glass house. Until China and the United States acknowledge mutually the problem – that their legitimate reciprocal complaints need more solution than aggravation – such complaints will compound and multiply, and the two countries will grow further apart and more antagonistic. They must either appreciate the view that glass houses uniquely afford – a place from which one can see out very well, but others can also see in -- stop throwing things at each other from inside the glass houses, or board them up. The last choice, which may define the direction in which things are going, is probably the worst of all.

中美间的紧张关系令人担忧，其中一个特点是合情合理两国都有许多可以抱怨的事件，虽然这些事件大同小异。其中三大事件最引人注目，也是贸易关系的重点——“市场”和“非市场经济”的定义以及地位；政府作为所有者在战略经济领域扮演的角色，以及针对这一角色采取的报复行动；网络骇客。当中美互相指责对方时，他们都是站在玻璃房子中向对方发起攻击，使得自己在报复措施面前显得软弱无力。（美国有句俗语：住在玻璃房子里的人不向邻居扔石头。）

市场经济体

几乎所有的世贸组织成员，包括俄罗斯等非市场经济国家，都在国际贸易领域被授予“市场经济”地位。这一地位很重要因为公平贸易法则旨在促进市场经济、奖励市场经济转型、惩罚扭曲市场的行为。市场经济、非市场经济的区分在冷战初期形成，这些法则旨在帮助私营经济和政府指令经济竞争。

根据国际贸易法则，政府经济干预扭曲市场。政府指令经济——“非市场经济”生来就具有扭曲市场的特性。国际贸易法规将它们排除在外，拒绝给予它们有利的假设条件。

虽然当中国在2001年加入世贸组织时同意暂时不被认可为市场经济体，但她没有料到将迟迟得不到认可。迄今为止，将近十年过去了，这一地位仍不着边际，这主要是因为美国反对。

美国认为政府指令在中国经济发展中扮演过于重要的角色。省及地方五年计划进一步强化了国家计划。国有企业占主导地位，尤其在钢铁、能源等最重要的领域。税收政策向某些产业倾斜。向生产商提供能源的是国有企业。土地亦非私有。最重要的是人民币汇率紧跟美元，在国际市场上不能自由兑换。

但中国却不这么认为。国有企业是把利润分配给所有持股人的企业，而这些持股人正是所有中国公民而不是少数资本家。董事会掌控这些国有企业，而且这些企业旨在竞争、获得利润。国家控制的银行旨在确保国家利益，因而避免冲动、不营利且甚至可能威胁国家经济发展的贷款。就业人口是流动的，而且面临竞争。在英国等英联邦国家，皇室拥有土地，但是土地使用权市场仍蓬勃发展。美元直至四十年前才开始自由兑换，然而在布莱顿森林体系倒塌前，并没有人否认美国的市场经济地位。在中国眼里，所有中国公民都是中国经济的股东，这并不影响他们支持企业间自由竞争。许多观察家认为当前中国和传统资本主义国家一样崇尚金钱。

美国像站在玻璃房子中辩护针对中国非市场经济运营的指控。2008年雷曼兄弟公司倒闭之后，美国联邦政府在几大银行中拥有很多股权。政府同时掌控了汽车行业。美国国会不断修改税法给予某些行业特别优惠，尤其是较依赖出口的行业。虽然财产私有，但是政府机构决定所有权条款并提供资金。同时美国政府定期干预经济以增加、保证就业机会，管理就业市场，鼓励企业增加就业机会、减少裁员。

中美两国都不是理想的市场经济体。在实际操作中这些区别并不重要，仅代表获得所有权的不同途径、以及利益分配的不同方式，但是在贸易法中却有重要意义。中国认为她因非市场经济地位在国际贸易中处于劣势。

2006年以前，中国至少获得些补偿。世界各国贸易法都认定如果市场不存在，那么政府对经济的干预也不能扭曲市场。也不能对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查，因为如果没有市场价格就没有办法衡量补贴；同时根据定义，补贴必须扭曲市场，而在非市场经济体中没有市场可以扭曲。

2006年下半年，美国对中国采取了双重措施。美国认为中国的市场经济发展到一定地位，因此可对中国展开反补贴调查，但还不足以摆脱非市场经济地位。从此，中国明显受制于不公平贸易体系。然而当中国采取特例时，她也在玻璃房中采取行动。

当中国从2006年开始在美国为自己辩护时，她采取的行动非但没有削弱，反而加强指控。中国应当指出中央对地方政府的“计划”和商业行为没有太多控制，但是中国中央政府引用宪法坚持声称地方政府都向其汇报。中国不愿承认收集美国政府在贸易调查中索取的信息有很大难度，相反在没有确切信息的情况下仍试图回答问题。她不是让私营企业寻找律师捍卫自己的利益，相反中央政府集合了应当是独立的进出口商会、主导法律抗争行动。她主要依赖那些对美国法律仅有局限了解的中国律师的建议。这些行动都是美国调查机构认为中国是政府主导的经济体，还不应被授予市场经济地位。

在实际操作领域，这一问题已经失去了它的重要性。即使中国获得市场经济地位，美国政府已经建立的计算方法仍将使中国面临同样不利的情况。但形式上，这一问题仍很重要。

中国的报复：相互指责不正当补贴

也许中国看到争取市场经济地位无果而深感失望，她采取了另一战略——指责美国同样缺少市场机制。中国现在指控美国出口品也享受补助，且政府在美国经济中扮演重要角色。

中国并不否认她为汽车工业的发展提供很多补助。相反，她认为自己已经走出这一阶段了。但是这一观点忽略了历史上国际贸易关注共产主义国家解体国有企业私有化进程。美国指控这些企业，尤其是钢铁企业，长期受益于补助。如果在私有化进程中国有企业不是完全按市场价格出售，那么这一进程不能消除补贴带来的利益。美国把提供证据证明政府没有向私营企业提供补助的重任落在外国企业肩上；但是国外企业因无法搜集足够证据，所以无法承担这一重任。

中国在时机尚未成熟的情况下，指控美国汽车产业向中国出口享受补助的车辆。在我们2009年12月10日刊登的搏客中，2009年11月中国展开的这一反补贴调查起源于一份认定美国汽车工业正在走下坡路、完全依靠强大政府补助支撑的调查申请书。这些指控的核心弊病是它们都是玻璃房子的产品。美国一定会指控中国出口到美国的汽车享受政府补助。因此，当两国汽车生产商都在努力发展节能汽车以减少二氧化碳排放的同时，两国贸易法却阻碍建立在产品质量上的竞争。

中国指控美国汽车不是由自由市场企业生产的行动显然是对美国拒绝授予中国市场经济地位的报复。但是，这一行动将对未来造成负面影响，虽然两国将需要互相帮助。

网络攻击

长期以来，美国指责中国不断对美国国防、安全设施发起进攻性网络袭击。当谷歌公司声称它的客户受到有组织的中国袭击时，包括中国籍持不同政见者的账户，这些指责又蒙上新含义。虽然谷歌已经同意接受中国政府的审查（这并不影响谷歌在其他国家的运营），但是最近的这些袭击让谷歌忍无可忍。谷歌威胁将离开中国。

谷歌和中国的冲突引发了国务卿克林顿的介入，她在“网络自由”的演讲中呼吁全世界谴责中国。哈佛法学院教授、布什总统任期内的司法部官员Jack Goldsmith迅速在《华盛顿邮报》做出回应：“克林顿呼吁网络世界的诚信和法规面临挑战，因为美国是众多网络袭击的发源地。在我们承认这些袭击并以实际行动控制这些袭击之前，我们不能在阻止发源于其他国家的网络袭击方面实现重大突破。”

因为中国政府的控制和审查，舆论认为中国政府操纵着针对谷歌等起源于中国的网络袭击。而起源美国的袭击却被认为是个人、自由职业者发动的袭击，至少美国人这样认为。Goldsmith接受这一传统观点，并进一步指出：“美国的个人及有组织的网络袭击对象是中国和伊朗政府网站、电脑系统以及审查机器。这些袭击得到美国大学、基金会以及联邦政府的支持。仅在克林顿抱怨中国的骇客行为后七个段落，她又开始称赞美国骇客的行动。”

掩护玻璃房子

中国显然比Goldsmith教授更清楚她的网络世界运行情况。美国对中国骇客袭击的控诉看起来振振有词，就像她对中国政府操纵经济运行、补贴企业的指控一样。但是这些指控都来自玻璃房子内。只有当中美双方都承认弊病——她们正当合理的抱怨需要解决途径，而不是使局势紧张化——这些抱怨只会使两国间的距离越来越远。她们或是应当理解对方在玻璃房子中发表的观点——发表观点的人可以清楚地看到外界，外界也可清楚地看到发表观点的人——停止向对方扔东西，或是掩护各自的玻璃房子。后者可能是两国关系发展的趋势，但却是下下策。

A Deep Freeze on Climate Change? 深度冷藏气候变化会谈？

Kavita Mohan — Tue, 16 Feb 2010 14:45:45 -0600

President Obama declared in his State of the Union address on January 27, to a standing ovation, that the United States would not take second place to anyone in the world, and specifically to countries such as China and India. The specific reference to China and India highlighted their growing importance on the global stage. India and China increasingly have been presenting a united front against the United States and the rest of the developed world, despite their own on-going political and territorial disputes (as we noted in our articles entitled, India, China, and the Doha Round, and India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change).

We predicted in India and China Turn Up the Heat on Climate Change that an alliance between India and China could present a formidable barrier at the climate change meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009. Indeed, the talks have been regarded by many as a failure, and the resulting Accord as “low-ambition.” Just as India, with the support of China, had been blamed by the United States for the failure of the Doha Round in July 2008, China, with the support of India, has been blamed by many for the failure of Copenhagen.

The Copenhagen Accord, drafted by Brazil, China, India, South Africa (the “BASIC” countries) and the United States, is not legally binding, and was recognized but not approved by the 193 countries represented at Copenhagen. It seeks to limit a rise in temperatures to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, and sets a goal that developed countries jointly will deliver $30 billion of aid over the next three years and $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries cope with the impact of climate change.

Developing countries, including China and India, have made clear that they will join other countries to combat climate change, but not at the expense of their own economic interests. They conditioned acting on the receipt of significant concessions from the developed world, which they see as primarily responsible for the problem they are being asked to address.

Both China and India chose Copenhagen as the platform from which to demonstrate that they could not be bullied by the developed world. India’s Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated in an address following the meetings in Copenhagen that the alliance of BASIC countries highlighted the growing influence of emerging economies. He further characterized as a significant victory the commitment from developed countries to provide $100 billion/year in climate funding without having to make significant concessions in return. He indicated that close links with China would continue. China also declared that Copenhagen proved China could not be pushed around.

India has been concerned about the binding nature of the Copenhagen Accord. Even though India was among the countries that brokered the deal, sources have said that it announced its support for the Accord only after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon clarified to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the Accord was a political statement of intent with no legal force. In the aftermath of the Copenhagen meetings, Minister Ramesh even “pled guilty” for allowing provision for “international consultation and analysis” of domestic mitigation programs, a greater concession than merely informing the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) about domestic mitigation programs. When the environment ministers of the BASIC countries met on January 24, 2010, Minister Ramesh stated that the Copenhagen Accord has “no hope” of becoming a legally binding document.

The Copenhagen Accord did include a January 31, 2010 deadline for countries to outline their climate change plans and declare specific emission reduction targets. More than 50 countries respected the deadline, including India and China. India committed to reduce emissions by 20-25% by 2020 (in comparison to 2005 levels) through domestic mitigation efforts, but stated specifically that “its domestic mitigation actions will be entirely voluntary in nature and will not have a legally binding character.” India further stated that “mitigation actions will also not apply to agriculture sector. The emissions from agriculture sector will be excluded from the assessment of emissions intensity.”

China stated in a January 28 letter that it would endeavor to cut the amount of carbon produced per unit of economic output by 40 to 45 percent below projected growth levels by 2020, also from a 2005 base. However, given China’s projected rate of economic growth, China still would increase substantially its total carbon emissions while expecting the developed countries to decrease their emissions drastically.

Whether the Copenhagen meeting was successful cannot be determined strictly from the setting of targets, on the one hand, and the absence of any legally binding agreement, on the other. It may be that “success” will have to be measured by “progress,” with the standard for progress reasonably modest and determined by actual carbon emission reductions worldwide. Nonetheless, unmistakably there will be no global progress without the developing world. Copenhagen confirmed a China-India alliance as the base of a larger group of developing countries resistant to progress at their expense.

China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are now central to progress on climate change. They have asked the UNFCC to hold six meetings through 2010 in preparation for the next climate summit in Mexico City in December. The BASIC ministers themselves will meet once each quarter, first in Cape Town at the end of April 2010. The European Community had entered Copenhagen with even greater ambition than the United States. The BASIC countries proved that Europe, the United States, and other developed countries will make little or no progress without them.

奥巴马总统在1月27日国情咨文演讲中宣布美国在世界事务中不会屈居第二，尤其不会落后于中国和印度。他在演讲中着重指出中国和印度说明这两个国家在世界事务中日益扮演更重要的角色。虽然中印间仍存在政治、领土纠纷，但是两国仍在美国及发达国家前组成共同阵营（见《印度、中国及多哈会谈》、《中印为气候变化加温》）。

我们在《中印为气候变化加温》一文中预测中印联盟将成为2009年哥本哈根会谈的阻碍。不出所料，这一会谈被许多观察家视为失败，会谈签署的协议也被视为“缺少野心”。正如美国指控中国支持下的印度应为2008年7月多哈会谈失败负责，在哥本哈根会谈中受印度支持的中国面临同样的指责。

巴西、中国、南非（“基础国家”）与美国联合起草的《哥本哈根协定》不具法律效力，这一协议虽为与会的193国认可，但却没有得到她们的批准。这一协定试图将升温限制在不高于工业化程度前全球气温2摄氏度的范围之内，还要求发达国家在未来三年内提供300亿美金的资金支持，并将每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持发展中国家应对气候变化带来的影响，直至2020年。

包括中印在内的发展中国家明确表示她们将和其他国家一起应对气候变化，但决不会以牺牲她们的经济利益为代价。她们表示她们的行动将以发达国家的重大让步为基础，因为她们认为发达国家应对气候变暖负主要责任。

中国和印度都选择哥本哈根作为显示她们不向发达国家屈服的战场。印度环境部长Jairam Ramesh 在会谈结束后的演讲中指出，基础国家联盟标志着发展中国家的影响力日益增强。他还指出发达国家承诺每年提供一千亿美金的资金支持、而发展中国家没有做出重大让步是发展中国家取得的重大胜利。他表示将继续和中国紧密合作。而中国也声称哥本哈根会谈证明中国不会为他国所左右。

印度一直担心《哥本哈根协定》的法律效力。虽然印度是促成这一协定的国家之一，知情者指出印度直至联合国秘书长向印度总理澄清这一政治声明不具法律效力后，才宣布支持这一协定。在哥本哈根会谈后，印度总理因协议中有就国内减排措施进行“国际磋商和分析”这一条款而向公众“认罪”，因为这一条款比联合国气候变化框架公约有关条款做出更大让步。当基础国家的环境部长于2010年1月24日举行会谈时，Ramesh部长说这一协定“没有希望”成为具有法律效力的文件。

《哥本哈根协定》设立了2010年1月31日这一最后截止日期让各国列出气候变化方案及减排目标。包括中印在内的50多个国家尊重这一截止日期。印度承诺通过国内减排措施，至2020年减排百分之20至25（与2005年排放量相比），但强调“她的国内减排措施建立在自愿原则上，不受法律效力限制”。印度进一步指出“减排措施不包括农业产业。农业领域的排放将排除在排放限量内”。

中国在1月28日的信中承诺争取到2020年单位国内生产总值二氧化碳排放比2005年减排百分之40至45。但是根据中国的经济增长预测，中国将持续增加二氧化碳排放总量，但她同时却希望发达国家显著减少排放量。

哥本哈根会谈成功与否既不能仅以设定目标为标准，也不能以缺少具有法律效力的文件为标志。“成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量，而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而，没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是众多发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价参与谈判的基础。

中国、印度、巴西和南非是气候变化谈判进展的核心。她们要求联合国气候变化框架公约在2010年12月前举行六次会谈，为墨西哥峰会作准备。“基础国家”将每一季度会谈一次，第一次会谈将于4月在南非开普敦举行。欧盟在哥本哈根会谈前提出比美国更高的目标。但是“基础国家”证明没有这些发展中国家的支持，欧洲、美国和其他发达国家不可取得进展。

“成功”或许应当以“进展”来衡量，而“进展”的衡量标准相对较低、且以全球范围内的实际减排量为标准。然而，没有发展中国家的努力不可能实现全球减排。哥本哈根会谈证明中印联盟是一大群发展中国家拒绝以她们的牺牲为代价的基础。

Making Progress BIT By BIT On A U.S.-China Bilateral Investment Treaty 美中双边投资条约一步一步前进

Michael S. Snarr — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 10:46:34 -0600

中文请点击这里

Despite the joint announcement of the United States and China that both countries would “expedite negotiation on a bilateral investment treaty” (abbreviated in English as a “BIT”), the notion of a BIT between the United States and China, two of the world’s five largest economies, remains inconceivable for some. On the U.S. side, there are significant political obstacles: free trade and foreign investment typically are not successful campaign platforms for U.S. politicians during an economic recession, especially in an election year. U.S. politicians would not likely accept a BIT while strong disagreement remains over China’s currency policies. China’s pegging of the yuan to the dollar remains an irritant (indeed, the only trade issue on President Obama’s agenda in Beijing in November), notwithstanding that it may have enabled critical flows of debt-financing while the United States endured the depths of a recession while still needing billions for military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are obstacles on Chinese protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property, controlled Chinese capital markets, and laws raising national treatment concerns for American investors trying to establish investments in China, according to Amy Tsui’s BNA Int’l Trade Daily article. Political support for a BIT with China does not look promising, particularly with a Congress whose Democratic leadership is often openly suspicious of Chinese trade and investment intentions.

China has its own policy disagreements with the United States, including on trade issues such as the United States’ safeguard duties on Chinese tires. China also has been reluctant to embrace international arbitration of investor-state investment disputes to the degree that the United States would demand using the 2004 U.S. Model BIT as the basis for negotiations.

Notwithstanding these obstacles, there are reasons to believe that a U.S.-China BIT is not a question of “whether” but “when.” When the Bush Administration announced in June 2008 that the United States and China had been discussing a BIT as part of the Strategic Economic Dialogue, at least one observer wondered whether the announcement meant a deal had been completed. According to a U.S. official, talks of a U.S.-China BIT already had been going on for seventeen months. Under the Obama Administration, it appears that discussions are continuing “in technical stages [but] have not yet reached political decisions.” (“ACIEP Report on Model BIT Lacks Consensus on Critical Issues,” Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 2, 2009.)

BITs are smaller in scope than free trade agreements (“FTAs”). The negotiations, therefore, are much more attainable, in terms of both the substance and the political capital expended to reach an agreement. BITs tend to favor the country in the agreement that is the larger exporter of capital, which usually has meant that the United States stood to benefit far more than its treaty partner. Of the approximately 60 countries with whom the United States previously has agreed on BITs or FTA investment chapters, Canada and South Korea are the only significant exporters of capital.

U.S. businesses see BITs as a way to open up access to foreign markets, and China would be no exception. For many years, U.S. industries have been looking for ways to improve access to China’s one billion consumers and to eliminate restrictions on or disincentives to foreign investment, particularly as, during recent years of high economic growth, the Chinese have accumulated unprecedented wealth for a developing country.

China, unlike most of the United States’ treaty partners in prior BITs, has become a significant exporter of capital, but this fact probably makes a BIT even more likely. Since 1998, China has been renegotiating BITs it had with many European countries in order to provide greater protection for its own investors doing business in Europe. Recently, China also has been in BIT negotiations with Canada. As China increases its investments in the United States, it becomes increasingly likely that China will want the same protections for its investors doing business there.

There have been critics in the United States fearing that BIT provisions for international investor-state arbitration circumvent U.S. judicial, legislative and regulatory processes, and many certainly would oppose a BIT with China given the implications for U.S. environmental and labor standards. And yet, there is little reason for anyone to believe that the United States would be overrun with foreign claims under a U.S.-China BIT. Notwithstanding Canada’s significant investments in the United States market, in the sixteen-year period since the adoption of NAFTA’s investment chapter no arbitration tribunal has required the United States to pay on a single claim.

Political concerns over U.S. national security restrictions on investment have subsided since 2005 when CNOOC’s bid to purchase UNOCAL was blocked, as discussed in our previous post in December. Specific transactions still may be blocked, but those decisions appear to be driven more by the national security analysis of a particular case than by reactionary measures to calm an agitated Congress, as discussed in our earlier post in January.

U.S. industry representatives have recommended that the United States should consider softening the “essential security” exception in its Model BIT language to allow foreign investors greater assurances that their investments will not be disrupted by disguised protectionist motivations. (“ACIEP Report on Model BIT Lacks Consensus on Critical Issues,” Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 2, 2009.) While they plainly intend for the exception to be softened as to foreign countries’ restrictions on foreign U.S. investment, the reciprocal nature of such a provision would be appealing to the Chinese as well. There may not be enough sympathy in Congress, however, for such a departure.

Negotiation of a China-U.S. BIT will not be quick and easy, but it remains likely. China is an expanding market attracting foreign investment from around the globe. American enterprises want to invest there and would like more security for their investments. Such incentives historically have driven the United States to negotiate BITs.

This time, however, there is an added and critical dimension. China has amassed capital and is beginning to invest abroad. The United States not only is an attractive market; the United States also needs a substantial share of that investment for the growth of its own economy. Chinese businessmen, like Americans, want investment security. This time, therefore, the BIT partners share a common vision of an agreement that will attract investment to their own countries while protecting their citizens investing abroad. Such unusual balance may make the negotiations more difficult, but they also make a positive result more likely.

尽管美国和中国共同宣布，两国将“加快双边投资条约”谈判（英文缩写为“BIT”），美国和中国——世界五大经济体中的两大国签订双边投资条约这一概念对一些人士而言仍然有些不可思议。在美国这一条约面临重大政治障碍：在经济衰退时期，尤其是选举年，自由贸易和外国投资通常不会成为美国政治家成功的竞选纲领。当美中在中国的货币政策问题上仍存在重大分歧时，美国政治家不可能接受双边投资条约。中国把人民币汇率与美元挂钩仍然让美国不满，（事实上，这是奥巴马总统11月北京之行议程上唯一的贸易问题），尽管它为经历经济衰退、同时为在伊拉克和阿富汗的军事行动支付数十亿美元的美国的债务融资、资金流动起到关键作用。中国在保护美国知识产权方面仍面临重重困难、严格控制本国资本市场、是否给予试图在华投资的美国投资者国民待遇这一法律问题等等。因此赢得支持双边投资条约的政治资本不容乐观，特别是美国国会的民主党领导经常公开对中国贸易和投资意向提出质疑。

中国也存在对美政策分歧，包括就中国轮胎征收特保税等贸易问题。美国要求以2004年双边投资条约范文作为国际投资者与国家间投资争端仲裁谈判的基础，中国一直不愿妥协至这一程度。

尽管存在这些障碍，但有理由相信美中签订双边投资条约不是“是否”，而是“何时”的问题。当布什政府于2008年6月宣布美国和中国把讨论双边投资条约作为战略经济对话的一部分，至少有一名观察员猜想这一宣布是否意味着已经基本达成协议。据美国官员，美中会谈已经进行了17个月。在奥巴马政府任内，“谈判仍在技术层面，还没有达到政治决定层面”。(“ACIEP Report on Model BIT Lacks Consensus on Critical Issues,” Inside U.S. Trade, 2009年10月2日.)

双边投资条约比自由贸易协定范围较小。因此，就实质内容和政治资本支出而言，双边投资条约谈判更容易达成协议。双边投资条约倾向于在该协议中较大的资本输出国，这通常意味着美国得到的好处远远超过它的条约伙伴。已与美国达成双边投资条约或是自由贸易条约投资章节的60多个国家中，加拿大和韩国是仅有的重要资本输出国。

美国企业认为双边投资条约是开放外国市场的方式，中国也不例外。多年来，美国企业一直在寻找途径，更好地接触中国10亿消费者，并消除或抑制限制外国投资的措施。特别是近几年来中国经历了高速经济增长，已经积累了对一个发展中国家来说前所未有的财富。

不像大多数已经与美国达成双边投资条约的条约伙伴，中国已成为重要的资本出口国，但这一事实很可能使双边投资条约更有可能实现。从1998年以来，中国已与许多欧洲国家重新谈判双边投资条约，以便为她在欧洲经商的投资者提供更好的保障。最近，中国也与加拿大展开双边投资条约谈判。随着中国增加在美投资，中国可能也越来越希望保护在美经商的投资者的利益。

目前在美国已有批评者担心双边投资条约中的国际投资者与国家间投资争端仲裁条规将规避美国司法、立法和行政监管程序；由于牵涉美国环境和劳工标准，还有许多人肯定会反对与中国签订双边投资条约。然而没有人有理由相信美国将被美中双边投资条约下的对外索赔淹没。尽管加拿大在美国市场投资数额巨大，自《北美自由贸易协定》投资章采纳16年以来，仲裁庭没有一次要求美国支付索赔。

正如我们在先前的帖子中讨论的，自2005年中海油收购UNOCAL受阻以来，美国对外资进行国家安全审查带来的限制的政治担忧已经消退。本博客一月的文章指出：具体交易仍可能会被封锁，但这些决定似乎更是建立在国家安全分析基础之上，而不是对激动不已的国会的回应。

美国产业界代表建议美国应考虑软化双边投资条约范本中的“重要安全”例外条款，给予外国投资者更大的投资不被伪装的保护主义中断的保证。(“ACIEP Report on Model BIT Lacks Consensus on Critical Issues,” Inside U.S. Trade, 2009年10月2日.) 这明显是为了减弱外国对美国对外投资的限制，这一互惠规定也一定对中国很有吸引力。但在国会，这种偏离可能不能赢得足够同情。

谈判中美双边投资协定将不会简单快捷，但它仍然有可能实现。中国不断扩大的市场吸引了来自世界各地的外国投资。美国企业想要在华投资，并希望他们的投资更加安全。历史上，这种奖励驱使美国参与双边投资条约谈判。

然而，这次谈判有一重要附加方面。中国积累了资本，并开始在国外投资。美国不仅是一个具有吸引力的市场，美国也需要这些投资大幅增长、促进自己的经济发展。和美国商人一样，华商想要确保投资安全。因此，谈判双方共享的一个目标：吸引投资流向本国，同时保护本国公民对外投资。这种不寻常的平衡可能使谈判更加困难，但同时更有可能促进实现积极结果。

The United States Remains Open To Chinese Investment 美国仍对中国投资敞开大门

John J. Burke — Fri, 22 Jan 2010 15:38:15 -0600

中文请点击这里

This blog posted an article titled “Setting The Record Straight: The U.S. Is Open For Chinese Business; Don't Worry Too Much About National Security Reviews” on December 12, 2009. Two weeks later Northwest Non Ferrous International Investment Co., Ltd. (“Northwest”) dropped its plans to acquire a Nevada mining company because a national security review under the Foreign Investment National Security Act “FINSA” was coming to an unfavorable conclusion. We do not stand corrected.

The rejection of the Northwest acquisition was based on unique facts and not because of opposition to Chinese investment generally. Chinese companies should not let this case dissuade them from acquiring companies and otherwise investing in the United States.

Northwest proposed to acquire control over a mining company, Firstgold Corp., all of whose operations are adjacent to Naval Air Station Fallon, the U.S. Navy’s premier tactical air warfare training center. The Navy opposed a company owned by the Chinese Government having control of property from which its most sensitive training activities might be monitored. Also in that area are other security and military assets so sensitive that the U.S. Government treats even their identities as classified information.

Due to the sensitive nature of the government installations, any acquisition by a foreign company, including companies based in NATO countries, would have raised national security concerns. Whether China created more concern is entirely speculative and ultimately unknowable. However, Chinese companies should not view the CFIUS result in this case as based on an objection focused on China, but rather as based on the serious national security concerns it definitely presented regardless of the foreign country. FINSA requires CFIUS to consider whether the acquiring company is state-owned. However, given the serious national security concerns raised by the location of Firstgold’s facilities, the result likely would have been the same even had the acquirer been a private company.

Northwest’s lawyers have described extraordinary but failed efforts to make the acquisition compatible with national security concerns. Their memorandum to Northwest, published on the New York Times website, reports that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) looked closely at all kinds of scenarios to mitigate the national security concerns, but concluded that none of them would be feasible because all four of Firstgold’s properties are located adjacent to Naval Air Station Fallon or other military sensitive locations.

The lawyers’ report demonstrates that CFIUS’ goal is not to block investments. Instead, CFIUS seeks to mitigate national security concerns. The exceptional facts in this case are that all of the operations to be acquired raised concerns. When national security is at issue, it usually affects some part of the deal and can be mitigated. Here, all of the deal was implicated; mitigation (such as spinning off some part of the deal while preserving the essential economic value) apparently was impossible.

Northwest acted wisely in this case, seeking a CFIUS review before investing because of uncertainties about national security. Reportedly, Firstgold did not want to request CFIUS review. Northwest could have invested, only to have CFIUS recommend and the President of the United States undo the deal, not because of animus toward Chinese investment, but because of the serious implications for national security.

It is important not to misinterpret the Northwest case. It proves the utility and wisdom of early CFIUS review, not an objection to Chinese investment. Notwithstanding CFIUS’ rejection of Northwest’s proposed acquisition of Firstgold, the United States remains one of the economies most open in the world to foreign investment, including from China.

