Business Bankruptcy Blog

First Court Of Appeals Decision Addresses Question Left Open In The Supreme Court's Travelers Opinion: Can Unsecured Creditors Recover Post-Petition Attorney's Fees?

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 28 Jun 2009 21:23:02 -0800

On June 23, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first Court of Appeals to answer the question left open in the U.S. Supreme Court's March 2007 decision in Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. -- whether post-petition attorney's fees can be added to unsecured claims.

The Ninth Circuit had before it an appeal from the December 2007 decision by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") in the In re SNTL Corp. case, which in turn had been the first appellate decision to address that unresolved question.
The decision also addressed the interesting, albeit unrelated, question of whether a guarantor of a debt can become liable if the payment of the debt by the primary obligor later is returned in a preference settlement.

The Travelers Case. Before turning to the SNTL Corp. case itself, let's look back at the Supreme Court's decision. In March 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit's so-called Fobian rule in the Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. decision. However, it did not decide whether unsecured creditors could recover, as part of their unsecured claims, post-petition attorney's fees incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case. For more on the Travelers decision, follow the link in this sentence.

The SNTL Corp. BAP Decision. In the December 2007 BAP decision, Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, writing for the unanimous BAP panel, held that that "claims for postpetition attorneys' fees cannot be disallowed simply because the claim of the creditor is unsecured." On the unrelated issue, the BAP held that a guarantor's liability was revived after a preference settlement.

The Ninth Circuit Rules In The SNTL Corp. Case. On June 23, 2009, the Ninth Circuit decided the appeal, issuing a brief, per curiam decision, stating as follows:

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons stated in its opinion in this case sub nom. We adopt the BAP opinion, In re SNTL Corp., 380 B.R. 204 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), as our own and attach it as an appendix to this opinion. See Appendix, infra.

A Second Look At The BAP's Decision. Given that the Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted as its own the BAP opinion in its entirety, further review of the BAP's analysis is merited. In reaching its decision, the BAP carefully reviewed two earlier decisions by bankruptcy courts that had taken up the open "Travelers" issue, In re Qmect, Inc. (see earlier post on the Qmect decision) and In re Electric Machinery Enterprises, Inc. (see prior post on the Electric Machinery decision), as well as pre-Travelers law, and first explained its analysis of the interplay between Sections 502 and 506(b):

We are not persuaded by the approach of the Electric Machinery court and, like Qmect, we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors. While we cannot predict how the Ninth Circuit will decide this issue in Travelers, we do find a clue in Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986), where the Ninth Circuit observed that section 506(b) defines secured claims and does not limit unsecured claims:

When read literally, subsection (b) arguably limits the fees available to the oversecured creditor. When read in conjunction with § 506(a), however, it may be understood to define the portion of the fees which shall be afforded secured status. We adopt the latter reading.

268 Ltd., 789 F.2d at 678.

Next, the BAP discussed Section 502(b)(1)'s requirement that the court determine the amount of an unsecured claim as of the petition date:

The Electric Machinery court, like the bankruptcy court here and many of the pre-Travelers majority courts, disallowed the postpetition fees of an unsecured creditor because section 502(b)(1) provides that a bankruptcy court “shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition” and the postpetition fees did not exist as of that date. Elec. Mach., 371 B.R. at 551; Pride Cos., 285 B.R. at 373. Because the amount of fees incurred postpetition cannot be determined or calculated as of the petition date, section 502(b) purportedly precludes their allowance. Id. We disagree with this approach, as it is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition of “claim,” which -- as discussed previously -- includes any right to payment, whether or not that right is contingent and unliquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A); Qmect, 368 B.R. at 884.

The BAP then held that the Supreme Court's 1988 Timbers decision did not apply:

We believe that Electric Machinery’s reliance on Timbers is misplaced. Timbers provided that an undersecured creditor could not receive postpetition interest on the unsecured portion of its debt. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380. This holding is consistent with section 502(b)(2), which specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest. Inasmuch as section 502(b) does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees, the comparison between the current issue and that presented in Timbers is not persuasive.

Finally, the BAP held that it was unnecessary to reconcile the competing public policy considerations advanced by the Electric Machinery and Qmect decisions:

Because we find that the Bankruptcy Code itself provides the answer to this issue (by not specifically disallowing postpetition fees), we do not attempt to reconcile these policy concerns. In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.

For more on this decision, as well as the BAP's discussion (now adopted by the Ninth Circuit) on the revival of a guarantor's liability after a preference settlement, this earlier post on the BAP's In re SNTL Corp. decision may be of interest.

On Remand From The Supreme Court's Travelers Decision. One interesting side note involves the BAP's December 2007 comment in the In re SNTL Corp. decision about being unable to predict how the Ninth Circuit would decide this issue in the Travelers case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court. Months later, in May 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued this brief order in the Travelers case, effectively remanding the case for "consideration of the bankruptcy court in the first instance." The bankruptcy judge to whom the decision was remanded? Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali, who wrote the BAP opinion in In re SNTL Corp.

Impact On Unsecured Creditors? As the first ruling by a U.S. Court of Appeals on this open issue, the Ninth Circuit's decision may lead unsecured creditors to include post-petition attorney's fees as part of their allowed unsecured claims when their contracts or a statute provides for them outside of bankruptcy. It will be interesting to see whether the decision has a significant impact on how unsecured creditors in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions pursue claims in bankruptcy cases, and how bankruptcy estates react to such claims for post-petition attorney's fees.

Section 363 Sales And Beyond: An M&A Lawyer's Perspective On Purchasing Assets From Distressed Companies

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 21 Jun 2009 23:40:10 -0800

With the economy suffering through the longest recession since the 1930s, it's little wonder that much of the merger and acquisition ("M&A") activity these days has been focused on distressed companies. The Chrysler and General Motors cases may be the best-known examples, but Chapter 11 bankruptcy is frequently used by companies large and small to sell assets through Section 363 sales. The important intersection between bankruptcy and M&A deals in today's business climate was recently made the focus of an article in the Wall Street Journal, aptly called "Barbarians in Bankruptcy Court."

Although Section 363 sales are quite common, some distressed companies are able to complete an asset sale outside of bankruptcy. The sale may be made directly by the company, or the seller may actually be a lender foreclosing on its collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code. In still other situations, the seller may be an assignee acting through a general assignment for the benefit of creditors under state law.

Regardless of the path chosen, the landscape of distressed asset purchases can be significantly different from that traversed by many traditional M&A lawyers and, most importantly, their clients. Fortunately, one of my M&A partners at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP with significant experience in distressed acquisitions, Jennifer Fonner DiNucci, has recently written an insightful article on the subject. Entitled "Balancing the Risks and Benefits of Transactions Involving Distressed Companies," the article discusses the unique challenges -- and opportunities -- posed by distressed asset acquisitions. It also highlights some of the major issues that potential asset buyers encounter when dealing with a distressed seller, and points out key differences between distressed transactions and more traditional M&A deals with solvent companies.

The article makes for interesting -- and timely -- reading for anyone considering a purchase of assets from a distressed company.

General Motors Files Chapter 11 Bankruptcy In New York

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 01 Jun 2009 06:33:14 -0800

General Motors Corp. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection this morning in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Robert E. Gerber has been assigned to preside over the case.

