Business Bankruptcy Blog

Ninth Circuit Opens The Door To Recharacterization Of Debt As Equity

Bob Eisenbach — Wed, 08 May 2013 12:52:06 -0800

In bankruptcy, prepetition loans made by insiders are often investigated, and sometimes challenged, by debtors, creditors' committees, or trustees. The two most frequent challenges brought are that (1) the loans in question are not really debt and should be recharacterized as equity, and (2) the debt should be equitably subordinated below the claims of all or some other creditors. Recharacterization focuses on the intent of the parties (e.g., did the parties intend for the debt to be repaid or treated like equity) and the characteristics of the alleged debt instrument. Equitable subordination, on the other hand, generally requires, among other facts, a showing of inequitable conduct on the insider's part. A successful challenge on either basis usually means the insider receives nothing on its claim since most debtors cannot pay all creditors in full.

The Ninth Circuit BAP Had Rejected Recharacterization Claims. For the past 27 years, although recharacterization challenges have been advanced in cases elsewhere around the country, lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have largely rejected them. Instead, they have tended to follow the holding of a 1986 decision by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986), which shut the door on recharacterization claims.

In Pacific Express, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the characterization of claims as equity or debt was governed exclusively by equitable subordination principles under Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
This meant that no separate challenge based only on recharacterization of debt as equity could be pursued.

The Ninth Circuit Opens The Door. With a decision issued last week by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, made at the Circuit level and not by the lower BAP court, those days are over. In its April 30, 2013 opinion in In the Matter of: Fitness Holdings Int'l, the Ninth Circuit held that recharacterization and equitable subordination address distinct concerns, and a recharacterization challenge separate from equitable subordination is permissible. (Follow the link in the prior sentence to read the opinion.) The Fitness Holdings court stated that recharacterization determines whether there is a claim to be paid at all while equitable subordination considers whether an allowed claim should be subordinated to other claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the Pacific Express court erred in holding that the characterization of claims as equity or debt is governed solely by Bankruptcy Code Section 510(c).

The case arose in the context of a fraudulent transfer claim originally brought on behalf of the bankruptcy estate by the creditors' committee. The committee alleged that the debtor's pre-bankruptcy repayment of a loan made by its sole shareholder was a constructively fraudulent transfer, a transfer made at a time when the debtor was insolvent or otherwise financially impaired and for which it did not receive "reasonably equivalent value."
Normally, repayment of a loan provides a debtor with reasonably equivalent value because it discharges an equal amount of debt owed by the debtor. However, the complaint sought to recharacterize the loan itself as an equity interest. If recharacterized, the repayment would be treated as a distribution to equity for which the debtor received no value in return.
In a footnote, the Ninth Circuit also called out the district court for erroneously holding that it, an Article III court, was bound by a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.

State Law Applies To Recharacterization Claims. Having opened the door, the Ninth Circuit then determined how recharacterization claims should be considered. Specifically, the Court ruled that bankruptcy courts should look to state law to determine whether a challenged debt claim should be characterized as debt or equity. The Ninth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Lothian Oil Inc., 650 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2011), which applied state law, rejecting the approach used in the Third and Sixth Circuits, which have developed their own set of factors based on a bankruptcy court's general equitable authority under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. This widened a split among the circuits but the Ninth Circuit held that Supreme Court authority, including Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443 (2007), requires state law to govern the substance of claims and, as a result, also the characterization of a claim as debt or equity. (Read this prior post for more information on the Travelers case.) In Fitness Holdings, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the issue of whether the loan should actually be recharacterized, instead sending the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings.

Conclusion. The Fitness Holdings decision aligns the Ninth Circuit with most other courts around the country in permitting a claim to be challenged on grounds that it should be recharacterized as equity instead of a true debt. Although the case arose in the context of a fraudulent transfer claim, the holding that recharacterization claims may be made separately from equitable subordination claims seems likely to be applied outside of that context. That said, a recharacterization claim is not easy to establish, and not every insider loan will be susceptible to such a challenge. Also, recharacterization claims have not typically been brought in state court. It remains to be seen how application of state law, as opposed to the well-developed factors used by bankruptcy courts in other circuits, will impact the viability of recharacterization claims. Nevertheless, given Fitness Holdings, recharacterization is now an issue that major shareholders and other insiders, as well as debtors, creditors' committees, and trustees, will need to keep in mind in bankruptcy cases in the Ninth Circuit.

Spring 2013 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

Bob Eisenbach — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 11:43:45 -0800

The Spring 2013 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has now been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

The U.S. Supreme Court's decision upholding a secured creditor's right to credit bid;
Determining when a claim arises under the Bankruptcy Code;
How the assumption of an executory contract can protect a party from a preference claim; and
A recent Seventh Circuit decision applying the absolute priority rule in a Chapter 11 plan context.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others, and our work for Chapter 11 debtors. Recent committee cases include Mervyn's Holdings, Appleseed's Intermediate Holdings, Atari, Vertis Holdings, United Retail, and Urban Brands, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Seventh Circuit Decision Gives Support To Protecting Buyers In Bankruptcy Sales From Successor Liability

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 02 Apr 2013 09:44:17 -0800

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a buyer of assets outside of bankruptcy (in this case, from a receivership), takes on successor liability for federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claims made by the employees of the company whose assets it purchases. Although the case arose in a receivership, the Seventh Circuit's opinion provides important insights into how these issues play out in bankruptcy sales of substantially all assets of a debtor.

Successor Liability Imposed. In Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, L.L.C., the Seventh Circuit held that the buyer took on successor liability for the FLSA claims, even though the sale was made "free and clear" of all liabilities generally and of the FLSA claims in particular. The Seventh Circuit ruled that although those provisions would have protected the buyer, Thomas & Betts, under applicable Wisconsin state law, the FLSA is a federal statute and under federal common law, the buyer had successor liability for the FLSA claims. You can read a copy of the Seventh Circuit's opinion, issued March 26, 2013, by clicking on the link in this sentence.

Contrast With Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales. As discussed in a recent post, when a debtor is facing major potential liabilities, the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the sale to the buyer "free and clear" of liabilities, including successor liability, can lead to a much higher price in a Section 363 sale. Cases discussing successor liability in bankruptcy therefore get the attention of those involved in distressed asset sales.

At first glance, the Seventh Circuit's opinion seems to be troubling news for buyers of assets from distressed companies because the buyer in the Teed case was held to have successor liability for the FLSA claims at issue.
However, there appears to be more to the Seventh Circuit's thinking. In its opinion, written by Judge Richard A. Posner, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "successor liability is appropriate in suits to enforce federal labor or employment laws--even where the successor disclaimed liability when it accepted the assets in question--unless there are good reasons to withhold such liability." It was in examining possible "good reasons" not to impose successor liability that the Seventh Circuit specifically highlighted bankruptcy sales.

Seventh Circuit's Analysis. Given that most bankrupt companies are insolvent, the Seventh Circuit noted that imposing successor liability on a buyer might allow unsecured FLSA claims against the seller (debtor) to become, effectively, senior to a secured creditor's claim against the debtor if the buyer lowered its purchase price to account for such claims:

That is a good reason not to apply successor liability after an insolvent debtor’s default, whether its assets were sold in bankruptcy or outside (by a receiver, for example, as in this case): to apply the doctrine in such a case might upend the priorities of competing creditors. See In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d 283, 290, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2003); Douglas G. Baird, The Elements of Bankruptcy 227-28 (5th ed. 2010). It’s an example of a good reason not mentioned in conventional formulations of the federal standard for not imposing successor liability. But it doesn’t figure in this appeal. Thomas & Betts has not urged it. It says that it didn’t discount its bid for Packard because of the workers’ claims; this both suggests that it didn’t anticipate successor liability and may explain why the bank has not complained about the imposition of that liability.