2009年12月12日，本博客刊登了《美国向中国企业敞开大门，请勿过分担心国家安全审查》。两周后，Northwest Non Ferrous International Investment Co., Ltd. （简称Northwest）因在根据《外国投资和国家安全法》展开的国家安全审查中面临不利裁决，而被迫放弃并购位于内华达州一矿产公司的计划。

拒绝Northwest的并购计划有其特殊背景，并非反对所有中国投资。中国企业不应因为这一事件而放弃在美投资、并购企业的计划。

Northwest提议并购Firstgold Corp.矿产公司，而这一公司的作业地点紧邻海军的Fallon飞行基地，这是美国海军最重要的飞行作战训练中心。不出意料，海军反对中国政府拥有的企业控制这一产业，此处可监控美国海军最敏感的训练活动。此外，这一地区还有其他属于美国政府列为保密信息的军事、安全设施。

因为这些政府设施非常敏感，所以即使是北约国家的公司并购这一产业也会引发国家安全担忧。中资企业是否引来更多担忧则纯属猜测、无法得知。但是，中国公司不应视这一国家安全审查建立在反对中国基础之上，而是建立在不分国别的国家安全考虑基础之上。《外国投资和国家安全法》要求国家安全审查考虑收购企业是否为国有企业。但是，因为Firstgold处于敏感地点，即使是私营企业试图并购这一公司也会受阻。

Northwest的律师称为通过国家安全审查他们付出很多努力，最终仍然失败了。《纽约时报》刊登的律师备忘录指出外国投资委员会仔细审查了各个可减轻对美国国家安全威胁的方案的每个细节，但是认为没有一个方案可行，因为Firstgold的四处产业都紧邻海军Fallon基地或是其它敏感军事设施。

律师的报告显示外国投资委员会的目标不是为了阻碍投资。相反，外国投资委员会寻找减弱对国家安全造成不利影响的措施。此并购的特殊情况在于并购涉及的所有的产业都影响国家安全。通常，如果只有并购的某一部分涉及国家安全，且可减弱其不利影响。但是这一并购却不是这样，减弱不利影响（如除去并购的某一部分、仅保留关键部分）也不可行。

Northwest采取了明智的处理方式，因为对是否能通过国家安全审查感到不确定，而在投资前就寻求国家安全审查。据报道，Firstgold不想申请国家安全审查。Northwest可以买下Firstgold产业，但最终美国总统在外国投资委员会的建议下还是会否决这一并购。否决不是因为仇视中国，而是因为并购将对国家安全造成负面影响。

避免错误理解Northwest案件非常重要。它证明了先前的国家安全审查的重要性和明智性，而且这些审查并非反对中国投资。虽然外国投资委员会否决了Northwest并购Firstgold的计划，美国仍是世界上对外资最开放的国家，仍欢迎中国投资。

China-U.S. Trade War 中美贸易大战

Dr. Elliot J. Feldman — Fri, 15 Jan 2010 08:51:02 -0600

*This article was published in International Trade Law 360 on January 7, 2010. 中文请点击这里

On January 4 The Washington Post headlined on Page 2, with a Beijing dateline, “U.S. and China in a snowballing trade fight.” The article followed two others prominently presented with similar messages on January 1 and 3, one bannered with the same wintry theme (“U.S.-China relations set for chill, experts say”). The Washington Post is not accustomed to covering international trade, let alone with major articles. Meanwhile, Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman was anticipating and endorsing in The New York Times on New Year’s Eve more trade remedy actions against China.

Trade remedy petitions are not prepared overnight. Nor are they, at least in the United States, the products of coordinated policy. Companies and industries decide that they are facing unfair international competition and that they could benefit from a trade action. Such decisions are not reached easily because trade actions are expensive and take a lot of time and attention. Whereas steel companies may orchestrate petitions because they may bring complaints about different products they make, their actions are independent of the manufacturers of non-steel products. Hence, the perception of a coordinated attack on Chinese goods is understandable (it requires only several petitions close in proximity on the calendar), but it does not correspond to a national trade policy.

Contributing to the perception of a coordinated attack on Chinese goods are the results of petitions. Most, but not all, result in affirmative determinations from both the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) and the imposition of duties. A constant anti-China roar from Congress contributes. Nonetheless, the process is anchored in the independent initiatives of the American private sector, not in the coordination of the government.

China’s initiation of trade investigations now projects a reflection of the American process, but with insufficient transparency to be entirely persuasive that the new wave is without political motive. China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) says it is receiving petitions from private enterprises and trade associations, is analyzing them and deciding whether to initiate investigations, exactly like the process in the United States. However, MOFCOM announces the filing of a petition only upon the initiation of an investigation. Some Chinese lawyers say these petitions may be the product of MOFCOM itself, and that their dating is unreliable. Because MOFCOM does not reveal the existence of the petition until it decides whether to investigate, there is no way to know. However, in the United States, Commerce must initiate an investigation within twenty days of the filing of a petition, which is a public document upon filing, Commerce cannot schedule initiations of investigations for political purpose. By contrast, MOFCOM retains complete control of its schedule and therefore can initiate investigations according to a political calendar.

American officials are talking about “inevitable” and “normal” conflicts in a growing trade relationship. China has a different view. It sees nothing inevitable or normal in the cases being brought against its goods, even though the United States has not been as aggressive in challenging Chinese exports as have been the European Union and India. Nor does it accept the results. One of the Washington Post articles, for example, was headlined, “China denounces U.S. trade ruling on steel pipes,” and Chinese Ambassador to the United States Zhou Wenzhong called the tires safeguard signed by President Obama in September “a very dangerous precedent.”

Tit For Tat

Were there “tit for tat” in this story, it would be almost entirely in the “tat.” The United States is doing what it has always done, initiating countervailing duty and antidumping investigations on virtually every petition Commerce receives. Commerce is acting as it has always acted, protecting U.S. industries by giving them the benefit of almost every doubt and zealously defending the indefensible, such as the practice of zeroing that has been struck down repeatedly by the WTO.
Commerce has been neither diplomatic nor delicate in its treatment of China. In published determinations it has accused Chinese officials of deceptive practices and misinformation. It has ignored expert testimony. It has cancelled verifications based on suspicions. It has refused to listen to government witnesses. China has ample reason to be distressed by Commerce conduct.

Notwithstanding its experience, China has complained little, if at all, about Commerce’s brass-knuckles treatment. There have been no official protests and no reports of unofficial complaints. The Chinese Government has not challenged Commerce’s conduct and determinations in U.S. courts. Conspicuously, China has reserved its public protest for denunciation of President Obama, and of the ITC, where it has declined to appear.

The President and the ITC, unlike Commerce, have not displayed animus toward China. In the tires safeguard, discussed in earlier postings on this blog, the President adhered closely to the terms of the accession protocol China had signed while fashioning a measure of relief designed to disadvantage Chinese exports without putting them out of business. Chinese commentators have suggested that Democrats, faithful to trade unions, are more protectionist than Republicans, but the ITC, with three Republican commissioners, has been consistently unanimous in its conclusions about injury caused by Chinese imports.

Chinese complaints, thus, do not seem aimed at changing results. They have not changed the course of U.S. actions, nor could they, inasmuch as the petitions do not arise from any particular policy except Commerce’s likely findings supporting petitioners.

The “tat” for the continuing American trade actions seems more apparent. Instead of contesting each trade action within the rules and laws, China has opted to take its own initiatives. Although they are not necessarily linked to American actions, it appears that China wants them interpreted this way. It was not possible, for example, for retaliatory petitions to have been readied within forty-eight hours of the President’s safeguard decision, yet Chinese statements frequently invoke the tire duties as a starting point for apparent retaliation.

Ariana Eunjung Cha linked the tires safeguard directly to Chinese reactions in The Washington Post. First she said that the safeguard “struck an emotional nerve.” She reported, “On Internet bulletin boards, public sentiment about the United States turned ugly.” Then she reported on the Chinese Ambassador’s warning that the safeguard is a “dangerous precedent,” followed by, “Two days later, China accused the United States of predatorily ‘dumping’ chicken products and auto parts into the Chinese market and warned that it could impose its own tariffs.” “Then,” she added, “in October, China made good on that threat by hitting the United States with duties of as much as 36 percent on certain nylon exports.”

With Chinese proceedings less than transparent, it is possible that the Chinese investigations were retaliatory. Ms. Cha’s subsequent statement, however, does not follow: “On Nov. 4 and 5, the United States went on the offensive again – slapping anti-dumping duties on Chinese-made steel pipe and launching two more probes of Chinese imports.” Breathlessly, now with the accumulating evidence of tit-for-tat, she adds, “Barely 24 hours later, the Chinese announced they had opened an investigation into U.S.-made passenger cars.”

The United States is not capable of the tit-for-tat this imagined trade war requires, if for no other reason than it does not control the timing and subject matter of petitions. The ITC does not have the capacity to orchestrate hearing and determination dates according to actions in China. Nor have all the ITC determinations been affirmative, and in the one instance where Chinese interests (but not the Chinese government) have challenged the legality of agency actions, the Court of International Trade handed them a partial victory as discussed in an earlier posting on this blog.

China, by contrast with the United States, may be capable of retaliatory actions, although such capability ought not be exaggerated. Bureaucracies share the same infirmities everywhere. They all move slowly, and they all have difficulty with deadlines. There is surely more coincidence than conspiracy in the timing of apparently reciprocal actions, although retaliation is not impossible.

There is, in the telling, nonetheless encouragement. Commerce has been consistent in rewarding U.S. petitioners. Congress has incited petitions. Professor Krugman, generally supportive of free trade, has declared protectionism justified, even warranted. Seen from Beijing, this apparent pattern could be seen as a policy requiring response.

The Tires Trigger And Chinese Conduct

Since accession to the WTO, China has been participating in trade disputes according to the rules, but less than fully. Unlike other countries, China is not appearing before the ITC. It is not appealing adverse agency determinations in U.S. courts. It is not pursuing administrative reviews of countervailing duty orders, when final duties are determined and set for collection. It is not even answering questionnaires in administrative reviews in support of its own companies. Instead, China is counting on the WTO for trade vindication, a strategic choice almost certain to disappoint.
The prevailing excuse for China’s incomplete commitment to the legal process, and its rising anger over American actions, continues to be President Obama’s safeguard decision. The complaint focuses on the proposition that China “did nothing wrong.” The safeguard exception in the WTO, however, expressly requires that nothing wrong be done. It exists strictly as a response to an unexpected and disruptive surge in imports.

China’s handling of the safeguard, like its handling of some of the other trade disputes, has displayed little strategic thinking. China did not present President Obama with a cogent legal argument as to why no duties should have been imposed on Chinese commercial tires, that there was no industry adjustment plan and, therefore, no remedy could serve the law’s object and purpose. Instead, China argued that the President, a Democrat elected with union support, should respect the decision of U.S. industry to offshore jobs to China.

China’s reaction to the ITC steel pipes decision has a similarly tone-deaf political character. Steven Mufson reported on New Year’s Day in The Washington Post, “China’s Ministry of Commerce said that China was ‘strongly dissatisfied’ with the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Wednesday ruling that Chinese subsidized imports had harmed or threaten to harm U.S. steel pipe manufacturers . . . The Commerce Ministry said that the ITC’s ruling was ‘wrong. . .’” Yet, MOFCOM did not present its case to the ITC. Commissioner Lane, extraordinarily, told the lead counsel for the Chinese industry during a public hearing that she did not think he was answering her questions and insisted on directing questions to the second chair.
China’s unhappiness, then, with U.S. trade actions may be the legitimate result of a pattern of petitions and decisions, but the only event deviant from the past has been the one safeguard action. It has proven not to be the “precedent” of which the Chinese Ambassador warned. No other safeguard action has been brought, even though the core injury complaint against steel pipes was about a surge.

The Bigger Picture

China is participating just enough in trade disputes arising in the United States to be informed and to complain, but not enough to prevail. Respondents to trade remedy petitions in the United States hope, but do not expect, to prevail at the ITC. They have little hope at Commerce except to build a record for appeal. Respondents, therefore, who do not appear at the ITC and do not appeal Commerce determinations do not expect ever to prevail. China’s choice of partial participation must be for some other reason.

China’s reasons may be detectable in the countervailing duty petition against U.S. automobiles, discussed in an earlier posting on this blog. The trade issue in the petition is that the U.S. industry is at least as much the beneficiary of state support as any Chinese industry, such that there is no reason for the United States to persist in treating China as a non-market economy. The grander strategic issue appears to be in the petition that the U.S. automobile industry, like the United States more generally, is in decline, whereas the Chinese industry, and China more generally, are ascending.

Trade disputes, as seen in the automobile petition, are expressions of China’s greater vision, as outlets for China to assert itself and to take on the United States as no other countries have been willing to do. As long as the United States continues business as usual, with agencies favoring domestic producers against Chinese imports, Chinese frustration will grow. Although a better answer, if China were focused on free and fair trade, would be to test the legal system, so far China prefers, apparently, to use trade as a soapbox for a bigger message.

Should China and the United States persist on these paths, the media will persist in seeing a trade war, reading into calendar coincidences strategic conspiracies. It may be the read China wants, and Congress might want it as well. The deteriorating atmosphere may then impact other critical bilateral and global issues. Consequently, it is important for China and the United States to pull back and think strategically together. Otherwise, toxic trade could pollute everything that concerns them.

1月4日《华盛顿邮报》在第2版刊登了题为《美国和中国打雪仗似的贸易战》的文章。此前，该报还于1月1日和3日刊登了类似文章，其中一篇使用了同样寒冷的标题（《专家说美中关系将转冷》）。《华盛顿邮报》不习惯于刊登报道国际贸易的文章，更不用说在显著位置刊登此类文章。与此同时，元旦前夕，诺贝尔奖获得者、经济学家保罗•克鲁格曼在《纽约时报》刊文赞同对中国采取更多贸易救济行动。

贸易救济申请不是一夜间就可准备好的。至少在美国，它们也不是协调政策的产物。而是企业和行业认定它们面临不公平的国际竞争，它们可受益于贸易行动。这种决定不容易达到，因为贸易行动是昂贵的，需要很多时间和精力准备。钢铁公司可能协调行动递交申请，因为他们可就不同产品协调行动，但是这与其他产品的制造商的调查申请无关。因此，认为中国商品受到协调攻击的想法可以理解（它仅需要几乎同时递交几个申请），但这些行动与美国国家贸易政策无关。

调查结果更助长了中国产品受协调攻击的看法。美国商务部和国际贸易委员会的大多数、并非所有的裁定导致中国产品面临惩罚性关税。但是，调查进程扎根于美国企业的、独立的推动作用，而非政府协调的结果。

中国启动的贸易调查似乎是美国行动的反射，但因为缺乏足够的透明度，很难说中国掀起的新浪潮没有政治动机。中国商务部称它接受民营企业和协会申请、分析这一申请、然后决定是否展开调查，和美国的过程完全一样。然而，中国商务部在发起调查时才宣布接到调查申请。一些中国律师说这些申请可能是中国商务部自身产品，申请递交日期也不可靠。由于中国商务部在决定展开调查前不透露申请书的存在，因此没有办法获悉。然而在美国，美国商务部在申请书递交后20天内必须发起调查，申请书从递交日起也成为公开文件。美国商务部不能根据政治目的安排调查进程。相比之下，中国商务部保留了对日程的主导权，因此可以根据政治目的安排调查日程。

美国官员谈论，成长中的贸易关系必将包括“不可避免”和“正常”冲突。中国有不同的看法。虽然美国不像欧盟和印度那么对中国出口品咄咄逼人，但是中国认为对中国产品展开的调查中没有“不可避免”和“正常”冲突之分。中国也不接受调查结果。《华盛顿邮报》的一篇文章的标题是《中国谴责美国对钢管行业的裁决》。中国驻美大使周文重称奥巴马总统去年9月批准的轮胎特保行动是“非常危险的先例。”

针锋相对

“针锋相对”是否存在取决于“针”。美国一如既往地行动，对美国商务部接到的几乎每一份反补贴、反倾销申请书发起调查。美国商务部也是一如既往地捍卫美国产业，热情帮助它们捍卫站不住脚的论据，如世贸组织已经反复否决了的归零法。

美国商务部对中国既没有使用外交辞令、也没有微妙处理。在发布的裁决中，它指责中方官员的欺诈行为、提供错误信息；美国商务部漠视专家证词；它在怀疑的基础上取消核查；它拒绝政府证人作证。中国有充分的理由对美国商务部的行为感到痛心。

尽管面临这些待遇，中国不曾抱怨美国商务部的做法。既没有官方抗议也没有非正式投诉。中国政府也没有在美国法院反对美国商务部的行为和裁决。引人注目的是，中国却在公开场合抗议奥巴马总统以及美国国际贸易委员会的决定，虽然中国拒绝参加国际贸易委员会调查。

总统和国际贸易委员会与美国商务部不同，并没有对中国显示敌意。在轮胎特保案中，总统严格按照中国入世议定书条款、制定了将限制中国出口品但不将它们排除在美国市场之外的贸易保障措施。中国评论家认为，忠于工会的民主党人比共和党人更倾向于贸易保护主义，但是国际贸易委员会五位委员中有三位是共和党人，这三位委员一直、一致认定中国出口品对美国产业造成损害。

因此，中国的投诉似乎不是为了改变结果。它们没有改变美国的行动。它们也不可能，因为调查申请愿不是政策支持的结果，或仅仅来自美国商务部的裁决可能支持调查申请。

美国的贸易行动将持续。中国没有利用法律对每一项进行斗争，相反决定自己采取行动。虽然中国的行动不一定与美国的行动相关，但中国似乎希望外界这样解释。例如，报复性调查申请不可能在奥巴马总统宣布保障措施前48小时准备完毕，但是中国的新闻发言常常援引轮胎案作为报复的出发点。

《华盛顿邮报》记者Ariana Eunjung Cha直接把中国的报复行动和轮胎案联系在一起。她首先提到轮胎特保案“撞上了中国的情感神经。”她接着报道说“在互联网电子公告板上，公众对美国的情绪愈演愈烈、愈演愈糟。”接着她引用中国驻美国大使的警告说特保行动是一个“危险的先例”。“两天后中国指责美国掠夺性地在中国市场‘倾销’鸡肉产品和汽车零部件，并警告说中国也可以征收关税”。她补充说，“在十月中国就实现了这一威胁，向美国尼龙征收高达百分之36的惩罚性关税。”

由于中国的调查过程不太透明，有可能中国的调查是报复性行为。Cha女士随后评论说：“11月4和5日，美方再次发动攻势，向中国钢管征收反倾销税，同时对另两项中国产品展开调查。”双方都毫不松气，越来越多的证据也证明现在双方都是针锋相对地报复对方，“不到24小时，中国宣布开始对美国轿车展开调查。”

美国没有能力参与这想象中的针锋相对的贸易战，其他原因撇开不谈，美方无法控制调查时间和调查申请主题。美国国际贸易委员会没有能力根据中国的行动左右听证会和裁决发布日期。也不是所有国际贸易委员会的裁决都不利于中国。我们在前文中提到中国代表（但不是中国政府）在美国国际贸易法庭质疑美国政府机构的行动，法院裁决中方获得部分胜利。

与美国相反，中国有能力采取报复行动，虽然这一能力不应该被夸大。世界各地的官僚都有一个相同的毛病。他们都行动缓慢，对截止日期感到头疼。虽然报复并非不可能存在，但是巧合比阴谋显然更有可能。

当然官方鼓励也存在。美国商务部以裁决奖励美国申请方。国会煽动申请。一般支持自由贸易的克鲁格曼教授也宣称贸易保护合理，甚至必要。从北京来看，这些情况应被视为需要应对的政策。
轮胎案导火线和中方行为

自加入世界贸易组织以来，中国开始、但没有完全根据规则参与贸易争端。与其他国家不同，中国不参与美国国际贸易委员会调查。也没有在美国法院上诉政府机构发布的不利裁决。中国不参加反补贴行政复审，而行政复审决定最后被征收的税率。中国政府甚至不回答可支持本国公司的行政复议调查问卷。相反，中国指望通过世贸组织解决贸易争端，这是一个几乎注定令人失望选择。

中国不完整地使用法律进程、对美方行动日益增长的愤怒的借口仍然是奥巴马总统批准特保行动。中国抱怨的重点是她“没有做错任何事”。但是世界贸易组织的保障条款明确规定可对未犯错的被调查国采取行动。保障条款针对出乎意料、破坏性进口激增。

中国处理特保案及其他贸易争端都显示出她没有太多战略思想。中国没有给予奥巴马总统令人信服的理由说明为什么不应当对中国商业轮胎征收惩罚性关税，也没有提供产业调整计划；因此，中方没有证明没有补救措施可以实现法律的目的和宗旨。相反，中国认为受工会支持当选的民主党总统应尊重美国产业的决定，向中国输送就业机会。

中国对美国国际贸易委员会钢管案裁决的反应也显示了中国政治不敏感。元旦，《华盛顿邮报》刊登了史蒂芬•穆夫森的报道，“中国商务部声明中国对美国国际贸易委员会的反补贴产业损害裁决表示强烈不满，中国商务部认为美国国际贸易委员会的裁决是错误的”。然而，中国商务部没有很好地参与美国国际贸易委员会调查。国际贸易委员会委员Lane在听证会上告诉中方首席律师她认为这位律师没有回答她的问题，并让第二位律师回答问题。

中国的不满是对美国贸易行动的正常反应，但只有轮胎特保案是唯一没有先例的案件。它不是中国大使警告的“先例”。因为还没有其他保障措施申请，虽然钢管案的核心投诉是进口大幅上升。

纵观全局

中国参与在美国发生的贸易争端，只能帮助她获悉、宣泄，但是不能使她占上风。应诉方一般希望在美国国际贸易委员会获胜，但不抱很大期待。他们在美国商务部调查中获胜的希望渺茫，只为上诉做好案件材料准备。因此，不参与美国国际贸易委员会调查、且未对美国商务部裁决提出上诉的应诉方永远没希望占上风。中国选择部分参与必定有其他原因。

要求对美国汽车展开反补贴调查的申请可显示中国的理由。申请书认为美国汽车产业和中方任一产业一样，接受至少相当的国家支持，因此美国没有理由坚持视中国为非市场经济。调查申请显示更重大的战略问题是美国汽车业和美国整体一样呈下降趋势，而中国产业以及中国整体呈上升趋势。

包括汽车案在内的贸易争端是中国视野的表现，是中国表现自己权威的渠道，并对美国采取其他国家不愿采取的行动。如果美国照旧行事，政府机构偏袒国内生产商，中国的不满将增长。虽然更好的解决方法是中国利用法律制度捍卫自由和公平贸易，但到目前为止中国明显喜欢使用贸易作为释放信号的肥皂泡。

如果中美继续在这些道路上前进，媒体将看到持续的贸易战、把巧合解读为战略阴谋。这可能是中国希望看到的解读，美国国会可能也需要这一解读。但日益恶化的气氛可影响其他重要双边和全球问题。因此，中美都应当退一步、采取战略性思考。否则，有毒贸易可能会污染她们关心的一切。

The President's Visit: A Success For China And Failure For The United States? 奥巴马总统访华：中国的成功、美国的失败？

Dr. Elliot J. Feldman — Tue, 05 Jan 2010 13:09:45 -0600

中文请点击这里

China’s leaders and commentators think President Barack Obama’s visit in November was an unqualified success. Publicly, the White House sees a qualified success, and privately not even that. It may all depend on what “success” and “failure” mean. The differences have consequences.

American analysts generally are less equivocal than American officials. They mostly see failure. Elizabeth Economy, Director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, called the trip “optically, one of the worst U.S. presidential visits to Beijing in memory.” Helene Cooper wrote in The New York Times from Beijing, “With China’s micro-management of Mr. Obama’s appearances in the country, the trip did more to showcase China’s ability to push back against outside pressure than it did to advance the main issues on Mr. Obama’s agenda, analysts said.” She went on to quote Eswar S. Prasad of Cornell University, “China effectively stage-managed President Obama’s public appearances, got him to make statements endorsing Chinese positions of political importance to them and effectively squelched discussions of contentious issues such as human rights and China’s currency policy. In a masterstroke, they shifted the public discussion from the global risks posed by Chinese currency policy to the dangers of loose monetary policy and protectionist tendencies in the U.S.”

Some Chinese critics share the American conclusions. Ying Chan, Director of the Journalism and Media Studies Center at the University of Hong Kong, headlined in The New York Times, “Obama Loses A Round,” writing, “While the jury is still out on what President Obama’s China visit has achieved for the long term, the president has most decidedly lost the war of symbolism in his first close encounter with China.”

Certainly China seems to have had its way with the President publicly. He wanted a spontaneous, televised meeting with students and bloggers in Shanghai and he got a rehearsed exchange with young members of the Communist Party in a sealed-off auditorium. He wanted to get out and meet people and he got what Helene Cooper reported in The New York Times to be a “ghost town” at the Great Wall, “the bustling tourist attraction” “largely shuttered for the presidential visit.” He was also diplomatically downgraded, accompanied to the Great Wall by the Chinese and American envoys and no senior Chinese official. At his joint press conference with President Hu Jintao, where the two presidents read mutually approving (and presumably mutually approved) prepared statements, the press were not permitted to ask questions. Ying Chan’s assessment was that “the Chinese outmaneuvered the Americans in all public events,” arguing that, “In status-conscious China, symbolism and protocol play a role that is larger than life.”

These conclusions are not good for Sino-U.S. relations. A cardinal principle of diplomacy is never to crush your opponent in a negotiation unless you expect the outcome to be definitive and final. What is perplexing, however, is that China is not gloating over a victory (although at least one senior U.S. official, quoted in The Washington Post anonymously, has referred to “a sense of triumphalism”). To the contrary, China appears to be sincere in its belief that the visit was a success for both parties, presumably understanding the meaning of such aphorisms and not trying to humiliate the President.

For President Obama, at least publicly, the trip to China was an investment with America’s bankers, and he was depositing good will. It was also intended as a foundation for a solid, long-lasting partnership. Chinese commentators believe he got what he said he was seeking. Xinhua reported, “When he left, analysts saw a new direction for developing the China-U.S. relationship, which had major significance, and believed the summit had rendered bilateral relations stronger.” Xinhua quoted Jin Canrong, deputy dean of the International Studies School at Renmin University referring to a “new goal” for the partnership as “positive and significant,” and Fu Menzgi, director of the Institute of American Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations ascribing “positive and new meanings” to the partnership. President Obama emphasized the need for mutual trust, and President Hu and Chinese commentators agreed. According to Xinhua, “Obama’s China visit turned to be fruitful. The two countries reaffirmed the new definition of their ties – a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship in the 21st century – as established by their heads of state, and enriched their relations and cooperation and more strategic connotation.”

Some critics think, however, that the President’s investment is naïve, the foundation less reliable than might be supposed, the rhetoric unsupported by anything of consequence. Writing in The Washington Post, Zhang Zuhua and Jiang Qishen counseled, “The Chinese government does not reciprocate when it is given things for free. It simply takes them and moves on. Foreigners may not know this, but to people in China it is plain as day.” They contend that the decision not to greet the Dalai Lama in Washington before traveling to China, the capitulation on attendees in Shanghai, the acceptance of a press conference with no questions, and the public silence on human rights were all things given away for free. They interpret the Chinese view of a “new direction” as diminishing the stature and role of the United States, taking advantage of a new, young, eager-to-please President.

Measuring Success And Failure

It may be that China and the United States are measuring success and failure differently. Americans may be inclined to consider the visit an optical failure because President Obama’s greatest populist skills, intelligent communication with “ordinary” people, were shut down by Chinese “micro-management.”

Many consider the visit a substantive failure as well, perhaps because President Obama spent only one full day out of three in serious meetings, mostly finalizing agreements reached before he ever got to China. None of the major items on his agenda – Iranian nuclear development and possible sanctions; climate change; global financial reorganization; valuation of the RMB; human rights and especially freedom of speech and communication – seemed to advance very much if at all.

The American presumption of a zero-sum game – American failure equals Chinese success – is not helped by the Chinese public expression of success, however two-way and sincere may be its intention. Most Americans see in the Chinese success a malevolent hand: a stage-managed, micro-managed visit that denied the President the rock star status he enjoys in much of the rest of the world and a denial of the priorities on his agenda. Some, such as David Lampton of Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, predict “nasty” relations ahead because China’s celebration of the relationship now is little more than a prediction of an ascendant China replacing a declining United States on the world stage, casting the United States “in the role of the supplicant.”

Some critics of the trip (and they are by far in the majority among American commentators) contrast President Obama’s experience with the experience of his predecessors. Whether Nixon, Reagan, Bush, Clinton or Bush, admiring and enthusiastic crowds greeted the American President at Badaling (they all visited the Great Wall, and all in the same place). American-style press conferences were conducted; interactions with “ordinary” people were televised in China. This time, in Ying Chan’s words, there was “a package of faux public events” in which, he comments, “the Obama team” was “outmaneuvered.”

The contrast with predecessors is politically very damaging for Obama, whatever the long-term outcome of the visit for the bilateral relationship. It compounds an accumulating image at home of a president who avoids controversy through submission, whether on the critical details of a health care bill or on the entire manner of going to war, compromising in ways and with adversaries who seek only to exploit agreeability as manifestations of weakness more than courage. There is a growing American impatience with the President’s diplomacy, from the right over Iran, from the left over Afghanistan. And from the China visit there is an echo for some Americans of John F. Kennedy’s first encounter with Nikita Khrushchev, the young and inexperienced President faring poorly as the tough Soviet tested him in Vienna. It seemed China was testing Obama, and he yielded to Chinese preferences every time.

There was a context for the President’s performance in China. He had been excoriated in the American press for appearing deferential to the Emperor of Japan just before arriving in Shanghai. Sensitive Chinese leadership eager to work with the President as a partner would have recognized his precarious position and would have treated him fully as an equal, catering to his wishes as well as their own. Instead, either oblivious to what had happened in Japan or determined to pursue their own course regardless, the public display in China worked to confirm the impression from Japan of a young president perhaps too eager to please his foreign hosts.

That the trip to China likely contributed to this unflattering portrait at home strongly suggests that the next presidential trip to China will not come any time soon, and that President Obama will need to make up lost ground when President Hu Jintao visits the United States in early 2010. President Obama will need to regain the ground American popular opinion will suggest he lost, from being the lone superpower to being a mere equal with a developing country, or worse.

There are at least two superficial challenges here, and then a third that cuts more deeply into the relationship. Superficially, President Obama’s conduct in China was not inconsistent with his personality and governing style more generally. He has been no more forceful with Congress than with China. He conserves effort for the highest priorities and is inclined to let the symbolic be the worry of others. China may have been exploiting this perceived weakness when it may be little more than style, and the exploitation may have, for purposes of the long-term bilateral relationship, little meaning. Or, it could mean a great deal, and more favorably for the United States than critics suppose: having ceded the superficial symbolism, President Obama may have deposited good will for which he expects later, more important dividends. Many Chinese commentators, in claiming the bilateral relationship was stronger after the visit, seemed to endorse this calculation.