A copy of GM's bankruptcy petition is available here. The petition listed approximately $82 billion in assets and $172 billion in liabilities. A copy of GM's press release regarding its bankruptcy can be found at the link in this sentence. GM has also created a restructuring website where additional information for customers, suppliers, and others can be found.

Spring 2009 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Tue, 14 Apr 2009 18:44:23 -0800

The Spring 2009 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

Claim issues involving the Madoff SIPA proceeding;
How new Bankruptcy Code provisions involving swap agreements and swap participants are being interpreted;
The importance of the mutuality requirement in setoffs;
Post-petition rent and Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" claims; and
The use of a trademark after a bankruptcy petition is filed.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn's, Boscov's, Gottschalk's, Lenox Sales, Goody's, KB Toys, BTWW Retail, and Innovative Luggage, among others. In addition, a note from my colleague, Jeffrey Cohen, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses the current economic climate and the impact it continues to have on how debtors and creditors have been approaching bankruptcies and restructurings.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Text Of Legislation To Repeal Certain Of BAPCPA's Business Bankruptcy Changes Affecting Retailers Now Available

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Wed, 08 Apr 2009 12:35:31 -0800

As reported in a post on the blog earlier this week, on April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." At that time the official text of the legislation was not available.

The full text of the legislation, which has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, is now available. You can download a copy of the legislation by clicking here.
For those who reviewed the draft bill from the National Association of Credit Management (NACM) website, it appears that the official text of the legislation is identical to the earlier draft.

The bill would repeal changes made by BAPCPA relating to (1) the deadline to assume or reject non-residential real property leases, (2) utility deposits, (3) the Section 503(b)(9) administrative claim, and (4) reclamation. These BAPCPA provisions are among those that have had a significant impact on retailers. For a discussion of the bill's provisions, you can read this blog's earlier post on the legislation or the explanation of the bill by the NACM. It will be interesting to follow the bill as it makes its way through the legislative process in Congress.

Legislation Introduced To Repeal Certain Business Bankruptcy Changes Made By BAPCPA's 2005 Amendments

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 05 Apr 2009 22:23:30 -0800

On April 2, 2009, Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) introduced a bill entitled the "Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009." The bill has been co-sponsored by Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN), the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. As of the date of this post, the bill's official text has not been printed but the National Association of Credit Management has made available on its website what appears to be a final or near-final draft of the legislation, which you can access by clicking here. I plan to provide an update on the blog once the official version of the bill as introduced becomes available.

Introduction of the bill follows testimony before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law by a number of bankruptcy professionals and law professors, including my partner and the Chair of Cooley Godward Kronish LLP's Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, Lawrence Gottlieb. Click here for a prior post about his September 26, 2008 testimony, which focused on the disappearance of reorganizations of retailers since the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as "BAPCPA"). A link to Representative Nadler's press release on the bill's introduction can be found here.

The Legislation's Proposed Changes. The Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009, introduced as H.R. 1942, would make several major amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The common theme is that the proposed bill would repeal certain changes made by BAPCPA and restore the statutory language that was in place before BAPCPA was enacted in 2005. The four principal changes are as follows:

Real Estate Leases. The bill would change Section 365(d)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code by repealing the maximum 210-day period within which debtors could assume or reject non-residential real property leases. Instead of the current 120-day initial period and up to a 90-day extension, the statute would revert back to the initial 60-day period under the prior law but, more importantly, would allow the bankruptcy court, for cause, to grant further extensions without any time limit.
Utilities. Similarly, the bill would repeal Section 366(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, which now requires a deposit of cash or certain cash equivalents to provide adequate assurance of payment to utilities. If enacted, the bill would allow debtors to establish adequate assurance of payment with something short of a monetary deposit, as had been the case under the pre-BAPCPA law.
20-Day Goods Administrative Claim. The bill would also make changes to the law relating to shipments by vendors prior to a bankruptcy filing. It would repeal Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code, added by BAPCPA, which gives an administrative claim to vendors for the value of goods received by a debtor in the ordinary course of business during the 20 days before the bankruptcy petition.
Reclamation. Another change the bill proposes to make is to go back to the pre-BAPCPA language in Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code governing reclamation claims, specifically to repeal language that had expanded the potential reclamation claim for vendors to the 45 days before a bankruptcy petition. The bill would reinstate the pre-BAPCPA provisions restricting reclamation to that provided for under the Uniform Commercial Code (generally only a 10 day period) and permitting an administrative claim or secured claim to be provided to a reclaiming vendor in lieu of a return of the goods pursuant to a valid reclamation claim.
Effective Date. Finally, the bill proposes that its changes would apply to cases commenced on or after the date of its enactment, meaning it would apply to cases filed after the bill became law but not to cases filed before it became law.

Conclusion. If the Business Reorganization and Job Protection Act of 2009 were enacted, it could have a major impact on Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, in particular those involving retailers. As explained in a recent article by several of my colleagues, the cumulative changes made by BAPCPA have had a profound impact on retail Chapter 11 cases. Repealing them could enable retailers the opportunity to emerge from Chapter 11 -- the way they often did in the years before the BAPCPA amendments were adopted. Otherwise, we are likely to continue to see more retailers forced into going of out business sales in Chapter 11.

U.S. Supreme Court Shows Interest In Deciding Whether The Hypothetical Test Or The Actual Test Should Be Used To Determine If IP Licenses Can Be Assumed In Bankruptcy

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Thu, 26 Mar 2009 00:36:38 -0800

It looks like the U.S. Supreme Court, or at least two of the Justices, is interested in deciding whether the "hypothetical test" or the "actual test" should be used in determining whether an intellectual property license can be assumed by a debtor in possession under Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. That was the clear message from the somewhat unusual statement by Justice Kennedy, with whom Justice Breyer joined, issued on March 23, 2009, in connection with the Supreme Court's denial of a writ of certiorari in the N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc. case. You can read a copy of the entire statement by following the link in the prior sentence.

The N.C.P. Marketing Case. As a refresher, in 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here, here, and here to read earlier posts on the case. Last May, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment "for the reasons provided by that court" in an order designed as "not for publication."

Assumption And Assignment. A key basis for the District Court's decision in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case was the way the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 365(c)(1), specifically on the question of whether a debtor in possession can assume an intellectual property license. In bankruptcy parlance, assumption means that the debtor gets to keep the license. Usually, debtors are allowed to exercise their business judgment when deciding whether to assume or reject (read: breach and stop performing) an executory contract, as well as to assume and assign one to a third party. However, Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code puts a limit on a debtor's ability to assign executory contracts, and perhaps even to assume them, when "applicable law" gives the non-debtor party to the contract the right to refuse to deal with someone else. In the N.C.P. Marketing Group decision, the District Court held that federal trademark law under the Lanham Act was such "applicable law" and rendered non-exclusive trademark licenses nonassignable.

The Key Bankruptcy Code Section. Section 365(c)(1) is so important to this debate that it bears careful review. Here's what it says:

(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if—

(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and

(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment.

Hypothetical Versus Actual Test. If a debtor cannot assign an IP license without consent of the licensor, can it at least assume the license? That question has led courts to examine ever so closely the first seven words of Section 365(c): "The trustee may not assume or assign..."