* * *

Thomas & Betts argues finally, with support in Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., supra, 760 F.2d at 751, that allowing the workers to enforce their FLSA claims against the successor, in a case such as this in which the predecessor cannot pay them, complicates the reorganization of a bankrupt. Seeing the handwriting on the wall and wanting to minimize the impact of the reorganization on them (in loss of employment or benefits), the workers might decide to file a flurry of lawsuits, whether or not well grounded, hoping to substitute a solvent acquirer for their employer as a defendant in the suits. The prospect thus created of increased liability might scare off prospective buyers of the assets. But there is no suggestion of such a tactic by workers in this case; if there were, it would be another good reason for denying successor liability. Still another concern is that an insolvent company, seeking to maximize its value, might decide not to sell itself as a going concern but instead to sell off its assets piecemeal, even if the company would be worth more as a going concern than as a pile of dismembered assets. In the latter case there would be as we said no successor liability, and successor liability depresses the going concern value of the predecessor, so the insolvent company might be better off even though it was destroying value by not selling itself as a going concern. Once a firm is in Chapter 7 bankruptcy (or in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in which a trustee is appointed), or receivership, it is “owned” by the trustee (or receiver), whose sole concern is with maximizing the net value of the debtor’s estate to creditors (and maybe to other claimants—including shareholders, if the estate is flush enough to enable all the creditors’ claims to be satisfied in full). In re Taxman Clothing Co., 49 F.3d 310, 315 (7th Cir. 1995); In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). With immaterial exceptions, the trustee in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy (or, we assume, a receiver) must sell the debtor’s assets for the highest price he can get. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1); In re Moore, 608 F.3d 253, 263 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Atlanta Packaging Products, Inc., 99 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988). He may not cut the price so that some junior creditor can enforce a claim not against the debtor’s assets but against a third party, the successor, in this case Thomas & Betts. The trustee would be required to sell the assets piecemeal if that would yield more money for the creditors as a whole (to be allocated among them according to their priorities) than sale as a going concern would, even if some creditors would be harmed because successor liability would have been extinguished, and even if economic value would have been destroyed.

But this is a theoretical rather than a practical objection. Since most firms’ assets are worth much more as a going concern than dispersed, successor liability will affect the choice between the two forms of sale in only a small fraction of cases. Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, “Bankruptcy Fire Sales,” 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2007).

Conclusion. Although the Court of Appeals did not find any of the potential "good reasons" applicable in the Teed case, its discussion of the problems with imposing successor liability in a bankruptcy sale is helpful. Despite the holding, the decision's analysis provides support for buyers seeking protection from successor liability in bankruptcy sales, even from liability under federal labor and employment statutes that might otherwise trump state law, and likewise for bankruptcy courts issuing orders granting buyers that protection. For that reason, it is an interesting and important opinion for buyers and sellers of distressed assets and the professionals that work with them.

Official Bankruptcy Forms Revised To Reflect April 1, 2013 Dollar Amount Adjustments

Bob Eisenbach — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 09:09:24 -0800

As discussed in an earlier post called "Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2013," various dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code and related statutory provisions were increased for cases filed on or after today, April 1, 2013. Now several official bankruptcy forms have been revised to reflect these new dollar amounts.

The updated forms include the official Proof of Claim form (click the link for a copy of the revised form), as well as a number of other commonly used bankruptcy forms.
Follow the link in this sentence for information about, and access to, all newly revised official bankruptcy forms.

Remember, the increased dollar amounts reflected on these forms apply only to cases filed on or after April 1, 2013.

Using Chapter 11 Bankruptcy's Sale Process To Achieve An Exceptional Sale Price

Bob Eisenbach — Mon, 11 Mar 2013 07:56:36 -0800

A Difficult Problem. Imagine that your company is facing a government investigation, requiring you to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees and costs, while being threatened with substantially more legal expense. That financial burden is simultaneously starving the company of cash needed to grow the business, and cash balances are heading toward zero. Worse yet, the cloud over the company means it cannot raise additional investment or even find a buyer, as potential buyers fear being saddled with the government investigation and any underlying potential claims.

The Strategy. That was the trap confronting our client Cylex Inc., a Maryland-based life sciences company whose diagnostic test kit detects immune function in organ transplant patients, when they asked me for help. After considering alternatives, the strategy we crafted was to use Chapter 11 bankruptcy’s sale process to obtain a bankruptcy court order expressly permitting the buyer to purchase the company’s assets “free and clear” of the government investigation and underlying claims.

The Stalking Horse Bidder. With the legal strategy in place, the next step was negotiating with a strategic buyer the company had identified. Fortunately, Cylex recognized the need for a solution early enough that we had time to work through the challenges of implementing the strategy.

Given that the sale would be under Bankruptcy Code Section 363 – which allows a bankruptcy court to authorize an asset sale free and clear of liens, interests, claims and encumbrances – the buyer knew that its asset purchase agreement would be subject to “higher and better bids.” In effect, as seller, Cylex would have a chance to “shop” the buyer’s purchase agreement to try and find a better deal.
The buyer, known as a “stalking horse bidder” in bankruptcy parlance, wanted both a break-up fee (a percentage of the sale price) and an expense reimbursement (for legal and other direct expenses), in the event another bidder emerged and won the bidding. Those amounts also set the floor for a minimum “topping” or overbid price.
As is common, the stalking horse bidder also insisted on a no-shop provision until the bankruptcy was filed, meaning that Cylex would have a chance to shop the deal but only for a relatively short period after the bankruptcy was filed.
The pre-bankruptcy sale negotiations with the stalking horse bidder were challenging and took months. However, in November 2012, Cylex and the stalking horse bidder executed a formal asset purchase agreement calling for a $6 million purchase price, but also including a long list of closing conditions, an escrow holdback, and other non-economic terms unfavorable to Cylex.

The Bankruptcy Filing. Cylex filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware on December 3, 2012. Among the motions we filed on the first day of the case was one to approve the break-up fee, expense reimbursement, and bidding procedures, and the Bankruptcy Court approved them two weeks later. Given the company’s dwindling cash, the bidding procedures set a deadline of January 18, 2013 for any overbids, an auction on January 22, 2013 (if any overbids were made), and a hearing on approval of the sale on January 23, 2013. The schedule was accelerated to be sure Cylex could get the transaction closed before it ran out of cash.

The Sale And Auction Process. The company and its advisors only had about six weeks to shop the stalking horse bid, including over the holidays, but they made the most of the limited time.

On the day of the overbid deadline, two new strategic bidders submitted overbids, both in the $6.7 million minimum overbid amount. That set the stage for the auction four days later.
The auction made all of the efforts worthwhile. After 16 rounds of bidding, spanning more than 12 hours, the winning bid (from one of the two overbidders) was a stunning $14.425 million, all cash at closing. Through the auction, Cylex had increased the sale proceeds by more than $8 million over the stalking horse bid.
When faced with bidding competition at the auction, the stalking horse bidder and each of the overbidders made concession after concession on non-economic terms, dropping closing conditions and the escrow holdback, and agreeing to purchase price adjustments favorable to Cylex.
The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to the winning bidder on January 23, 2013, and entered an order expressly permitting the winning bidder to purchase Cylex’s assets “free and clear” of the government investigation and underlying claims. The sale closed in February.