The second superficial challenge may be in distinguishing substance from style. Here the President may have a larger problem, for as a candidate he exploited his rock star receptions abroad to win favor and votes at home. As President, he cannot easily reduce to insignificance, therefore, how foreign nations receive him. He made those receptions important and now cannot escape them. He understood instantly that the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded by Norwegians on promise more than performance, could be more of a burden than a boon, and there was nothing he could do about it.

While there is already some evidence of dividends in quiet diplomacy, there are also troubling signs, particularly in the unaddressed agenda of trade, the third challenge that may cut more deeply. Most of what was visible in Copenhagen was more of the same: lower level Chinese officials publicly disagreed with the President of the United States in meetings that were to have been attended only by heads of state, and Chinese security attempted to bar the President from a meeting chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. Yet, the breakthrough in Copenhagen, right after the visit in Beijing was not trivial: President Hu seemed to give in to the President on critical points that he had refused in Beijing. Perhaps it was easier when out of China than in, holding on to an independent public profile while getting to more substance . Perhaps there was some payback for the President’s conduct, or some fulfillment of private promises. The apparent progress in Copenhagen on climate change, an apparent failure on the Beijing agenda, is not matched, however, as to trade, which seems to be turning into the third rail of the relationship.

The Chinese view and communication of success, then, needs to be understood better. Did China celebrate the success of the visit because it got its way (no populism, no trappings of democracy, no embarrassments, almost no public criticism in China), or because the relationship for the future is stronger and better? If the latter, was the achievement not possible without wounding the President at home, or were wounds self-inflicted, consistent with the President’s personality and aversion to conflict and confrontation? Or, could China not have been more sensitive to the political risks for their new friend, the Pacific President (a potentially discomfiting double entendre), and permitted him to have more of what he asked symbolically?

There are at least two competing interpretations of the current situation. One refers to a new Chinese “swagger,” a confidence that China and the United States are moving in opposite directions and that the Chinese formula – a capitalist, authoritarian state – is more likely to succeed in the twenty-first century than capitalism and freedom.

China projected many signs of this view during the last year of the decade in addition to the President’s November visit. On the authoritarian side, it has openly restricted internet access and use. It has jailed protestors on transparent pretexts. It summarily executed a British citizen for drug trafficking despite international pleas to reconsider. And on the capitalist side, it has begun lending to American enterprises as diverse as Southwest Airlines and Wal-Mart in a global promotion of trade and investment. It has taken its WTO membership very seriously.

A second interpretation, that China’s actions are not merely expressions of confidence, even arrogance, lies in a cultural difference contributing to a growing mutual incomprehension. China never fails, when the United States appeals for its leadership on issues in its neighborhood – whether North Korea’s nuclear capabilities or Pakistan’s harboring of Al Qaeda – to remind the United States that it is a developing country. While demanding treatment as better than an equal (reveling in suggestions of a G-2 while demurring that it would not want such a thing) , it asks for substantial financial aid on global warming and technology transfer on energy efficiency. China wants to be revered and admired for its astonishing achievement pulling hundreds of millions out of poverty, but it also wants sympathy and help. It is happy to leave the most difficult global problems to American leadership, but it wants deference whenever it chooses to take a position. It wants to develop in its own way, on its own time, although it is also in a hurry. Chinese leadership worries every day that a retardation of economic growth could inspire dangerous protest, the kind of fear no American president experiences.

President Obama needs to address both theories in both substance and in symbols. As he tucked into his steak dinner in the Great Hall of the People with knife and fork, so President Hu perhaps should expect to dine with chopsticks in Washington, D.C., each side catering to the other’s cultural preferences and expectations. Perhaps only with such paradox will Chinese leaders understand the domestic damage the visit to China may have done to the President whom they profess to like and admire, and Americans will need to learn the cultural side of why the Chinese do not perceive American failure in the visit. It is not unlike the contrasting perceptions of the Beijing Olympics, whose disciplined coordination frightened many westerners while seen in a proud China as the success of an ascendant nation.

The Xinhua News Agency carefully selected only favorable comments from a handful of Americans who insisted the trip went well. Sometimes the spinning was transparent, as in a subtitle, “China Pulls U.S. Out Of Recession,” leading a quotation from President Obama that read, “China’s partnership has proved critical in our efforts to pull ourselves out of the worst recession in generations.” President Obama obviously did not credit China with pulling the U.S. out of recession. The bias in this reporting, however, seems to have reflected the sincere views of at least some Chinese authorities.

One well-placed source has explained that the acute attention to every detail of the Obama visit demonstrated China’s respect for the President. This idea is captured well by Ni Shixiong, a professor at Fudan University and an organizer of the sanitized Shanghai meeting. He said the organizers felt “there was no need to make both sides embarrassed and stop our guests in their tracks,” and that they did not want to upstage the subsequent meetings in Beijing. In Mr. Ni’s words, as quoted by Sharon LaFraniere in The New York Times, “The climax was in Beijing. We could not overshadow what really counted.”

“What really counted” in Beijing were prepared statements with no questions, and tourism with only one tourist. American reports indicate consistently that, however much the Chinese may have perceived they were honoring their guest by protecting him from potential embarrassment, they were not honoring his wishes, which had been for a different audience in Shanghai and more direct exposure to the people of China. Arguably, however, Chinese officials believe that, on their turf, they know best, and it is better to honor their own views of protecting their guest, rather than the views of the guest himself. There is more in this idea, unfortunately, than a mere whiff of “father knows best.”

Trade And Electric Cars

If Copenhagen were the first test of the new relationship, electric cars may be the second. In President Hu’s words, “I stressed to President Obama that under the current situation, both China and the United States should oppose and reject protectionism in all forms in an even stronger stand.” On the eve of the meetings, China initiated wide-ranging investigations alleging enormous subsidies (in the tens of billions of dollars) and dumping of U.S. automobiles sold to China, and just after the meetings the United States imposed prohibitive tariffs on oil country tubular goods (“OCTG”) from China. Neither action seems mindful of “the current situation,” nor that either China or the United States is opposing or rejecting protectionism.

The Obama visit to China produced a contradiction at the interstices of climate change, energy efficiency, and international trade. Presidents Obama and Hu announced on November 17 the launch of the “U.S. China Electric Vehicles Initiative,” following a U.S.-China Electric Vehicle Forum in September. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, “The two leaders emphasized their countries’ strong shared interest in accelerating the deployment of electric vehicles in order to reduce oil dependence, cut greenhouse gas emissions and promote economic growth.”

The Electric Vehicles Initiative is to be operationalized within the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center, created by a protocol on the same day, along with two other projects, building energy efficiency generally and developing clean coal, including carbon capture and storage. The program is extraordinarily ambitious considering that joint funding may be only $150 million over five years, split evenly between the two countries. Still, as a joint venture it is an important declaration of common good intentions and a commitment of government funds to solve a common environmental problem.

While China and the United States were convening in Beijing in September to discuss electric cars under the auspices of China’s Ministry of Science and Technology and the U.S. Department of Energy, China’s Ministry of Commerce was entertaining a petition requesting an investigation of alleged U.S. Government subsidies to develop electric vehicles. The petition’s complaint about government support for fuel efficient cars began with President Obama’s August 2009 announcement of $2.4 billion “to develop cells for new-fuel cars and parts & components.” The petition argued, “Ultimately, with R&D subsidies, the auto industry boasts advanced production technologies and levels, improve their product varieties and quality, and enhance competitiveness.” Such subsidies, the petition contended, violate Article 3 of Chapter 2 of the PRC Anti-subsidy Regulations.

For ten more pages, the petition focused on American programs promoting the development of fuel efficient and electric cars and buses, concluding “that the US government or the Congress, or governmental organs (especially the Department of Energy) funds R&D of electric vehicles in the form of grants, investment, injection of supporting funds, and all the programs involve fund transfer from the government to the auto industry.” The industry gained, the petition claimed, “a competitive edge” from this support.

MOFCOM initiated a subsidy investigation based on this petition days before President Obama’s arrival in Beijing. Support for fuel efficiency in 2009 had nothing at all to do with the petition’s target, “Saloon cars and Cross-country cars (of a cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc) exported to the People’s Republic of China which originated and were manufactured in the United States.” Yet, MOFCOM did not exclude from its investigation the allegations aimed at support for R&D in fuel efficiency and electric cars, the very same support the Ministry of Science and Technology was promoting, at the very same time.

Amidst a great deal of chatter about retaliatory trade cases (particularly China’s pique over subsidy cases brought in the United States under President Bush while treating China as a “non-market economy,” beginning in November 2006, and the low-grade commercial tires safeguard enacted by President Obama in September 2009), it is easy to interpret Chinese actions (against American chicken parts, steel, and now automobiles) as merely a way for China to remind the United States of sauce for the goose. There is, however, much more to these actions. Notwithstanding the apparent agreement in Pittsburgh at the G-20 meeting that “rebalancing” requires more American saving and more Chinese spending and consuming, China’s growth remains predominantly export-driven. It still needs Americans, and Europeans and Canadians, to buy its products. As much as exports are helping lift the United States out of recession, the Chinese market still lags behind Canada and Japan. China knows it needs the U.S. market more than Americans need to sell to China. Undertaking these investigations, therefore, must be about more than the allegations themselves.

China, or at least MOFCOM, may now think a way to keep open the American market is to warn that it could close its own. In the automobile petition, it also appears to be a way to remind the United States that its own subsidy allegations against China as a non-market economy are being advanced from a glass house. This trade-off, however, remains unbalanced and legally unsound. The U.S. Department of Commerce, for all its protectionism, would not likely have initiated an investigation into allegations that have little or nothing to do with subject merchandise. Assistance for the future development of electric cars has little or nothing to do with saloon and cross-country vehicles already imported into China. Should China link these alleged subsidies to the subject merchandise in final findings, the WTO almost certainly will reject the link.

There is no sensible way to reconcile MOFCOM’s investigation into electric car subsidies with the joint Electric Vehicles Initiative proclaimed by the two presidents. The U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center is expected to raise and distribute public and private funds for joint research and development on electric cars, the very thing MOFCOM decided to consider as illegal and subject to trade restrictions and penalties. While President Hu was insisting upon President Obama’s concurrence to resist protectionism, and was celebrating joint research and development to overcome the environmental scourge of carbon emissions from automobiles, President Hu’s Ministry of Commerce was launching a hostile investigation into every American effort to solve that very problem.

It is not as if China were not playing by the rules. The Chinese Anti-Subsidy Regulations are translated almost verbatim from the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement. The countervailing duty laws in the United States, based on this same international agreement, routinely are invoked by U.S. industries to complain about the same kinds of programs identified in the United States by the Chinese petition, and the United States Department of Commerce routinely finds such subsidies in violation of U.S. law and international norms. The Department of Commerce regularly now imposes countervailing duties on Chinese goods (more than a dozen times since 2007) when U.S. industries have complained about Chinese government financial support in a variety of forms. And China, in its investigation of electric vehicles, appears to be pursuing a theory long popular in the United States, that all money is fungible and any government assistance, for any purpose, when within the same company, impacts subject merchandise. Although the U.S. Department of Commerce has experienced judicial setbacks in stretching this theory, MOFCOM has not. Notwithstanding that MOFCOM likely will lose a legal showdown on this theory, if not at home then at the WTO, there is no legal impediment to trying.

Certainly one way to combat the American proclivity to impose countervailing duties on Chinese products is to serve up to American industry, especially prominent industry, high doses of the same medicine. It is also logical to emphasize the overbearing presence of the U.S. government in some sectors, such as automobiles, while combating the American treatment of China as a non-market economy. But such actions hardly reflect President Hu Jintao’s promise to combat protectionism “in all forms” and to promote a stronger, deeper partnership to solve common problems.

Nor is China combating protectionism in all forms when resisting U.S. trade actions. Unlike other countries, China is not appearing before the United States International Trade Commission to challenge injury allegations. It is not appealing adverse agency determinations in U.S. courts. It is not pursuing administrative reviews of countervailing duty orders, when final duties are determined and set for collection. Instead, China is counting on the WTO for trade vindication, a strategic choice almost certain to disappoint.

The only publicly disclosed item on President Obama’s trade agenda in Beijing was the value of the RMB. He apparently made no more progress on this subject than his predecessor, and of course the United States does not comment publicly on “the weak dollar” which, according to Dana Hedgepeth in The Washington Post, “has made it easier for U.S. manufacturers of parts for appliances, automobiles and other equipment to compete globally on price and is helping them win back business lost to overseas competitors, a shift that economists say should help the country’s economic recovery.” That description sounds like a strategy for pulling out of the recession, delivering to the United States exactly the same benefit about which the United States has complained so loud and long with respect to China.

Economists are distinguishing between the weak dollar and the undervalued RMB. Although China may be acting legally, they say China is not acting fairly nor wisely. Countries disadvantaged by China’s currency policy may have no legal complaint, but China’s policy may entitle them to complain about trade on other grounds. Even free traders see protectionism, confronting China’s mercantilism, as justifiable.

On New Year’s Eve, Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman wrote in The New York Times, “China has become a major financial and trade power. But it doesn’t act like other big economies. Instead, it follows a mercantilist policy, keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s depressed world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, predatory.” Krugman goes on to indict specifically China’s currency policy: “In the past, China’s accumulation of foreign reserves, many of which were invested in American bonds, was arguably doing us a favor by keeping interest rates low … But right now . . . that trade surplus drains much-needed demand away from a depressed world economy. My back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that for the next couple of years Chinese mercantilism may end up reducing U.S. employment by around 1.4 million jobs.”

“The Chinese refuse to acknowledge the problem,” Krugman writes. “Recently Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, dismissed foreign complaints: ‘On one hand, you are asking for the yuan to appreciate, and on the other hand, you are taking all kinds of protectionist measures.’ Indeed: other countries are taking (modest) protectionist measures precisely because China refuses to let its currency rise. And,” Krugman concludes most conspicuously, “more such measures are entirely appropriate.”

In making currency valuation the only trade issue on his Beijing agenda, President Obama may have been treating it as a surrogate for other trade concerns. However, he thereby avoided confronting the massive government interventions in the economy that unavoidably contravene the rules of the WTO when products benefiting from these interventions are exported. China is now calling the United States on the very programs essential to economic recovery, and as China is unwilling to discuss the value of the RMB, the United States apparently is unwilling to discuss its massive subsidies to banks, automobiles, and other economic sectors.

That China would threaten American trade, both by refusing to discuss currency valuation and by launching cases against American exports, while entertaining the President and applauding new cooperation, should worry everyone sharing agendas of economic recovery and environmental improvement. That the United States should persist in imposing countervailing duties on Chinese products because they benefit from state support should be equally worrisome. There is an inescapable hypocrisy in countervailing loans from Chinese banks going to Chinese goods exported to the United States while American companies are borrowing from the same Chinese banks and the United States has been taking virtual ownership of the key private financial institutions lending to American enterprises.

Embedded in these actions – an effective refusal to confront honestly the pressures of the recession as they impact trade laws and practices -- is either a cultural misunderstanding, a failure to communicate, an intellectual dishonesty, or some dangerous combination. It catapults trade, the subject apparently left behind in Beijing, to the head of an agenda about recovery and climate change. Unfortunately, either the two Presidents do not yet know it, do not want to know, or are ill-equipped to deal with it.

A Further Meaning

China wants the sympathy to be accorded a developing nation historically deprived and exploited, but it also wants the respect of a major power. It wants the United States to provide aid and technology transfer for climate change, but it also wants joint ventures on the basis of equality. It wants President Obama to believe he is admired and respected while it wants him to behave according to Chinese norms and with full respect for Chinese preferences. President Obama seems to have understood these mixed messages and tried mightily to satisfy them all. In 2009 he placed China at the center of his foreign policy, continuing everything he thought good about the Bush Administration’s approach to China, and expanding upon it. In the process, he opened himself to criticism that he satisfied none of China’s expectations, and diminished himself and the United States in the process.

This Chinese paradox inevitably arouses suspicion. China’s celebration of a successful presidential visit may endorse future partnership, but it may also signal an interpretation of a long-term reversal of fortunes. Again, the automobiles petition may be one of the clearest possible statements of Chinese intent, and some Chinese trade experts believe it is an expression of MOFCOM’s own views, perhaps even the product of MOFCOM’s own drafting. It may enable President Hu to say one thing and mean another, his Ministry of Science and Technology devoted to cooperation and government support for technical and technological development, his Commerce Ministry evening the score with American trade agencies by aggressively seeking remedies for state involvement in the economy.

The automobiles petition characterizes the automotive industry as the most important in the United States, “a pillar industry playing a key role in the stability and development of the U.S. economy.” It then accuses past American presidents as acting consistently “to protect the U.S. automobile industry,” but concludes that they failed: “instead, the policies eventually resulted in the decline of the industry.” The protective subsidies “severely violated the relevant provisions of the WTO and distorted the normal market competition.” The petition barely disguises its view that this decline is emblematic of a greater decline of the United States.

The message about decline and bankruptcy is matched by the contrasting description of China’s industry and, without much subtlety, China. However, the most important element of the contrast, the one that raises the most important questions about world trade, contends that China’s rise is attributable to the shedding of state influence, to “the reform and opening up” of China. The petition wishes the legacy of state support to disappear in the mists of time, and pretends that none effectively remains. It wants its audience to believe that the state-driven economy is now in the United States; China is the paragon of a free market.

The automobile industry is the vehicle for this grander argument and seems, therefore, deliberately chosen at the highest levels of the Chinese government. It was bound to get American attention.

Before describing the rise and fall of the U.S. industry, from its creative days as a free enterprise a century ago to its demise at the hands of the state at the dawn of the new millenium, the petition offers a history of the Chinese industry: “By 2008, three decades have passed since the reform and opening up of the country, which is also three decades of reform and opening up of China’s auto industry. In three decades, China’s vehicle production developed, from producing 149,000 vehicles to 9.5 million vehicles, and from less than 1% of world production to nearly 13%. In 2007, car ownership in China exceeded 43 million, ranking fourth in the world. The automotive industry employed 2.91 million people, and employed more than 30 million in related industries.” This astonishing growth, so the petition claims, resulted from free enterprise: “China’s automobile industry grew in strength in the reform and opening up, rapidly becoming one of the world’s largest automobile manufacturer and consumer, and since joining the WTO six years ago, it has achieved the most prominent and fastest sales growth in history.”

The argument of the petition is that China’s automotive ascent matched exactly the U.S. decline, and that as China liberated economic forces, the United States constrained them. Implicitly, as the last century belonged to America, the new one belongs to China. Of course, none of this story has anything to do with trade laws entitling China to impose tariffs on American goods. Instead, the automobile industry here is a surrogate for contrasting the fortunes of China and the United States, a way of saying that the Chinese formula of authoritarian capitalism is better than the American way.

In the new century, China has been innovating, so the automobile petition claims, while the United States has fumbled (the translation apparently was prepared in the Office of the United States Trade Representative but may have originated elsewhere, and is decidedly less elegant here than in some other passages):

Automobile industry is one of the most important pillar industries in America, with a huge number of employees. Less efficient, poor management, and high cost have long since hovering American automobile and keep it down. Under the impact of the economic crisis, American automobile industry is between the beetle and the block. All three top forms are driven to corner. President Obama once declared in public, ‘I may not, can not, and will not let our automotive industry perish . . . It is a pillar of our economy, it is where millions of dreams dwelt.’ Just like what Obama had said, above measures is only the first step. US government will take further measures in domestic automobile industry, and help them get through the difficult period of reorganization. No to mention the competitive power of American new energy vehicles, just from the fact that the government spent such a huge capital and appointed the three top automobiles of General Moto [sic], Ford and Chrysler for its new energy automobiles procurement, we can see that the US automobile industry and new energy automobile project to walk out of their embarrass [sic].

Such statements are rich in irony. They expose resentment of presumed American advantages, criticism of American performance, and rejection of American efforts to stand in the way of a rising China. They demand immediate action because the United States has taken but a “first step” in trying to overwhelm the developing Chinese industry. And since new-energy vehicles define the American strategy for saving its automobile industry, it is the government support for the new-energy vehicle that must be stopped.

President Obama likely did not know, when he used the term “pillar,” that it is a favorite of Chinese central planning and the frequent target of the U.S. Department of Commerce in its assault on alleged Chinese subsidies. The petition authors likely salivated over the American use of the term, confirming their worst suspicions of an American conspiracy to thwart an ascending China by blocking its exports to the United States while shipping to China subsidized goods.

What Now?

The contradiction between the Electric Vehicles Initiative and MOFCOM’s investigation of alleged subsidies to U.S. automakers translates into a much larger problem of cultural misunderstanding and trade protectionism. It echoes the contrasting views of success and failure in the President’s visit in China. It tests whether China and the United States will be able to cooperate or be forced to compete antagonistically. It requires the United States to reexamine the most fundamental aspects of its trade policies and address its hypocrisies, particularly over subsidies and currency valuation. It requires China to tell an honest history and to deal forthrightly with the engagement of the state in the economy.

The avoidance of a trade agenda during President Obama’s visit suggests that neither country is ready for the conversation that could determine the future of the world. Both may well want the same things for the health and prosperity of their societies – gainful and productive employment, clean air to breathe and safe food and water to eat and drink. Both may know, abstractly, that they must trade freely with each other in order to achieve these simple and precious goals. But so absorbed is each country in saving itself that they cannot even talk effectively about saving each other. Instead, they are wrapped in paradoxes and contradictions, leading Krugman to warn that “the victims of [ ] trade mercantilism have little to lose from a trade confrontation.”

China invited the President, deft with chopsticks, to eat with a knife and fork in China, yet one more detail detaching him from the Chinese people and, consequently, from his popular image at home. President Hu’s visit to the United States will, therefore, be all the more important, for its substance and for its symbols. President Obama will demonstrate either that his personality inevitably produces a portrait of unnecessary compromise when China pushes hard, or that as host he can restore his own aura by setting the terms and tone that win at home without exacerbating the tensions already rising between the world’s most significant powers.

中国领导人和评论家认为，奥巴马总统11月访华获得空前成功。白宫在公开场合也宣称访华取得成功，但私下却不这么认为。如何看待访华结果可能都依赖于如何诠释“成功”和“失败”。两者间的差异带来不同后果。

美国评论家一般不像美国官员那样模棱两可。他们大都认为这次访华是失败的。美国外交关系委员会亚洲研究主易明女士（Elizabeth Economy）认为这次访华是“记忆中最失败的美国总统北京之行。”海伦•库珀（Helene Cooper）在《纽约时报》撰文指出，“分析家说中国严格管理奥巴马中国之行的每个细节，这次访华更多展示了中国抵抗外界压力的能力，而未推动奥巴马议程上的主要问题。”她接着引用美国康乃尔大学埃思瓦尔•普拉萨德（Eswar S. Prasad）原文，“中国成功地操纵了奥巴马总统的公开露面，让他发言赞同对中国而言重要的政治立场，并有效地压制了对有争议的问题的讨论，如人权和中国的汇率政策。这是一个大手笔，他们把公众讨论从中国的货币政策可能带来的全球风险转移至美国宽松的货币政策和保护主义倾向带来的危险。”

一些中国评论家赞成这一美国观点。香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心主任陈婉莹教授在《纽约时报》题为《奥巴马输了一局》的文章中指出“虽然陪审团还在争论奥巴马总统中国之行的长期贡献，在首次与中国近距离接触时他显然已经失去了象征意义上的战争。”

表面来看中国都自行其事。总统想与上海学生和博客展开自发式电视会议，结果却在封闭的礼堂和年轻共产党展开经过排练的交流。他想外出会见中国民众，看到的却是《纽约时报》海伦•库珀报道中空无一人的“鬼城”的长城，这一“繁华的旅游景点”因为奥巴马总统访华基本关闭了。同时他也受到外交降级对待，陪伴他登长城的是中美大使，并没有中方高级官员。在与胡锦涛主席共同主持的记者招待会上，两位领导人宣读了双方事先准备的（大概是双方都已批准的）发言稿，不允许新闻记者提问。陈教授的评论是，“中方在公共场合都略胜美方一筹。”她认为，“在对地位异常敏感的中国，象征意义和利益发挥的作用大于生活本身。”

这些结论是不利于中美关系发展。外交基本原则之一是永远不在谈判中击败对手，除非你期望这一结果是明确的最终结果。令人费解的是，中国却没有炫耀自己的胜利（但至少一位不愿透露姓名的美国高级官员在《华盛顿邮报》报道中提到他感受到“中方有一丝胜利的喜悦”）。相反，中国似乎是真的认为访问是对双方而言都取得了成功，假设中方了解这一词的含义，而不是试图羞辱总统。
至少在公开场合，奥巴马总统中国之行是与美国银行家的共同投资，他用良好意愿投资。此行也是为坚实、持久的伙伴关系打下基础。中国评论家认为，奥巴马总统得到了他提出希望实现的目标。新华社报道，“当他离开中国时，分析家看到中美关系向新的方向发展，这具有重大意义，分析家同时相信首脑会议加强了双边关系。”新华社援引人民大学国际关系学院金灿荣副院长的谈话指出伙伴关系的“新目标”是积极、重要的；中国现代国际关系研究院美国研究所所长也认为奥巴马访华为两国伙伴关系带来“积极、崭新的意义。”奥巴马总统强调双方需要相互信任，胡锦涛主席和中国评论家赞同他的意见。据新华社报道，“奥巴马对中国的访问取得丰硕成果。两国重申了双方关系的新定义——面向21世纪的积极、合作、全面的关系——就如两国前任元首建立的、并不断丰富、巩固的合作关系，且更具战略性内涵。”

但是一些批评者认为总统的投资是幼稚的，两国关系的基础可能比预想的更不坚固、公开场合的论调得不到实质内容的支持。张祖华和江棋生在《华盛顿邮报》撰文告诫：“中国政府并不回报免费获得的东西。她只会纳入囊中，然后迈步前进。外国人可能不知道这一点，但对中国人而言却俨如白昼。”两位作者认为，未在华盛顿接见达赖喇嘛、在上海与学生会面、没有提问的新闻发布会、以及在公开场合对中国人权保持沉默都是奥巴马总统免费赠送的东西。他们解释中方认为的“新方向”是指美国的地位和作用逐渐削弱，欺负一位新上任的年轻的、渴望和解的美国总统。

衡量成功与失败

这可能是因为中国和美国是衡量成功和失败的标准不同。美国人可能倾向于认为这次访问在镜头前是失败的，因为总统奥巴马与“普通”民众交流的高超技能因为中国的“细节管理”而无法发挥。
许多人认为总统之行在实质性问题上也是失败，或许是因为奥巴马总统三天内只花了一整天参加严肃会谈，而且主要是在他抵达中国前已经达成的协议上签字。他议程上的重要话题——制裁伊朗核发展、气候变化、全球金融重组、人民币升值、人权、尤其是言论自由和通信自由——似乎都未取得突破。

无论中国如何真诚地希望取得互惠的成功，尽管中国公开声称访问取得成功，却无助于改善美国人眼中的零和游戏——美国的失败等于中国的成功。多数美国人视中国的成功为操纵的手：舞台管理、微观管理总统访华的每个细节否定了总统在世界其他国家享受的明星地位，同时否定了总统议程上的优先事项。约翰霍普金斯大学高级国际关系学院蓝普顿教授等人士预测两国关系将面临一些阻碍，因为中国对两国关系的庆祝只显示她预测不断上升的中国将在世界舞台上取代下降中的美国，把美国放在“从属者角色。”

对此行持批评态度的评论家（他们在美国评论家中占绝对多数）将奥巴马总统此行与他前任的中国之行对比。无论是尼克松、里根、老布什、克林顿还是小布什，都在八达岭受到热情民众的欢迎（他们都游览了长城，并在同一个地点）。他们举行了美国式的新闻发布会；中国电视台播出他们与“普通”人的互动。陈教授认为这一次却是“人造公共活动的组合”，奥巴马团队“受挫”。

无论此行为两国关系带来何种长期结果，与前任总统中国之行的对比都对奥巴马总统造成政治危害。此行与奥巴马在美国国内留下的、通过妥协避免冲突的印象产生化学反应：无论关于卫生改革提案的关键细节还是战争全局部署，他的妥协只助长把他的和气视为软弱的对手的气焰。美国人对总统外交政策的不满日益渐长，右翼不满他的伊朗政策，左翼不满他的阿富汗政策。他的中国之行让一些美国人认为此行与肯尼迪和赫鲁晓夫的首次会面很相似，强硬的苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫在维也纳测试年轻、缺乏经验的肯尼迪的总统，并给了他一个下马威。同样，奥巴马每次都屈从于中国的偏好。

此处需要指出总统在中国的表现是有根源的。在抵达上海之前，他因对日本天皇异常恭敬受到美国媒体痛斥。敏感的中国领导人意识到奥巴马总统的处境、给予他平等待遇、希望以伙伴关系与总统合作，充分迎合他以及中国领导人自身的愿望。相反，不知是不了解究竟在日本发生了什么，还是决心实现自身利益，中国的工作强化了他在日本留下的年轻总统过分取悦受访外国主人的印象。

奥巴马总统对中国的访问很可能影响他在美国国内的形象，这说明短期内他不会再访问中国，同时他将在胡锦涛主席2010初访问美国时力争扳回一句。奥巴马总统将需要挽回在美国民众眼中失去的战场——从唯一的超级大国沦落为仅仅与一个发展中国家平等的地位，或许更糟。

这里至少有两个表面挑战，第三个挑战更深层。表面上，奥巴马总统在中国的行为符合他的个性和执政方式。他对待中国不如对待国会有力。他节约精力以用于最优先事项，倾向于让象征性事务成为他人的担心。中国可能利用奥巴马总统的这个弱点，但这种利用对长期双边关系而言没有多大意义。或者它有重要涵义，比批评家评论的更有利于美国：虽然象征意义上奥巴马总统输了，但是他表达、存储了今后可以利用的良好意愿，还带红利。许多声称双边关系在访问后更强大中国评论家似乎赞同这一观点。