When the statute says that the trustee may not assume or assign an IP license, does the word "or" really mean "and" too?
Put differently, what happens when a debtor is only trying to assume (keep) an IP license and is not actually trying to assign it? Does the Bankruptcy Code language mean that it can neither assume nor assign the license or does it only mean that the debtor cannot assign the license?
That, in a nutshell, is the difference between the so-called "hypothetical test" (which reads Section 365(c)(1)'s language as asking whether the debtor hypothetically could assign the license even if it's only proposing to assume it) and the "actual test" (which interprets the statute's language as asking only what the debtor is actually proposing to do).
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for at least three circuits have adopted the hypothetical test. The Ninth Circuit (covering California, Nevada, Arizona, and a number of other Western states), the Third Circuit (which includes Delaware, the venue of many Chapter 11 cases), and the Fourth Circuit (covering Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and North and South Carolina), have held that Section 365(c)(1) gives most IP licensors a veto right over proposals by a Chapter 11 debtor to assign -- and even to assume -- IP licenses.
For a more complete discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post, entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?"

Justice Kennedy's Statement. N.C.P. Marketing Group petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the decision denying it the ability to assume the trademark license. Although also voting to deny review, Justice Kennedy issued a three-page statement on that decision to express his view, joined in by Justice Breyer, that the Supreme Court should considering granting certiorari in a future case on the "significant question" of whether the hypothetical test or the actual test should be applied in interpreting Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Justice Kennedy summed up his analysis this way:

The division in the courts over the meaning of §365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve for Bankruptcy Courts and for businesses that seek reorganization. This petition for certiorari, however, is not the most suitable case for our resolution of the conflict. Addressing the issue here might first require us to resolve issues that may turn on the correct interpretation of antecedent questions under state law and trademark-protection principles. For those and other reasons, I reluctantly agree with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari. In a different case the Court should consider granting certiorari on this significant question.

Justice Kennedy's discussion of the two tests suggests that he (and perhaps Justice Breyer) may be leaning toward the actual test. Although noting that the actual test "may present problems of its own," including that it aligns Section 365 "with sound bankruptcy policy only at the cost of departing from at least one interpretation of the plain text of the law," Justice Kennedy aimed most of his criticism in the statement at the hypothetical test.

Specifically, Justice Kennedy commented that one "arguable criticism of the hypothetical approach is that it purchases fidelity to the Bankruptcy Code's text by sacrificing sound bankruptcy policy." He stated that the hypothetical test "may prevent debtors-in-possession from continuing to exercise their rights under nonassignable contracts, such as patent and copyright licenses." Continuing, he noted that without these licenses, "some debtors-in-possession may be unable to effect the successful reorganization that Chapter 11 was designed to promote."
He also remarked on what he perceived as a "windfall" to nondebtor parties to valuable executory contracts. While outside of bankruptcy the nondebtor cannot renege on its agreement, if the debtor files bankruptcy "then the nondebtor obtains the power to reclaim--and resell at the prevailing, potentially higher market rate--the rights it sold to the debtor." Although most non-exclusive licenses are not treated as a sale of intellectual property, Justice Kennedy appears to view the potential loss of IP license rights due to a bankruptcy filing as an unfair result.

Conclusion. In denying review in the N.C.P. Marketing Group case, the Supreme Court has let stand the decision of the courts below that, where the hypothetical test applies as it does in the Ninth Circuit, a non-exclusive trademark license cannot be assumed by a debtor in possession. However, given the detailed statement issued by Justice Kennedy, and joined in by Justice Breyer, it appears that the chances of the Supreme Court granting certiorari in a future IP license assumption case have increased. If such a case reaches the Supreme Court, the current split in the circuits on this important intersection between bankruptcy and intellectual property law may finally be resolved.

If Madoff Investors Are Sued By The SIPA Trustee And Pay Money Back, Can They File Proofs Of Claim After The Bar Date?

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Tue, 03 Mar 2009 07:20:23 -0800

Recently, I posted about SIPA liquidations of brokerage firms, prompted by the Securities Investor Protection Act (known as SIPA) liquidations of Lehman Brothers, Inc. and Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. An interesting issue has come up in the Madoff case involving investors who redeemed their accounts before the Madoff bankruptcy was filed. In other alleged Ponzi scheme cases, trustees have sued such investors asserting fraudulent transfer or other claims. The investors in turn often raise defenses, including that they redeemed their accounts in good faith and without any knowledge of the alleged fraud, and lengthy and complex litigation usually results.

Resolution of such litigation can come long after the deadline set for filing proofs of claim (known as a "bar date"). This raises a question: if investors end up paying money back to the estate as a result of the trustee's litigation, will they be able to file proofs of claim -- after the bar date -- for the amounts they have to return? Before turning to that question, let's take a look at how such post-bar date claims are dealt with in non-SIPA bankruptcy cases.

Section 502(h) Of The Bankruptcy Code. Under the Bankruptcy Code, if a person or entity is sued by the bankruptcy estate (usually by a trustee, the debtor in possession, or a creditors' committee) for receipt of an alleged preference or fraudulent transfer, they will be able to file a proof of claim if they end up paying money back to the bankruptcy estate in settlement or as a result of a judgment. Bankruptcy Code section 502(h) expressly covers this situation:

(h) A claim arising from the recovery of property under section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.

Section 502(h) recognizes that resolution of avoidance actions may come long after the original bar date for filing proofs of claim has past and allows holders of these later-arising claims to share in the estate along with other creditors. The Bankruptcy Code treats these claims as having arisen at the time of the payment back to the bankruptcy estate and allows proofs of claim to be filed months or even years after the bar date.

The Claims Bar Date In SIPA Liquidations. In a SIPA liquidation, there are generally two claims bar dates. The first bar date set is for customer claims, in which customers of the failed brokerage firm seek to recover the securities in their accounts (or more likely in the Madoff case, the securities that were supposed to have been in their accounts). The Securities Investor Protection Corporation insurance of up to $500,000 applies to customer claims. A second bar date, usually a few months later, is for general claims. General creditors may include customers with claims in excess of the $500,000 SIPC protection or those who have more traditional trade creditor or other claims.

The Madoff Case. In the Madoff case, last month several investors filed a motion seeking to have the bar date order clarified with regard to their potential claims in the event that the Madoff trustee later sued them and they were forced to return funds under a fraudulent transfer or other avoidance (sometimes called a "clawback") cause of action after the general claims bar date.

These investors had previously redeemed some or all of their investments, and were seeking an order holding that claims arising from avoidance actions could be filed within 30 days after the judgment giving rise to the claim became final, a provision common in non-SIPA bankruptcy bar date orders due to Bankruptcy Code section 502(h).
The moving parties were concerned that without this clarification, any such claims they filed after the bar date might be held to be barred. On the other hand, if they were forced to file a protective claim before the bar date, they would submit to the court's equitable jurisdiction and may be held to have waived their right to a jury trial in any avoidance action brought against them.
The Madoff trustee filed an opposition to the motion (copy available at the prior link) arguing, among other things, that these investors were not creditors, had not been sued, and as a result did not present an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication. In addition, the trustee argued that Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was inapplicable, contending that it was inconsistent with an absolute bar date provision under SIPA. (The SIPA statute provides that Bankruptcy Code provisions are generally applicable in SIPA cases to the extent consistent with SIPA.)
The SIPC also filed a response to the motion (copy available at the prior link) making arguments similar to those advanced by the trustee. In particular, the SIPC argued that Section 502(h) was inconsistent with what the SIPC called SIPA's "immutable" bar date.