Conclusion. Cylex, now known as Immunology Partners Inc., faced an extremely challenging set of problems caused by the government investigation, in turn triggered by a False Claims Act qui tam complaint. Although the government later declined to intervene in the qui tam case, that decision came too late for the company to have non-bankruptcy options. As mentioned in the press release on the sale, despite the legal issues and financial distress it faced, the company was ultimately able to sell its assets for 2.6 times revenue, a multiple typically reserved for healthy companies in its industry. It never could have achieved that sale price, or perhaps any price, without a bankruptcy sale process given the cloud of the government investigation. Chapter 11 bankruptcy may be considered a last resort, but there are times when it is simply the best way to address a company’s financial and legal problems.

Going Up: Bankruptcy Dollar Amounts Will Increase On April 1, 2013

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 26 Feb 2013 14:59:28 -0800

It hasn't gotten much publicity yet, but certain dollar amounts in the Bankruptcy Code will be increased for new cases filed on or after April 1, 2013. Follow this link for a chart listing all of the changes on this Federal Register page, which printed this month's official notice from the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Among the most meaningful increases for Chapter 11 and other business bankruptcy cases:

The total amount of claims required to file an involuntary petition rises to $15,325 from $14,425;
The employee compensation and benefit plan contribution priorities under Sections 507(a)(4) and 507(a)(5) both increase to $12,475 from $11,725;
The consumer deposit priority under Section 507(a)(7) rises to $2,775 from $2,600;
The dollar amount in the bankruptcy venue provision, 28 U.S.C. Section 1409(b), which requires that actions to recover for non-consumer, non-insider debt be brought against defendants in the district in which they reside, has increased to $12,475 from $11,725;
The minimum amount required to bring a preference claim against a defendant in a non-consumer debtor case, specified in Section 547(c)(9), rises from $6,225 from $5,475; and
The total debt amount in the definition of small business debtor in Section 101(51D) will rise to $2,490,925.

Other adjustments will affect consumers more than business debtors. For example, the debt limit for an individual to be able to qualify to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case will rise to $1,149,525 of secured debt, and certain exemption amounts will also rise.

Although the changes aren't substantial, be sure to keep them in mind when assessing cases filed after April 1st.

Summer 2012 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

Bob Eisenbach — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 13:57:25 -0800

The Summer 2012 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has now been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

Decisions from courts in Delaware and California interpreting the Supreme Court's 2011 Stern v. Marshall decision and its impact on the ability of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in fraudulent transfer and other cases;
The Section 546(e) defense to fraudulent transfer claims; and
Issues involving the recharacterization of a non-insider's loans as equity.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Ritz Camera & Image, Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, Wave 2 Wave Communications, Signature Styles, Urban Brands, and Mervyn's Holdings, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Seventh Circuit Bankruptcy Ruling Is Big Win For Trademark Licensees

Bob Eisenbach — Wed, 11 Jul 2012 08:27:21 -0800

On July 9, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, and in doing so handed a major victory to trademark licensees whose licenses are rejected in bankruptcy by trademark owners. A copy of the opinion is available through this link. However, before discussing the details of the opinion, it's important to put it in context first. And for that, we need to journey back to the 1980s.

A History Of Rejection. Back in 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a decision in Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). The Fourth Circuit held that Lubrizol, a nonexclusive patent licensee whose patent license was rejected as an executory contract in the bankruptcy case of Lubrizol's licensor, debtor Richmond Metal Finishers, could not "rely on provisions within its agreement with [the debtor] for continued use of the technology." According to the Lubrizol court, when Congress enacted Section 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, governing the effect of rejection of an executory contract, "the legislative history of § 365(g) makes clear that the purpose of the provision is to provide only a damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party," and no specific performance remedy. The Fourth Circuit held that, as a result, when the debtor rejected the contract, Lubrizol, as the patent licensee, lost its rights under the license.

Congress Protects Certain IP Licensees. In reaction to the Lubrizol decision and the concerns of the decision's potential impact on patent and other technology licensees, in 1988 Congress added Section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, expressly permitting licensees of intellectual property to elect to retain their rights to the intellectual property. However, Congress also added to the Bankruptcy Code its own definition of "intellectual property" for Section 365(n) purposes, and decided not to include trademarks in Section 101(35A)'s definition. As a result, trademark licensees have none of the protections of Section 365(n). Follow the link for more on Section 365(n) and its protections for licensees.

Back To The Future. With that history in mind, it's time to come back to the future, or at least the present. Lubrizol's decision that a licensee cannot rely on the provisions of its license agreement for continued use of the intellectual property, together with the fact that Section 365(n)'s protections do not extend to trademark licenses, has for years left trademark licensees at great risk of losing all trademark rights if the license is rejected. That is, it seemed that way until just the past couple of years.

A 2010 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the In re: Exide Technologies case held that when a trademark license was provided in connection with the sale of a business, and that sale had been substantially performed, the trademark license was no longer executory, could not be rejected, and the licensee could continue to use the trademarks.
In a concurring opinion in Exide Technologies, Judge Ambro went further, concluding that rejection of a trademark license should not deprive the licensee of all rights. In enacting Section 365(n) but leaving trademarks outside the definition of "intellectual property," Congress did not intend that Lubrizol's result apply to trademark licenses and instead courts should use equitable powers to protect licensees.
Last year, in the case that led to the Seventh Circuit's decision here, the bankruptcy court in In re Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., Inc, 459 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011), decided to "step into the breach," follow Judge Ambro's reasoning, and begin the "development of equitable treatment" of trademark licensees that it concluded Congress had anticipated would occur. In so doing, it held that despite rejection of a manufacturing and supply agreement that included a trademark license, the licensee could continue to sell trademarked goods as it had been licensed to do.

The Seventh Circuit's Decision. The bankruptcy court's decision was taken up on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. In its July 9, 2012 opinion, written by Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court's analysis but ultimately affirmed its decision. In its opinion, however, the Seventh Circuit took aim directly at the Lubrizol decision and reasoning.

The facts of the Sunbeam case are fairly straightforward. Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co. made various consumer products, including box fans, which were covered by its patents and trademarks. Lakewood contracted with Chicago American Manufacturing ("CAM") to make its fans for 2009, granting CAM a license to the relevant patents and trademarks. In recognition of both the investment CAM would have to make to manufacture the fans and Lakewood's own distressed financial condition, the agreement authorized CAM to sell directly any of the 2009 production of box fans that Lakewood did not purchase. A few months after the agreement was signed, Lakewood was forced into involuntary bankruptcy and a trustee was appointed. The trustee sold Lakewood's assets, including the patents and trademarks, to Sunbeam Consumer Products, which wanted to sell its own fans and not have to compete with CAM's sales. The trustee rejected the CAM agreement and, when CAM continued to sell the remaining fans, Sunbeam sued CAM for infringement.

The issue on appeal was the effect of the trustee's rejection of the CAM agreement, and specifically the trademark license, on CAM's ability to sell the fans. The Seventh Circuit's focus on the Lubrizol decision was apparent:

Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), holds that, when an intellectual-property license is rejected in bankruptcy, the licensee loses the ability to use any licensed copyrights, trademarks, and patents. Three years after Lubrizol, Congress added §365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code. It allows licensees to continue using the intellectual property after rejection, provided they meet certain conditions. The bankruptcy judge held that §365(n) allowed CAM to practice Lakewood’s patents when making box fans for the 2009 season. That ruling is no longer contested. But “intellectual property” is a defined term in the Bankruptcy Code: 11 U.S.C. §101(35A) provides that “intellectual property” includes patents, copyrights, and trade secrets. It does not mention trademarks. Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission that Congress codified Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an omission. The limited definition in §101(35A) means that §365(n) does not affect trademarks one way or the other. According to the Senate committee report on the bill that included §365(n), the omission was designed to allow more time for study, not to approve Lubrizol. See S. Rep. No. 100–505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988). See also In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957, 966–67 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring) (concluding that §365(n) neither codifies nor disapproves Lubrizol as applied to trademarks). The subject seems to have fallen off the legislative agenda, but this does not change the effect of what Congress did in 1988.