第二个表面挑战是如何区分风格和实质内容。此处总统可能面临更严重的问题，因为作为候选人他利用他在国外受到的摇滚歌星待遇在国内赢得青睐和选票。因此，身为总统在接受外国首脑接待时，他不能轻易降低至微不足道的地位。在他的努力下这些接待显得重要，现在无法排除这些接待的重要性。他明白挪威授予的诺贝尔和平奖是建立在希望而非认可之上，可能是负担而非福音，但对此他无能为力。

虽然有证据显示总统的行为已经在安静的外交领域得到红利回报，也有令人不安的迹象，特别是在尚未提上议事日程的贸易领域。第三个挑战则更深入。在哥本哈根会谈上最引人注目的是：在只应有国家元首出席的会议上，较低级别的中国官员公开反对美国总统的意见，而且中国安全人员试图阻止奥巴马总统参加由温家宝总理主持的会议。然而，在北京之行之后举行的哥本哈根会谈取得了重大成果：胡锦涛主席虽然在北京拒绝就关键问题做出让步，但在哥本哈根却对美国总统做出让步。也许是因为在中国境外、面对独立的公众，比较容易讨论实质问题。或许是对奥巴马总统的回报、或是履行私下承诺。在哥本哈根举行的气候变化会议上取得的成就，显然与北京议程的失败不匹配，这将转入第三点：贸易。

必须更好地理解中方眼中及媒体宣传的成功。中国庆祝这次访问成功是因为她占上了风吗（没有民众对奥巴马的狂热追捧，没有批评中国民主，没有尴尬，中国几乎没有受到公开批评），或因为未来关系得到加强和改进？如果是后者，成就可否不建立在不让总统在美国国内受伤的基础上呢？或是伤口是奥巴马自己造成的，是由于总统厌恶冲突和对抗的性格？或许，中国对新朋友——和平总统（一个潜在的尴尬双关词）面临的政治危险过于敏感，未让他得到他象征性的需要呢？

对现状至少有两个相互竞争的解释。其一认为新的中国“招摇”，相信中国和美国正朝相反方向发展，而中国公式——资本主义专制国家——比资本主义加自由在21世纪更有可能成功。

不仅在奥巴马总统11月访华时，中国去年还在其他场合多次表明这一意见。在专制的一面，中国公开限制互联网接入和使用。她用自欺欺人的借口关押示威者。她不顾国际社会的请求坚决处决了贩毒的英国公民。在资本主义方面，它在全球推广贸易投资过程中开始贷款给不同企业，如西南航空公司和沃尔玛。它对世界贸易组织成员地位非常重视。

第二种解释认为中国的行动不只是表现信心、甚至傲慢，而是文化差异导致的日益加深的互不理解。当美国在邻近中国的区域问题上寻求中国帮助时，无论是北朝鲜核能力或巴基斯坦庇护基地组织，中国从未忘记提醒美国中国仍是发展中国家。在要求高于平等待遇的同时（一方面建议建立G2集团，一方面又声称不希望这样的事情发生），中国要求获得防止全球变暖和提高能源效率的技术及资金。中国希望因实现数亿人摆脱贫困而被尊敬，但也同时希望同情和帮助。中国很高兴地把最困难的全球问题留给美国的领导，但当她选择立场时总想获得尊重。它希望根据自己的时间安排走自己的路，虽然也有些着急。中国领导人每天担心经济增长迟缓就将激发危险的抗议，没有一位美国总统有这样的经验。

奥巴马总统需要用实质内容和形式回答。他在人民大会堂用刀叉品尝牛排晚餐，所以胡锦涛主席或许应该期待访问华盛顿时用筷子吃饭，因为双方都照顾到对方的文化取向和期望。也许只有这样，中国领导人才能了解对他们喜欢和欣赏的美国总统的美国国内形象造成的损害，而美国人需要学习中国文化，了解为什么中方没有察觉到奥巴马访华在美国人眼中的失败。就像北京奥运会给中西方留下不同印象一样，中国的纪律严明、协调一致让中国引以为豪，却让西方人感到可怕。

新华社精心挑选了一些赞同此行顺利的美国评论。有时操纵是透明的，如一副标题写道“中国拉动美国摆脱衰退”，并引用奥巴马总统的评价，“中国的伙伴关系在我们努力摆脱几代未遇的、最严重的经济衰退时起到关键作用”。奥巴马总统显然没有认同中国拉动美国摆脱经济危机这一看法。但这篇偏颇的报道似乎反映了一些中方领导真实的想法。

一可靠来源解释说密切关注奥巴马访华的每个细节表明中国对总统的尊重。上海会议的组织、消毒者、复旦大学倪世雄教授对这个想法领会颇深。他说组织者认为，“没有必要让双方尴尬，阻碍我们的客人的行程”，他们更不想影响北京会议。《纽约时报》Sharon LaFraniere引用倪教授原话：“高潮是在北京举行的会谈。我们不能遮掩最重要的事件。”

在北京眼中“真正重要”的是没有提问的记者招待会、只有一个游客的旅游观光。美国报道显示尽管中国可能认为他们履行了保护奥巴马总统的职责，让他免遭可能的尴尬，但他们没有尊重奥巴马的意愿，让他在上海面对不同的观众、更直接地接触中国人民。尽管中国官员相信：他们最了解自己的地盘，他们应服从自己的意见，而不是尊重客人的意见。不幸的是，这一想法不仅显示“父亲知道最多。”

贸易和电动车

如果哥本哈根是对新关系的第一次测试，电动汽车可能是第二次。胡锦涛主席指出，“我在和奥巴马总统的谈话中强调，当前形势下中国和美国都应该更强硬地反对和摒弃一切形式的保护主义”。会议前夕，中国针对美国出口至中国的轿车和越野车发起了覆盖面极广（价值数十亿美元）的反补贴和反倾销调查；会议刚刚结束，美国向中国出口的油井管材征收惩罚性关税。这两个行动似乎都没有意识到“当前形势”，中国和美国也没有反对或拒绝贸易保护主义。

奥巴马对中国的访问是气候变化、能源效率和国际贸易的检验。奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席于11月17日宣布启动“美中电动汽车项目”，这是继9月中美电动车论坛之后两国在这一领域的又一举措。根据美国能源部的新闻公告，“两位领导人强调加快电动汽车发展可以减少对石油的依赖、减少温室气体排放、促进经济增长，符合两国共同利益”。

同一天，根据另一议定书，美中国清洁能源研究中心及其他两个项目也宣告成立，这一清洁能源研究中心将研究如何节能尤其是包括捕获和储存碳释放技术在内的清洁煤发展。这一项目非常雄心勃勃，因为两个国家在5年内仅仅平均分摊1.5亿美元的投资。尽管如此，作为一个合资企业，这是体现善意的重要宣言、承诺提供政府资金以解决共同面临的环境问题。

当中国科学技术部和美国能源部于9月在北京共同主持召开会议讨论发展电动汽车，中国商务部提供了一个小插曲，声称收到了要求对美国政府为发展电动汽车提供的补贴展开调查的申请。申请书中的指控项目包括奥巴马总统2009年8月宣布用于“开发新能源汽车零部件”的24亿美元。申请书说“最终，研发补贴将帮助汽车产业拥有更先进的生产技术和水平、提高产品质量、增加产品品种、增强竞争力。”申请书认为这些补贴违反了《中华人民共和国反补贴条例》第二章第三款。

申请书用长达10多页的篇幅讨论促进提高燃料效率、电动汽车和公共汽车的美国项目，总结道“无论是美国政府还是美国国会，或者政府机关（特别是美国能源部）以赠款、投资或是配套资金形式注入的研发电动车的资金，以及所有把资金从政府转移至汽车业的项目。”申请书称，“美国汽车业从这种支持中获得竞争优势”。

就在奥巴马总统抵达北京前几天，中国商务部根据这份申请书发起了反补贴调查。2009年支持提高能源效率的项目和申请书的目标——“出口到中国的、美国制造的轿车和越野车（气缸容量≥2.0升）”没有任何关联。然而，中国商务部并没有把为提高燃油效率和发展电动汽车提供的研发支持排除在这一调查之外。虽然几乎同时中国科学技术部宣布为这些项目提供支持。

当人们纷纷讨论报复性贸易案件（特别是布什总统在其任内，虽然仍视中国为“非市场经济国家”，却从2006年11月开始对中国展开反补贴调查，至2009年9月奥巴马总统宣布对低档商业轮胎采取贸易保障政策），很容易理解中国的行动（针对美国鸡肉产品、钢材、汽车的贸易行动）仅仅是为了提醒美国她也会面临同样的贸易行动。但中国的行动不局限于此。20国集团在匹兹堡协议会议上提出的“平衡”需要美国增加储蓄和中国扩大投资和消费。中国的经济发展仍主要是出口导向型。她仍然需要美国人、欧洲人和加拿大人购买她出口的产品。当美国需要扩大出口以摆脱经济衰退时，中国市场仍落后于加拿大和日本市场。中国知道她对美国市场的需求大于美国对中国市场的需求。因此，中国展开这些调查的含义一定超过指控本身。

中国（至少是中国商务部）可能认为为了保障美国市场大门畅通无阻，必须警告美国中国可以关闭中国市场大门。在汽车案申请书中，中国似乎想提醒美国，美国对中国这一非市场经济的补贴指控似乎来自一座玻璃房子。中国的权衡仍是不平衡、法律上不健全的。贸易保护主义推动下的美国商务部不太可能对与商品无关的指控发起调查。为电动汽车发展提供的补助与中国进口的美产轿车和越野车很少或几乎没有关联。如果中国在最后裁决中把这些这些指控和受补贴商品联系在一起，世界贸易组织几乎肯定会否决这一联系。

中国商务部宣布对电动汽车展开补贴调查以及两国领导宣布联合研发电动汽车，没有理智的办法可以调和这两个决定间的矛盾之处。美中清洁能源研究中心预计将筹集、用于联合研究、开发电动汽车的公共、私人资金，这正是中国商务部考虑视为非法、应受制裁的贸易项目。当胡锦涛主席坚持要求奥巴马总统同意共同抵制保护主义、庆祝联合研究和开发克服汽车二氧化碳排放带来的环境危害，他领导下的商务部却对美国试图全力解决这一问题的努力展开调查。

并不是中国不依规矩。《中华人民共和国反补贴条例》几乎是逐字逐句翻译世贸组织的反补贴措施协定。美国反补贴法也是建立在此同一国际协议基础之上，美国产业的指控和中国申请书中的指控项目类似，美国商业部则经常发现这些补贴行为违背了美国法律和国际惯例。当美国产业界对中国政府各种形式的财政支持提出指控时，美国商务部经常决定对中国产品征收反补贴税（自2007年来也有十多起案件）。同时中国对电动汽车的调查使用了一个在美国长期受欢迎的理论：所有的钱都可流通至不同领域、政府为任何目的提供的补助在某一公司可对受调查产品产生影响。虽然美国商务部在使用这一理论时经历了司法挫折，但是中国商务部还没有经历挫折。尽管中国商务部很可能不是在国内、就是在世贸组织会失去这一理论的法律战役，但是没有任何法律条款阻碍尝试。

当然，对付美国向中国产品征收反补贴税的倾向的办法之一就是对美国产业，尤其是著名产业，使用同样高剂量的药物。同时强调美国政府一方面在某些领域，如汽车领域，作用过大，一方面视中国为非市场经济的做法不合乎逻辑。但这些行动似乎不符合胡锦涛主席打击“一切形式”的保护主义，促进更强大、更深入的伙伴关系以解决共同面临的问题的承诺。

中国也不是利用一切行动抵制美国的贸易保护主义。与其他国家不同，中国不参加美国国际贸易委员会调查、挑战产业损害指控。也不在美国法院上诉美国政府机构的不利裁决。中国也不参与反补贴行政复审，而一年一度的行政复审决定最终税率。相反，中国完全依赖世贸组织为贸易平反，这一战略选择几乎肯定会令中国失望。

奥巴马总统访华议程中唯一公开的贸易项目是人民币汇率问题。就这个议题，他显然没有比他的前任实现更多进展。当然美国也不会公开评论“美元疲软”，据《华盛顿邮报》的Dan Hedgepeth，美元疲软为“美国电器、汽车和其他设备的生产商和零件制造商提供了价格竞争优势，并帮助他们在全球夺回输给了海外竞争对手的市场份额，经济学家认为该转变应该帮助美国经济复苏。”这一解释听起来就像是拉动经济发展的战略，提供给美国的利益和美国对中国的大声抱怨完全一致。

经济学家区分美元疲软和人民币被低估，他们说中国采取的行动不明智、不公平。那些因中国的货币政策而处于不利地位的国家可能还没有用法律行动表达不满，但中国的政策迫使她们在其他领域抱怨不公平贸易。即使自由贸易者也认为用保护主义抵制中国的重商主义有理。

元旦前一天，诺贝尔经济学奖得主保罗•克鲁格曼（Paul Krugman）在《纽约时报》专栏发表评论：“中国已经成为一个重要金融和贸易强国。但她并不像其他经济大国那样行动。相反，她奉行重商主义政策，人为地保持高额贸易顺差。在今天低迷的世界经济中，这一政策说穿了就是掠夺性政策。”克鲁格曼接着具体评论中国的货币政策：“过去，中国积累的外汇储备大多投资于美国国债，这样做可以说是有利于我们，因为它保持美国的利率较低......但是现在，贸易顺差使急需的需求流失。我的粗略计算显示在未来两年中的重商主义可导致美国失去140万人左右的就业机会。”

“中方拒绝承认这个问题，”克鲁格曼写道。“最近，温家宝总理反驳外国控诉：‘一方面，你要求人民币升值；另一方面，你却采取各种保护主义措施。’事实上：其他国家采取的（适度）的保护主义措施正是因为中国拒绝人民币升值。而且，更多的此类措施是完全适当的。”克鲁格曼总结道。
选择人民币汇率作为他北京议程上唯一的贸易问题，奥巴马总统可能想用它替代其他贸易问题。他从而回避挑战中国政府巨大的、违背世贸组织规则的经济干预措施，并把受益于这些措施的产品出口至其他国家。中国现在对美国急需的经济复苏计划提出批评，就像中国不愿意讨论自己面临的问题一样，美国显然不愿意讨论对银行、汽车和其他经济领域的巨额补贴。

中国一方面通过拒绝讨论人民币汇率、对美国出口产品展开调查威胁美国贸易，另一方面迎合美国总统、赞扬新的合作，这应当使每一个关心经济复苏和改善环境议程的人士担心。同时美国坚持向享受中国政府支持的产品征收反补贴税同样令人担忧。中国的银行向中国企业提供的贷款面临美国反补贴指控，而美国公司的贷款也来自这些中国银行，同时为美国企业提供贷款的主要美国金融机构现在都几乎变为国有。

拒绝诚实地面对经济衰退带来的压力以及它对贸易法和惯例的影响——要么是文化误解、沟通失败、思想上的不诚实、或是危险的组合。贸易议题被留在北京，重点被移至经济复苏和气候变化议程上。遗憾的是，不知两国总统是不知道、不想知道，还是没有能力处理这一问题。

深层涵义

中国希望受到给予历史上被剥夺、被剥削的发展中国家的同情，但同时也希望获得大国享受的尊重。她希望美国提供气候变化援助和技术转移，但也希望在平等的基础上设立合资企业。她希望奥巴马总统相信他受钦佩和尊重，同时也希望他的行为符合中国准则、充分体现对中国文化的尊重。奥巴马总统似乎理解这些混合的信息，并试图满足中方需求。2009年他把外交政策的中心放在中国，延续他认为合适的布什政府对华政策，并继续扩大。在这一过程中，他因没有满足中国的期望使自己面临批评，同时减弱自己以及美国地位。

这中式矛盾不可避免地引发猜测。中国庆祝总统访问成功可能是表示支持未来伙伴关系，但也可能预示中国认为两国命运将发生长期逆转。再次，汽车案调查申请书可能是中国意图最明确的表白，一些中国贸易专家认为这是中国商务部自己的看法，甚至可能是商务部自己起草的。它使胡锦涛主席显得说一套、做一套：他的科技部长致力于合作，并为技术和科技发展提供支持；他的商务部长却与美国贸易机构不相上下，积极对政府参与经济活动采取贸易救济行动。

汽车案调查申请书把汽车工业视为美国最重要的产业，“为美国经济稳定和发展发挥关键作用的支柱产业。”然后指责前任美国总统“坚持保护美国汽车产业”，但认为这些措施都失败了，“相反，这些政策最终导致美国汽车产业的衰退。”这些保护性补贴“严重违反了世贸组织有关规定，扭曲了正常市场竞争。”申请书毫不掩饰地表明这一下降象征美国综合国力的进一步下降。

与美国衰退、破产消息相对照的是对中国工业和中国的描述。两者差别中最重要的一点，同时也是世界贸易中最重要的问题，是中国的崛起是由于国家影响力的减弱，以及“改革开放的中国”。申请书希望国家支持的影响随着时间推移而消失，并装作认为所有影响都已经完全消失了。它希望读者认为，国家推动的经济目前存在于美国，中国是自由市场的典范。
汽车行业是这个宏大论点的载体，因此故意选择由中国政府最高级别部门发出这一信号。这一行动旨在吸引美国注意。

在描述美国工业崛起（一个世纪前的自由企业）和衰退（二十一世纪由政府主导的企业）之前，申请书对中国汽车工业史展开描述：“至2008年，中国改革开放30年以来，中国汽车工业也经历了30年的改革开放。三十年来，中国的汽车生产蓬勃发展，从生产14.9万辆至近一亿辆（0.95亿辆），从不到1％的世界产量到接近13％的世界产量。2007年，中国汽车拥有量超过四千三百万辆，居世界第四位。汽车行业就业人口达到两百九十一万人，相关产业就业人口达到三千多万。”申请书声称这一惊人的成长源自自由企业：“中国汽车产业在改革开放中成长，迅速成为世界上最大的汽车制造商和消费者之一；而且自6年前加入世贸组织以来，它取得历史上最突出和最快速的销售增长。”

申请书认定中国解放经济力量和美国限制经济力量导致中国汽车工业的崛起与美国的衰退同时出现。暗指上世纪属于美国，而新世纪属于中国。当然，这个故事与中国依法享有对美国商品征收惩罚性关税的贸易权没有任何关联。相反，汽车行业在这里仅是对比中国和美国的工具，为了说明中国式的专制资本主义比美国式资本主义更优秀。

汽车案申请书认为，在新世纪，中国一直不断创新，而美国却笨手笨脚（翻译源自美国贸易代表办公室，但也可能源于他出，在这里不再像其他段落那么优雅）：“汽车业是美国最重要的支柱产业，雇有大量员工。长期以来美国汽车工业面临效率较低、管理不善、成本过高等问题，这些问题一直延续至今。在经济危机影响下，美国汽车业面临重重困境。三大汽车公司被逼到角落。奥巴马总统曾公开宣称，‘我不可能、不能、也不会让我们的汽车产业消亡……这是我们经济的支柱，这是数百万人的梦想。’就像奥巴马总统宣布的那样，上述措施只是第一步。美国政府将采取进一步措施帮助汽车行业，帮助他们渡过重组困难时期。更不用提美国新能源汽车的竞争力，仅从政府花费的巨额资金、并指命三大汽车生产商独占政府新能源汽车采购项目，我们可以看到美国新能源汽车项目和美国汽车产业走出尴尬境地。”

这些陈述极具讽刺意味。它们显示了对假定的美国优势深怀敌意、批评美国的表现、反对美国阻碍中国崛起。它们要求立即采取行动，因为美国已经采取了“第一步”试图压倒发展中的中国产业。而且，由于新能源汽车被定义为拯救美国汽车工业的战略，必须制止美国政府对新能源汽车发展提供支持。

奥巴马总统很可能不知道，他使用的“支柱”一词，这是中国人最喜爱使用的中央计划词语，并经常在美国商务部的补贴调查中受到攻击。申请书的作者可能被美国的唾沫淹没了，认为这证实了他们猜测中的、美国企图通过阻止中国产品出口到美国，同时补贴出口至中国的商品以挫败中国的阴谋。

现在怎么办？

电动汽车发展计划和中国商务部对美国汽车制造商展开的补贴调查间的矛盾展现一个更严重的问题：文化误解和贸易保护主义。这和对总统访华成功和失败的讨论相呼应。它探讨了中国和美国能否合作还是被迫竞争。它要求美国重新审视其贸易政策最根本的问题，并解决补贴和货币估价等矛盾之处。它要求中国诚实叙述历史、直截了当地处理政府参与经济这一问题。

奥巴马总统访华时回避贸易问题表明两国都没有为参与可以决定世界未来的对话做好准备。两国都想实现本国社会健康和繁荣发展——高效率的生产力、呼吸清洁空气、安全食品和饮用水。两国可能都知道她们必须彼此贸易，以实现这些简单、珍贵的目标。但到目前为止，两国却被包裹在悖论和矛盾之中，这导致克鲁格曼警告说，“重商主义的受害者在贸易对抗中没有什么可失去。”

中国邀请不善使用筷子的美国总统用刀叉参加晚宴，在中国这是另一个使他脱离中国民众的细节，也使他在美国国内脱离受欢迎的形象。因此，当胡锦涛主席访问美国时实质将比符号更重要。奥巴马总统或是将证明在中国努力推动下，他的个性将不可避免地导致不必要的妥协；或是作为东道主设置条件和基调，既不加剧紧张局势，又重塑自己的光辉形象。

Media Mentions 2010: First Quarter

Christine Gill — Thu, 31 Dec 2009 11:27:43 -0600

Members of the Baker Hostetler International Trade practice have been quoted in numerous media outlets regarding various Chinese -U.S. trade issues, including:

Kavita Mohan: India Law News: An Update on India and the Doha Round (3/3/10)

Dr. Elliot Feldman: China Business Law Journal: China Targets the West (2/26/10)

Dr. Elliot Feldman: ITCB Threads: Rags to Riches to Rags? Textile Trade Policy in the U.S. After the Quotas (2/4/10)

Dr. Elliot Feldman: China Economic Review: Home or Away? (1/7/10)

Dr. Elliot Feldman: International Trade Law360: The China-US Trade War (1/6/10)

Steel Matters 举足轻重的钢铁工业

Jing Zhu — Sat, 26 Dec 2009 12:50:57 -0600

中文请点击这里

Besides currency valuation, steel is perhaps the most contentious trade issue between China and the United States. Steel products face numerous traditional trade remedy actions in both countries, and are under intense scrutiny in the climate change debate. In the United States, Congress is considering whether to include in climate change legislation additional tariffs on imported steel and other energy-intensive products to offset alleged competitive harm to domestic industries, should other countries not commit to equivalent greenhouse gas (“GHG”) reductions.

China And Copenhagen
China’s chief climate negotiator, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission (“NDRC”) XIE Zhenhua, visited India at the end of October where he signed the Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change. China and India together called on developed countries to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions and provide financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building support to developing countries.

It was not surprising for the world’s leading GHG emitter to form an alliance with India, another rising industrial power, on the eve of the Copenhagen meeting. Indeed, it was a victory for China to obtain India’s assurance that there “was virtually no difference between the negotiating positions” of the two Asian giants.

China slightly softened its stance in the final negotiations at the Copenhagen meeting, and signaled a willingness to abandon its demand for funding from the developed world. Meanwhile, China's State Council announced that China would stick to its promise to cut emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45 percent by 2020.

Although China thinks this promise to cut emissions is a large concession, it may not be viewed that way from the perspective of developed countries, or of those developing countries that are particularly at risk from climate change. With China’s economy expected to expand at a rate of 7 to 10 percent per year for the next decade, a 45 percent reduction per unit of GDP would mean that China’s GHG emissions would still rise substantially while China expects developed countries to make drastic reductions.

Climate Change And The Steel Industry
Even though China’s promise is not binding, Beijing is not paying mere lip-service to climate change. China has realized that it is in its interest to improve energy efficiency, particularly in the steel sector. Improved energy efficiency is the most cost effective way that China can lower its GHG emissions.

A case study of Hebei Province, China’s leading iron and steel producer (18 percent of the nation’s total iron and steel output in 2007), illustrates the benefit to China of improved energy efficiency, with reduced GHG emissions being a favorable side effect. The case study also demonstrates the difficulties Beijing faces in pushing local governments to shut down small and inefficient steel mills.

Low energy efficiency is one of the reasons why Hebei’s contribution to the nation’s economic growth lags behind coastal provinces. Gross industrial output created by Hebei’s large companies in 2007 was US$230.5 billion (RMB1,705.5 billion), accounting for 4.2 percent of China’s total; industrial value-added was US$65.2 billion (RMB482.3 billion), about 4.1 percent of the nation’s total. In contrast, the same indices for coastal Jiangsu Province, also a major steel producer, were roughly three times those of Hebei (13.2 percent and 11 percent respectively).

Increasing energy efficiency, and reducing GHG emissions, in Hebei’s steel industry depends upon closing old, inefficient mills. However, both the provincial government and the public are reluctant (or unable) to force the iron and steel industry to close those mills. Hebei Province relies heavily on energy intensive industries. It has attracted 112 of China’s Top-1000 energy consuming enterprises, with steel companies the most important. The industrial profit generated by the province’s large ferrous metal producers was US$6.8 billion (RMB50 billion) in 2007, 27.3 percent of the province’s total industrial profit produced by large companies in all industries. Steel employed in 2008 some 450,000 workers, 15 percent of the province’s total employment. As the unemployment rate is rising in Hebei, neither the provincial government nor the public wants to see those small inefficient steel mills closed.

So far, the province has taken one major step to improve the steel industry’s energy efficiency. It consolidated the province’s top two steel groups and launched the Hebei Iron & Steel Group (“HBIS”) in 2008, which became China’s number two steel producer. The creation of HBIS was to improve the competiveness and efficiency of Hebei’s steel industry. However, a recent Chinese study pointed out that China’s giant iron and steel producers are not necessarily more efficient than smaller companies. Compared to the size of a steel company, technology plays a more important role in improving efficiency, particularly energy efficiency.

As in the United States, steel is a major employer in China, and as in the United States, there is insufficient political will to sacrifice steel industry jobs on behalf of climate change. Industry consolidation is inevitable in China as it has been in the United States, but data do not support the perception that fewer, bigger steel mills must translate into reduced GHG emissions. It is not so much size as age that matters. Inefficiency may drive smaller, older mills out of business, but they are less likely to shutter because of a desire to clean up the environment.

除人民币汇率这一议题之外，钢铁产品可能是中美两国间最备受争议的贸易议题了。钢铁产品不仅在中美两国都面临贸易救济行动，同时在气候变化谈判中也面临严峻考验。如果其他国家不愿相应减少温室气体排放，美国国会考虑将在气候变化法案中向出口至美国的钢铁等高能耗产品征收额外关税以确保本国企业竞争力。

中国和哥本哈根
中国首席气候变化谈判代表——中国发展改革委员会副主任谢振华于2009年10月访问印度，并与印度官员签署了《关于应对气候变化合作的协定》。中印两国共同呼吁发达国家率先减少温室气体排放，并向发展中国家提供资金、技术转让和能力建设支持。

作为世界最大的温室气体排放国，中国在哥本哈根会谈前夕与另一成长中的工业大国——印度达成这一协议并不令人惊讶。印度公开承诺两大亚洲巨人的“谈判立场基本没有差别”更是中国在外交领域取得的重大胜利。

中国在哥本哈根会谈中稍稍缓和了其谈判立场，表示愿意放弃要求发达国家提供资金支持的要求。同时，中国国务院宣布中国将坚守至2020年，单位GDP减排百分之四十至百分之四十五的承诺。

虽然中国认为这一承诺是巨大让步，但是发达国家和直接面临气候变化冲击的发展中国家却不这么认为。中国经济在未来十多年里仍将以百分之七至百分之十的速度增长，因此单位GDP减排百分之四十五意味着中国温室气体总体排放量仍将显著上升。同时中国却期待发达国家显著减少温室气体排放。

气候变化与钢铁工业
虽然中国的承诺不具法律效应，但中国并非是行动的矮子。中国认识到提高能效符合自身利益，尤其有助于钢铁产业发展。对于中国而言，提高能效是减少温室气体排放的最佳途径。

河北省是中国第一大钢铁生产省（2007年产量占全国钢铁产量的百分之十八）。河北省的个案研究可充分展示提高能效有益于中国发展，以及中央政府在促使地方政府关闭小型、低能效钢铁企业过程中面临的种种难题。

低能效是河北对中国经济发展的贡献远远滞后于沿海省份的重要原因之一。2007年河北省大型企业的工业总产值为17055亿元（2305亿美金），占全国工业总产值的百分之4.2；工业增加值为4823亿元（652亿美金），占全国工业增加值的本分之4.1。然而，同为钢铁大省、沿海的江苏省的这两项指标却是河北省的三倍（分别占全国总量的百分之13.2和百分之11。）

河北省若想提高能效、减少温室气体排放，很大程度上依赖于关闭落后、低能效钢铁企业。但是，省政府和公众都不愿意（或是无力）施压钢铁企业、关闭这些落后、低能效的钢铁厂。河北省经济极度依赖高能耗企业。中国千大高能耗企业中有112家企业位于河北省。其中钢铁企业扮演最重要角色。该省大型钢铁生产企业在2007年创造了价值500亿人民币的工业利润（68亿美金），占全省大型企业工业利润的百分之27.3。同时，2008年河北省钢铁企业职工总数达到45万人，占全省就业人口的百分之十五。当省内失业人口不断攀升，河北省政府和公众都不希望看到小型落后钢铁企业关闭、带来更多失业人口。

迄今为止，省政府已经采取一项重要举措以提高钢铁企业能效。河北省两大钢铁集团于2008年合并创建了中国第二大钢铁生产企业——河北钢铁集团。这一合并旨在增进河北省钢铁企业的竞争力和能效。但是，中国最近发布的一份科研报告指出，中国的大型钢铁生产企业的效率并不一定比中小型企业高。与企业规模相比，技术是决定效率（尤其是能效）高低的关键。

与美国的情况相似，中国钢铁企业通常是就业大户；同时中国和美国一样缺少足够政治意愿，愿意以牺牲就业机会为代价减缓气候变化。和美国的经历相似，企业整合是中国发展道路中不可避免的趋势。迄今还没有足够的数据支持企业整合可以减少温室气体排放这一观点。企业大小并非关键。低能效可把小型落后钢铁企业驱逐出市场，但是改进环保却不是关闭它们的理由。

Setting The Record Straight: The U.S. Is Open For Chinese Business; Don't Worry Too Much About National Security Reviews 美国向中国企业敞开大门，请勿过分担心国家安全审查

John J. Burke — Sat, 12 Dec 2009 08:13:44 -0600

中文请点击这里

Chinese and other foreign companies considering investments in the United States often are confused about the degree to which the United States is open to foreign investment. They hear terms such as CFIUS, Exon-Florio and FINSA and claims that the United States is now hostile to foreign investment, especially from China and the Middle East.