The Court's Decision. In a five-page decision issued on February 24, 2009, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Burton R. Lifland denied the motion, first holding that the Court did not have the discretion to extend the bar dates involved. (A copy of the decision is available by clicking on the link in the prior sentence.) The Court then stated that the motion essentially sought a determination of whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code was applicable in SIPA liquidations. Because no avoidance action had yet been filed, the Court held that the requested relief, if granted, would amount to an improper advisory opinion.

As a result, the Court refused to decide whether Bankruptcy Code Section 502(h) applies in SIPA cases, commenting as follows: "Although section 78fff(b) of SIPA specifies that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code shall apply in SIPA liquidation proceedings, to the extent that they are consistent with SIPA, it is unclear whether section 502(h) of the Code would apply. 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(b) (1981)."
The Court concluded by noting that the investors could file a protective proof of claim before the general claims bar date, although that would subject them to the Court's equitable jurisdiction.

An Open Question. Although the Court denied the motion, it left open the ultimate issue involved -- whether Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code applies in SIPA liquidations and permits parties to file proofs of claim after the bar date if they are sued by a trustee and later have to return funds or other property. With the issue undecided for now, some investors may choose to file a protective proof of claim before the bar date passes.

New Article Looks At BAPCPA's Impact On Retailers In Chapter 11

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 23 Feb 2009 21:52:47 -0800

My colleagues Lawrence C. Gottlieb, Michael Klein, and Ronald R. Sussman recently authored an article entitled "BAPCPA's Effects on Retail Chapter 11s Are Profound," in the February 2009 edition of the The Journal of Corporate Renewal, published by the Turnaround Management Association. You can access a copy of the article by clicking on its title in the prior sentence.

What's their assessment of the impact of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA) on retailer Chapter 11 bankruptcies? Here's an excerpt:

BAPCPA’s numerous creditor-friendly amendments and modifications have profoundly impacted the Chapter 11 process, to the point that it is nearly impossible for retailers to reorganize, regardless of the prevailing national and international economic conditions.

Time and again in the three years since its enactment, BAPCPA has significantly impaired the ability of retailers to obtain the necessary post-petition financing and breathing room from creditors to test and implement a reorganization strategy, regardless of the debtor’s capital structure, the fluctuating state of the credit markets, or the extent to which they compete with large discount retailers like WalMart or online retailers like Amazon.

The article details several of the critical changes BAPCPA made, their effect on retailers, and how the timing of a bankruptcy filing is often critical for a retailer to have any chance of trying for a going concern sale to avoid complete liquidation through going out of business sales.

The Cooley Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, which Lawrence Gottlieb chairs, is representing official committees of unsecured creditors in many high-profile national and regional retail bankruptcies, including Steve & Barry’s, The Bombay Company, Hancock Fabrics, Lillian Vernon, The Sharper Image, Mervyns, Shoe Pavilion, Boscov’s and Goody’s. The article, drawn from these recent experiences, is important reading for retailers, creditors, and insolvency professionals alike.

Free Online Bankruptcy Research Tool Now Updated

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 16 Feb 2009 23:18:27 -0800

Last year I posted about the research binder that Chief Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California makes available to bankruptcy professionals and the public. Well, Chief Judge Newsome has now updated his binder as of February 5, 2009, covering cases through Volume 395 of Bankruptcy Reports. Follow the links in this sentence to access the entire binder in PDF format and the HTML version organized by topic. The PDF version is capable of being searched using a key word or phrase.

The primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law given that Chief Judge Newsome presides in the Northern District of California, but some out-of-circuit law is also included. The disclaimer Chief Judge Newsome includes puts the binder's use in context:

The following list of cases and supplemental information is presented for informational and educational purposes only. Though it represents the aggregation of 19 years of research, the Court makes no claims as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases set forth may very well have been superseded, reversed, or otherwise may no longer be good law. The Court has posted it with the intention to educate and assist those who may find it helpful. Accordingly, users should consider it a first, but by no means final, research tool, and should cite check all cases listed herein for continued viability prior to relying on such cases in practice.

With those comments in mind, the binder can be a very helpful place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

The SIPC And SIPA Liquidations: When A Brokerage Firm Goes Bankrupt

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sat, 31 Jan 2009 14:34:26 -0800

It's an organization that can go for years without ever making the news. Then along comes a financial crisis -- and Lehman Brothers and Madoff -- and suddenly the SIPC finds itself at the center of some very big stories. This post takes a look at the SIPC, its role in broker-dealer liquidations, how a SIPA liquidation differs from Chapter 7 liquidation, and how it affects businesses and individuals with accounts at a failed brokerage firm.

What Is The SIPC? SIPC stands for the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. This federally-created nonprofit corporation describes its mission as follows:

When a brokerage firm is closed due to bankruptcy or other financial difficulties and customer assets are missing, SIPC steps in as quickly as possible and, within certain limits, works to return customers' cash, stock and other securities. Without SIPC, investors at financially troubled brokerage firms might lose their securities or money forever or wait for years while their assets are tied up in court.

The SIPC and its activities are governed by the Securities Investor Protection Act, known as SIPA, which was enacted in 1970. The SIPA is not in Title 11 of the United States Code where the Bankruptcy Code is found, but in Title 15, together with other securities laws. That said, the SIPA incorporates many provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

When Does The SIPC Get Involved? When a SIPC-member brokerage fails, the SIPC has the authority to step in. If the brokerage has filed a bankruptcy -- and notwithstanding the automatic stay -- the SIPC can file a lawsuit in the district court seeking a protective decree. Once granted, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding is put on hold and the case becomes a SIPA liquidation instead. Here's how the SIPC explains its role:

The [SIPC] either acts as trustee or works with an independent court-appointed trustee in a missing asset case to recover funds. The statute that created SIPC provides that customers of a failed brokerage firm receive all non-negotiable securities that are already registered in their names or in the process of being registered. All other so-called "street name" securities are distributed on a pro rata basis. At the same time, funds from the SIPC reserve are available to satisfy the remaining claims of each customer up to a maximum of $500,000. This figure includes a maximum of $100,000 on claims for cash. Recovered funds are used to pay investors whose claims exceed SIPC's protection limit of $500,000. SIPC often draws down its reserve to aid investors.

As this explanation notes, there is a $500,000 per customer limit to SIPC protection, including a $100,000 limit on claims for cash held in an account. These apply to both businesses and individuals. Some brokerage firms also have private insurance in addition to the SIPC protection.

How Is A SIPA Liquidation Different From A Chapter 7 Bankruptcy? Although Chapter 7 bankruptcy and SIPA liquidations both involve the liquidation of a brokerage firm, there is an enormous difference in terms of what happens to each customer's securities.

In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy of a brokerage firm, the bankruptcy trustee is required to liquidate -- that means sell -- all of the securities held in "street name" by the failed brokerage. Section 748 of the Bankruptcy Code, part of Chapter 7's special stockbroker liquidation provisions, spells it out:

As soon as practicable after the date of the order for relief, the trustee shall reduce to money, consistent with good market practice, all securities held as property of the estate, except for customer name securities delivered or reclaimed under section 751 of this title.