Chief Judge Easterbrook's opinion noted that the bankruptcy court had permitted CAM to continue using the trademarks on equitable grounds, but rejected that approach as going beyond what the Bankruptcy Code permits. The Seventh Circuit then directly addressed the Lubrizol decision:

Although the bankruptcy judge’s ground of decision is untenable, that does not necessarily require reversal. We need to determine whether Lubrizol correctly understood §365(g), which specifies the consequences of a rejection under §365(a). No other court of appeals has agreed with Lubrizol—or for that matter disagreed with it. Exide, the only other appellate case in which the subject came up, was resolved on the ground that the contract was not executory and therefore could not be rejected. (Lubrizol has been cited in other appellate opinions, none of which concerns the effect of rejection on intellectual-property licenses.) Judge Ambro, who filed a concurring opinion in Exide, concluded that, had the contract been eligible for rejection under §365(a), the licensee could have continued using the trademarks. 607 F.3d at 964–68. Like Judge Ambro, we too think Lubrizol mistaken.

After observing that outside of bankruptcy a licensor's breach does not terminate a licensee's right to use intellectual property, and Section 365(g) provides that rejection is breach, the Seventh Circuit turned to the impact of Section 365(g) and rejection in bankruptcy:

What §365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in place. After rejecting a contract, a debtor is not subject to an order of specific performance. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984); Midway Motor Lodge of Elk Grove v. Innkeepers’ Telemanagement & Equipment Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 407 (7th Cir. 1995). The debtor’s unfulfilled obligations are converted to damages; when a debtor does not assume the contract before rejecting it, these damages are treated as a pre-petition obligation, which may be written down in common with other debts of the same class. But nothing about this process implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized. Consider how rejection works for leases. A lessee that enters bankruptcy may reject the lease and pay damages for abandoning the premises, but rejection does not abrogate the lease (which would absolve the debtor of the need to pay damages). Similarly a lessor that enters bankruptcy could not, by rejecting the lease, end the tenant’s right to possession and thus re-acquire premises that might be rented out for a higher price. The bankrupt lessor might substitute damages for an obligation to make repairs, but not rescind the lease altogether.

The Court then distinguished rejection from avoidance powers, which might lead to rescission or termination of an agreement, observing that "rejection is not 'the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the contract was formed.” Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007). It 'merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform' and 'has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence'. Ibid. (internal citations omitted)." Follow the link for more background on the Thompkins decision.

The Seventh Circuit referenced scholarly criticism of the Lubrizol decision before turning back to the Fourth Circuit's opinion:

Lubrizol itself devoted scant attention to the question whether rejection cancels a contract, worrying instead about the right way to identify executory contracts to which the rejection power applies.

Lubrizol does not persuade us. This opinion, which creates a conflict among the circuits, was circulated to all active judges under Circuit Rule 40(e). No judge favored a hearing en banc. Because the trustee’s rejection of Lakewood’s contract with CAM did not abrogate CAM’s contractual rights, this adversary proceeding properly ended with a judgment in CAM’s favor.

A Significant Decision. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in the Sunbeam case not only creates a circuit split that could potentially lead the Supreme Court to address the issue, but more significantly represents the first court of appeals decision in 27 years to challenge Lubrizol's view of how rejection impacts an intellectual property license. Although binding only in the Seventh Circuit (much like, in theory, Lubrizol was binding only in the Fourth Circuit), the Sunbeam decision has the potential to impact licensee rights in cases across the country. Licensees, and especially trademark licensees, will be arguing that rejection does not terminate their license rights. Debtors and purchasers of trademarks may well argue otherwise. If followed by other courts, the Sunbeam decision and its potential interplay with Section 365(n) raises a number of questions, including:

Aside from the right to use the licensed trademarks, does the licensee keep other rights under its agreement, such as exclusivity if applicable?
How long does the right to the trademarks continue, the full term of the license agreement plus any extensions, or some shorter period?
If royalties are required under a trademark license, must the trademark licensee continue to pay them post-rejection to use the licensed trademarks, as an IP licensee covered by Section 365(n) is required to do, or can the trademark licensee argue that rejection is a material breach excusing that performance?
Since under Sunbeam rejection does not terminate trademark license rights, does the same analysis apply to intellectual property other than trademarks, including those covered by Section 365(n)?
Are licensees of patents, copyrights, or trade secrets, otherwise protected by Section 365(n), required to follow Section 365(n)'s statutory scheme to retain their rights, or can they rely on the Sunbeam decision's analysis of the effect of rejection as an alternative approach?
How will purchasers of trademarks and other assets react to the potential continued use of the marks by licensees under rejected trademark licenses?

Conclusion. As these questions suggest, the full impact of the Seventh Circuit's Sunbeam decision is yet to be determined. It remains to be seen how other circuits -- and bankruptcy courts in important venues such as Delaware and the Southern District of New York -- will react. Given the circuit split now created, it's possible the Supreme Court could address the issue, either in Sunbeam or a later case. In the meantime, however, a long-standing and often accepted view of the impact of rejection on intellectual property licenses, and especially on trademark licenses, has been upended. It will likely take courts, licensors, and licensees some time to sort through how the new, post-Sunbeam state of the law will play out. This could get interesting -- stay tuned.

Supreme Court Bids Adieu To Plans Denying Secured Creditors The Right To Credit Bid

Bob Eisenbach — Thu, 31 May 2012 07:24:43 -0800

On May 29, 2012, only a little more than a month after the April 23, 2012 oral argument in the case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank on the question of "credit bidding." You can get a copy of the opinion by following the link in this sentence. (You are also welcome to follow my Twitter feed @BobEisenbach for updates; I tweeted a link to the opinion the afternoon it was issued.)

The Circuit Split. The Supreme Court took the case to resolve a split between the circuits on this issue. In an earlier case, In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit had confirmed a plan of reorganization that prevented credit bidding, and the Fifth Circuit had done so in a case involving an asset transfer under a plan, which was considered to be a sale. However, in the RadLAX case, decided as River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (2011), the Seventh Circuit took the opposite view. It rejected proposed bidding procedures that would have precluded the secured creditor from credit bidding at an auction contemplated by the plan of reorganization. For more analysis of these issues and the split in the circuits, follow the link in this sentence to the Winter 2012 edition of Cooley's Absolute Priority newsletter.

The Supreme Court's Decision. By an 8-0 vote (Justice Kennedy did not participate), the Supreme Court held that a secured creditor has a right to credit bid its secured debt under a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization that provides for a sale of its collateral. The decision affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision rejecting the bidding procedures in the RadLAX case.

The issue is important because with a "credit bid," a secured creditor is able to acquire the assets being sold by using its debt, up to the amount it's owed, without having to pay cash upfront for the assets. It can be challenging for secured creditors to raise large amounts of cash, especially when a syndicate of lenders (or, as the Supreme Court noted, the Federal Government) is involved, even though presumably they will later be paid back out of the sale proceeds.
Secured creditors argue that, without the right to credit bid, for these reasons they would be unable to participate in the sale and their collateral could be sold for an unreasonably low price.
Debtors argue that a secured creditor's credit bid could chill bidding by third parties, particularly if the secured creditor's debt, and thus potential credit bid, is substantially higher than what a cash bidder would be likely to pay.