The reality is that the United States remains one of the economies most open in the world to foreign investment. When it comes to greenfield investments creating new businesses in the United States, foreigners are as free to invest as domestic concerns. The United States does have procedures for reviewing foreign acquisitions of existing businesses under the Foreign Investment National Security Act of 2007 (“FINSA”), conducted by the inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), presided over by the U.S. Treasury Department. However, as the Treasury Department noted when it published its CFIUS guidance, “CFIUS focuses solely on any genuine national security concerns raised by a covered transaction, not on other national interests.”

Notwithstanding today’s difficult economic climate and the confusion over national security reviews of foreign investment, Chinese companies obviously remain interested in acquiring U.S. companies. For example, on October 23, 2009 BGP Inc., a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation, agreed to a joint venture with ION Geophysical Corporation, a Houston, Texas based company specializing in seismic products used in oil and gas exploration. According to ION’s press release, the transaction, which would result in the Chinese company owning 16.66% of ION, is contingent upon obtaining clearance of the transaction from CFIUS. This proposed acquisition is likely to face an exhaustive and extended CFIUS review because it is in a particularly sensitive sector, energy, and the ultimate acquirer is a Chinese state-owned enterprise. Although CFIUS may require some conditions designed to mitigate national security concerns, the transaction probably will be approved.

Congress passed FINSA in 2007 following controversies over the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s attempted acquisition in 2005 of Unocal, a U.S. energy company, and Dubai Ports World’s acquisition in 2006 of a British company that managed several major seaports in the United States. These controversies focused congressional attention on CFIUS; the earlier Exon-Florio procedures for review of foreign acquisitions; potential harm to U.S. national security that could arise from foreign control of energy, infrastructure and critical technologies; and on investments by state-owned entities. The public debate over these cases and a new law, however, was not one-sided and the Administration convinced Congress to balance national security concerns with the need for the United States to remain open to foreign investment. FINSA, legislated on July 26, 2007, is not a barrier to foreign investment, but a balance of investment with national security.

FINSA covers any transaction that “could result in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person.” It covers transactions that could result in the switch of control from one foreign person to another. However, it does not cover greenfield investments or a strictly real estate transaction. Control over an existing U.S. business must be at stake. “Control” is defined very broadly. Thus, even the acquisition of a relatively small minority stake in a company could be covered by FINSA.

FINSA does not pose a significant barrier to the vast majority of foreign acquisitions of U.S. businesses because, although all such acquisitions are covered transactions, the President’s authority under FINSA to suspend or prohibit a covered transaction can be exercised only when the President finds that “the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national security.” Neither the statute, nor its implementing regulations, defines “national security” and Congress intended CFIUS to interpret that term broadly to include, among other things, energy, critical materials, critical technologies, homeland security and infrastructure. Nonetheless, where there is no plausible connection between the business conducted by the U.S. company to be acquired and national security, FINSA will not be an issue.

Whenever a transaction covered by FINSA might affect national security, FINSA provides a review process whereby the parties to the transaction can seek clearance from CFIUS before they have invested a great deal. A CFIUS review is not mandatory, but companies generally seek one whenever there is a possibility that the transaction could be considered to affect national security. Once a transaction has been cleared by CFIUS, it cannot subsequently be challenged under FINSA unless one of the parties to the transaction submits false or misleading material information.

Companies take advantage of the CFIUS safe harbor – the preclearance -- by submitting a voluntary notice of a proposed transaction providing the detailed and extensive information that CFIUS’ regulations require for such notices. The filing of the notice commences a 30 day initial review process. Most transactions are cleared within this initial 30 day period.

When any of the CFIUS member agencies have unresolved national security concerns with a proposed transaction, a formal 45 day investigation begins. The parties typically resolve transactions that go through this second stage by agreeing with the government to mitigate the agencies’ national security concerns.

Mitigation agreements can involve modifications to the transaction, certain limitations on the new foreign owner’s exercise of control, or extra protections for critical technologies or facilities. A very small number of transactions pose national security concerns that cannot be mitigated successfully. Those transactions usually are abandoned before the completion of the CFIUS process. It is rare for CFIUS to complete its review with a recommendation to the President that a transaction be blocked.

The United States remains committed to an open investment environment, treating foreign investors on an equal footing with their domestic competition. It was for this reason that Congress set the initial CFIUS review deadline at 30 days, to coincide with the 30 day antitrust review period for mergers and acquisitions. The expanded view of national security mandated by FINSA does mean that CFIUS national security reviews are a crucial part of transactions involving foreign investment, but it is no more onerous than an antitrust examination.

Most important for success in a CFIUS review is understanding in advance the concerns of CFIUS member agencies, creative thinking about how to demonstrate that those concerns are not threatened, and where perceived threat may be reasonable, creative proposal to mitigate them. In most cases early attention to the CFIUS process and to the legitimate concerns of the member agencies, Congress, and the public, can ensure smooth and timely proceedings that result in CFIUS clearance without restrictions, or on terms that preserve the value of the transaction for all parties.

中国及其他国家的企业常常不清楚美国对外资的开放程度。他们常听到国家安全审查等词句，以及美国对外资尤其是中国及中东投资不友善。

事实上美国是世界上最欢迎外资的国家。就可增加美国就业机会、对新兴领域的投资而言，外资和美资享受同等待遇。《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》建立了审查程序，审查购买美资公司的外资，这一程序由多个部门组成的美国外国投资委员会（“CFIUS”）负责。美国财政部是这一委员会的牵头部门。美国财政部在刊登外国投资委员会指引时明确指出：“外国投资委员会关注于国家安全，而不是国家利益。”

虽然当前经济不景气，而且外资对国家安全审查困惑重重，中国公司仍然对美国公司感兴趣。例如，2009年10月23日，中国石油天然气集团公司（CNPC）的子公司BGP公司与德克萨斯州休斯敦市、对主要生产用于石油天然气开发中的地震产品ION Geophysical Corporation 达成建立合资公司的协议，BGP公司将拥有ION公司百分之16.66的股权。根据ION的新闻公告，这一协议仍有待外国投资委员会批准。因为是中国国有企业投资敏感的能源领域，外国投资委员会很有可能进行严格审查。虽然外国投资委员会可能要求两家公司采取措施减少美国国家安全隐患，但这一协议应该可以得到批准。

美国国会于2007年通过《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》，这是美国国会继2005年中国海洋石油总公司试图收购美国能源公司UNOCAL；2006年迪拜世界港口公司收购一家管理多个美国港口的英国公司后采取的行动。这些争议使美国国会开始关注以下领域：外国投资委员会，先前的Exon-Florio 审查外资机制，外资对能源、基础设施以及关键技术的控制对美国国家安全可能产生的危害，以及国有企业对美投资。

《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》涵盖任何可能导致“国外人士控制美国企业”的情况，也包括企业从某一外国人士转移至另一外国人士的情况，但是并不涵盖对新项目和房地产业的投资。审查重点是对美国企业的“控制”将发生转移，因为控制一词定义很广，所以即使收购少数股份，这一收购仍被《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》涵盖。

《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》对绝大多数收购美国公司的商业行为并不构成障碍，因为虽然它们属于法案涵盖范围；但是根据这一法案，只有当总统认定“外资利益行使控制将危害国家安全”的情况下才能推迟或是禁止这一收购。这一法案以及相应的法规并没有对“国家安全”做出界定，国会则希望外国投资委员会将这一词界定得非常广泛，包括能源、关键材料、关键技术、国土安全和基础设施等。但是，如果被收购的美国企业与国家安全没有关联，则无须担忧《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》。

但当某一经济并购可能与国家安全有关时，《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》提供了审查机制，使公司在获得外国投资委员会后再投入大笔资金。外国投资委员会审查并不是强制性的，但是当公司认为并购可能会对国家安全产生影响时，都自动申请。外国投资委员会批准一并购后，除非其中某一公司提供了虚假信息，这一并购将不再面临任何《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》指控。

许多公司充分利用外国投资委员会审查提供的安全港——事先批准：它们根据外国投资委员会审查规定主动向委员会提出申请、提供详尽信息。第一阶段非正式审查为期30天。大多数审查将在30天内获得批准。

如果外国投资委员会的任何机构对某一商业交易有任何疑问，为期45天的正式审查开始。涉及的公司通常通过与政府签订缓解协议，缓解政府对国家安全担忧的方式使这一商业交易得到批准。

缓解协议包括修改已签订的协议、限制新外资拥有者的权利、对关键技术或是设备的额外保护等。只有极少数商业转让带来的国家安全威胁不能减缓。但这些商业活动通常在审查结束前就中止了。外国投资委员会极少建议总统禁止某一商业转让。

美国仍然承诺开放的投资环境，对国内外投资者一视同仁。因此，国会把初审期限设为30天，与并购中的反垄断审查期限相同。《2007年国外投资国家安全审查法》对外国投资委员会审查的规定并不意味着这一审查是国外投资的重要组成部分，也不比反垄断更繁琐。

取得外国投资委员会审查批准的关键是事先了解委员会各部门的担忧，富有创意的表明这些担心是多余的，并在需要的时刻递交富有创意的缓解计划。通常，尽早准备，充分考虑政府部门、国会以及公众的意见可保证外国投资委员会审查的顺利进行、确保公司利益。

Media Mentions 2009: Various Trade Issues

Christine Gill — Fri, 11 Dec 2009 08:29:52 -0600

Members of the Baker Hostetler International Trade practice have been quoted in numerous media outlets regarding various Chinese -U.S. trade issues, including:

Wall Street Journal: China Firms Defend Tech-Purchase Rules (12/14/09)

Law360: Shoe On Other Foot As China Investigates U.S. Autos (12/10/09)

Financial Times: China to Investigate U.S. Car Subsidies (10/29/09)

International Trade Law360: Q&A with Elliot Feldman (10/6/09)

International Trade Law360: Mistakes To Avoid In Duties Cases (10/5/09)

China Daily - U.S. Edition: Trade Imbalance Teeters Amid Quarrels (9/28/09)

Bloomberg TV: The U.S.-China Relationship (9/24/09)

Financial Times: China Appeals on WTO Films Ruling (9/23/09)

Financial Times: US Car Aid Plan Irks Trading Partners (8/4/09)

BusinessWeek: The U.S. and China Put Their First String in Washington Summit (7/27/09)

Reuters: U.S. Lawmaker Blasts China Food Safety (3/18/09)

Whether "Buy American" Could Become "Bye America": Trade Protection in the Stimulus Package (2/5/09)

Bloomberg TV's "On the Economy": China Currency Controversy (1/23/09)

Calling All Cars 拦截所有车辆

Dr. Elliot J. Feldman — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 11:46:54 -0600

中文请点击这里

The Scope Of The Challenge

China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) initiated officially on November 6, 2009 antidumping and countervailing duty investigations into saloon and cross-country cars imported from the United States and manufactured by General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford Motor companies. Although the scope of the products at issue is described (chassis, engine, etc.) and defined according to tariff codes, the real scope of the petitions has little to do with saloon and cross-country (or sport utility) vehicles. The petitions upon which the investigations have been initiated may be the single most important documents in China-U.S. trade relations since the Chinese Protocol of Accession to the WTO. They are about competing models of economic and industrial development, and constitute a complaint against the American strategy for overcoming the financial crisis that dates from at least 2008. According to the Chinese petition, the United States, and the United States alone, caused the crisis. The Chinese contend that China is ascendant while the United States is declining, a statement as much of Chinese historical perspective as of legal rights and wrongs.

The selection of the Big Three American manufacturers, the timing, and the contents of the petitions, suggest that China, on the eve of President Obama’s first visit there, is going far beyond a trade remedy action concerning automobiles. Automobiles, however, may have been chosen as the target of the sweeping indictment, both because of vulnerability in the economic crisis, and because of their symbolism as the icon of American industrial dominance in the twentieth century. China is calling into question the American economic development model and the entire premise of American trade actions against China, advancing an argument that the U.S. automobile industry is failing and exposing the depth and breadth of American economic support for an exporting industry. Were the petitions to succeed, they would likely be the first of many against other U.S. exports to China.

The Chinese petitions challenge American definitions of market and non-market economies, and turn against the United States the subsidy policies and practices the United States has been applying to China. The Chinese petitions question the legitimacy of much of American trade policy toward China, while exposing great American vulnerability to trade remedy actions against American exports.

The petitions reach beyond trade policy. They question the U.S. Government’s energy and climate change policies by challenging government support for research and development into more energy efficient and less-polluting vehicles. As President Obama has placed research and development at the heart of the American economic recovery (and identified it with American global leadership), so China is now contending that state support for research and development is, according to Chinese law, the WTO, and implicitly American practice, a collection of countervailable subsidies.

There are many ironies in the Chinese decision to initiate a countervailing duty investigation based on the automobile petition, but perhaps the greatest is in the agreement reached a few days after initiation by Presidents Obama and Hu Jintao, in mid-November. They announced a cooperative effort specifically for the development of electric vehicles, and both committed significant R&D funds. Yet, China began investigating, ten days before President Obama’s visit, whether American subsidies for the development of electric vehicles violate WTO obligations. The Chinese petition contends that an American competitor, Tesla, in the nascent electric vehicle market, has been receiving funds (the petition alleges at least $465 million) from the federal government under several programs. The petition also identifies electric vehicle development funds to the Big Three, alleging $5.9 billion to Ford alone.

The excuse for the allegations against electric vehicles is the fungibility of money, which is an argument that has been used in the past by the U.S. Commerce Department that says any funds given to a company, for whatever purpose, may contribute to production and export of subject merchandise by relieving other sources of funds. There is no excuse offered, however, for the discussion of Tesla, which is not one of the Big Three, not a manufacturer of subject merchandise, and therefore not a respondent. Nor is there an explicit acknowledgement that electric cars are a different product not subject to the petition.

Warned But Oblivious

In December 2008, we warned the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) of a potential Chinese action such as this one. USTR, under the Bush Administration, had solicited comments on how the United States should treat alleged Chinese subsidies. We advised that, since September 15, 2008, it was no longer possible to continue business as usual. The United States, in response to the global financial crisis, was subsidizing banks and encouraging loans to uncreditworthy companies at below market rates. Banks were becoming state-owned, even if temporarily, in all but name. The United States was also acquiring significant equity positions in the automobile industry through massive cash infusions.

Even were the petitions to be taken entirely at face value – that they were prepared by a private industry association and reviewed by MOFCOM for a subsequent government decision whether to initiate investigations in response to a private request – MOFCOM’s notices of initiation imply acceptance of the petitions as to the credibility of most of the allegations. The petitions, therefore, are plausibly statements of MOFCOM’s views on a variety of subjects critical to U.S.-China relations.

The petitions appear to have been used as an opportunity for China to offer a comparative history of economic development, of industry in general and the automobile industry, the American icon, in particular. This Chinese version argues that the American automobile industry had every possible advantage in global markets over the last century, that China’s industry has been developing quickly, first with foreign help but more recently of its own accord, and that the United States’ efforts to save its automobile industry cannot come at the expense of China.

Loosely tied to the petitions’ comparative history of economic development is a contemporary conclusion. The petitions allege that “the U.S. subprime crisis escalated suddenly and ballooned into a global financial crisis.” (Elsewhere, the petition complains, “since the broke out [sic] of economic crisis aroused by the United States sub-loan crisis.”) This critical commentary, like the comparative economic history, is irrelevant to the subsidy and dumping allegations, but appears to be an unvarnished Chinese view of why the United States is today in China’s debt. It is a commentary that unashamedly connects economic and industrial policy to allegations of unfair trade, without hesitating to accuse the United States of pursuing a state-driven “industrial policy,” while implicitly denying its own.

Even the terms of reference equate American policy with Chinese language: the petitioners found President Obama referring to the automobile as a “pillar industry” of the American economy, a favorite Chinese term frequently noted by the U.S. Department of Commerce when, focusing on Chinese central planning, it assumes a link of plans to actions and accuses the state-driven Chinese economy of massive subsidies.

It is possible that neither President knew the details of the automobile petitions when they met shortly after investigations were initiated and they agreed to cooperate in the development of electric vehicles. There had been bilateral consultations as mandated by the WTO before initiation of a subsidies investigation, and the United States Trade Representative had summoned the Big Three manufacturers to a meeting, but the United States has not exported electric cars to China and the subject of the investigation is saloon cars and sport utility vehicles. There was no reason, therefore, for either President to think that R&D support for the development of electric vehicles was a primary focus of the countervailing duty petition.

The agreement Presidents Obama and Hu reached on this subject is strange in the circumstances. In light of the agreement, there is little logic in pursuing the allegations, but China may have its own reasons for both, nearly simultaneous, actions.

A Petition More And Less Than Meets The Eye

According to the countervailing duty petition, China is second only to the United States worldwide in the purchase of automobiles. In the narrower classes of saloon and cross-country vehicles, the petition claims China imported 33,732 such vehicles from the United States in 2007, and 43,240 in 2008. Chinese total imports of these vehicles, however, grew from 234,493 to 299,132 during the same period. Thus, the Big Three represent, in shipping from the United States, less than 15 percent of China’s imports of the subject merchandise, and less than half of one percent of China’s total consumption.

The petition does not link systematically any injury being caused by these shipments to current Chinese manufacture and sale of these specific categories of vehicles. To the contrary, the petition acknowledges that China’s own production and consumption grew during the period of investigation, even as overall imports grew as well. Nor are the subsidy allegations focused on the subject merchandise, but rather refer to the entire automobile industry, and especially initiatives regarding energy efficiency and green technologies that are unrelated to the subject merchandise. The petition challenges almost every aspect of the economic recovery package, with a particular objection to Buy American provisions. But it does not narrow the subsidies analysis to the scope of the petition, complaining more generally about the automobile industry. In repeated recitations of the legal “specificity” standard, it treats automobiles as a specific industry, not the types of cars about which the petition complains.

The petition details two arguments for upstream subsidy investigations, although it does not expressly call for any, and Chinese regulations may not articulate how one might be done. After all, upstream subsidy investigations in the United States have been rare, with the Commerce Department loathe to do them. In a notable exception to practice, the Commerce Department undertook an upstream subsidy analysis in Hardwood Laminated Trailer Flooring from Canada and in February 1997 found no subsidy. There, the allegation was about Canadian stumpage, possibly the most controversial subsidies issue between Canada and the United States in the last twenty-five years. Here, the allegations focus on steel and on components for electric vehicles. Steel is perhaps the most contentious trade issue between China and the United States and likely will be the subject of more petitions in 2009 and early 2010. In both principal instances – stumpage with Canada, steel with China -- an important motivation for the petition might have been to get at the upstream product. The attack on electric car inputs may reflect the U.S. objections in several subsidies cases brought against China regarding inputs from state-owned enterprises. The United States, however, has not deployed any upstream analyses.

It seems the petition, then, is not so seriously about saloon cars and SUVs. It may be more about preemptive strikes (electric vehicles; R&D) and retaliation on thorny disputes (steel). The petitions seem to contend that there is no material difference between the economic actions of governments in China and the United States, between market and non-market economies.

The petition is a first foray against multiple levels of American government (with four allegations concerning subsidies from the state of Michigan), perhaps a response to the now-frequent American complaints about Chinese regional and local government programs and planning. The petition, thus, is less than meets the eye: it is hard to take it too seriously as to the specific cars in question; and a great deal more than meets the eye: a resetting of the table for the treatment of the role of the state in the economy, for addressing American federalism, and in the future of energy efficiency and green technologies.

Possible Reverberations

There are many possible problems arising from this investigation. The United States has never before defended itself in China. China has never before sent investigators to examine U.S. books. No U.S. state has ever before submitted to a Chinese investigation, or participated in one. Although this petition has precipitated China’s third countervailing duty investigation against the United States, none has yet reached a preliminary determination, none has yet involved a verification with Chinese officials inspecting U.S. government books, and none has involved a state government. The U.S. automobile industry has not been subject to dumping or subsidies allegations before. Conducting the investigation will be new for China; responding to it will be new for Americans. It will require a sorting out of American federalism, and a new diplomacy for China.

Some have said that the investigation is retaliation for the tire safeguard. In its timing, this view seems attractive, but too much about it makes the theory implausible. The petition covers too much ground and is too broad an assault on the U.S., its trade and economic policies, to have been mere retaliation for a safeguard contemplated in the Accession Protocols. The timing is more notable for President Obama’s first visit to China than for the safeguard. It sets an agenda: affirmatively, market economy recognition; negatively, warnings on steel and electric vehicles.

There have been no reports suggesting any U.S.-China dialogue about the petition during President Obama’s visit. The United States may have chosen deliberately to say nothing, or it may not have reached the President’s attention in the planning of the visit. China, however, may take American silence on the subject as a first round of acquiescence to the charges, and the charges, formally lodged in a trade action, are the most serious China has brought against the United States since, at least, China’s accession to the WTO.

Other countries likely will watch this investigation closely. On the last day of his Asian tour, President Obama received from President Lee Myung-Bak of South Korea agreement to reconsider the automobile dispute that is blocking finalization of a free trade agreement, but he did not receive agreement to reopen settled language in the pending treaty as sought by Congress. South Korea likely will be reinforced in its objections to the terms of the pending free trade agreement with the United States, as China intends to demonstrate massive subsidies to the U.S. automobile industry that ought to make South Korea reluctant to lower its barriers to U.S. cars.

Competing automobile industries, especially in Europe, which have been subsidized heavily during the financial crisis, may face future Chinese challenges. China may seek to clear its market, as implied in a petition that sees its industry ascendant.

China may have been anticipating American barriers to electric vehicles. The action brought, however, could now arguably make those barriers more likely. Tesla manufactures a luxury vehicle; China will seek to enter the U.S. with much more modest electric cars. Consequently, it may be difficult for Tesla, or any other U.S. manufacturer of electric vehicles, who may not yet have sold in the market when Chinese imports first arrive, to challenge Chinese electric cars. The Chinese petition, however, provides theories for challenging vehicles not yet in the market, including an attack on suppliers.

In Laminated Woven Sacks from China, the U.S. International Trade Commission found neither injury nor threat of injury to any American industry. Instead, it found that China’s industry was responsible for retarding the development of a U.S. industry. China did not contest this weakest of all possible injury allegations, enabling final affirmative determinations.

Chinese acquiescence could inspire a similar approach to electric vehicles. American petitioners might allege that Chinese imports are designed to kill off a nascent American industry. The petition could assure an American petition against Chinese electric cars that could complicate the efforts of both countries to develop new technologies for energy efficiency and environmental improvement. The petition is uncompromising and unforgiving as to American efforts to develop cleaner, more efficient automobiles.

The Chinese countervailing duty petition on automobiles could do more to change Chinese-U.S. trade relations than summits and presidential visits. Just as President Obama apparently did not pursue the frequent congressional complaint (and constant Bush Administration theme) regarding revaluation of Chinese currency, so China did not, apparently, assail publicly the United States as the source of the global financial crisis. Yet, President Obama was barely home before congressional committees called again for tough trade sanctions against China, including an attack on Chinese currency.

In a public document that forms the basis for a Chinese investigation of the United States, the current form of American capitalism is being put on trial. Consultations already have failed. No negotiations have followed. Unless national leaders contain the impulses of their respective Ministries (Departments) of Commerce, the trade war that the tires safeguard likely did not trigger may become inescapable. Each country will accuse the other of violating international trade rules in their respective pursuit of a cleaner and more energy efficient planet. Cooperation might threaten leadership. Without a swift settlement, China will be obliged to make its subsidies case, and the United States will not like it.

挑战的覆盖面

中国商务部于2009年11月6日宣布立案对原产于美国，由通用、克莱斯勒和福特三大汽车公司生产的轿车和越野车展开反倾销、反补贴调查。虽然受调查产品被界定为包括底盘、发动机等主要部件，且附有关税编号，但真正受调查的产品却与小轿车和越野车没有太大关联。这份调查申请可能是中美贸易关系史上自签订《中国入世协定》以来最重要的文件。这份文件对存在竞争关系的不同经济、工业发展模型进行分析，是对自2008年以来美国走出金融危机的战略的抱怨。这份调查申请指责美国应对这次金融危机负责，而且只应由美国负责。中方认为中国逐渐壮大，同时美国渐趋衰微，这不仅是法律对错的分析，也是历史性回顾。

选择三大美国汽车生产商、在奥巴马总统第一次访华前夕立案以及调查申请的内容都表明中国的醉翁之意不在于对汽车产品展开贸易救济行动。汽车产品被选为调查对象既因为这一产业在金融危机中异常脆弱，同时它也是20世纪美国工业霸权地位的象征。中国是对美国经济发展模式提出疑问，公开质疑美国针对中国采取的贸易行动；同时进一步证明中方认为美国汽车工业逐渐衰退的观点，揭露美国对这一出口产业资助的深度和广度。这份调查申请对美国提出的市场经济和非市场经济定义提出挑战，并以此攻击美国的补贴政策和对中国采取的贸易行动。中方质疑美国对华贸易政策的合理性，同时指出美国现在极其容易面对他国针对美国产品展开贸易救济行动。

调查申请不仅仅对贸易政策提出质疑，同时亦对美国政府的能源、气候变化政策提出疑问，质询美国政府对研发能效更高、污染更小的交通工具给予的支持。奥巴马总统把研发视为美国经济复兴的核心，并把这视为美国全球领导地位的一部分；现在中国指出根据中国法律、世贸组织章程和美国实践，美国政府的研发支持其实是一系列不正当补贴。

中国决定对汽车产品展开反补贴调查这一决定颇带讽刺意味。最具讽刺意义的是就在该案立案后不久，奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席在11月中旬达成协议。两位国家领导人宣布双方将携手发展电动汽车，双方都将提供科研资金支持。但是，中国在奥巴马总统访华前十天宣布对美国的电动汽车发展补助展开反补贴调查，研究这些补助是否违背了美国的入世承诺。这份调查申请把美国Tesla公司视为成长中的电动汽车市场上的竞争对手，并指出Tesla从联邦政府获得四亿六千五百万美金的支持。这份调查申请同时列出三大汽车生产商从政府获得电动汽车开发资金，仅福特公司就获得59亿美金支持。

中方指控沿用美国商务部曾使用的论点——给予某一企业的资金，不管初衷如何，都将减轻该企业对其他资金来源的依赖、有助于产品的生产和出口。但是不清楚为什么这份调查申请对Tesla展开讨论，Tesla不是三大汽车生产商之一、也不是受调查产品的生产商，因而也不是应诉企业。同时调查申请也没有明确承认电动汽车属于另一类别产品，因此不在调查范围之内。

早被提醒但却置若罔闻

2008年12月，我们提醒美国贸易代表办公室中国将采取类似行动。当时美国贸易代表办公室就应该如何处理面临指控的中国补贴征求公众意见。本所提出自2008年9月15日起，形势发生变化，因此不应照旧行事。面对全球金融危机，美国政府对银行提供补助、鼓励对信用不佳的企业提供低于市场利息的贷款。虽然名字未变，但银行已经变为国有。美国政府同时通过巨额资金输入变成汽车行业的大股东。

仅从调查申请的表面价值来看，代表私营企业的行业协会准备、递交了这一调查申请，中国商务部审查并就企业要求做出行政决定，商务部的立案调查公告说明中国政府承认大多数指控的可靠性。因此，这份调查申请展示了中国商务部对众多涉案议题的看法。

调查申请为中国提供了机会，对美国各行业经济发展、尤其是汽车工业发展史（这一标志性美国产业）进行比较研究。中方认为美国汽车工业在过去一个世纪里在国际市场上拥有所有可能拥有的竞争优势。中国的汽车工业首先在国外帮助下、近来主要依靠国内力量迅速发展；美国拯救本国汽车工业也不得不以牺牲中国为代价。

和经济发展比较史松散地联系在一起的是现代结论。调查申请指控“美国次债危机迅速蔓延发展成全球金融危机。”这一批判性评论与经济发展比较史、反倾销、反补贴指控无关，但却是中国对拖欠中国巨额外债的美国最毫无修饰、最真实的观点。这一评论毫不害羞地把经济和工业政策与不公平贸易指控联系在一起，毫不犹豫地指控美国追求政府驱动的“工业化政策”，同时又间接否认中国采取这类政策。

调查申请提及这些美国政策时都使用中式语言：奥巴马总统把汽车工业称作美国经济的“支柱行业”。美国商务部在研究中国中央规划时常常指出这是中国最喜欢使用的术语，这一术语显示计划和行动之间的关联、并指责受政府驱动的中国经济享受巨额补贴。

很可能当两位国家领导人承诺合作发展电动汽车时，这一调查刚刚立案，他们都不了解调查申请细节。根据世贸组织章程规定，反补贴案立案前必须展开双边磋商，美国贸易代表办公室也紧急会晤了三大汽车生产商。但是美国没有向中国出口电动汽车，调查的对象也仅仅是小轿车和越野车。因此两位领导人都未曾预料为发展电动汽车提供的研发支持竟成为反补贴调查的重点。

这种情况下，奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席就这一合作项目达成协议令人惊讶。当两国领导人宣布这一协定的同时，中国却指控美国的研发支持为不正当补助、对这一项目展开反补贴调查，这不符合逻辑。中国可能自有一套逻辑解释为什么几乎同时展开这两项行动。

调查的深层含义

调查申请中提到中国仅次于美国，是世界第二大汽车消费市场。调查申请指出，在稍狭窄的轿车和越野车市场，2007年从美国共进口三万三千七百三十二辆，2008年进口了四万三千两百四十辆。同期，这两类车的总进口量从2007年的二十三万四千四百九十三辆上升至2008年二十九万九千一百三十二辆。因此三大汽车公司在美国生产、出口至中国的产品仅占这两类产品进口总量的百分之十五、不足这两类车总消费量的百分之零点五。