Subject to certain exceptions, in Chapter 7 customers receive a pro rata share of the proceeds from the sale of the securities, not the securities themselves. The only securities that are not sold are "customer name securities," which are handed back to their owners. (More on the difference between street name and customer name securities below.)

In a SIPA liquidation, the trustee's goal is exactly the opposite. Instead of being required to sell the securities, a SIPA trustee works to return to customers the securities in their accounts, often through a transfer of the accounts to a financially healthy brokerage firm. When that isn't possible, the SIPA trustee has the authority to purchase securities to replace any that were missing, tapping into the SIPC's reserve fund when necessary to cover the acquisition costs. If securities are missing or the SIPA trustee is otherwise unable to return a customer's "street name" securities, then the brokerage's firms remaining customer assets are divided up and funds distributed on a pro rata basis based on the total size of "net equity claims" of customers (generally, net of any margin loans owed by the customer). As in a Chapter 7, "customer name securities" are returned to the customer, including those in the process of being registered in the customer's name.

Customers generally prefer SIPA liquidations over Chapter 7 bankruptcy. (Stockbrokers and commodity brokers are not permitted to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.) Most SIPC member brokerages that file bankruptcy end up either in a SIPA liquidation or with the SIPC directly involved.

What Are Customer Name Securities? As an aside, there is a big distinction between street name and customer name securities.

As the term implies, customer name securities are a typically limited group of securities held by a brokerage firm that are literally registered with the issuer in the customer's name, such as an actual stock certificate registered in and bearing the customer's own name.
These days most securities are registered in "street name," with the actual legal owner being Cede & Co., the Depository Trust Corporation's nominee name.
Each brokerage has its own DTC participant account holding the securities for all of its customers, and the brokerage in turn keeps records of which customer owns which securities in the DTC account.
Street name securities are far easier to trade than customer name securities because the trade can be accomplished via DTC instead of having to make a physical transfer of a stock certificate.

The Customer Claim Bar Date. In both a Chapter 7 and a SIPA liquidation, a deadline, known as a bar date, will be established by which creditors claims must be filed. However, in a SIPA liquidation a separate "customer claim" bar date is also set. Customers seeking SIPC protection must file their claims by that date using a special customer claim form, which asks for details on the securities in the customer's account, dates of trades, and other information. Follow the link for an example of the SIPC claim form used in the Lehman Brothers SIPA liquidation. If the customer's account has not already been transferred to a solvent brokerage firm, a customer with an allowed claim will receive back the securities that were held in their account at the failed brokerage firm, together with any cash held, up to the SIPC protection limits.

Where To Learn More About SIPA Liquidations. For additional information on SIPA liquidations and their Chapter 7 counterparts, you may find this discussion on the U.S. Court system's website of interest. In addition, SIPA trustees appointed in brokerage cases frequently establish a case-specific website. These links will take you to the websites created by the Lehman Brothers SIPA trustee and the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities SIPA trustee.

Conclusion. They may not be common, and the SIPC does not provide the same type of protection as the FDIC, but SIPA liquidations can play an important role in protecting investors when brokerage firms fail. However, the SIPC is generally able to intervene only when one of its member firms fails, making that little-noticed "Member SIPC" designation more significant that most investors realize.

Amendments To The Federal Bankruptcy Rules Take Effect December 1, 2008

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 30 Nov 2008 23:23:09 -0800

Nearly every year, changes are made to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure -- the ones that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed -- to address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. This year's amendments to the national bankruptcy rules take effect on December 1, 2008.

Business Bankruptcy Rule Changes. Unlike the more substantive modifications made last year (discussed here), this year's amendments make a host of relatively smaller, but still important, changes. The most notable ones for business bankruptcy cases involve privacy concerns. New rules have been put in place to protect patients when health care businesses file for bankruptcy while others govern the proposed sale or transfer of personally identifiable information by any type of business. Separate rule changes implement provisions of Chapter 15 (the Bankruptcy Code's cross-border and international insolvency chapter), address a range of issues in small business Chapter 11 cases, grant courts more flexibility in giving notice to foreign creditors, introduce various consumer bankruptcy procedural changes, and establish a process to allow some bankruptcy court decisions to be appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals.

For a complete set of the newly amended rules redlined to show the changes made, together with a helpful summary of these changes, click on the link in this sentence.
For a "clean" set of the newly amended rules, click on the link in this sentence.

Interim Bankruptcy Rules Being Replaced. These rules also replace the interim bankruptcy rules that have been in place for the past few years following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (known as BAPCPA). Some bankruptcy courts, such as the District of Delaware and the Southern District of New York, have already issued general orders retracting the effectiveness of the interim rules effective as of December 1, 2008.

Rules Of The Road. At a time when the financial crisis is likely to push more and more companies into Chapter 11, bankruptcy attorneys and other insolvency professionals will want to review the rule changes closely to make sure they are following the most current version of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. For debtors, creditors, and other parties, this year's rule amendments should help make management of Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases more consistent with BAPCPA's changes and, potentially, a more efficient process.

Fall 2008 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Is Now Available

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 02 Nov 2008 17:18:27 -0800

The Fall 2008 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley Godward Kronish LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter or to register to receive future editions. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

Claims and defenses under the WARN Act;
The Supreme Court's decision on transfer taxes and bankruptcy sales;
Section 363 "free and clear" sales in bankruptcy; and
The interplay between claim objections and the Section 503(b)(9) "20 day goods" administrative claim.

This edition also has information on some of our recent representations of official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers. These include Mervyn's, Boscov's, Hancock Fabrics, Steve & Barry's, Goody's, Sharper Image, The Bombay Company, and Shoe Pavilion, among others. In addition, a note from my partner Adam Rogoff, the editor of Absolute Priority, discusses how the current economic problems will require lenders, unsecured creditors, and others to consider the impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy on their rights.

I hope you find this latest edition of Absolute Priority to be a helpful resource.

Second Liens And Recharacterization: Is More Litigation Around The Corner?

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 19 Oct 2008 21:03:29 -0800

In many Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, unsecured creditors investigate whether a basis exists to recharacterize existing secured debt as equity. The reason? A successful challenge can turn first or second lien secured debt into "back-of-the-line" capital contributions, enabling unsecured creditors to realize a much greater recovery. A recent article by two of my Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group colleagues at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, Ronald R. Sussman and Michael A. Klein, digs deeper into the complex issues behind these claims.

Appearing in the October 2008 edition of The Journal of Corporate Renewal published by the Turnaround Management Association, the article is entitled "Recharacterization Battles Likely in Next Round of Bankruptcies." You can access a copy of the article, reprinted with permission of The Journal of Corporate Renewal (© 2008, The Journal of Corporate Renewal), by clicking on its title in the prior sentence. It first discusses the concept of recharacterization itself, including the key factors courts typically apply. Next, the article compares recharacterization to the doctrine of equitable subordination under Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and examines some of the key differences between the two.