Indubitable What? The Bankruptcy Code requires that if a secured creditor objects to a plan, it must receive "fair and equitable" treatment, a term of art under Section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. That section provides that "fair and equitable" means that a secured creditor must either (i) retain its lien and be paid deferred cash payments, (ii) be entitled to credit bid at a sale of its collateral, or (iii) realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim. The RadLAX debtor was attempting to sell its assets (the secured creditor's collateral) without permitting the secured creditor to credit bid, pay the resulting sale proceeds to the secured creditor, and "cram down" this treatment over the secured creditor's objection, arguing that it constituted the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

The legal issue at the core of the decision involved the interpretation of Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii) of the Bankruptcy Code. In RadLAX, although the Supreme Court did not decide what "indubitable equivalent" means, it held that even though Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) may appear to permit a plan to provide a secured creditor with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim, when a plan provides for a sale of the secured creditor's collateral, it must permit the secured creditor to credit bid under Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides that when a plan of reorganization calls for a sale of a secured creditor's collateral, the sale is "subject to Section 363(k)," which permits a credit bid as discussed below.
The Supreme Court held that the "indubitable equivalent" alternative may be available in some situations, but it's not an option when the Chapter 11 plan of reorganization calls for a sale of the secured creditor's collateral.
Although the RadLAX case involved a Chapter 11 plan sale, typical bankruptcy sales do not. Far more often, sales are conducted, separately from a plan, under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 363(k) specifically provides that a secured creditor has a right to credit bid and offset its secured claim at such a non-plan Section 363 sale, absent "cause" to take that right away. No such "cause" was present in the RadLAX case, and the Supreme Court held that Section 363(k)'s credit bid right applied.

An "Easy" Decision. Ultimately, as the unanimous decision reflects, the Supreme Court held that this was "an easy case," that the debtor's reading of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) was "hyperliteral and contrary to common sense," and that the more specific provisions of subsection (ii) controlled over the general "indubitable equivalent" language of subsection (iii). The Supreme Court's decision should put to rest efforts to sell a secured creditor's collateral without allowing for credit bids, except in cases where there are issues with the validity of the secured creditor's secured claim or cause exists under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Forced Into Bankruptcy: The Involuntary Bankruptcy Process

Bob Eisenbach — Thu, 24 May 2012 07:06:27 -0800

When a company is facing financial distress, the question often comes up whether creditors can "force" the company into bankruptcy. Although the answer is more complicated than it may seem, this post aims to sort out what being "forced into bankruptcy" really means (hint: there are two different ways this can happen) and why it matters to companies and creditors.

Forced But Voluntary Bankruptcy. When a company is "forced" into bankruptcy, often what actually has happened is that the company filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 (reorganization) or Chapter 7 (liquidation) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in response to creditor actions. For example, a secured lender may have declared a default under its loan documents and commenced foreclosure proceedings, or an unsecured creditor may have filed a lawsuit or obtained a judgment against the company. In response, the company filed bankruptcy.

While it may be fair to describe the company as having been "forced" into bankruptcy, technically the company's board of directors made a voluntary decision to file bankruptcy given the company's financial circumstances or creditor actions. The distinction is important because a voluntary bankruptcy filing puts the company in bankruptcy immediately, making it subject to the Bankruptcy Code's provisions and the bankruptcy court's supervision. In contrast, the other kind of bankruptcy -- an involuntary bankruptcy filing -- does not.

A Truly Involuntary Bankruptcy. This begs the question: if the company does not consent, can creditors literally force a company into bankruptcy anyway? The answer is yes, under certain circumstances, and subject to meeting the requirements for filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. The major requirements, discussed below, are found in Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Required number of creditors. The Bankruptcy Code specifies the minimum number of creditors and amount of their claims:
- If a company has 12 or more creditors, an involuntary bankruptcy petition requires (a) three or more creditors whose claims are not contingent as to liability or subject to a bona fide dispute as to either liability or amount to file the petition, and (b) those qualifying claims must total, in the aggregate, at least $14,425 if unsecured or $14,425 more than the value of any liens securing those claims if any are secured.
- If the company has fewer than 12 creditors, it only takes one qualifying creditor to file an involuntary petition.
- Additional creditors can join the petition later, and if only one creditor files and it turns out that the company has more than 12 creditors, the bankruptcy court will give other creditors an opportunity to join.
- The $14,425 amount is adjusted every three years, with the next adjustment due in April 2013.
Generally Not Paying Debts. If the company timely objects to the involuntary filing, for the company to be placed in bankruptcy, the company also must:
- generally not be paying its debts as they become due unless those debts are subject to a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or
- have had a custodian appointed within the past 120 days to take possession or control of substantially all of its assets.
Choosing The Chapter. In the involuntary petition, the petitioning creditors must designate which bankruptcy chapter (Chapter 7 or 11) into which they seek to force the company.

How Is An Involuntary Different? When an involuntary petition is filed, the automatic stay of bankruptcy kicks in immediately to prevent creditor actions, but that's where the similarities with voluntary bankruptcy end.

Unlike a voluntary bankruptcy filing, when an involuntary bankruptcy petition is filed, a company is not immediately placed into bankruptcy and the company may continue to operate its business and use, acquire, or dispose of its property as if an involuntary bankruptcy case had not been filed.
Instead, an involuntary bankruptcy petition functions more like a complaint asking the court to declare that the company should be put into bankruptcy. Like a complaint, the involuntary petition must be served together with a summons.
Although the bankruptcy court has the authority to appoint an interim trustee or order other restrictions on the company, those do not automatically apply, have to be sought by motion, and may be denied by the bankruptcy court.
The company can consent to the involuntary bankruptcy filing. When an involuntary Chapter 7 filing is made, the company can also respond with its own voluntary Chapter 11 filing and take control over the case as a debtor in possession.
To contest an involuntary petition, the company must do so within the time allotted by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, currently 21 days after service of the summons. Typically that involves filing an answer or a motion to dismiss.
Litigation over whether the requirements discussed above have been met, and thus whether the company should be put in bankruptcy, can involve various pleadings, document and deposition discovery, status conferences, motions for summary judgment, and/or an evidentiary hearing or trial.
If the bankruptcy court ultimately rules in favor of the petitioning creditors, an "order for relief" is entered and the company is officially placed into bankruptcy. At that point, the company is subject to the Bankruptcy Code's provisions and supervision by the bankruptcy court.

What If The Involuntary Fails? Filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition against a company is, of course, serious business, and the consequences of failing are equally serious.

Once filed, an involuntary petition cannot be dismissed without a notice and an opportunity for a hearing, even if the petitioning creditors and the company agree.
If the involuntary petition is dismissed, the petitioning creditors can be liable for costs and attorney's fees of the company.
If the bankruptcy court determines that the involuntary petition was filed in bad faith, the petitioning creditors can be liable as well for damages caused by the involuntary filing and even for punitive damages.

When Do Creditors Typically File An Involuntary? The prospect of creditor liability for costs, attorney's fees, damages, and possibly punitive damages makes involuntary petitions one of the lesser-used creditor tools. Involuntary bankruptcy is most often used when unsecured creditors suspect fraud on the part of a company, such as when a Ponzi scheme is discovered, or for some other extraordinary reason. Otherwise, creditors will typically pursue collection of their own claims directly, including through litigation in state or federal court. That might end up "forcing" the company into bankruptcy, but technically it would be a bankruptcy of the voluntary kind.