调查申请未能系统地把进口和对国内生产、消费造成的损害联系起来。恰恰相反，调查申请虽然承认进口有所增长，却又指出中国国内生产、消费在受调查期间均稳步上升。调查申请中的补贴指控不是针对受调查产品，而是整个汽车行业，尤其是节约能耗和绿色科技项目。调查申请针对经济复兴计划的每个项目的每一方面逐一攻击，尤其是购买美货条款。补贴分析却未能缩小着眼点、集中于调查针对的产品，相反却泛泛攻击整个汽车行业。调查申请反复引用“特定”这一法律术语，但却把汽车工业视为特定产业，而不是将特定一词与受调查产品联系在一起。

调查申请没有要求对上游产业补助展开调查，中国法规可能也没有规定如何展开调查，但是却对两项上游产业补助展开详尽展述。即使在美国，对上游产业补助展开调查也不多见，美国商务部极其厌恶调查上游产业补助。1996年美国商务部不同寻常地在加拿大复合木地板一案中对上游产业补助展开调查，但并未发现不正当补助。在这一案件中，上游产业补助调查针对加拿大的伐木收费——这大概是美加两国在过去25年里最备受争议的补助指控了。中国调查指控聚焦于钢铁和电动汽车部件。钢铁或许是美中两国最紧张的贸易领域，未来一、两年内将有更多针对这类产品的贸易案件。在这两个案件中——加拿大伐木收费和中国钢铁——调查的重要动机是对上游产品展开行动。对电动汽车部件的控诉可能是针锋相对、对美国在多个反补贴案件中对中国国有企业提供的原料展开调查所采取的行动。但是美国尚未部署上游产业补助分析。

这份调查申请似乎并非针对小轿车和越野车。相反，它是针对电动汽车、科研投资的防范性攻击，对中国钢铁等产品展开调查的报复行动。这份调查申请似乎认定中美两国政府的经济行动之间并没有本质差别，虽然一个是市场经济国家，另一个是非市场经济国家。

同时，这也是中方第一次针对不同级别的美国政府进行攻击（其中四项指控针对米歇根州政府），这大概是为还击美方反补贴调查申请对中国的省及地方政府计划和政策提出控诉。所以，不仅应关注这份调查申请传达的表面信息——它并非针对调查申请中提到的汽车产品，同时亦应挖掘视野之外的信息——为重新评估政府在经济活动中的作用提供论坛、为未来针对高能效和绿色科技采取行动准备。

可能引发的反响

这一调查可能产生许多问题。美国从未在中国应对反补贴调查，中国也从未派调查员前往美国检验原始文件。美国各州从未面临中国的反补贴调查，也未曾参与任何调查。美国汽车从未面临任何倾销或补贴指控。主持调查对中国而言是全新事务，应对调查对美国而言也是陌生领域。中国将需要深入了解美国联邦体制，采取全新外交政策。

一些人士提到这一调查是对421轮胎特保案的报复。这一观点难以令人信服。这一调查申请涉及面甚广、全方面攻击美国经贸政策，因此不仅仅是针对中国入世协议框架下的特保案的报复。这一案件的时机十分引人注目，更是针对奥巴马总统第一次访华而不是轮胎特保案。中国旨在设立讨论议题：正面意义，中国希望美国承认中国的市场经济地位；负面意义，对美国钢铁和电动汽车产业的警告。

媒体报道显示在奥巴马总统访华期间，中美并未讨论这一案件。美国可能故意选择避开这一话题；也许在准备总统访华时，这一案件并未提升至需要引起总统重视的程度。但是，中国可能把美国的沉默视为对这些指控的默认；而这些指控是中国自加入世贸组织以来对美国最严厉的指控。

其他国家将会密切关注这一调查。在奥巴马总统亚洲之行的最后一站，南韩总统李明博允诺奥巴马总统他将重新考虑阻碍两国签订自由贸易协定的汽车纠纷，但他并未答应重新商定协定包含的汽车条款、实现美国国会的愿望。当中国展示美国对汽车产业提供巨额补助时，韩国肯定也不愿意降低针对美国汽车设置的贸易障碍，这样中国进一步巩固了韩国在美韩自由贸易协定中的立场。

竞争激烈的汽车产业在金融危机中获得巨额补助，尤其在欧洲，它们可能将面临中国盘问。就像调查申请暗示的那样，当本国产业逐渐成长时，中国可能开始清理汽车市场。

中国可能预见美国将对电动汽车出口至美国设置障碍。但是中方现在采取的行动增强了贸易障碍产生的可能性。Tesla 生产豪华车，中国则希望向美国出口稍低档次的电动汽车。Tesla以及其他生产电动汽车的美国生产商看到现在自己尚未向中国出口电动汽车，但是中国电动汽车却首先抵达美国市场，因此他们很可能采取行动刁难中国电动汽车。中国的调查申请为盘问尚未投入市场的汽车提供了理论依据，包括攻击供货商。

在针对中国产复合编织袋展开的反补贴调查中，美国国际贸易委员会既没有发现美国产业受损，也没有发现损害威胁。该委员会只发现中国复合编织袋将阻碍美国产业发展。中国未对这一初裁提出异议，最终导致不利终审裁决。

中国的默认可能促使美方对中国电动汽车采取类似行动。美国申请调查的企业可能指控中国产品将摧毁初生的美国电动汽车工业。同时，这一调查申请一定会促发美方对中国电动汽车采取贸易行动，这将使中美共同发展高能效、环保技术的合作变得复杂。这一调查申请对美国发展清洁能源、高能效汽车持敌对态度。

中国对美国汽车展开反补贴调查将比双边首脑会议更深刻地影响中美贸易关系。和布什总统一样，奥巴马总统此次没有听从国会意见就人民币汇率向中国施压，中国也没有攻击美国是此次世界金融危机的根源。但是，奥巴马总统还未返回华盛顿，国会小组已经要求对中国采取更严厉的贸易制裁，包括针对人民币采取行动。

作为中国对美国采取反补贴调查的基础，这份公开文件审判了美国资本主义。双边磋商失败了，也没有进一步磋商。除非两国领导人遏制两国商务部长的冲动，轮胎特保案没有激发的贸易战变得不可避免。两国将在追求更清洁、更节能的地球的同时互相指责对方违背世界贸易法。如果不立即解决这一纠纷，中国将不得不做出反补贴裁决，美国当然将不悦。

Can The United States And China Really Cooperate To Improve The Balance Of International Trade? 美中合作、平衡全球贸易可能吗？

Michael S. Snarr — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 13:28:10 -0600

中文请点击这里

An old Chinese proverb says, “You can’t expect both ends of a sugar cane to be just as sweet.” Presidents Obama and Hu, however, do not seem to believe the proverb applies to the U.S.-China trade relationship, according to their public statements leading up to November’s APEC meetings in Singapore and the subsequent bilateral meetings in Beijing. A joint statement on behalf of China and the United States said that the two countries “recognize the importance of open trade and investment to their domestic economies and to the global economy, and are committed to jointly fight protectionism in all its manifestations." Just prior to the APEC summit, President Obama explained that the United States’ relationship with China “does not need to be a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another.” At the summit, President Hu said, “We both agreed to properly handle trade frictions through negotiations on an equal basis and to make concerted efforts to boost bilateral trade and economic ties in a healthy and steady way.”

Both leaders have suggested recently that there are important steps that their respective countries can and should take to improve the balance of U.S.-China trade. President Obama noted that Americans need to consume less, save more and export more to help offset the trade imbalance with China. President Hu declared that China is in the process of reorienting its export-driven economy to expand and fill an internal, domestic demand for products.

The diplomatic sentiments of mutual cooperation and joint responsibility expressed by Presidents Hu and Obama are noble and serve an important purpose in building constructive relations. China and the United States should aspire to mutually beneficial relationships in trade and on other matters. But no one should think that political pronouncements and temporary trade adjustment policies will easily overcome the seriousness of the trade disputes for the industries involved, and the determination of the governments to act upon their own interests. In 2009, China and the United States both took steps to impose antidumping, anti-subsidy, or safeguard duties on products such as tires and steel pipe from China, or nylon, chicken and automobiles from the United States.

During the recent visit to Shanghai, there was more than a little irony in a November 16 exchange between President Obama and Communist Party Secretary Yu. According to news reports, Secretary Yu told President Obama that business was “pretty good” at a General Motors plant in Shanghai. He went on to say that, “[b]y the end of October this year their sales has increased by 40 percent over the same period of last year. I think that the fantastic performance here in Shanghai is definitely a boost to their business in the United States." President Obama responded, “Absolutely. I think [General Motors] can learn from their operations here in terms of increasing sales back in the United States." Neither of them apparently mentioned the fact that China currently is investigating whether to impose countervailing duties against General Motors to offset alleged subsidies that it is receiving from the U.S. Government in response to the economic crisis, and that China’s petitioners claim General Motors has received over decades.

Even were China and the United States able to agree on the need for reversing current trade flow trends, one should not expect that stopgap policies can be effective in addressing the problem. The policies designed to put the brakes on trade flows easily could become the subject of new WTO complaints about unfair market access restrictions. For example, suppose that China adopted policies such as quotas or duties restraining exports of certain raw materials in an effort to stimulate domestic demand and help reduce the trade imbalance. Instead of receiving a note of thanks from the U.S. Trade Representative, China would likely receive a request for consultations under the WTO Agreements.

That reaction is precisely what happened in response to China’s imposition of quotas and export duties on bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, zinc, and other products. On November 5, 2009, the United States requested that a WTO Panel be formed to resolve the dispute:

"We are going to the WTO today to enforce America's rights, so we can provide our country's manufacturers with a fair competitive environment. We believe the restraints at issue in this dispute significantly distort the international market and provide preferential conditions for Chinese industries that use these raw materials," said Debbie Mesloh, a USTR spokeswoman. "Working together with the European Union and Mexico, we tried to resolve this issue through consultations, but did not succeed. At this point, therefore, we need to move forward with the next step in the WTO dispute settlement process. We remain open to working with China to find a mutually agreeable solution to our concerns.”

The United States contends that China’s export restraints on raw materials violate Article XI(I) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

President Obama declared on his way to the APEC Summit, “I do not believe that one country's success must come at the expense of another.” But he will find, if he hasn’t already, that it is no easy task for governments to intervene in markets and solve international problems, even when the countries concerned can agree on the problem. It is not easy, either, for a President to control fully the actions of his Commerce Department, nor is it certain that the Secretary of Commerce himself controls the actions of his Import Administration, where he has yet to choose his own Assistant Secretary. China surely hopes to see the U.S. economy stabilize, especially as it holds so much U.S. debt, and yet President Obama’s emergency stimulus packages to assist U.S. auto companies and calm fears about the U.S. economy are now the subjects of countervailing duty actions in China. As China applauds stabilizing the American economy, it initiates investigations into the very measures that are bringing stability. Meanwhile, Chinese policies that would stimulate domestic demand and potentially limit U.S. consumption are coming under the WTO scrutiny from the United States. At least one important lesson would seem to be that, even when governments are cooperating, short-term government policies to correct systemic trade imbalances typically create new disputes more than they solve old ones. And even Presidents may not have complete control over the decisions taken by others in their own governments.

中国有句谚语：“甘蔗没有两头甜。”但是，根据中美双方在新加坡举行的APEC会议上以及随后举行的双边会谈中发表的公开声明，奥巴马总统和胡锦涛主席似乎并不相信这一谚语适用于中美贸易关系。中美联合声明指出两国“认识到开放贸易和投资对本国经济和全球经济的重要性，并致力于共同反对各种形式的保护主义”。就在APEC首脑会议召开前夕，奥巴马总统指出美中关系“不是零合游戏，一个国家成功不应该以另外一个国家的牺牲作为代价”。在首脑会谈中，胡锦涛主席发言指出：“我们都赞成在平等基础上、通过磋商适当处理贸易摩擦，同时积极促进双边经贸关系健康稳定发展。”

两位领导人建议两国都应采取一些重要措施以帮助解决中美贸易不平衡。奥巴马总统提出美国人应减少消费，增加储蓄并扩大出口以削减双边贸易赤字。胡锦涛主席则声明中国正逐渐从出口型经济转向扩大满足内需。

        两国领导人在外交场合表达合作及共同责任对建立建设性双边关系非常重要。中国和美国都应当为在贸易及其他领域建立互利关系而努力。但是任何人都不应当认为政治声明和临时性贸易政策可以轻易掩盖贸易纠纷的严重性、两国政府维护本国利益的决心。2009年，中国和美国都针对对方采取贸易行动，美国的行动包括针对中国钢管展开反补贴、反倾销调查和轮胎特保案，中国的行动包括对美国肉鸡、汽车和尼龙展开贸易补偿行动。

        当奥巴马总统最近访问上海时，他和上海市委书记俞正声11月16日的对话似乎是反语。据新闻媒体报道，俞书记告诉奥巴马总统，通用汽车上海分公司的业绩不错。他接着说“截至今年十月，销量比去年同比增加百分之四十。我相信上海分公司的优异业绩一定有助于美国总公司的业务。”奥巴马总统回答说：“当然。我认为通用可以从这里学习经验以促进美国本土销量增长。”两人都没有提到中国正对通用汽车展开反补贴调查，中国申诉方指控通用享受美国政府资助以渡过经济危机，中方还指控通用汽车十多年来一直享受不正当政府补助。

        虽然中美两国都承认应当改变双边贸易巨额逆差，但是这一政策不足以解决问题。阻碍贸易的行动很容易在世贸组织面临不正当市场准入限制的指控。例如，如果中国采取配额或关税政策限制生产原料出口以扩大内需、减少贸易顺差。美国贸易代表办公室不仅不会写感谢信给中国政府，而且中国可能还会接到世贸组织贸易纠纷磋商请求。

中国针对黄磷、铝矾土、焦炭、氟石、镁、锰、金属硅、锌产品采取的配额和出口关税政策现在正面临这一处境。2009年11月5日，美国要求世贸组织成立专家组裁决这一纠纷。美国贸易代表办公室发言人Debbie Mesloh 指出：“我们今天要求世贸组织采取行动确保美国的权利，使我们可为美国生产商提供公平竞争环境。我们相信案件中提到的这些贸易限制政策严重扭曲了国际市场，并为中国企业提供竞争优势。与欧盟以及墨西哥一起，我们希望通过协商解决这一纠纷，但是未果。因此，在这一时刻，我们需要更进一步，进入世贸组织纠纷解决机制的下一阶段。我们仍然希望能与中国一起找到双方都可接受的解决方案。”美国认为中国对这些原材料采取的出口限制违背了《关贸总协定》第十一条第一款。

奥巴马总统在前往参加APEC会议的途中提出“我不相信一个国家的成功必须以另一国的牺牲为代价。”但是如果他现在还没有认识到，那么他迟早会意识到政府干预市场、解决国际问题并不是件容易的事，即使涉及的国家都承认这一问题。美国总统全权控制商务部的举动，这不太容易；即使让美国商务部长全权控制下属的进口贸易局（Import Administration）的行动也不太可能，因为直到现在他还未选择助理部长。中国当然希望看到美国经济趋于稳定，因为中国持有大量美国国债；美国经济复兴计划帮助美国汽车生产厂商，这有助于消除对美国经济悲观恐慌情绪，现在却成为中国反补贴调查的对象。中国一方面拍手称赞美国经济趋于稳定，另一方面又调查这些促进经济稳定的政策。同时，中国促进内需、却可能限制美国消费的政策也面临世贸组织的审核，美国提出这一要求。其中可得出的重要教训是，即使政府正在合作，政府采取的纠正贸易不平衡的短期政策不仅没有解决以往纠纷，通常还会造成新纠纷。同时，即使是总统也不能完全控制政府内部其他成员的决定。

Trade War? Part II: China Initiates Third CVD Investigation Against U.S. Products 贸易战？(二)：中国针对第三项美国产品展开反补贴调查

Jing Zhu — Mon, 16 Nov 2009 11:40:57 -0600

中文请点击这里

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) announced on November 6, 2009 that it had launched anti-dumping (“AD”) and countervailing (“CVD”) investigations against sedans and sport utility vehicles of cylinder capacity ≥ 2000cc originating from the United States. We are providing on this blog an English translation of the CVD notice. This announcement represents the third CVD investigation initiated against U.S. products in less than six months. So far, Chinese investigations have targeted CVD investigations only against products originating from the United States.

According to the November 6 notice, MOFCOM will investigate 24 alleged subsidy programs, all identified as being provided by the U.S. Government. However, four of those alleged programs are tax incentives and other assistance provided by the state of Michigan, which in the U.S. federal system is a distinct sovereign and not part of the U.S. Government. ( In China, all regional and local governments are subordinate to the central government. In the U.S., the states have distinct powers and are not subordinate.)

China adopted its regulations on CVD investigations in October 2001, and the Regulations Of The People’s Republic Of China On Countervailing Measures entered into force at the beginning of 2002. However, China did not initiate its first CVD investigation until June 1, 2009.

The vocal U.S. steel industry was the first target of Chinese countermeasures. The product under investigation was grain-oriented flat-rolled electrical steel, and an Ohio company – the AK Steel Corporation – and a Pennsylvania producer – the ATI Allegheny Ludlum Corporation – were singled out as respondents.

Soon after President Obama imposed additional tariffs on Chinese commercial, low-cost tires as a China-specific safeguard measure, MOFCOM issued a press release saying it would review AD and CVD petitions against U.S. poultry products and cars. Many observers rushed to label this announcement as “retaliation.” However, both products have been the subject of trade disputes between China and the United States for a long time. Our previous article “Trade War?” analyzed the safeguard action and recent trade disputes between the two sides, querying whether China was retaliating in the opening salvo of a trade war. The initiation of investigations into U.S. automobiles may require an adjustment in our analysis. We expect to post soon an analytical article on China’s investigations of alleged U.S. subsidy programs, particularly as they refer to U.S. automobiles.

中国商务部于2009年11月6日正式宣布对原产于美国的排气量在2.0升及2.0升以上的进口小轿车和越野车展开反倾销、反补贴调查。本所翻译并在此刊登该案反补贴立案调查公告英文版。不到六个月，这已经是第三起针对美国产品展开的反补贴调查。迄今为止原产于美国的产品是唯一在中国面临反补贴调查的产品。

11月6日的公告指出，中国商务部将调查24项美国政府补贴。但是，其中四项补贴指控的调查对象是米歇根州向汽车生产商提供的税收优惠以及其他资助。和中国的政治制度不同，在美国联邦体制中，州政府虽然是美国政府的一部分，但拥有特定权利、并不隶属于联邦政府。

中国早在2001年10月就通过了反补贴法规——《中华人民共和国反补贴条例》，这一条例于2002年1月1日正式生效。但是，直到今年6月1日中国才展开第一起反补贴调查。

美国钢铁企业首受其冲。受调查的产品是原产于美国的取向电工钢。（注：取向电工钢是电力工业行业不可缺少的一种软磁材料，主要应用于各种类型变压器、整流器、电抗器等行业。）俄亥俄州的AK Steel Corporation 以及宾西法尼亚州的 ATI Allegheny Ludlum Corporation 被选为应诉企业。

当奥巴马总统在421特保案中宣布对国产轮胎征收额外关税，中国商务部随即发表新闻公告，宣布将对部分美国汽车产品和肉鸡产品启动反倾销和反补贴立案审查程序。许多观察家立即指控这一举措为贸易报复。但是长期以来这些产品一直面临贸易摩擦。在《贸易战？》一文中，我们深入分析了轮胎特保案以及最近发生的其它贸易纠纷，探讨中国的这一举动是否是贸易大战的序幕。现在对美国汽车展开双反调查可能要求我们调整分析。我们计划最近再刊登一篇博文深入分析面临指控的美国政府补贴，尤其是针对美国汽车行业的补贴。

Textile Trade Policy In The United States After The Quotas 配额制度终结后的纺织贸易

Baker Hostetler Team — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 17:13:31 -0600

Coauthored by Elliot J. Feldman and John J. Burke

The last of the quotas on textile and clothing imported into the United States from the developing world expired at the end of 2008 with the end of the quotas authorized by China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO. Notwithstanding the end of the quotas, trade in textiles and clothing remains distorted by a web of bilateral agreements that give preferential access to the U.S. market on a quasi colonial basis. Dr. Elliot J. Feldman discussed these issues in a speech he gave on November 3, 2009 to a meeting of the Private Sector Consulting Committee of the International Textiles And Clothing Bureau entitled Rags To Riches To Rags? Textile Trade Policy In The United States After The Quotas.

Dr. Feldman noted in a speech (Part I & Part II) given on September 20, 2008 to the Chinese National Textile Association, Shandong Province Textile Industry Association and the Zaozhuang City Government, that U.S. textile companies would face substantial obstacles in filing trade remedy actions against textiles imports. Whether for the reasons he offered then, or for reasons related to the global recession, no trade remedy actions have been filed to date against textile or apparel imports into the United States. It is prudent to remain vigilant. Cases may still come. If they do, however, they are likely to be narrow and targeted.

Our prediction that significant trade remedy disputes over clothing and textiles are not likely with the United States is based on the organization and structure of American government as much as it is on the nature of the merchandise. The United States federal government has three branches, reasonably balanced and offsetting one another. The power to negotiate trade agreements rests with the President, but only Congress can pass the necessary legislation to implement them. Each house of Congress is divided into many committees.

Two committees, one in each house, control international trade, the Finance Committee in the Senate, and the Ways & Means Committee in the House of Representatives. These committees are also the tax writing committees. For various reasons, the Congressmen and Senators most interested in tax-writing tend to come from rural states with small populations. U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing tends to be concentrated in the more populous states, such as California, New York, New Jersey, Georgia and North Carolina. Hence, in the current Congress, at least, textile and apparel interests are not well-positioned to influence laws and policy with respect to international trade.

Notwithstanding over 30 years of quotas, the U.S. apparel industries declined drastically as production was shifted to lower cost countries, such as China, and countries that benefited from special trade preference agreements with the United States. These industries have declined to the point where, except for certain niche products, it would be hard to find a U.S. industry left with the standing to file a trade remedy case against apparel imports. The U.S. textile industry would like to restrict imports of apparel from countries such as China and Vietnam, because those imports compete with apparel made with U.S. textiles in countries that have entered into preferential trade agreements with the United States. However, the textile industry does not have standing to file trade remedy cases against apparel imports.

The U.S. textile industry would like to restrict imports from countries such as China because Chinese imports interfere with a quasi colonial strategy they have worked out with U.S. apparel companies. The strategy is simple. The capital intensive textile producers sell their products into regions subject to special agreements, originating with the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, the Andean Trade Preference Act, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act. The countries subject to the agreements receive textiles and raw materials from the United States duty-free and return them in the form of finished goods to the United States, which imports them duty-free provided they contain raw materials from the United States. The United States thus effectively incorporates cheap labor offshore, preserving the capital intensive industry. The WTO waived on all of these agreements, permitting the discriminatory preferences regarding American content, in May 2009.

The looming question is whether China can penetrate with textiles the markets the United States has insulated through the duty-free provisions for apparel made from U.S. fabric and yarn. So far, however, China has not shown much interest in this direction, content to intensify capital investment at home while also relying at home on the labor intensive process of making finished products. Because the U.S. arrangements are based on regional trade agreements recognized by the WTO, there are limits on what other competing countries can do. They can seek their own bilateral agreements with the United States, of course, asking for the same terms as applied to the NAFTA, CAFTA, and Andean countries. They might focus on reconsideration of these privileged relationships by targeting tariff reductions in the Doha Round, but the Round already is paralyzed by agricultural issues. Expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement meant the end of quotas, but it has turned out not to mean global free trade.

限制发展中国家纺织服装制品出口到美国的配额制度终于在2008年底结束，这是中国入世协定规定的。虽然配额制度已经结束，但是纺织服装贸易仍被建立在类似殖民主义基础之上、给予某些国家进入美国市场特殊优惠政策的双边协议编制的巨网所扭曲。费德门博士在2009年11月3日召开的国际纺织服装局企业界磋商委员会会议上做了题为《Rags To Riches To Rags? Textile Trade Policy In the United States After The Quotas》的演讲，探讨了这些问题。

费德门博士早在2008年9月20日对中国纺织协会、山东省纺织工业协会和枣庄市政府的演讲中就提到：美国的纺织企业如果想对进口纺织产品递交贸易救济申诉将面临很多难题。不管是根据他当时的解释，还是因为全球经济衰退，美国企业至今尚未递交针对纺织或服装产品的贸易救济申诉。谨慎起见，仍应保持警觉。因为仍有可能有新的案件发生。一旦发生，案件涉及面狭窄且将针对特定产品。

我们预测就纺织服装与美国发生重大贸易救济纠纷不太可能，这是建立在美国政府组织结构和这一类产品特性上的推断。美国中央政府有三大分支，相互制约平衡。总统拥有谈判贸易协定的权利，但只有国会才能通过必要法案实施这些协定。参众两院又包括许多委员会。

参众两院各有一个委员会负责国际贸易，分别为参议院金融委员会和众议院筹款委员会。这两个委员会也负责制定税收法案。因为许多原因，对税收事务感兴趣的参议员和众议员大都来自人口稀少的农业州。美国纺织服装生产大都集中在人口密集的州，如加利福尼亚、纽约、新泽西、乔治亚和北卡罗来纳州。因此，纺织服装利益集团基本不能就国际贸易法和政策影响本届国会。

虽然配额制度存在30多年，但是美国服装产业还是迅速萎缩，服装生产转移至中国等生产成本较低的国家，或是和美国签订特殊贸易优惠协定的国家。美国本土产业退缩至这一地步：除了一些特定产品，美国产业已无法达到法律规定的规模可针对进口服装递交申诉。美国纺织行业希望能限制中国、越南等国的服装出口到美国，因为这些产品将与已经和美国签订优惠贸易协定的国家生产的、用美国纺织品为原料的服装产生竞争。但是根据法律规定，纺织行业不能要求对进口服装展开贸易救济调查。

美国纺织行业希望限制中国等国的出口，因为中国产品妨碍它们和美国纺织企业联合制定的这一后殖民主义战略。这一战略非常简单。资金密集的纺织企业将产品出口至《加勒比海贸易伙伴法》、《加勒比海经济复兴法》、《非洲发展和机会法》等法案覆盖的国家。根据法律规定，这些国家免税从美国进口纺织品和原材料，然后再免税向美国出口利用美国原料制成的服装制品。这样，美国既可确保廉价海外劳动力，又可保存资金密集的纺织业。但是中国却对这一方向不感兴趣，中国对加强本土投资、同时依赖本土劳动力密集的优势生产终端产品深感满意。由于美国的协议是世贸组织承认的地区贸易协议，其他国家并不能采取更多行动。他们可寻求与美国签订双边协定，要求享受和北美自由贸易区、中美洲自由贸易区国家相同的待遇。他们首先可利用多哈会谈减少关税，但是会谈因农业问题已经瘫痪。《多边纺织协定》过期意味着配额制度的结束，但是这并不意味自由贸易的到来。

India And China Turn Up The Heat On Climate Change 中印为气候变化加温

Kavita Mohan — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 15:44:43 -0600

中文请点击这里

We noted in our article entitled India, China, and the Doha Round that India and China have forged a formidable alliance in the Doha Round of negotiations. Now the two “Asian giants” have combined forces in an effort to gain leverage in another multilateral dialogue – this time, the dialogue on climate change that will take place in Copenhagen later this year.

India and China signed an agreement (“Agreement”) on October 21, 2009 on climate change, providing further recognition that the two countries have much to gain from cultivating a long-term, economically-driven partnership. An India-China alliance, however, is a relationship that the developed world will regard with some caution. India and China were accused of conspiring to stall the Doha Round of negotiations in July 2008 and, unless the developed world makes some of the concessions they demand, the combined forces of India and China could present a similar barrier in Copenhagen.

The Agreement was signed at a ceremony in New Delhi by Minister Jairam Ramesh, of India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests, and Vice Minister Xie Zhenhua, of China’s National Development and Reform Commission. The two countries agreed to work together over the next five years on a variety of initiatives, including collaboration in the areas of energy efficiency, renewable energy, clean energy technologies, sustainable agriculture, and reforestation. The Agreement also reaffirmed the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, in particular that developed countries should take the lead in and continue to reducing [sic] their greenhouse gas emissions and providing financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building support to developing countries.” China accounts for more than 20 percent of global emissions. India accounts for less than 5 percent, but it is the fourth largest emitter after China, the United States, and Russia. Despite the difference in emission levels, however, Minister Ramesh noted on October 21 that there was virtually no difference between the negotiating positions of India and China. Both countries have agreed to work on slowing the growth of greenhouse emissions, but resist making those limits binding and subject to international monitoring.

The Agreement, and the earlier Doha Round collaboration, suggest a transformation of regional and global relationships, albeit within defined and specific sectors. For students of traditional international relations, it ought to be unexpected and counterintuitive. India and China are demonstrating that global issues may encourage regional alliances even as regional issues, historically, might have made such alliances impossible. One day it might even turn out that regional alliances on global issues can help solve the regional divisions over local and regional issues.

China and India fought a war against each other as recently as 1962. Substantial territorial and sovereignty issues continue today, especially with regard to the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, portions of which China claims as South Tibet. In recent weeks, the Indian press has reported on nighttime boundary incursions and troop buildups, and there has been tension between the two countries about an upcoming visit by the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh. Just days before the Agreement was signed, the People’s Daily Online accused India of pursuing a “shortsighted and immature” foreign policy of “befriend[ing] the far and attack[ing] the near.” It stated that India’s “dream of superpower is mingled with the thought of hegemony, which places the South Asian giant in an awkward situation and results in repeated failures.”

Some may view the emerging economic partnership between India and China with skepticism also in light of China’s historical alliance with Pakistan. China has long regarded Pakistan as its “all weather friend,” and has offered it economic assistance in addition to military aid and support for its nuclear program. However, the friendship may be fraying, probably because it was built in significant part on taking sides against India. Some experts have noted that, as India grows in global importance, China appears to be distancing itself from the unconditional friendship it previously offered to Pakistan. For example, in October 2008, China refused a request from Pakistan’s President for a full blown economic bailout.