After setting the stage, the article then looks ahead to what appears to be a coming wave of bankruptcy cases. It focuses on how future efforts by unsecured creditors to challenge second lien loans -- a type of financing that has become a major part of corporate capital structures over the past several years -- may fare:

The next wave of bankruptcies undoubtedly will include attempts by unsecured creditors to recharacterize second lien debt as equity, especially when the second lien holder is an insider of the debtor. However, the current framework established by Bankruptcy Courts presents significant obstacles to unsecured creditors seeking to knock out the second lien claims of lenders that provided capital on a purportedly secured basis to a struggling debtor that was unable to find capital from alternative sources.

The article observes that, given the present state of the law, courts will have to embrace a more flexible legal standard if unsecured creditors are to have success in recharacterizing second lien debt as equity. It concludes by offering a different approach for addressing recharacterization with this new landscape in mind. Unsecured creditors, lenders, insolvency professionals and others confronting these issues will find the article to be a helpful and interesting read.

The 2005 Bankruptcy Law Changes And Their Impact On Retail Reorganizations

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Wed, 15 Oct 2008 00:17:10 -0800

On September 26, 2008, my partner Lawrence Gottlieb, the Chair of the Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, testified before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. Joining him at the hearing were Professor Jay Westbrook of the University of Texas Law School and Professor Barry Adler of the New York University School of Law. The subject of the hearing was "Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan's, and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Working?" You can access their testimony and watch the full hearing by clicking on the link in the prior sentence.

In his testimony, entitled "The Disappearance of Retail Reorganization In The Post-BAPCPA Era," (a copy of which is available by clicking on its title), he discussed the major impact the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA") has had on retail reorganizations. One of his main observations involves the 2005 amendment limiting the time within which a debtor may assume or reject commercial real estate leases to a total of 210 days (if a 90-day extension is granted). He testified that this change, in combination with other BAPCPA provisions that reduce a retailer's liquidity, has had a devastating effect on a retailer's ability to reorganize. Among his comments are the following:

BAPCPA has left retailers without adequate time and money to effectuate operational initiatives and cost cutting measures needed to resuscitate their businesses. Retailers now enter the Chapter 11 arena with little choice but to narrowly tailor their strategy to ensure that their lenders are not deprived of the substantial benefits and protections conferred by section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes the use, sale or lease of estate property outside the ordinary course of business upon court approval. Section 363(b) offers the unique ability to cleanse the assets of a distressed company by permitting debtors to convey assets “free and clear,” thereby maximizing value by removing the uncertainty of such stigmas as successor liability, fraudulent transfer claims and lien issues that often accompany asset purchases. Prepetition lenders, cognizant of this powerful liquidating tool and mindful of the numerous liquidity hurdles that the debtor must clear as a result of BAPCPA, have little to gain by risking their collateral in pursuit of a reorganization process now widely perceived as hopeless.

Indeed, the constricted time frames and liquidity problems created and imposed by BAPCPA have effectively eliminated the need for existing lenders to provide any more financing than necessary to position the debtor to liquidate its assets in the first few months of the case. Today, the debtor is no longer “in possession” of its assets or its future upon the commencement of its Chapter 11 case. BAPCPA’s constrictive liquidity provisions and the enormous leverage handed to secured lenders as a result thereof have eliminated the ability of retailers to control the Chapter 11 process as a “debtor-in-possession.” Rather, the process is now controlled almost exclusively by prepetition lenders, who have essentially assumed the role of "creditor-in-possession."

The Cooley Bankruptcy & Restructuring Group, which Lawrence Gottlieb chairs, is representing official committees of unsecured creditors in high-profile national and regional retail bankruptcies such as Steve & Barry’s, The Bombay Company, Hancock Fabrics, Lillian Vernon, The Sharper Image, Mervyns, Shoe Pavilion, Boscov’s and Goody’s. His testimony, drawing on experience in these recent cases as well as many others in the past, underscores how BAPCPA's key changes have transformed Chapter 11 bankruptcy from a process by which retailers could reorganize into one where almost all face an early liquidation. Retailers, creditors, and insolvency professionals will find his full testimony on the disappearing retail reorganization both timely and informative.

The Credit Crisis And DIP Financing

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 12 Oct 2008 20:30:14 -0800

The credit crisis has made it difficult for companies to borrow throughout the economy. It should come as little surprise then that the constriction in the credit markets is hitting Chapter 11 debtors in possession as well. According to an article entitled "Bankruptcy financing gets pricier and more elusive," debtor in possession financing (commonly known as "DIP financing") has recently become more costly for companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy -- when it's available at all.

Adding to the challenge is the amount of prepetition secured financing, including second lien debt, that many companies took on over the past few years when financing was easier to get. A company that has already encumbered its assets with secured debt may have little or no unencumbered assets to offer a DIP lender as collateral.
The article predicts that fewer companies in Chapter 11 will be able to find new lenders to provide DIP financing, giving the DIP's existing lenders the advantage in negotiating DIP financing terms such as interest rate and fees.
Alternative sources of DIP financing may be able to be found in certain circumstances. In some cases, the buyer in a Section 363 asset sale may provide DIP financing to bridge to the closing of the sale. However, such limited purpose financing is not a substitute for the type of DIP financing generally needed for a successful reorganization.

Cash is king in bankruptcy and DIP financing is often a key source of that cash. Until the credit crisis subsides and DIP financing becomes more available, companies may find it more difficult to reorganize in Chapter 11.

Ninth Circuit Rules In N.C.P. Marketing Trademark License Case

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Sun, 28 Sep 2008 09:50:40 -0800

Back in March I gave an update on In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., a case addressing whether a debtor can assume a trademark license over the trademark owner's objection. In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada issued its first of a kind decision, In re: N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D.Nev. 2005), holding that trademark licenses are personal and nonassignable in bankruptcy absent a provision in the trademark license to the contrary. Click here for a copy of the N.C.P Marketing Group decision and here and here to read earlier posts on the case.

The N.C.P. Marketing Court's Analysis. In reaching its conclusion, the District Court held that under the Lanham Act, the federal trademark statute, a trademark owner has a right and duty to control the quality of goods sold under the mark:

Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the good will, quality, and value of its products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely assignable to a third party.

The trademark owner in that case, Billy Blanks of the Billy Blanks® Tae Bo® fitness program, successfully moved the court to compel rejection of the trademark license because under the "hypothetical test" analysis of Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contracts that cannot be assigned by the debtor without the nondebtor party's consent cannot be assumed by the debtor either. (For a full discussion of these issues, take a look at this earlier post entitled "Assumption of Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: Are Recent Cases Tilting Toward Debtors?")

The Ninth Circuit Appeal. N.C.P. Marketing appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, the appeal was fully briefed, and oral argument had been scheduled for November 5, 2007.

Prior to the oral argument, the Chapter 7 trustee for N.C.P. Marketing reached a settlement in the case. At the trustee's request, the Ninth Circuit took the oral argument off calendar and directed the parties to move to dismiss the appeal if the settlement was approved by the Bankruptcy Court.
However, instead of approving the settlement the Bankruptcy Court authorized a sale of the appeal rights to certain objecting parties, who then restarted the appeal before the Ninth Circuit and requested an oral argument.