Winter 2012 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

Bob Eisenbach — Mon, 13 Feb 2012 08:42:21 -0800

The Winter 2012 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has recently been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

The Supreme Court's recent Stern v. Marshall decision and its impact on the ability of bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments in certain cases;
Recent decisions on the ability of secured creditors to credit bid their debt in bankruptcy asset sales;
Issues involving the recharacterization of debt as equity; and
The ability of directors and officers to obtain coverage under a D&O liability policy purchased by a bankrupt company.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, Alexander Gallo Holdings, Claim Jumper, Signature Styles, Urban Brands, and Mervyn's Holdings, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Amendments To Federal Bankruptcy Rules, Official Forms, And Federal Rules Of Evidence Are Now In Effect

Bob Eisenbach — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 07:20:24 -0800

Bankruptcy Rule Amendments. As reported in a post last month, this year's amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure have now taken effect today, December 1, 2011.

For a discussion of the amended rules, follow the link in this sentence.
For the Advisory Committee's report on the amendments, together with a redline showing the changes made, follow the link in this sentence.

Amended Official Bankruptcy Forms. In addition to the national bankruptcy rules, revisions have been made to a number of the official bankruptcy forms. This sentence contains a link to a set of these updated official forms.

Amended Federal Rules Of Evidence. Finally, a restyled edition of the Federal Rules of Evidence also goes into effect today; follow the link in this sentence for the revised evidence rules. Although the substance of the rules of evidence has not changed, revisions in the numbering of some subsections and the style of how the rules are phrased have been implemented.

Amendments To The Federal Bankruptcy Rules, Including Rule 2019, To Take Effect December 1, 2011

Bob Eisenbach — Wed, 16 Nov 2011 09:46:28 -0800

Almost every year, changes are made to the set of rules that govern how bankruptcy cases are managed -- the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The changes address issues identified by an Advisory Committee made up of federal judges, bankruptcy attorneys, and others. There are seven amendments to the national bankruptcy rules this year. Some affect bankruptcy cases involving individuals but major revisions have been made to Rule 2019, which governs disclosures by ad hoc committees and groups of creditors or equity security holders in Chapter 11 business bankruptcy cases and in Chapter 9 municipality cases. All of the new amendments will take effect on December 1, 2011, barring unlikely action by Congress.

Read All About It. A copy of the Advisory Committee's report, together with a redline of the new rule amendments, is available by following the link in this sentence. The report also includes the Advisory Committee's notes on each new or amended rule.

Significant Revisions to Rule 2019: Controversy Resolved? Over the past several years, Rule 2019, the national bankruptcy rule regarding disclosure by unofficial committees and groups of hedge fund and other investors, has been the subject of much litigation and a number of conflicting court decisions, including opposite views from different bankruptcy judges in Delaware. Follow the link in this sentence for a collection of previous posts on the blog discussing those past decisions and the controversy surrounding old Rule 2019.

In an attempt to put the controversy to rest, the Advisory Committee drafted, and the Supreme Court has approved, a new Rule 2019, which will take effect on December 1, 2011. It requires disclosure in Chapter 11 and Chapter 9 cases by unofficial committees, groups and entities consisting of or representing multiple creditors or equity security holders that are (1) acting in concert to advance common interests, and (2) not composed entirely of affiliates or insiders of each other, and which take a position before the court or solicit votes on confirmation of a plan.

The new rule focuses on the nature and purpose of the committee or group, rather than how it names itself. In contrast, old Rule 2019 covered entities and committees, leading to disputes over whether a self-designated "group" had to make disclosures. Also dropped from the final version of new Rule 2019 was language from the initial proposed rule amendments that would have permitted the court to require disclosure of the amount paid for a disclosable economic interest, another topic of much prior controversy.

Disclosable Economic Interest. Amended Rule 2019 is built around the defined term "disclosable economic interest," which is defined to mean the following:

Any claim, interest, pledge, lien, option, participation, derivative instrument, or any other right or derivative right granting the holder an economic interest that is affected by the value, acquisition, or disposition of a claim or interest.

Required Disclosures Under Rule 2019. A covered group or committee will be required to file a verified statement disclosing facts and circumstances on the following topics listed in new Rule 2019(c):

The group or committee's formation;
Any entity's employment and the party at whose instance the employment was arranged;
Each member's and entity's name, address, and nature and amount of their disclosable economic interest;
For each member of a group or committee claiming to represent any entity beyond the group's members, the date of acquisition by quarter and year of each disclosable economic interest, unless acquired more than a year before the bankruptcy petition was filed; and
Where applicable, a copy of any instrument authorizing the entity, group, or committee to act on behalf of creditors or equity security holders.

If any material changes have occurred since the group or committee's last statement, a supplemental statement must be filed whenever the group or committee takes a position before the court or solicits votes on confirmation of a plan.

Consequences of Non-Compliance With Rule 2019. A party in interest or the court on its own motion can determine whether there has been any failure to comply with the new Rule 2019's requirements. If so, the court may refuse to permit the group or committee from being heard in the case and/or hold invalid any authority, objection, or plan votes made or obtained by the non-complying entity, group or committee, as well as grant any other appropriate relief.

Other Business Bankruptcy Rule Amendments. In addition to Rule 2019, three of the other new amendments directly impact business bankruptcy cases.

New Rule 1004.2 applies in Chapter 15 cross-border bankruptcy cases. It requires that any petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code state the center of the debtor's main interests (aka, "COMI"), as well as each country in which a foreign proceeding involving the debtor is pending. The rule is designed to help identify whether the foreign proceeding is a foreign main or nonmain proceeding.
Amended Rule 2003(e) will require the United States Trustee or designee to file a statement specifying the date and time to which any Section 341(a) meeting of creditors has been adjourned. This rule amendment was included to be sure that creditors who did not attend a meeting of creditors could learn when the continued meeting will take place, information that sometimes was known only to those who attended the original meeting.
Rule 6003, discussed in this prior blog post on the 2007 rule amendments, has been amended to clarify that although a court cannot, absent immediate and irreparable harm, enter an order during the 21 days after a petition has been filed on certain matters, including employment of professionals, it can enter an order after those first 21 days that grants relief effective as of a date prior to entry of the order, i.e., as of the petition date.

Rule Amendments for Individual Bankruptcy Cases. The balance of the new rule amendments involve cases in which the debtor is an individual.

Amended Rule 3001(c), governing proofs of claim, requires in an individual debtor's case that an itemized statement of interest, fees, expenses or other charges be filed with the proof of claim. If a security interest is claimed in the debtor's property, a statement must also be included giving the amount required to cure any default. If the property involved is the debtor's principal residence, the proof of claim must attach, and give the information required by, a new official form addressing this rule change, and also must include information related to any escrow account. Penalties for non-compliance can include barring the claimant from presenting the omitted information in any contested matter or adversary proceeding, and an award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses caused by the failure.
New Rule 3002.1, related to claims secured by a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence, sets forth a number of additional requirements when the claim is provided for under Section 1322(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. The new rule details required information related to post-petition fees, expenses, and charges, as well as procedures for determining those amounts and the final cure amount.
Rule 4004(b) has been amended to allow a party in interest, under certain circumstances, to seek an extension of time to file an objection to a debtor's discharge after the deadline for filing such objections to discharge has already expired.

Updated Official Forms. As mentioned, some of the pending amended rules will require revisions in official bankruptcy forms. You can find the proposed revised forms, which will be formally released on December 1, 2011 (unless Congress surprises us and prevents the amendments from taking effect), by following the link in this sentence.

Conclusion. For business bankruptcy professionals, and companies and investors involved in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the most important change to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure this year is the newly revised Rule 2019. However, several of the other amendments also will impact Chapter 11 cases, and all are worthy of note.

Delaware Supreme Court Affirms Ruling Protecting Managers Of Insolvent LLCs

Bob Eisenbach — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 10:31:40 -0800

Creditor Derivative Claims Against Fiduciaries Of Insolvent Corporate Entities. In a 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation's directors. That led many to wonder whether the same ruling would be extended to managers of Delaware limited liability companies ("LLCs"), the LLC equivalent of a corporation's directors.