China would be wise to court India and to continue improving relations with its historic rival regardless of its relationship with Pakistan, which China is unlikely to abandon completely in the near future. As the saying goes, nations have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies, only permanent interests. A stronger relationship with India is in China’s economic interest. India commands a much larger place on the issues of the day – the global economy, climate change – than Pakistan, and therefore is more important to China. Although China and Pakistan signed a comprehensive free trade agreement in 2006, trade between China and Pakistan was approximately $7 billion in 2008, contrasted to the $51.78 billion in total trade between China and India.

India’s population of over a billion people, and its growing middle class, make India more like China than Pakistan, and make India an attractive market for Chinese products. China’s new capitalism has a greater future alongside a prosperous India. China replaced the United States as India’s largest trading partner in 2008, and India ranked as China’s tenth largest export destination. The growing importance placed on India by the United States – for example, with the signing of the civil nuclear agreement in October 2008 – also means that China cannot afford to overlook or minimize India’s role in the world.

Climate change is expected to be on the agenda during President Obama’s meetings with China’s president Hu Jintao in Beijing on November 16 and 17 and with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the White House on November 24. It would be surprising if President Obama were not speaking to China about India, and to India about China, which is all the more reason to expect that China and India will be speaking to each other. Notwithstanding emerging references to a “G-2” of China and the United States, India is no more likely to be left out of the equation from Asia than the European Union could be left out of the conversation with the United States. Should there be no reductio to a G-2, the emerging alliance between India and China may turn out to be a major reason. As for Copenhagen, the weight of the new Asian alliance might make all the difference.

在《印度、中国及多哈会谈》一文中我们谈到中国和印度在多哈会谈中建立了坚固联盟。现在，这两个亚洲巨人又齐心协力争取在另一重要多边会谈中拥有更多自主权：这次是即将在哥本哈根举行的气候变化会谈。

中印两国于2009年10月21日签订了《关于应对气候变化合作的协定》，进一步承认两国将获益于从经济利益出发的长期伙伴关系。发达国家对这一中印联盟却有所警觉。中国和印度面临阻挠2008年7月多哈会谈的指责，除非发达国家做出相应让步，中印又将在哥本哈根形成新的阻挠势力。

印度环境与林业部部长Jairam Ramesh 和中国发展和改革委员会副主任解振华在新德里签署了协议。两国同意在未来五年内在多方面共同合作，包括提高能效、可再生能源、清洁能源技术、可持续农业和造林。这一协定重申“共同但有区别的责任”原则，要求“发达国家应率先并继续减少其温室气体排放，并向发展中国家提供资金、技术转让和能力建设支持。”中国占全球排放的百分之二十以上，印度仅占不足百分之五的排放，但是是继中国、美国和俄罗斯之后的第四大排放国。虽然两国的排放量不同，但是Ramesh部长指出两国的谈判立场基本没有差别。两国同意减缓温室气体排放增长速度，但是拒绝接受强制性排放量限制并接受国际监督。

这一协定以及先前的多哈合作说明区域及全球关系的变化。传统国际关系学的学生可能会认为这一新关系不合常理。印度和中国证明全球一体可能会鼓励建立区域联盟，即使回顾历史，地区事务使这一联盟几乎不可能成立。有一天，就全球事务建立的区域联盟可帮助解决因地方或区域事物产生的区域分歧。

早在1962年，中印展开边境战争。两国间关于边境及主权的争执持续至今，尤其关于印度东北部阿鲁纳恰尔邦。中国认为该邦的一部分属于西藏自治区。最近几周，印度媒体报道双方加强军事部署、及晚间边境侵入，同时双方也因达赖喇嘛将对阿鲁纳恰尔邦访问产生分歧。就在《协定》签署前不久，《人民日报》网络版指责印度推行“目光短浅和幼稚”的、“远交近攻”的外交政策。文章说印度的“超级大国梦想体现霸权主义思想，这使得南亚巨人处于尴尬境地并不断导致失败。”

一些人士可能对印度和中国的经济伙伴关系带有疑虑，因为中国一直以来与巴基斯坦联盟。中国一直以来视巴基斯坦为“患难之交”，并向巴基斯坦提供经济军事支援并支持她的核项目发展。但是，这一友谊可能因为大多建立在反印立场上而有些磨损。一些专家已经注意到随着印度的国际重要性日渐增长，中国已经开始稍稍改变以往给予巴基斯坦的无条件的友谊。例如，2008年十月，中国拒绝了巴基斯坦总统的全方位经济救援要求。

对于中国而言，改善与印度这一传统竞争对手的关系无疑是明智做法，但这并不意味着中国将抛弃巴基斯坦。俗话说，国家间没有永远的朋友也没有永远的敌人，只有永久的利益。和印度保持良好关系符合中国的经济利益。印度在全球经济、气候变化等事务中比巴基斯坦扮演更重要的角色，因此对中国而言更重要。虽然中国和巴基斯坦于2006年签署了全方位自由贸易协定，两国2008年贸易量只有70亿美金，同比中印贸易量为517.8亿美金。

印度人口总数超过10亿，她的中产阶级不断壮大，使得印度越来越像中国而非巴基斯坦，也使得印度成为吸引中国商品的市场。繁荣的印度也给中国新资本主义带来更美好的未来。2008年中国取代美国成为印度首要贸易伙伴，同时印度成为中国第十大出口市场。美国对印度日益重视，如两国于2008年10月签订民用核协议，这也意味着中国不能轻视或减弱印度在世界事务中的影响力。

当奥巴马总统于11月16日、17日在北京和胡景涛主席会晤时，气候变化估计将是议题之一；当印度总理辛格（Manmohan Sign）于11月24日访问白宫时，气候变化也将是议题之一。如果奥巴马总统未与中方谈到印度将非常令人惊讶，反之亦然，所以中印一定会磋商。中印联盟的简称“G-2”正日益成为流行词；就像欧盟是美国重要的对话伙伴，印度也是亚洲不可忽视的力量。G-2，这一成长中的联盟将在哥本哈根扮演重要角色。

U.S. Court Decision Ought To Change Chinese Thinking (Revised and Expanded) 美国法庭裁决应将改变中国思维

John J. Burke — Wed, 21 Oct 2009 11:35:29 -0600

中文请点击这里

This article is co-authored by Elliot J. Feldman and John J. Burke.

Until now, China has preferred the WTO to resolve trade disputes. Of a dozen countervailing duty cases brought against Chinese products, all but one (the coated free sheet paper case failed at the International Trade Commission) went adversely before U.S. agencies and the Government of China challenged none of these final agency determinations in U.S. courts. Instead, China consolidated four of them and complained at the WTO.

We have indicated before our doubts about the wisdom of this choice (see our blog article titled WTO Challenges: Not Always A Panacea For Respondents In Trade Litigation). Now, there is new evidence. In GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, a case brought before the United States Court of International Trade (“CIT”) by private parties (not the Government of China), Chief Judge Jane Restani found an important flaw in the procedures of the United States Department of Commerce that could return substantial sums of money to importers of Chinese goods and alter the way trade remedy actions are brought and analyzed against China. Although this victory for Chinese interests is less than suggested by its advocates and some in the trade press, it is significant nonetheless and comes at an important time. The Chinese Government has achieved nothing comparable in its efforts at the WTO.

Judge Restani’s decision does not preclude the Department of Commerce from initiating countervailing duty investigations against China or any other non-market economy. In fact, its impact is more likely to be seen in the conduct of antidumping cases against China. Judge Restani held that, when Commerce chooses to apply the countervailing duty law to China with respect to the same products for which it also is calculating antidumping duties, using the non-market economy methodology, Commerce must alter its antidumping calculations to avoid counting the same subsidy twice. She noted that Commerce would have to accomplish this task within the confines of the non-market economy provisions of the antidumping law. She remanded to Commerce to find some way to resolve this problem.

The easiest way for Commerce to resolve the double counting problem, as strongly hinted by Judge Restani, would be to resume its old practice of more than twenty years of not applying the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. She noted that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the 1986 case, Georgetown Steel, held that Commerce was not required to apply the countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Many legal commentators had interpreted the Georgetown Steel case as prohibiting the use of countervailing duty laws to non-market economies. Judge Restani acknowledged that interpretation, but held that Georgetown Steel was ambiguous and she herself found the statute ambiguous. Therefore, she deferred to Commerce’s interpretation as "not unreasonable."

Judge Restani implicitly urged Commerce to abandon its adventure in applying the countervailing duty law to non-market economies, but nonetheless gave Commerce the option of altering its antidumping methodologies to prevent double counting. Given all of the political capital the Commerce Department has now invested in applying the countervailing duty laws to China, we expect Commerce will work hard to find a way to resolve this issue through changes in its antidumping calculations, without returning to the conventional interpretation of Georgetown Steel.

Commerce could separate antidumping from countervailing duty cases. It could decline to initiate them together against the same product. The cost of filing may go up for petitioners, but they might be able to preserve the ability to claim both subsidies and dumping. They could, alternatively, not include alleged subsidies in the calculation of cost of production for dumping, and instead allege all subsidies together in the separate countervailing duty petition. There would be no double-counting, but alleged subsidies would not escape scrutiny.

Judge Restani does not exclude these possibilities. To the contrary, she expressly authorizes as “reasonable” petitions alleging subsidies in non-market economies. She denies overturning Georgetown Steel, but she certainly overturns the popular understanding of it for the last two decades.

Judge Restani also overturned Commerce’s automatic use of December 11, 2000, the date China joined the WTO, as the cut-off date for determining whether a subsidy could be calculated in China. Commerce had been countervailing alleged subsidies conferred after that date, but refusing to investigate any allegations of subsidies conferred before that date. Some of the Chinese companies argued that Commerce could not go back any earlier than the date in 1997 when it announced it would apply the CVD law to China. The U.S. producers argued that there should be no cut-off date. Judge Restani ruled that Commerce must decide how far back to go based on the facts of each subsidy allegation. The bottom line for the Chinese Government and Chinese companies is that they now have to be prepared to defend against subsidy allegations reaching back into the 1990s, a serious setback from core arguments advanced by some counsel for China in the CVD cases.

Judge Restani, Chief Judge of the CIT, has long been a rigorous, thoughtful judge willing to reject the arguments of the United States Government and prepared to interpret the law and international agreements as favoring free trade. However, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit historically has not been unwilling to overturn her. Occasionally, when she thinks a legal issue especially important and perhaps difficult, she assembles a three-judge panel of the court to hear a case. Three-judge panels have not been overturned in the last twenty years. Consequently, this decision is vulnerable to appeal.

Despite the celebration of a Chinese victory, assuming an unsuccessful appeal, there may be many ways around the rejection of double-counting, leaving China with less of a legal victory than it seems now to think. Nonetheless, although China lost the key legal principle at issue in the case – whether subsidy actions can be brought against non-market economies – it won a point that should mean the return of monies to importers of record in the United States and should complicate life for petitioners who were making the simultaneous filing of antidumping and countervailing duty petitions routine. As narrow as that victory may be, it is substantially more than anything gained to date at the WTO, and more than anything likely to be possible at the WTO as to Chinese exposure to CVD petitions. It ought to convey several lessons one of which is that U.S. courts are not necessarily inhospitable to Chinese appeals. Another ought to be, like the Chinese proverb, that the road is long, and requires many steps. This appeal should be the first, not the last, on a journey to justify the practices of the Chinese economy.

本文由 Elliot J. Feldman 和 John J. Burke 合著。

迄今为止，中国仍偏爱通过世贸组织解决贸易争端。在十二个针对中国产品展开的反补贴案中，中方只在一个案件中赢得调查胜利（美国国际贸易委员会否决了铜版纸一案），但是中国政府放弃了在美国法庭上诉这些终审裁决的机会。相反，中国把四个案件整合在一起，向世贸组织递交了申诉。

在先前的文章中，我们已经对这种做法表示怀疑（见博文《世贸组织争端解决机制 ----不是贸易纠纷应诉方的万能药》）。现在，又有新证据证明我们的论点。在美国国际贸易法庭受理的GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States 一案中，中国企业（而非中国政府）提出上诉，首席法官Jane Restani裁定美国商务部在调查过程有重大疏漏，这一裁定可帮助进口商拿回多缴的惩罚性关税，同时将改变针对中国的贸易补偿行动。虽然中方这一胜利的意义略小于媒体以及中方律师强调的意义，但仍然是关键时刻取得的显著胜利。中国政府至今尚未在世贸组织取得可以和这一案件相媲美的成就。

Restani法官的裁决并未禁止美国商务部针对中国及其他非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。事实上，这一案件的意义将主要表现在针对中国产品展开的反倾销调查中。Restani法官裁定：如果美国商务部决定针对面临反倾销调查、且美国商务部在计算反倾销税率时使用非市场经济体计算方法的中国产品展开反补贴调查时，美国商务部必须改变计算反倾销税率的方法以避免在反补贴调查中双重征税。她指出美国商务部应在反补贴法非市场经济体条款管辖范围内完成这一任务。她要求美国商务部找到解决这一问题的途径。

对于美国商务而言，就如Restani法官建议，解决双重征税最简单的方法是重新采用二十多年来沿用的老方法：不向非市场经济体展开反补贴调查。她指出联邦法院上诉庭在1986年乔治城钢铁案中裁定美国商务部无需针对非市场经济体使用反补贴税。许多法律评论家将乔治城钢铁案解释为禁止向非市场经济体使用反补贴法。Restani法官提到这一解释，但是她认为乔治城钢铁案裁决在这一点上模棱两可，她自己也认为这一法律条文模棱两可。因此，她并不认为美国商务部的诠释“毫无依据”。

Restani法官并未明确要求美国商务部放弃向非市场经济体采用反补贴法，而是给予美国商务部修改反倾销税率计算方法的选择以避免双重征税。目前美国商务部在针对中国展开的反补贴调查领域投入巨大政治资本，我们预计商务部会极具创意地、非常辛苦地寻找途径修改反倾销税率计算方法、以此解决这一法律挑战，而不必重新回到对乔治城钢铁案的传统解释

美国商务部也可以将反倾销调查和反补贴调查分开处理。它可放弃针对同一产品同时展开反补贴和反倾销调查。这可能增加申诉方的费用，但同时申诉方也可以保留申请展开反补贴、反倾销调查的权利。或者，他们可选择将受指控的补贴排除在反倾销调查中的成本计算之外。这样，重复计算不存在，但是受指控的补贴项目仍将面临调查。

Restani法官并没有排除这些可能性。恰恰相反，她明确允许“合理的”针对非市场经济国家的反补贴申诉书。她拒绝否决乔治城钢铁案，但是她否定了过去二十年里对这一案件最流行的理解。

Restani法官同时否决了美国商务部使用2000年12月11日——中国加入世贸组织这一天作为计算反补贴税率的起始日期。美国商务部对这一日期之后的补贴都展开调查并征收反补贴税率，但是拒绝调查这一日期前给予的补贴。一些中国企业提出美国商务部在1997年宣布将对中国使用反补贴法，因此此前的反补贴项目不必担心面临反补贴调查。但是美国生产商认为应该没有最早截止日期。Restani法官裁定美国商务部应根据每一反补贴指控的实际情况决定最早截止日期。这说明中国政府和中国企业现在应开始准备应对针对1990年代补贴项目的指控。对于代表中国参与反补贴应诉的律师来说，这是关于核心争端的严重倒退。

作为美国国际贸易法庭的首席法官，Restani法官一直以来是一位严厉、思想深刻、愿意拒绝美国政府论点、准备从倾向自由贸易的角度诠释法律、国际协定的法官。但是从历史纪录来看，联邦上诉庭也曾驳回她的裁决。偶尔，当她认为一法律问题尤其重要、可能还颇有难度，她就与其他两位法官一起审理案件。三位法官的联合裁决在过去二十年里从未被驳回。所以，Restani法官的这一裁决可能面临上诉、且比较脆弱。

在庆祝中国取得胜利之余，否决双重征税也带来其他许多问题使得中国取得的法律胜利显得并不辉煌。有关本案最关键的法律原则——是否可对非市场经济体展开反补贴调查，中国几乎全盘皆输，只有涉案美国进口商可拿回部分惩罚性关税，让同时递交反补贴、反倾销申诉的美国申诉方面临更多难题。虽然胜利并不显赫，但是这比在世贸组织取得的任何胜利都更具实际意义，而且比未来可能取的胜利更辉煌。这一案件带来许多启示，其中之一就是美国法庭并非对中国上诉不友善。另一经验是，用中国典故; 路漫漫其修远兮，需要分步走。这一上诉是证明中国经济运作合理性的第一步，而不是最后一步。

Will The WTO Sweeten The Sour U.S.-China Chicken Trade? 世贸组织可使变酸的美中鸡肉战变美味吗？

Michael S. Snarr — Tue, 13 Oct 2009 16:05:12 -0600

中文请点击这里

When China announced it was investigating U.S. chicken parts for dumping a few weeks ago, there were immediate suggestions of an incipient trade war, a Chinese “retaliation” over U.S. safeguards imposed on commercial tires, which we discussed in Trade War? , a recent article on this blog. Yet, there have been disputes between China and the United States over chickens and chicken parts for several years. The United States has been blocking access to the U.S. market for Chinese chickens, and even before questioning trade in the other direction China has been challenging the U.S. actions.

Less than six months after China requested WTO consultations with the United States over measures that they claimed unfairly banned chicken imports from China, members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives reached agreement on legislation that eventually may reopen the door to Chinese chickens. On September 25, 2009, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk announced that members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives had reached an agreement on legislation that would provide the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) funding for the year 2010 to implement rules allowing the import of poultry products from China. The announcement came two days after the WTO declared a panel had been formed to hear the case raised by China in April of this year that the United States’ restrictions on imports of Chinese poultry violated its obligations under the WTO. The public announcement from these Obama Administration officials suggests that the Administration had concerns about the legitimacy of the ban and finally succeeded in moving members of Congress from a protectionist position to a more pragmatic one on questions of the food safety of Chinese imports.

The history of the chicken trade dispute goes back to 2004, when China and the United States suspended trade in poultry amid concerns about the spread of avian bird flu. China claims that, at the Sino-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade in 2004, the two countries mutually agreed to lift the bans, but that the United States had failed to live up to that promise. Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro, a Democrat from Connecticut and the Chairwoman of the Agriculture Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, has been an outspoken critic of safety standards for food imported from China, and was primarily responsible for legislation that effectively banned imports of Chinese poultry products. The legislation cut off funding for USDA to implement rules that would allow the importation of Chinese chicken parts consistent with U.S. food safety guidelines. Section 727 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-8) unabashedly stated that, “None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products to be imported into the United States from the People’s Republic of China.”

Congresswoman DeLauro’s version of the 2010 appropriations bill would have continued the ban on Chinese chicken, but the U.S. Senate version of the bill removed the ban subject to USDA’s adoption of safety inspection and approval procedures. The Senate version of the bill appears now to have prevailed in U.S. House and Senate negotiations, and soon may be approved by Congress.

Although the imbalance in the bilateral chicken trade is a dispute at least five years old, it received greater attention in 2009 as China requested WTO consultations with the United States on April 17, and then initiated an antidumping investigation and threatened to cut off U.S. chicken imports following President Obama’s decision in September to impose safeguard duties on Chinese tires. The U.S. Poultry and Egg Export Council has been lobbying Congress and the Obama Administration to keep the chicken trade open with China, at least for U.S. exports, especially as China is responsible for consuming 19% of U.S. chicken exports, and jumbo-sized chicken feet produced in the United States have been very popular in China and can be sold at much higher prices than in the United States.

Whether the Senate and House agreement on the 2010 appropriations bill ultimately will lead to USDA’s approval of Chinese chicken imports remains to be seen. The Obama Administration’s USDA will continue to face competing domestic pressures from Congresswoman DeLauro, food safety critics, and trade protectionists to require strict audits and on-site review of Chinese poultry processing facilities for compliance with U.S. food safety standards. But U.S. poultry exporters, as well as U.S. poultry producers looking to import from facilities located in China, will be pushing for free trade in chicken. The question is whether China’s WTO complaint can provide the additional impetus to ensure that USDA inspection procedures are conducted fairly, without the taint of protectionism, and will open the door for the import of safe and sanitary Chinese poultry products.

Does China Have A Case At The WTO?
China has argued that the U.S. chicken ban is a quantitative restriction on trade in violation of Article XI:1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and Article 4.2 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and that the ban is not consistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”). Even though legitimate questions have been raised in the United States about the safety of Chinese food products generally, it would seem that China has a good case regarding chickens that the U.S. ban is not consistent with the WTO Agreements.

It is not clear that the ban would even qualify as an SPS measure that the United States might justify on the basis of concerns for protecting public health. As a WTO panel noted in paragraph 7.149 of European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the purpose, form and nature of a law determines whether it qualifies as an SPS measure. That panel went on to note that the “nature” of an SPS measure is that it has “requirements and procedures, including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures… ." Section 727 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 does not establish any requirements or testing procedures for determining whether Chinese poultry products meet public safety criteria. To the contrary, Section 727 denies funding for the USDA to adopt and implement any such requirements or procedures exclusively for poultry products from China (“None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products to be imported in the United States from the People’s Republic of China.”).

Even were the ban considered an SPS measure, it would not likely satisfy the requirements of the SPS Agreement. Articles 5.1 through 5.4 of the SPS Agreement require that SPS measures be based on assessments of health risks, taking into account scientific evidence, the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting risks, and the objective of minimizing negative trade effects. Article 2.1 requires that any SPS measure be “applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” and that it be “based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific research ….” The very procedures that would allow for risk assessments, research, the gathering of evidence, and evaluation of competing effects have been blocked by legislation that precludes any financial support going to USDA to undertake such procedures.

USDA likely has known that the Chinese chicken ban is problematic with respect to the United States’ international obligations. A February 2006 fact sheet published by the Foreign Agriculture Service explains that the SPS Agreement was adopted during the Uruguay Round with the support of “[v]irtually all countries, including the United States” because countries previously had used vague and opaque SPS measures to disguise restrictions on trade. According to USDA, the SPS Agreement requires that measures “be based on science,” “be applied only to the extent necessary” to protect health, and “should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where identical or similar conditions prevail.” USDA, however, has had its hands tied thus far by the Chairwoman of the Agriculture Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, who opposed earlier attempts by USDA to implement rules allowing the inspection and import of Chinese poultry products.

Were a WTO Panel to agree that Section 727 lacked the “nature” of an SPS measure, Section 727 would appear to be a quantitative restriction on trade in violation of GATT Article XI(1) and Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement. Given the law’s unique and exclusive application to China, it would appear also to violate the principle of most-favored nation treatment, as China suggested in its request for consultations:

Moreover, by imposing these restrictions with respect to imports from China, but not similarly prohibiting the import from other Members of like products, China is concerned that the US fails to accord immediately and unconditionally to China an advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted to other Members with respect to rules and formalities in connection with importation.

The United States certainly would have other trade disputes with China that would be more compelling and defensible at the WTO.

As pointed out previously on this blog, it is a significant undertaking to seek relief through WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings. However, in this case there is no mechanism for China to challenge Section 727 in U.S. courts. A WTO challenge offers the best avenue for China to obtain meaningful relief. Here, simply filing the WTO challenge appears likely to have given the U.S. Government sufficient incentive to lift the chicken ban voluntarily.

The WTO challenge to the chicken ban has moved the internal U.S. discussion of the issue from one of purely domestic politics controlled by a powerful subcommittee within the U.S. House of Representatives, to one of respect for international obligations in which the President’s Cabinet-level policymakers—the Secretary of Agriculture and the U.S. Trade Representative -- are involved actively. The President’s pragmatism suggests that he chooses his international trade battles carefully. While the President will want to be resolute on certain trade issues with China, the Chinese chicken ban seems transparently inconsistent with the United States’ WTO obligations and public safety concerns can be addressed through USDA’s implementation of prudent, non-discriminatory inspection procedures. WTO attention to the Chinese chicken ban, coupled with support from U.S. industry groups with aligned interests, should provide the Obama Administration and the Congress with the incentive they need to ensure that the U.S. Senate and House agreement to remove the ban from the 2010 appropriations bill is implemented in the final draft that reaches the President’s desk for signature.

几周前当中国宣布对美国鸡肉展开反倾销调查时，立即有人指出贸易战即将展开，这是中国针对美国轮胎特保案的“报复”措施（见《贸易战》一文）。但是，中美鸡肉、鸡肉产品纠纷已持续多年。美国限制中国鸡肉出口至美国市场，中国也早已采取行动挑战美国的举动。

就在中国针对美国限制中国鸡肉出口的“不公平”政策申请世贸组织磋商后不到六个月，美国参议院和众议院达成协议，将重新向中国鸡肉敞开大门。2009年9月25日，美国农业部长维尔萨克（Tom Vilsack）以及美国贸易谈判代表柯克（Ron Kirk）宣布美国参、众两院已经达成协议，将向美国农业部提供2010财政拨款以实施进口中国禽肉的法律条款。这一声明宣布之前两天，世贸组织宣布成立专家组审理中美鸡肉贸易纠纷，在这一案件中中国指控美国违背了入世承诺。奥巴马政府的声明说明美国政府担心这一进口限制的合法性，并最终成功地推动国会成员从保护主义立场转向更符合实际的立场——从食品安全角度对中国出口提出质疑。

中美鸡肉大战可追溯至2004年，在禽流感风暴中，中美两国都取消从对方进口鸡肉。中国声称，双方在2004年中美联合商贸委员会上达成协议、同意同时取消进口限制，但是美国没有履行承诺。肯达基州众议员、众议院拨款委员会农业分会主席罗萨•迪莱罗（Rosa DeLauro）长期公开批评中国食品的安全标准，也是禁止中国禽肉产品出口至美国的议案的主要推动者。这一法案取消给予美国农业部的拨款，使之没有资金实施条款、采取符合美国食品安全指导纲要的条款进口中国鸡肉产品。《2009年综合拨款法案》第727款指出：“这一法案涵盖的任何拨款不得用于建立、实施允许中国禽肉产品出口至美国的条款。”

迪莱罗起草的2010年拨款法案延续了这一进口限制，但是参议院草案提出在美国农业部采取安全检验和审核程序的前提下，取消这一限制。参议院草案在参众两院获得多数支持，并将很快获得国会批准。

虽然中美鸡肉贸易不平衡已是长达5年的贸易纠纷，这一纠纷在2009年4月17日中国寻求世贸组织磋商时赢得更广泛关注。9月当奥巴马总统宣布向中国轮胎采取特保措施、中国随即宣布展开反倾销调查、威胁禁止美国鸡肉出口至美国，这一纠纷引起更广泛关注。美国禽蛋出口协会已经游说国会和奥巴马政府保持鸡肉贸易通畅无阻，至少从美国出口角度着眼，百分之十九的美国鸡肉出口至中国，而且大型鸡脚爪在中国十分受欢迎，价格也远远高于在美售价。

参众两院就2010年拨款法案达成的协议能否最终导致美国农业部向中国鸡肉敞开大门仍有待观察。奥巴马领导下的美国农业部仍将面临来自迪莱罗众议员、食品安全评论家以及贸易保护主义者的压力，要求更严格的抽检以及实地检验中国禽肉加工设施是否符合美国食品安全标准。但是希望从位于中国的生产设施进口禽肉产品的美国进口商和生产厂家将推动鸡肉自由贸易。现在面临的问题是中国的世贸磋商要求能否提供更多动力，使美国农业部的检验程序体现公平原则、而不是呈现保护主义色彩，为安全、干净的中国禽肉产品出口至美国敞开大门。

中国的世贸申诉立得住脚吗?

中国认为美国的鸡肉进口限制是数量性限制，违背了《关税及贸易总协定》第十一条以及世贸组织《农业协定》第4条第2款，而且这一进口限制不符合《卫生和植物卫生协议》。虽然美国国内对中国食品产品安全提出合理质疑，但是中国针对美国鸡肉进口限制提出的世贸组织申诉有法有理可依。

美国这一以保护公众健康为基础的进口限制是否能被视为卫生和植物卫生政策仍不清楚。就如世贸组织专家小组在欧盟生物产品批准、营销程序一案裁决第7.149章（European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products）指出，法律的目的、形式和性质决定它是否属于卫生和植物卫生政策。专家小组进一步指出卫生和植物卫生政策的性质是指，“它包括但不局限于终端产品标准、生产加工方法、测试、检验、许可证发放和批准程序等要求和程序规定。”《2009年综合拨款法案》第727款并未设立任何要求、或是测试程序以检验中国禽类产品是否符合公众安全标准。恰恰相反，第727款拒绝拨款给美国农业部，使之无法采纳、实施单单针对中国禽类产品制定的类似要求和准则（“这一法案涵盖的任何拨款不得用于建立、实施允许中国禽肉产品出口至美国的条款。”）

即使这一进口限制能被视为卫生和植物卫生政策，它也不符合《卫生和植物卫生协议》。该协议第5.1至5.4款要求卫生和植物卫生政策必须建立在考量公共卫生的基础上，同时综合考虑科学证据、有效限制威胁的方法、以及减小负面贸易影响。第2.1款要求任何卫生和植物卫生政策“只适用于保护人类、动物或是植物生命和健康”同时它必须“建立在科学原则之上，如果没有充足的科学研究也不能沿用…”这些允许危险评估、研究、证据收集以及效果评估的措施都被限制给予美国农业部财政拨款的法案否决了。

美国农业部很可能已经知道面对美国的国际承诺，限制中国鸡肉进口问题重重。美国农业部国外农业服务局2006年2月发布的一份文件解释说《卫生和植物卫生协议》在乌拉圭回合被采纳，目的是为了支持“包括美国在内的所有国家”，因为此前各国使用含糊不清、不透明的卫生和植物卫生政策以掩盖贸易限制。据美国农业部，《卫生和植物卫生协议》要求措施必须“建立在科学之上”，“不得超过需要的程度”以保护健康，同时“面对相同或类似条件，不可任意或没有根据地歧视不同国家”。但是美国农业部受众议院拨款委员会农业分会主席迪莱罗的束缚，她先前反对美国农业部实施检验、进口中国禽肉产品的条款。

如果世贸组织专家组认定727款不属于卫生和植物卫生政策，727款就是违反《关税及贸易总协定》第十一条第一款和《农业协定》第4.2款的数量性贸易限制。因为这一法律条款只针对中国，它也违反了最惠国待遇原则。中国在磋商申诉书中提到：“而且，只针对中国采取这些限制，但却未对其他世贸组织成员国的类似产品采取类似限制，中国担心美国没有立即、无条件地给予中国它根据法规、礼仪授予其他国家的贸易优势、偏袒、特权和特例”。美国与中国的其他世贸组织纠纷比这一案件更易辩护。

正如先前的博文所说，通过世贸组织争端解决机制寻求补偿是一重大举动。但是，中国不能在美国法庭起诉727款。通过世贸组织解决争端是中国获得有意义的补偿的最佳途径。在这一案件中，世贸组织磋商申请给予美国政府动力、自动取消鸡肉进口限制。

通过世贸组织挑战鸡肉进口限制使美国国内的讨论从掌控国内政治的、强大的众议院分会转变成总统内阁讨论国际承诺，美国农业部部长和贸易谈判代表都积极参与。总统的务实说明他选择国际贸易战时非常小心。总统在对华贸易的某些方面采取坚定立场，但是因为鸡肉进口限制明显不符合美国的世贸承诺，同时可以通过美国农业部实施谨慎、不带歧视的检验规则消除公众安全担忧。世贸组织对这一案件的关注，再加上美国相关产业组织的支持，应当给予奥巴马政府和国会足够动力确保参众两院达成协议，在2010财政拨款法案中取消中国鸡肉进口限制，等待总统最后批准。

Trade War? 贸易战？

Dr. Elliot J. Feldman — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 10:02:21 -0600

President Obama, on September 11, announced that the United States would restrict imports of Chinese commercial, low-cost tires. This action was foreseeable and foreseen (for example this blog foresaw this action in articles titled Attack On China Rolls On New Tires and Consultations To Settle The Tires Dispute: Too Little Too Late?). President Obama committed to additional tariffs of 35-30-25 percent stepped down over three years; the United States International Trade Commission had recommended 55-45-35 percent over three years. Many analysts called the ITC’s recommendation prohibitive; the Obama rates, according to United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk, were derived from an economic model designed to reduce but not prohibit Chinese tires in the U.S. market. The victorious United Steelworkers predicted getting their lost jobs back; most analysts predicted that exports from other countries, not domestic production, would fill in the missing Chinese tires.