The Ninth Circuit Affirms The District Court's Decision. In an unpublished order dated May 23, 2008, the Ninth Circuit denied the request for oral argument and affirmed the District Court's judgment "for the reasons provided by that court." The appellants' request for a panel rehearing or rehearing en banc was denied by order dated July 9, 2008. The Ninth Circuit designated the May 23, 2008 order affirming the District Court as "not for publication," meaning it is not precedent under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Ninth Circuit's Circuit Rules. Nevertheless, the order may be cited in other cases.

A Final Thought. Precedent or not, the Ninth Circuit's order has affirmed the District Court's decision on this important issue. Trademark owners now have a stronger argument in the Ninth Circuit (and also in the Southern District of Florida given the In re Wellington Vision, Inc. decision last year), that non-exclusive trademark licenses may not be assigned, or even assumed, in bankruptcy cases absent consent of the trademark owner.

Will Section 363 "Free And Clear" Sale Orders Survive An Appeal? A Recent Appellate Decision Raises New Doubts

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 18 Aug 2008 07:30:40 -0800

The primary objective of any buyer at a Section 363 sale, whether one purchasing for cash or an existing secured creditor making a credit bid, is to obtain good title to the purchased assets free and clear of any liens, claims, or interests. However, a recent decision on this subject by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is causing something of a stir in the bankruptcy world.

In Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), the Ninth Circuit BAP held that a senior secured creditor's credit bid, in an amount less than the aggregate value of all liens against the property in question, did not satisfy the requirements of Section 365(f) and permit the sale to be "free and clear" of the existing junior liens on the property and reversed the bankruptcy court's order on appeal. You can read the entire opinion by following the link in this sentence.

For an excellent discussion of the decision and the analysis employed by the BAP, be sure to read Steve Jakubowsi's post on the case over at The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Instead of covering the same ground, I want to discuss some of the implications of the decision for Section 363 bankruptcy sales.

Credit Bid Or Foreclosure? First, the Clear Channel decision raises questions about how a senior secured creditor should proceed in a bankruptcy case.

On the one hand, the BAP's decision that a sale will not be "free and clear" of junior liens is not that surprising. It has generally been accepted that for a "short sale" under Section 363 (one in which the purchase price is less than the amount of liens against the property) to be free and clear of liens, the secured creditors must consent or one of the other exceptions under Section 363(f) must be satisfied. Those other exceptions include a lien subject to "bona fide" dispute or a situation in which the lien holder can be forced to accept a cash payment in satisfaction of the lien.
What has surprised some about this new decision is the holding that a credit bid by a senior secured creditor also cannot be made free and clear of junior liens, even though the senior secured creditor could have wiped out the junior liens through a foreclosure under state law.
Section 363(f)'s focus on the "aggregate value of all liens on such property" makes the existence of junior liens the issue, regardless of whether they are in the money. Put differently, even if the junior liens are worthless, they exist and a Section 363 sale to a credit bidding senior secured creditor will not be free and clear of those junior liens.
With the enormous increase in second lien lending over the past several years, including many second lien loans made as part of private equity buyouts, expect to see more Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in which substantial junior liens are present.

This ruling seems to leave secured creditors seeking to take title to their collateral with two main choices. One is to seek relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on its collateral, avoiding the Section 363 sale and credit bid approach altogether. If the assets cannot be sold for cash in an amount greater than the senior secured creditor's claim, and if a reorganization is not reasonably in prospect (the key factors in a bankruptcy court's decision whether to lift the stay), this may be the preferred path. A second approach would be to complete the credit bid through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, something the Clear Channel court implied was also available. However, some secured creditors may find the delay and expense involved in being a plan proponent problematic. As a plan proponent, the secured creditor would take on the obligation to pay administrative expenses of the estate on the effective date of the reorganization plan, as well as satisfaction of all of the other requirements for confirming a plan.

The Risks Of An Appeal: The Limits Of Section 363(m) And The Mootness Doctrine. Second, perhaps the most important aspect of the Clear Channel decision is the risks it exposes even for "good faith" purchasers in Section 363 sales. Purchasers of assets under Section 363 regularly seek a finding that they are a good faith purchaser because a sale to such a buyer cannot be overturned on appeal. This protection is found in Section 363(m) and reads as follows:

The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

Here, the BAP held that although the sale itself to the senior secured creditor could not be overturned on appeal, the protection of Section 363(m) did not extend to the question of whether the sale was made "free and clear" of the junior liens. Instead, the BAP ruled that even in the absence of a stay pending appeal, the appellate court could reverse the "free and clear" determination because Section 363(m) is expressly limited to sale orders under Sections 363(b) and (c), which authorize the sale or lease of property, and does not extend to "free and clear" orders under Section 363(f).

Going hand in hand with the Section 363(m) ruling was the decision's holding that the closing of the asset sale did not render the "free and clear" issue moot. Instead, even though no stay pending appeal was obtained, the BAP concluded that relief could still be granted on the "free and clear" question by ordering that the junior lien remained attached the property even after its sale.

When Should A Buyer Close The Sale? The Section 363(m) and mootness rulings raise issues about when a buyer of assets under Section 363 should close on the sale. The BAP's views on Section 363(m) and mootness do not appear limited to the credit bid situation involved in the Clear Channel decision. Instead, if a good faith purchaser for cash pays less than the "aggregate value of all liens" against the purchased assets -- or perhaps a question exists whether a lien or interest is really in "bona fide" dispute -- the "free and clear" aspect of the sale may be outside the protection of Section 363(m) and an appeal by a secured creditor or other interest holder may not be moot.

Buyers usually prefer to close as soon as possible after entry of a bankruptcy court's order approving the sale, especially if the value of the assets are declining or the debtor is running out of cash.
A buyer that closes with an appeal threatened runs the risk of having the "free and clear" decision overturned months or even years later and the purchased assets suddenly subject to the debtor's liens.
While every sale objection or appeal will not raise these issues, if a serious objection to the "free and clear" aspect of the bankruptcy court's sale order has been made, and the objector is likely to appeal, the buyer should consider whether to wait until the later of (a) the passage of the 10-day appeal period, or (b) a final appellate decision affirming the bankruptcy court's denial of the objection, before agreeing to close the sale.
Buyers may want to consider including provisions in the asset purchase agreement to permit this type of flexibility on when to close or to terminate the agreement if the closing is substantially delayed.

The Precedential Effect Of A BAP Decision. Unlike a U.S. Court of Appeals itself, a BAP is made up of bankruptcy judges, not federal circuit judges. Given a BAP's place in the judicial system's hierarchy, its decisions are not given the same precedential weigh as U.S. Court of Appeals decisions, and this means that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit might reach a different conclusion. Moreover, BAP decisions generally are not binding on bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit. That said, some bankruptcy judges make a practice of following BAP decisions and the BAP's reasoning may influence other judges.

Conclusion. The BAP's Clear Channel decision has important implications for Section 363 asset sales. Secured creditors intent on making a credit bid may now rethink that approach when junior liens are present. Cash buyers may be more cautious on when to close a sale if disputes exist over whether the sale should be "free and clear" of existing liens and interests. It will be interesting to see how other courts, in the Ninth Circuit and beyond, react to the decision, so stay tuned.