The Chancery Court's Decision. In November 2010, the Delaware Chancery Court answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no." In CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238 (Del.Ch. 2010), the Chancery Court held that creditors could not bring derivative actions for breach of fiduciary duty against managers of insolvent LLCs, chiefly because the relevant Delaware LLC Act provision limited standing to bring such suits only to LLC members and their assignees. For a discussion of the Chancery Court decision, follow the link to a November 2010 post on the blog entitled "New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs."

The Delaware Supreme Court Decision. The decision was appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. On September 2, 2011, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion analyzing the Delaware LLC Act and affirming the Chancery Court's decision. A copy of the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion is available through this link.

The Delaware Supreme Court held that the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, limits standing to bring derivative claims only to LLC members and their assignees because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The Delaware Supreme Court held that this statute was unambiguous and expressly limits standing only to LLC members and their assignees. The creditor plaintiff argued that it was "absurd" for the result to be different as between a corporation and LLC, but the Delaware Supreme Court held that the Delaware General Assembly "was well suited to make that policy choice and we must honor that choice."
The plaintiff also claimed that by limiting standing, the statute violated the Delaware Constitution's prohibition against curtailing the Chancery Court's jurisdiction to less than the general equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain as it existed in 1792, when Delaware ratified its first constitution. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the argument holding that, among other reasons, Delaware limited liability companies, unlike corporations, came into existence only in 1992 and therefore did not exist in 1792. In addition, the LLC statute was properly able to both grant and limit derivative standing.

Creditor Options. Recognizing that this standing provision could limit creditor remedies in the event of insolvency, the Delaware Supreme Court discussed one remedial option available to creditors. In footnote 20 of the opinion, the Court stated:

Admittedly, this approach is not the only option the General Assembly had, and we make no normative comment on the General Assembly's policy choice. Our only purpose here is to explain that limiting derivative standing to members and assignees in a contractual entity like an LLC is not absurd because other interest holders--like creditors--have other options--as, for example, negotiating automatic assignment of membership interests upon insolvency clauses into the credit agreement and requiring the members and governing board to amend the LLC agreement accordingly.

Key Observations. As the Delaware Supreme Court noted, certain creditors may require that the LLC agreement be amended to provide for automatic assignment of membership interests to the creditors upon insolvency. If so, those creditors would then have standing to bring derivative claims. However, absent such provisions, under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision:

Managers of a Delaware LLC will not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent, although it is far less certain that the standing statute would preclude a bankruptcy trustee from bringing claims on behalf of the LLC itself;
An insolvent LLC's creditors will not have derivative standing to bring potential D&O type claims; and
These creditors will be limited to contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves.

Although Delaware LLCs and corporations share many common features, this new Delaware Supreme Court decision makes clear that the automatic derivative standing of creditors upon insolvency is one important distinction.

Summer 2011 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

Bob Eisenbach — Mon, 29 Aug 2011 10:29:07 -0800

The Summer 2011 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Bankruptcy & Restructuring group at Cooley LLP, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

Recent case law on the impact of a confirmed plan on a second bankruptcy filing by a successor to the original debtor;
The Second Circuit's recent decision limiting "gifting" in a Chapter 11 plan;
The reach of the Section 546(e) securities transaction safe harbor defense in avoidance actions; and
An update on litigation by the Madoff trustee against feeder funds and its broader implications.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case for our client Metropark USA, Inc., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, ArchBrook Laguna Holdings, Signature Styles, Claim Jumper Restaurants, OTC Holding Corp., Urban Brands, Mervyn's Holdings, Sierra Snowboard, Trade Secrets, Mt. Diablo YMCA, and Pacific Metro, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

First Published Court Of Appeals Opinion Issued Answering Whether Trademark Licenses Are Assignable In Bankruptcy

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 02 Aug 2011 07:11:24 -0800

It's been a long wait, but we finally have a published decision from a U.S. Court of Appeals answering whether a trademark license is assignable in bankruptcy without the licensor's consent. On July 26, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion in In re: XMH Corp., written by Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, and a copy of the opinion is available by following the link in this sentence. Until now, the closest we had come to a Court of Appeals decision on this issue was an unpublished affirmance by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit of the district court's decision in In re N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230 (D. Nev. 2005). For more on the Ninth Circuit case including the Supreme Court's interest in one of the issues in the case, take a look at these earlier posts on the blog, here, here, and here.

The Context. The dispute that led to the Seventh Circuit's decision arose in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case of Hartmarx Corporation (which later changed its name to "XMH"). One of its subsidiaries, Simply Blue ("Blue"), which was also in bankruptcy, sold its assets in a Section 363 sale to two buyers (the "purchasers").

Among Blue's assets was an executory contract with Western Glove Works ("Western"), which Blue sought to assign to the purchasers. Western objected, arguing that the contract could not be assigned because it was a sublicense to Blue of a trademark licensed by Western. The bankruptcy court agreed with Western and XMH appealed.
That's when things got a little complicated. While XMH's appeal was pending, Blue and the purchasers amended the contract. Under the amendment, title to the contract was left with Blue but the purchasers assumed all of Blue's contractual duties, together with the right to receive all fees to which Blue was otherwise entitled. The bankruptcy court approved the amendment and Western appealed from that decision.
In the meantime, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's original decision holding that the contract could not be assigned, effectively allowing the original contract to be assigned. Western appealed the district court's decision and that brought the case to the Seventh Circuit.

The Court's Decision. After disposing of a few jurisdictional issues springing from the complicated way the case had played out, the Seventh Circuit reached the merits. The Court first looked to Section 365(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which limits assignment of an executory contract if "applicable law" permits the non-debtor party to the contract to refuse to accept performance from an assignee, regardless of whether the contract prohibits or restricts assignment. In the XMH Corp. case, the contract did not prohibit or restrict assignment (but neither did it permit it). Western argued that "applicable law" was trademark law because the contract stated that Western was a licensee of a trademark for "Jag Jeans." The Court noted that "Jag" is a federally registered trademark, although "Jag Jeans" is not.

The Court held that if the contract included a trademark sublicense when XMH attempted to assign the contract, it was not assignable. This was true regardless of whether federal trademark law applied, any particular state's trademark law applied, and also, apparently, even if Canadian law applied (Western is a Canadian company). The Seventh Circuit put it this way:

None of this matters, though, because as far as we've been able to determine, the universal rule is that trademark licenses are not assignable in the absence of a clause expressly authorizing assignment. Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006)(per curiam); In re N.C.P. Marketing Group, Inc., 337 B.R. 230, 235-36 (D. Nev. 2005); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 18:43, pp. 18-92 to 18-93 (4th ed. 2010).

After describing how consumers rely on a trademark as an indicator of a good's quality, the Court explained that if a trademark owner (or licensee sublicensing the mark) allows another company to produce the trademarked goods, it

will not want the licensee to be allowed to assign the license (that is, sublicense the trademark) without the owner's consent, because while the owner will have picked his licensee because of confidence that he will not degrade the quality of the trademarked product he can have no similar assurance with respect to some unknown future sublicensee.

Because this is the normal reaction of a trademark owner, it makes sense to make the rule that a trademark license is not assignable without the owner's express permission a rule of contract law--what is called a 'default' rule because it is the rule if the parties do not provide otherwise (as they are allowed to do).

Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that although the contract included a trademark sublicense, the sublicense had expired and the parties had not designated the contract, post-expiration, as a trademark sublicense. Further, the Court held that the balance of the contract was only a service agreement and not an implied trademark license. The Court also refused to go down the "dark path" of whether a contract could be a trademark license for some purposes but not others. As such, with no actual trademark sublicense in existence at the time of assignment, the default rule discussed above did not apply and the executory contract could be assigned. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower courts' decisions approving the assignment of the contract as amended.