Within twenty-four hours, China announced trade remedy investigations into chicken and automobile parts from the United States. Observers were quick to label the announcement as “retaliation” (Inside U.S. Trade headline: CHINA RESPONDS TO TIRES SAFEGUARD WITH NEW AD INVESTIGATIONS), which China denied. China announced a WTO appeal of an adverse decision on the sale and distribution of visual works and music download services almost simultaneously, and a WTO challenge to the tires safeguard decision within days.

Dire predictions, and accusations directed at President Obama, followed quickly. President Obama was accused of breaking the word he gave, and the undertaking of world leaders that he had solicited, at the last meeting of the G-20, to avoid any acts of trade protectionism in the midst of a global recession. He was accused of inconsiderate timing, making his announcement on 9/11, a day that ironically had brought the world together, and less than two weeks before the next G-20 in Pittsburgh, where he would be the host. China complained, expressly, that President Obama seemed prepared to trade off 5000 American jobs for 100,000 Chinese, seeking a superior moral ground. Trade analysts rushed to predict a wave of safeguard actions against Chinese products. After all, if an apparently weak claim could succeed with the Obama Administration, surely stronger claims could prevail, and the standards for relief based on a safeguard action are much lower than for dumping and countervailing duty petitions.

The safeguard action did not require any Chinese violations of any trade rules, and there were no formal allegations of dumping or subsidies in the tires case. Had there been any, the law required them to be disregarded in the decision process. Nonetheless, United Steelworkers President Leo Gerard engaged in vitriolic denunciations of Chinese trade practices before, during, and after the President’s decision. He quickly seized leadership in new petitions that did contain such allegations. The Obama Administration said nothing publicly to recognize the difference between the decision on tires and findings of subsidies or dumping, thereby possibly reinforcing an apparent Chinese impression that the proceedings were unfair and ill-timed for global economic recovery. Gerard’s statements (and similar statements from a Union witness, the Alliance of American Manufacturing, at the Trade Policy Committee hearing), seem intended, in their disregard for the law and in their tone, to damage Chinese-U.S. relations. As they were, in the tires case, outside the law, the Obama Administration may need to be sensitive to an overtly warm embrace of the unions.

Did President Obama start a trade war? Is China retaliating? Will the G-20 countries conclude that the U.S. is not committed to free trade, and will they react by seeking to protect their own domestic markets? Will this trade trigger reverse the promising signs of global recovery from the worst recession since the 1930s?

There are no simple answers to these disturbing questions, but it is possible to address some of them without hysteria. There is here much more than may seem apparent, and also a bit less.

The Decision On Tires

All trade disputes begin with domestic politics. The tires dispute began with Candidate Obama’s promises to give meaning to the special China safeguard and to insist upon Chinese adherence to trade laws and agreements, and the critical support he received from the trade unions in his run for the presidency. It was sustained by a continuing anti-Chinese sentiment in Congress, where various bills alleging currency manipulation and other unfair trade sins are introduced almost routinely. And it was advanced by the analytical conclusion of four of the six Commissioners of the International Trade Commission, led by a Chairwoman previously on the staff of the Democratic Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, who found that an increase in Chinese tire imports had disrupted the U.S. market and injured the U.S. industry. The Democratic Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, coincidentally but instrumentally, is essential to the President in his efforts to reform health care, his highest priority.

The President’s rationale is uncomplicated. China agreed to the special safeguard. Its requirements were met, at least insofar as the case was presented to the International Trade Commission, the United States Trade Representative, and the Trade Policy Committee. Therefore, it was right and reasonable to apply the law.

There is perhaps another explanation. The gathered political forces made a presidential refusal to act in the tires case impossible. The trade unions and the Democratic Congress would have accused President Obama of representing continuity with the Bush Administration, not the change he had promised. He would have been seen to condone the offshoring of jobs, which the Chinese interests in the case brazenly emphasized as the core of their defense. He would have been seen as “soft” on China. Most important of all, he would have had no subsequent credibility with Congress or a probable majority of Americans on trade. He would never have been able to advance a free trade agenda. Indeed, he likely would never have been granted the trade negotiation authority that, at present, he does not have but needs.

The Timing

The law, Section 421 et seq. of the Trade Agreements Act of 1974 , as amended, required presidential action by September 17. The President could have let the date slip inasmuch as there is nothing in the law to discipline him had he done so. However, President Obama is particularly respectful of the law, and he would have been under unwelcome political pressure had he not acted when the statute required.

The President probably did not want to act while National People’s Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo was in the United States, which China may have interpreted as insulting. The Chairman, after all, seems to have raised the issue in meetings with the President, Vice President, and congressional leaders during a visit of more than ten days, exactly during the initial window when the recommendation from the Trade Policy Committee and the Trade Representative had reached the President’s desk.

With the September 17 deadline preceding the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh (beginning exactly one week later) the President surely wanted as much distance as possible between his announcement and the Summit. At the Summit he wanted to discuss the world’s financial institutions, the economic crisis, climate change. He did not want a diversion into a trade war.
Wu Bangguo left for China from Washington on Friday morning, September 11. The President announced his decision that afternoon, which was already the weekend in China. It was the end of the U.S. news cycle for the week. It was as long before the Summit as possible once Wu Bangguo had left, and it met the statutory deadline. It happened to be 9/11, but otherwise there could not have been politically or diplomatically a better time.

The “Retaliation”

China’s nearly simultaneous announcement of antidumping and countervailing investigations could not have been retaliatory in any normal meaning of that term. China’s bureaucracy, like the bureaucracy in any major country, inevitably is large and slow. It could not have arranged to announce antidumping and countervailing investigations on less than twenty-four hours notice. The investigations had to have been planned long before the President’s decision was known.

The Chinese announcement, not the investigations themselves, may have been intended to appear retaliatory, but it, too, had to have been planned. It is probable, therefore, that the President had told Chinese officials during consultations (see Consultations To Settle The Tires Dispute: Too Little Too Late?) when he would make his announcement so that they could prepare. It may even have been agreed that the Chinese would announce the antidumping and countervailing investigations effectively in conjunction with the President’s announcement, so that both sides could posture for their publics but also sweep the dispute away a couple of weeks before the G-20 Summit.

That China has a growing agenda of trade grievances with the United States is not surprising, particularly as a wave of trade remedy petitions has begun to flood agencies in the United States and other countries against Chinese products. As much as China pledges to encourage more domestic consumerism and to reduce reliance on exports (consistent with American requests in the G-20 framework), such a change will not come about quickly. China needs foreign markets to remain open to its products, just as do other countries. China is appropriately aggrieved by the drive to close or limit markets for its goods.

A dispute over chicken has been festering between China and the United States for a long time. China’s domestic industry in auto parts has been troubled, especially in the recession. Both have been likely sources of Chinese trade actions against foreign imports. The timing for these investigations may not have been entirely coincidental, but it would also appear to have been less calculated and calculating than to be called “retaliation.”

Within a week of these “retaliatory” Chinese actions, three more antidumping and countervailing duty petitions were filed in Washington against Chinese products. No one suggested that these petitions were part of a new trade war, or were retaliatory. Instead, they were understood to be part of the normal course of trade relations between China and the United States, where China is still a major producer of goods that Americans want to buy and American manufacturers and, more significantly it seems, American trade unions, want to keep out. Notwithstanding the grand objectives of the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, to make China more a consumer society and less export-driven, while making Americans greater savers with a reduced compunction to buy, the life of the two countries goes on, and with it the rhythm of American trade complaints against Chinese products.

The Maturing Of China

Although life goes on, there are unmistakable changes, precipitated in part by the global recession, but also by the maturing of China in the international system. China made significant sacrifices to join the WTO, including negotiating compromises that created exposure to the special safeguard that produced President Obama’s tires decision. China has been exposed to the WTO disciplines, and nine Chinese actions have been challenged in cases filed in the WTO against Chinese practices. However, China during the last twelve months alone has launched four cases against others. China has begun to recognize the WTO not only as a forum where it might be brought to judgment, but also one where it may challenge others.

China’s growing engagement in the WTO is part of its growing engagement more generally, whether in the G-8 or the G-5, the G-20 or the International Monetary Fund. China is growing into a new role, still a developing country, but one with a voice to be heard. Rather than characterize China’s use of trade laws as “retaliation,” these actions more properly can be seen as maturation, China’s willingness, ability, even determination to act like other countries participating at comparable levels in the world’s trading system.

China is now neither first nor last in the invocation of trade remedies and dispute settlement. It is one among few, but it is more inside the norms of international organizations than out.

These developments signal more than mere maturation. They also signal that China accepts the legitimacy of international institutions, and their disciplines. China accepts full international citizenship, claiming its rights as well as its responsibilities. Instead of finding fault or danger or risk when China exercises these rights, it is probably wiser to find relief as China integrates into the global economy and polity. It was not so very long ago when China was an effective member of neither.

The Next Road For Tires

There is no forum other than the WTO where China can appeal the Section 421 safeguard decision. Nonetheless, China is likely to be disappointed there. Were it to win, it would not be a victory that could be finalized soon enough to impact the tires trade (especially as all WTO relief is prospective), nor to head off other safeguard actions much before the expiration of Section 421 at the end of 2012. China, therefore, should not permit the safeguard actions to create an illusion about the WTO, nor exaggerated expectations.

The tires decision may also have limited effect encouraging other safeguard actions. It took seven months from the filing of the petition to reach presidential decision, which means that “full” relief (three years) requires beginning a case with at least 43 months left in the statute. It is no longer possible to bring any safeguard action under this provision of the law and obtain a result that could yield even three years of relief, as only 39 months of legal authority remain. With every passing day, the potential length of time for relief diminishes because of the law’s mandatory expiration.

It would be more prudent and effective for Chinese interests to continue pressing for reconsideration in the White House, where the statute directs everyone after a year. Were the first year of relief to produce American jobs, a continuing challenge to the President’s decision likely would be futile, but should the predictions of the economists engaged by the Chinese side prove correct, such that safeguard relief does little or nothing for American jobs, the President might be willing to rethink, just as President Bush was forced to do after two years of steel safeguards. In the latter, even as the President was driven to give up the relief, there was a significant recovery in the domestic industry. Without any recovery in the tires industry, the likely scenario, the President would be that much less likely to continue the relief in a form harmful to China.

奥巴马总统于9月11日宣布美国将限制中国产商用低价轮胎出口至美国。这一决定已被广为预见、并不出人意料（如本博客文章Attack On China Rolls On New Tires and Consultations To Settle The Tires Dispute: Too Little Too Late?)。奥巴马总统决定在未来三年内分别向中国轮胎征收百分之三十五、三十和二十五的额外税率，美国国际贸易委员会此前则建议追加百分之五十五、四十五和三十五的税率。许多分析员都认为美国国际贸易委员会的建议将把中国产品排除在美国市场之外。根据美国贸易谈判代表柯克，奥巴马总统的方案建立在一个将降低但不排除中国轮胎出口到美国的经济模型之上。胜利的美国钢铁工人联合会预计将赢回失去的就业机会，然而大多数分析家认为其他国家生产的轮胎将填补中国轮胎原先占有的市场份额，而非美国本土生产的轮胎。

不到24小时，中国就宣布对美国禽类产品和汽车零部件展开贸易救济调查。观察家立即把这一声明贴上“报复”的标签（《美国贸易内幕》刊登了题为《中国以反倾销调查回应轮胎特保案》的文章），中国政府予以否认。几乎同时，中国宣布将在世贸组织上诉不利于中国的、有关视听产品下载服务销售和分销的裁决，稍候又向世贸组织上诉轮胎特保案裁决。

耸人听闻的预测以及针对奥巴马总统的指责随即而来。奥巴马总统面临违背承诺的指责，违背在他推动下、各国首脑在上届G-20会议上做出的、为避免全球经济衰退而回避贸易保护行动的承诺。他还面临宣布这一决定时机不对的指责，在9/11这一把全世界团结在一起的日子宣布裁决、在匹兹堡G-20首脑会议即将举行之际，更何况美国还是东道国。中国公开抱怨奥巴马总统准备用十万个中国就业机会换取五千个美国工作，争取道德制高点。贸易专家急忙预测一系列针对中国产品的保障案件将立即到来。总而言之，如果一个软弱无力的指控能得到奥巴马政府的支持，那么更强有力的指控一定将赢得胜利。而且采取保障救济的标准比反倾销、反补贴调查低得多。

在贸易保障调查中不需要证明中方违背了贸易规则，在本案中没有任何反补贴或反倾销指控。即使有不正当贸易行为，法律规定在裁决时无须考虑这些行为。但是，美国钢铁工人联合会主席Leo Gerard在总统宣布决定前后公开诋毁中国的贸易行为，他还立马带头在新的申诉中包括这些指控。奥巴马政府没有公开评论轮胎特保案决定与反倾销、反补贴裁决之间的差别，因此更强化了中方认为这一裁决不公且时机不当的印象。Gerard的评论（以及钢铁工人联合会证人和美国制造业联盟在贸易政策委员会听证会上的发言）显示他们置法律于不顾、破坏中美关系。观察他们在轮胎案中的表现，奥巴马政府应注意工会热情的拥抱。

奥巴马总统真的展开一场新的贸易战吗？中国是否采取了报复行动？G-20成员国是否得出美国并不坚信自由贸易的结论，并采取行动保护本国市场呢？这一案件是否会影响刚刚开始的全球经济复苏、使自1930年代以来最严重的经济危机又走下坡路呢？

这些令人不安的问题并没有简单答案，但是不用歇斯特里就可回答其中一些问题。有些并不显而易见，有些却明白无误。

轮胎案裁决

所有的贸易纠纷都源自国内政治。轮胎案起源于奥巴马在竞选美国总统时承诺将赋予针对中国产品的特保条款意义、督促中国遵守贸易法及协定，以及工会支持为他赢得选举起的关键性作用。同时，国会内的反华情绪也起到一定作用，国会指控中国操纵汇率及采取其他不正当贸易行为似乎已成为惯例。美国国际贸易委员会六位委员中、包括主席在内四位委员的研究结论起到了推波助澜作用，这位主席曾为参议员金融委员会民主党主席的工作人员。这四位委员认定中国轮胎出口增长已经扰乱美国市场、使美国产业受损。参议员金融委员会的这位民主党主席恰好在总统的医疗改革中起关键作用，而医疗改革是总统的首要任务。

总统的逻辑并不复杂。中国接受了特殊保障条款。条款规定的要求已经达到，至少这一案件已由国际贸易委员会、美国贸易代表办公室和贸易政策委员会审核。因此，实施这一法律是正确且合理的。

或许还有一种解释。种种政治力量使得总统在轮胎案中否决贸易救济行动不切实际。工会和民主党国会已经指责奥巴马总统沿用布什政府政策，而非承诺的改革。如不批准救济行动，那么奥巴马将被认为对本土工作流失漠不关心，在本案中中方抗辩的立足点就是就业这一点。他将被认为对中国太“软弱”。最重要的一点，他将失去国会乃至大多数美国民众在贸易问题上的信任。他将无法推动自由贸易。他现在没有但却需要国会授予贸易谈判的权利，如果不这么做，他将永远无法得到授权。

时机

修订后的《1974年贸易协定法案》第421条要求总统在9月17日之前采取行动。总统可以错过这一截止日期，因为法律中不包含惩罚条款。但是，奥巴马总统特别尊重法律；如果不依法行事，他将面临许多不利的政治压力。

总统或许是希望避免在全国人大常委会委员长吴邦国访美期间采取行动，因为中方可能会视此为侮辱。在十多天行程中，吴邦国委员长在与总统、副总统和国会领导会晤时多次提到轮胎案，这恰好是贸易政策委员会和美国贸易代表办公室提交的意见抵达白宫、总统可作出决定这一时间段的初期。

9月17日这一截止日期恰好在匹兹堡G-20首脑会议召开前一周，总统当然希望能尽量提前宣布。在首脑会议上，奥巴马希望讨论全球金融体系、经济危机和气候变化。他不希望将话题转至贸易战。

吴邦国于9月11日（周五）上午离开美国返回中国。总统在这天下午宣布决定，此时中国已是周末。对于美国媒体而言，这是一周新闻的尾声。同时这也是吴邦国委员离美后、距离G-20首脑会议最远的时间点，且符合美国法律规定。这一天恰好是9月11日，但是从政治、外交角度而言的最佳时机。

报复

中国几乎同时宣布对美国产品展开反补贴、反倾销调查，但这并不是报复。中国的官僚体系和其他国家的官僚体系一样，只不过更大更慢。中国不可能在不到24小时就做好准备、宣布展开调查。这些贸易调查早在总统宣布决定前就已经开始酝酿了。

中国的声明可能显得这些贸易调查是报复行径，而不是这些调查本身。所以，总统可能在中美磋商过程中（见Consultations To Settle The Tires Dispute: Too Little Too Late?一文）告诉中方他准备如此宣布，希望中方做好准备。可能美方也默许中方将于这一时间宣布展开贸易救济调查，这样双方都可尽早在G-20首脑会议召开前对国内公众有所交待。

在贸易领域，中国对美国不满的清单越列越长并不令人奇怪，尤其是当中国产品在美国和其他国家面临一波接一波的贸易救济案。虽然中国承诺鼓励国内消费、减少出口依赖（这与美国在G-20首脑会议的要求吻合），但这一变化不会很快到来。中国需要海外市场继续对中国产品敞开大门、享受和其他国家产品同等的待遇。中国对单单针对中国产品的市场限制理所当然有所不满。

中美鸡肉产品纠纷持续已久。中国国内的汽车零部件产业陷入困境，尤其是在经济衰退中。这是中国采取贸易行动的源泉。这些调查展开的时间可能并非完全巧合，但也不一定是精心策划的“报复”。

在中国宣布报复行动后短短一周内，美国企业针对中国产品递交了三份反补贴、反倾销申诉。没有人认为这些申诉是新一轮贸易战的一部分、或是报复。恰恰相反，它们被认为是中美正常贸易的一部分。中国是美国希望购买的产品的主要生产国，但是美国生产商以及（尤其是）美国工会希望把这些产品排除在美国市场之外。匹兹堡G-20首脑会议的宏伟目标包括鼓励中国向消费型经济发展、减少出口依赖，同时鼓励美国减少消费、增加储蓄，两个国家的命运在美国对中国贸易政策的抱怨声中延续。

日趋成熟的中国

虽然命运在延续，全球经济衰退以及中国的成长也带来许多变化。中国为加入世贸组织作出许多牺牲，包括谈判妥协最终导致特保条款及轮胎救济行动。中国已经多次面临世贸组织的管理，迄今为止中国因为九项贸易举动成为多个世贸案件的辩护方。同时，中国在过去一年里也向世贸组织递交了四份申诉。中国已经意识到世贸组织不仅是她面临指控的法律论坛，同时也是挑战其他国家的场所。

中国更积极地参与世贸组织活动是她积极参与国际舞台的一部分，其他场所还包括在G-8, G-5,G-20及国际货币基金组织。虽然仍为发展中国家，但是中国已经逐渐扮演新角色，是世界需要倾听的声音。与其简单地把中国使用贸易法视为“报复”，这些行动更应当被视为成熟的表现，中国愿意、有能力、甚至决心和其他国家一样行事、在同一平台参与世界贸易体系。

中国既不是第一个、也不是最后一个使用贸易救济和纠纷解决机制的国家。她是使用这一机制少数国家之一，但至少中国已经成为国际组织内的一员、而不是徘徊在组织之外。

这些发展不仅显示中国已更加成熟，同时亦显示中国已经承认国际组织的合法性并接受管理。中国已经接受国际国籍，维护自己的权利并履行自己的职责。与其寻找中国在履行职责时犯的错误、带来的危险，更明智的做法是对中国融入全球经济和政治长舒一口气。不久前，中国还不是有影响力的成员。

轮胎的另一条道路

世贸组织是中国唯一可以上诉421条款特保决定的场所。但是，在那里中国很可能会感到失望。即使中国胜诉，这一胜利也遥遥无期、无法影响轮胎贸易（更何况世贸裁决针对未来），更无法阻止在2012年底421条款失效前面临更多特保案件。因此，中国不应当允许特保行动以造成对世贸组织的错觉，更不应该夸大期望。

轮胎案的裁决可能不会激发其他特保案件。从递交申诉至总统裁决需要7个月，这说明如想寻求全面特保救济（横跨3年）应当在这一法律条款失效前43个月启动案件。现在距离这一条款失效仅剩39个月，因此已经不可能通过特保案获得全面救济。因为这一条款在2012年底失效，随着时间一天天推移，美国企业可享受救济的时间也一点点减少。

更谨慎和有效的做法是中国应当继续向白宫施压、要求重新考虑，因为这是法律规定一年后应采取的行动。如果第一年的贸易救济的确为美国带来更多就业机会，那么挑战总统的决定将毫无意义；但如果中方聘请的经济专家的预言正确——贸易救济对美国就业没有或只有极小影响，那么总统可能愿意重新考虑，就像布什总统在钢铁保障生效后两年被迫放弃这一贸易救济。在钢铁保障案中，虽然总统被迫放弃救济行动，但是国内产业已经复苏。如果轮胎产业没有恢复，最可能的情况是奥巴马总统更不可能维持这一危害中国的救济行动。

CPSC Obtains New Resources to Address 'China Fear' 美国消费品安全委员会获得新资源应对"中国恐慌"

Jing Zhu — Thu, 24 Sep 2009 14:52:01 -0600

中文请点击这里

The new Chairman of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”), Inez Moore Tenenbaum, plans to attend the third biennial consumer product safety summit from October 21 through 26, 2009 in three Chinese cities, Beijing, Wuxi (Jiangsu Province), and Jinhua (Zhejiang Province). The CPSC delegation will meet its Chinese counterpart agency, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine (“AQSIQ”), and manufacturers and exporters.

China’s commercial reputation in the United States was seriously damaged in 2007 because of safety problems with food and toys. China’s subsequent domestic scandal over infant formula in 2008 heightened the concerns of American consumers. The public response revealed, however, that the CPSC was underfunded, with a limited mandate to inspect and enforce safety rules. The policy of the Bush Administration had been to favor voluntary compliance with industry-defined safety standards instead of mandatory laws and regulations.

There has been much anticipation of how the Obama Administration, committed to “change,” might change the ways and means of the CPSC, especially in dealing with China. In May, President Obama included in his budget a 71 percent increase in CPSC funding. Consequently, the Tenenbaum visit to China could be particularly important. It could lead to policy changes affecting access to the U.S. market for Chinese products.

Officially, the CPSC and the AQSIQ expect to help U.S. importers and Chinese suppliers “establish a comprehensive and systemic approach” to meet both voluntary standards and U.S. laws and regulations. Recent regulatory developments in the United States under the Obama Administration already are impacting Chinese manufacturers and exporters of toys, bicycle parts, jogger strollers and youth electronic devices, as John Burke discussed in two previous blog posts (“CPSC Issues Exemptions To Lead Content Requirements” and “Recent Changes To U.S. Consumer Protection Laws Affect Chinese Exporters”).

Tenenbaum, nominated by President Obama on June 9, 2009 and confirmed by the Senate ten days later to serve as the ninth Chairman of the CPSC, was not an obvious appointment to this specialized agency. Her background is in education, not consumer safety, but her early endorsement of Obama and support during the primary elections could give her direct access to the White House. According to Newsweek columnist Howard Fineman, the first person Obama embraced (after his wife) on primary night in South Carolina was Tenenbaum. The appointment may have been more important to Obama politically than substantively, but Obama understands the importance of consumer safety both for his own stature and for relations with China, in particular.

President Obama also nominated Robert S. Adler and Anne M. Northup as CPSC Commissioners, which is part of the White House’s effort to expand and strengthen the agency. For more than fifteen years, CPSC operated with only three Commissioners, and in the final years of the Bush Administration frequently was without even three. Confirmed by the Senate on August 7, 2009, Adler and Northup expand the agency’s leadership to five and bring important professional and political resources: Adler spent eleven years (1973 – 1984) as an attorney-advisor to two CPSC Commissioners, and Northup, an experienced Republican politician, represented the 3rd congressional district of Kentucky in the United States House of Representatives, from 1997 to 2007, where she served on the powerful House Appropriations Committee. The combination of moves – the appointment of an early and ardent supporter of the President as Chairman; the expansion of the number of Commissioners from three to five; bipartisan appointments mixed with experience and expertise in consumer safety; early regulatory reform – all suggest a serious presidential commitment. The trip to China, four months after Ms. Tenenbaum’s appointment, signals a primary commitment to improved consumer safety regarding Chinese products.

作者：朱晶

美国消费品安全委员会新任主席Inez Moore Tenenbaum 计划参加今年10月21至26日在北京、无锡和金华三地召开的第三届中美消费品安全高峰会议。美国消费品安全委员会代表团一行将会见中国国家质量监督检验总局负责人及生产厂家和出口商。

2007年，因为食品和玩具的安全隐患，中国产品在美声誉严重下降。次年，中国国内销售的三鹿婴儿奶粉的质量问题也引发美国消费者关注和不安。美国公众反应显示美国消费品安全委员会资金不足、缺少决策层支持以监督实施安全法规。布什政府的政策倾向于自愿实施行业安全标准而非强制实施法律、条规。

人们都期待坚信“改革”的奥巴马政府将改变美国消费品安全委员会的工作方式及资源，尤其在对华领域。今年五月，奥巴马总统为美国消费品安全委员会增加了百分之七十一的财政预算。因此，Tenenbaum访华意义更为重大。这可能带来政策改变，影响中国产品进入美国市场。

中美负责消费品安全的两大机构将帮助美国进口商和中国供货商“建立全面、系统的接触机制”，帮助他们达到自愿性标准和美国法规规定。奥巴马政府的法规建设已经影响玩具、自行车部件、童车以及少年用电动产品的中国生产、出口商。John Burke撰写的两篇搏客介绍了这些法规变化（“CPSC Issues Exemptions To Lead Content Requirements” and “Recent Changes To U.S. Consumer Protection Laws Affect Chinese Exporters”).

Tenenbaum于2009年6月9日获得奥巴马总统提名，十天后获得参议院批准成为消费品安全委员会第九任主席。她并不是这一专业委员会当之无愧的人选，因为她拥有教育背景，而非消费品安全。但她很早就表态支持奥巴马竞选总统，并为奥巴马赢得民主党党内提名立下汗马功劳，这使得她可与白宫直接联系。根据《新闻周刊》专栏作家Howard Fineman，奥巴马在赢得南卡罗莱纳州民主党党内提名的初选胜利之夜，Tenenbaum是继奥巴马太太之后这位未来总统第一个拥抱的人。因此，这一任命对于奥巴马总统来说政治意义比实质意义更为重大，但奥巴马总统也充分认识到消费品安全对于他个人声望和对华关系的重要性。

奥巴马总统同时提名Robert S. Adler和Anne M. Northup为消费品安全委员会委员，这是白宫扩展、加强这一机构建设的举措之一。过去十多年里，只有三位委员负责消费品安全委员会工作，在布什政府执政的最后几年，甚至只有两位委员主持工作。Adler和Northup在今年8月7日获得参议院批准，他们不仅将消费品安全委员会的领导层扩充到五位，同时也为该机构带来重要专业、政治资源。Adler曾在该机构任职十一年（1973 – 1984），担任两位委员的法律顾问。Northup则是资深共和党政治家，于1997至2007年出任肯塔基州第三区众议员，并在权力巨大的众议院拨款委员会任职。这一系列举动——任命总统的忠实支持者为主席，将委员增加至五位，跨党任命并任命拥有丰富专业背景人士，尽早进行法规改革——都充分显示了总统的决心。Tenenbaum女士上任四个月就访华，这也显示了她改善中国产消费品质量的决心。

Media Mentions 2009: Tire Dispute

Christine Gill — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 09:19:07 -0600

Members of the Baker Hostetler International Trade practice have been quoted in numerous media outlets regarding the Chinese tire trade dispute, including:

The Hill: China Tires A Deal For Steelworkers Union (9/16/09)

Bloomberg News: Obama Says Chinese Tires Decision Isn't Provocative (9/14/09)

Bloomberg News: U.S. Steel Pushes Obama to Choose Workers Over Trade (9/9/09)

Forbes.com: Obama Faces Tire Trade Dispute (9/2/09)

Forbes.com: Tire Trade Dispute Rolls On (8/18/09)