Recent California Decision Addresses Whether Directors And Officers Can Be Liable For Unpaid Wages Of A Bankrupt Company

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 07 Jul 2008 21:54:43 -0800

When insolvent companies are unable to make payroll or to pay accrued vacation or other amounts owed employees, the question often arises whether directors, officers, or shareholders face personal liability for these unpaid amounts. The California Court of Appeal recently addressed that issue, examining whether particular sections of the California Labor Code, as well as section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code (California's unfair competition law), impose personal liability.

The Court of Appeal Decision. In its April 2008 decision in Bradstreet v. Wong, the Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held that owners, officers, and managers of an insolvent company, which later filed bankruptcy, were not personally liable for unpaid wages, overtime, vacation pay, and other amounts based on a series of alleged California Labor Code violations. The Court also ruled that these individuals were not liable to pay restitution under Business and Professions Code section 17200. A copy of the Court of Appeal's opinion is available here.

Risks Remain. Although the decision is a favorable one for officers and directors, risks remain. Be sure to read the informative discussion written by my colleagues in the Employment & Labor Group at Cooley Godward Kronish LLP for a careful analysis of the decision. As they explain, despite this new decision, and the California Supreme Court's 2005 decision on similar issues in the Reynolds v. Bement case, it's possible that directors and officers may still face a risk of individual liability under other California Labor Code sections or based on different legal theories. Depending on the facts and statutes involved, there may also be individual liability under federal law or the laws of other states.

Get Advice. The issues presented when an insolvent company is, or might be, unable to pay wages are complicated. Directors and officers of a company facing this situation should be sure to get both insolvency and employment law advice to help guide them, and the company, through these difficult straits.

Supreme Court Decision Settles The Section 1146(a) Transfer Tax Exemption Issue

reisenbach@cooleygodward.com (Bob Eisenbach) — Mon, 16 Jun 2008 17:36:34 -0800

On June 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., the case involving whether Section 1146(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which exempts from stamp or similar taxes any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of the Code,” applies to transfers of assets occurring prior to the actual confirmation of such a plan. The issue has taken on added importance in recent years because so many sales of assets in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases -- including the one in the Piccadilly case -- are made through Section 363, well before any plan of reorganization is confirmed.

(For more background on the issue, and the oral argument before the Supreme Court last March, you can read a prior post entitled "What Happened At the Supreme Court Oral Argument In The Section 1146(a) Transfer Tax Exemption Case?")

The Supreme Court's Holding. In a 7-2 decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that Section 1146(a) applies only to post-confirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan of reorganization. Follow the link for a copy of the Supreme Court's decision. The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit (opinion below available here), which unlike the Third and Fourth Circuits, had held that pre-confirmation transfers could also be covered by the exemption. The Supreme Court summed up its holding as follows:

The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Code, and applicable substantive canons all lead to the same conclusion: Section 1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed. Because Piccadilly transferred its assets before its Chapter 11 plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court, it may not rely on §1146(a) to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment below and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Keys To The Decision. In examining the statute and the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court found Florida's reading of the statute far more reasonable:

While both sides present credible interpretations of §1146(a), Florida has the better one. To be sure, Congress could have used more precise language—i.e., “under a plan that has been confirmed”—and thus removed all ambiguity. But the two readings of the language that Congress chose are not equally plausible: Of the two, Florida’s is clearly the more natural. The interpretation advanced by Piccadilly and adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—that there must be “some nexus between the pre-confirmation transfer and the confirmed plan” for §1146(a) to apply, 484 F. 3d, at 1304—places greater strain on the statutory text than the simpler construction advanced by Florida and adopted by the Third and Fourth Circuit.

Later, the Court added the following:

Even if we were to adopt Piccadilly’s broad definition of “under,” its interpretation of the statute faces other obstacles. The asset transfer here can hardly be said to have been consummated “in accordance with” any confirmed plan because, as of the closing date, Piccadilly had not even submitted its plan to the Bankruptcy Court for confirmation. Piccadilly’s asset sale was thus not conducted “in accordance with” any plan confirmed under Chapter 11. Rather, it was conducted “in accordance with” the procedures set forth in Chapter 3—specifically, §363(b)(1). To read the statute as Piccadilly proposes would make §1146(a)’s exemption turn on whether a debtor-in-possession’s actions are consistent with a legal instrument that does not exist—and indeed may not even be conceived of—at the time of the sale. Reading §1146(a) in context with other relevant Code provisions, we find nothing justifying such a curious interpretation of what is a straightforward exemption.

In dismissing another of Piccadilly's arguments, the Court had occasion to make an interesting comparison between the mechanics of assumption and rejection of executory contracts and the timing of a transfer for Section 1146(a) purposes:

We agree with Bildisco’s commonsense observation that the decision whether to reject a contract or lease must be made before confirmation. But that in no way undermines the fact that the rejection takes effect upon or after confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan (or before confirmation if pursuant to §365(d)(2)). In the context of §1146(a), the decision whether to transfer a given asset “under a plan confirmed” must be made prior to submitting the Chapter 11 plan to the bankruptcy court, but the transfer itself cannot be “under a plan confirmed” until the court confirms the plan in question. Only at that point does the transfer become eligible for the stamp-tax exemption.

The Court also found that the placement of Section 1146(a) in a subchapter entitled "POSTCONFIMRATION MATTERS" was yet another factor which, while not decisive, helped to undermine Piccadilly's arguments.

Canon Fodder. The Court next held that even if the statute were ambiguous, which the Court did not expressly decide, two canons of statutory interpretation would compel a decision in favor of Florida's reading of the statute.

First, changes were made to Section 1146 as recently as the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, and Congress is generally presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of a statute (here decisions from the Third and Fourth Circuits refusing to apply the exemption to pre-confirmation transfers, both of which predated the Eleventh Circuit's 2007 decision in Piccadilly) when the statute was revised.
Second, a federalism canon directs courts to proceed carefully before recognizing an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed. Given Piccadilly's arguments that the statute was ambiguous, the Court found this canon to be "decisive in this case."
The Court rejected the canons advanced by Piccadilly, most notably viewing Chapter 11 (and Section 1146) as a remedial statute to be liberally construed to facilitate reorganizations.

The Dissent. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, focused on "whether the time of the transfer matters." Finding the language of the statute ambiguous, he looked to the policy Congress was trying to implement with the statute. He concluded that Congress would not have "insisted upon temporal limits" in Section 1146(a) since, in his view, "it makes no difference whether a transfer takes place before or after the plan is confirmed."

Other Bloggers Weigh In. For an excellent and entertaining review of the decision, be sure to read Steve Jakubowski's post on his Bankruptcy Litigation Blog. Hat tip as well to the SCOTUS Blog for first reporting on the decision (and updating its excellent wiki on the case) and to the Delaware Business Bankruptcy Report for its post as well.

Minor Impact On Chapter 11 Cases? Of course, the most immediate impact of the decision is that pre-confirmation Section 363 sales will no longer be exempt from stamp or transfer taxes in any circuit, and those taxes will have to be paid. What remains to be seen is whether sales will be delayed until plan confirmation in order to take advantage of the Section 1146(a) exemption. Given how many asset sales in Chapter 11 cases these days are conducted at the early stages of a case because of financing limitations and declining asset values, a move to delay those sales until plan confirmation seems unlikely. With an economic downturn upon us, the pressures that have led to the expanded use of Section 363 are not likely to abate, regardless of how attractive a stamp or transfer tax exemption may be.