An IP Attorney's Observations. For the perspective of an in-house intellectual property attorney on the Seventh Circuit's decision, including helpful links to the trademark and the parties' underlying agreements, you may find Pamela Chestek's discussion of the case on her "Property, intangible" blog, interesting reading.

Good News For Trademark Owners. With the Seventh Circuit's XMH Corp. decision, we now have two Courts of Appeals (the Seventh and Ninth Circuits) on record holding that trademark licenses are not assignable in bankruptcy absent the consent of the trademark owner or sublicensor. While the full force of a decision depends on whether other courts follow its holding, trademark owners will likely find the guidance provided by this decision meaningful, especially given the Seventh Circuit's observation that the non-assignability of trademark licenses is "the universal rule." That said, how the decision is viewed in other circuits, particularly in Delaware and New York where many large Chapter 11 cases are filed, remains to be seen, so stay tuned.

Bankruptcy Judge's Free Online Research Binder Now Updated

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 21 Jun 2011 10:42:55 -0800

I have posted in the past about the helpful research binder that former Judge Randall J. Newsome of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California had made available on the Bankruptcy Court's website. Although Judge Newsome has retired from the bench, fortunately Judge Charles Novack, also of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, has picked up the mantle and has continued to update the research binder. Judge Novack recently released the updated version covering cases through Volume 436 of Bankruptcy Reports. Follow the link in this sentence to access the entire binder in PDF format, which is capable of being searched using a key word or phrase.

The primary focus of the research binder is on Ninth Circuit law, as Judge Novack presides in the Northern District of California, but some out-of-circuit law is also included. The disclaimer Judge Novack includes puts the binder's use in context:

I have the privilege of continuing Judge Randall Newsome's research binder. Although this represents the aggregation of his 22 years of research (and my own several months of work), I make no claim as to its current level of accuracy. Some of the cases may well have been superseded, reversed or otherwise no longer be good law. I, like Judge Newsome, post it with the intention of assisting those who are researching bankruptcy matters within the 9th Circuit. Users should consider it a first, but not final research tool, and should cite check all cases before relying on them.

With those caveats, and with Judge Novack's continuing work, the binder remains a good place to start when researching bankruptcy law issues in Ninth Circuit.

Spring 2011 Edition Of Bankruptcy Resource Now Available

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 22 Mar 2011 10:14:22 -0800

The Spring 2011 edition of the Absolute Priority newsletter, published by the Cooley LLP Bankruptcy & Restructuring group, of which I am a member, has just been released. The newsletter gives updates on current developments and trends in the bankruptcy and workout area. Follow the links in this sentence to access a copy of the newsletter. You can also subscribe to the blog to learn when future editions of the Absolute Priority newsletter are published, as well as to get updates on other bankruptcy and insolvency topics.

The latest edition of Absolute Priority covers a range of cutting edge topics, including:

Recent case law on third-party releases in bankruptcy plans;
Treatment of make-whole and no-call provisions in bankruptcy;
Breach of fiduciary duty claims against managers of insolvent Delaware LLCs; and
Ordinary course of business defense to preferences.

This edition also reports on some of our recent representations, including the successful Chapter 11 reorganization of our client, retailer Crabtree & Evelyn, Ltd., and our work for official committees of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases involving major retailers and others. Recent committee cases include Blockbuster, Orchard Brands, Ultimate Electronics, Claim Jumper Restaurants, OTC Holdings, Urban Brands, Mervyn's Holdings, Sierra Snowboard, Trade Secrets, Mt. Diablo YMCA, and Pacific Metro, among others.

I hope you find the latest edition of Absolute Priority to be of interest.

Blast From The Past: Website Provides Quick Access To Older Bankruptcy Code Sections

Bob Eisenbach — Wed, 01 Dec 2010 07:19:01 -0800

Thanks to Professor Robert Lawless of the University of Illinois College of Law, also of the Credit Slips blog, you can now save yourself from combing through dusty old books to find the language of Bankruptcy Code provisions going back as far as 1980. Need to find how Section 547 was worded prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA"), or interested in tracing the evolution of exceptions to the automatic stay of Section 362? Then navigate over to the BankrLaw Project site. Once there, select a date and the site will provide you with the Bankruptcy Code in effect at that time, free of charge. This promises to be a very useful research tool when the text of older Bankruptcy Code provisions is in issue.

New Ruling Finds Important Protection For Managers Of Insolvent Delaware LLCs

Bob Eisenbach — Tue, 16 Nov 2010 07:25:57 -0800

Derivative Claims Against Directors Of An Insolvent Delaware Corporation. With its 2007 decision in North American Catholic Educational Programming, Inc. v. Gheewalla, et al., 930 A.2d 92 (Del. 2007), the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation could be sued derivatively by creditors for breaches of fiduciary duty. To read that decision, click on the case name in the prior sentence. For a discussion of the case, you may find this earlier post of interest: "Delaware Supreme Court Addresses, For The First Time, Whether Creditors Can Sue Directors For Breach Of Fiduciary Duty When The Corporation Is Insolvent Or In The Zone Of Insolvency."

What About LLCs? The Gheewalla decision clarified that creditors of a Delaware corporation that is insolvent (but not one only in the "zone of insolvency") can assert derivative claims against the corporation's directors, but a question remained: Would that same ruling extend to managers of Delaware limited liability companies, the LLC equivalent of a corporation's directors. Although a number of commentators and some court decisions assumed that it would, a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision has answered the question, somewhat surprisingly, with a decisive "no."

New Chancery Court Ruling. In the new decision, CML V, LLC v. Bax, C.A. No. 5373-VCL (Del.Ch. Nov. 3, 2010), the Delaware Chancery Court undertook an extensive analysis of the Delaware LLC Act and also examined the issue more broadly.

The Court held that under the literal terms of the Delaware LLC Act, specifically 6 Del. C. section 18-1002, only LLC members and their assignees have standing to bring derivative claims because the LLC Act provides that only they are "proper plaintiffs." The LLC Act does not give an insolvent LLC's creditors standing to bring derivative claims. The situation is different for creditors of insolvent corporations because the governing Delaware corporation statutes do not impose exclusive derivative standing provisions.
Although the Chancery Court acknowledged that arguments could be made for allowing creditors to bring derivative actions against managers of an insolvent LLC, the Court saw no reason to set aside the literal reading of the LLC Act's standing provision. The Court also noted that the Delaware Limited Partnership Act has a similar exclusive standing provision.

For a full discussion of the decision, including a link to the opinion itself, be sure to read Francis G.X. Pileggi's excellent post entitled "Chancery Bars Derivative Claim of Creditor Against Insolvent LLC, Based on LLC Act."

Impact On An Insolvent LLC's Creditors. So where does this new decision leave creditors of an insolvent Delaware LLC?

Under the Chancery Court decision, unlike directors of a Delaware corporation, managers of a Delaware LLC are not be subject to derivative claims by creditors if the entity becomes insolvent.
If the decision is followed by other courts -- specifically including bankruptcy courts where claims involving managers of bankrupt LLCs may more often be litigated -- then an insolvent LLC's creditors will not have access to potential D&O type claims. Instead, those creditors will have to rely on contractual remedies against the LLC to protect themselves.

Stay Tuned. As noted, the bankruptcy court is often the forum where insolvency-related matters are litigated. Should these claims be pursued outside of the Chancery Court, it will be interesting to see how other courts interpret the Delaware LLC Act's provisions.