Aviation Law Monitor

Cessna Caravan Trial Begins 10 Years After Crash

Mike Danko — Mon, 30 Apr 2012 20:32:57 -0800

More than 30 Cessna 208 and 208B Caravans have crashed when their wings iced up in flight. Victims’ families have filed many product defect lawsuits against Cessna, claiming that Cessna concealed from the pilots defects in the aircraft’s deicing system. Silvey v. Cessna is the first case to reach trial. At least the first that I know of.

Silvey, which is pending in federal court in Fort Worth, Texas, involves a Caravan that crashed near Parks, Arizona in November 2002. The pilot reported encountering light icing. According to the NTSB report, a short time later, a witness saw the aircraft come spinning out of the clouds with its nose pointed down. All four on board were killed on impact.

After that crash, the FAA issued at least three airworthiness directives against the Cessna Caravan, all concerning the aircraft’s deicing system. Cessna asked the Silvey trial judge, the Honorable Terry Means, to keep the airworthiness directives from the jury. Cessna argued that since the FAA didn't issue the airworthiness directives until after the accident, they are not relevant. The judge declined to rule whether the evidence will come in or stay out. Instead, he ruled that he’d have to see how the trials goes before deciding.

Three of the airworthiness directives at issue are:

AD 2005-07-01, prohibiting takeoff when there is any ice on the aircraft, and requiring pilots to feel the wings for ice rather than simply inspect visually;
AD 2006-01-11 requiring owners to modify the aircraft’s deicing system to legally fly in icing conditions; and
AD 2006-06-06 prohibiting flight in anything other than “light” icing conditions, requiring pilots to maintain higher air speeds when climbing through ice, and advising pilots that the aircraft’s stall warning system cannot be relied on in icing conditions.

Reno Air Crash: NTSB Critical of Race Organizers' Tracking of Aircraft Discrepancies

Mike Danko — Tue, 10 Apr 2012 20:05:00 -0800

No conclusion yet as to exactly what caused the Galloping Ghost to crash last September at the Reno Air Races. But the interim report the NTSB issued today disclosed that the Galloping Ghost experienced an “upset” 6 seconds before it lost its left elevator trim tab. That, in turn, caused the aircraft to go out of control. None of that information is really new, and was discussed shortly after the accident in this post and in the post's many thoughtful comments.

The NTSB also issued safety recommendations that specifically questioned whether the Galloping Ghost had been properly tested at race speeds or otherwise evaluated for resistance to “flutter;” an aerodynamic phenomenon that can destroy an aircraft in seconds. But that’s not news either -- flutter and its possible role in this crash was discussed the day after the crash here.

There is one fact, however, that we didn’t know before. Race officials inspected the aircraft just before the race and determined that the aircraft’s trim tab’s screws were too short. But the NTSB could find no documentation that the screws had been replaced and the discrepancy resolved before the race started. Though the race inspector stated that he verified that all the aircraft’s discrepancies had been resolved, the NTSB recommended that, in the future, race organizers develop a system that tracks discrepancies found during pre-race technical inspections and ensures that they have been resolved before an aircraft is allowed to race As the NSTB put it:

without a method to track discrepancies to resolution, conducting pre-race inspections is of limited value.

The NTSB’s interim report doesn’t say whether the screws were, in fact, replaced. For that, we’ll have to wait for the NTSB to issue its factual report. But even without a system for race officials to track discrepancies, whenever a mechanic performs any work on an aircraft, he is supposed to record that work in the aircraft’s maintenance logs. If there’s no entry in the Galloping Ghost’s logbooks showing that the screws were changed, that’s evidence that the work wasn’t done, or at least wasn’t done properly.

Besides recommending that race officials establish a better system of ensuring that aircraft discrepancies are repaired before race time, it issued recommendations that would, among other things:

Require race pilots to be trained to tolerate or avoid high g-loadings;
Revise the mathematical formulas used to lay out the race courses;
Require aircraft to be tested at race speeds before they be allowed to compete; and
Require pilots to practice on the actual race course before being allowed to compete.

Related Content:

Jury Hearing Iron 44 Helicopter Crash Case Disagrees with NTSB

Mike Danko — Tue, 27 Mar 2012 14:28:27 -0800

The NTSB blamed the helicopter crash that killed 9 firefighters on the the helicopter's operator. Basically, the NTSB concluded that the helicopter crashed because it was overloaded. But today a jury disagreed, deciding that the Sikorsky helicopter crashed because one of its two engines failed. The jury handed down a $70 million verdict against GE, the engine's manufacturer.

Why is a jury allowed to come to a conclusion totally opposite to that reached by the NTSB? In short, because the NTSB's findings are inadmissible in a court of law. And there's good reason for that. For starters, a victim's family is not allowed to participate in the NTSB investigation, while the manufacturers who may be to blame for the accident are. As a result, the NTSB's findings frequently favor the manufacturers.

Is that what happened here? Did the NTSB unfairly favor GE? It seems that it may have.

I spoke today with one of the participants in the trial held in Portland. He explained that, originally, the NTSB had determined that one of the helicopter's engines did, in fact, fail in flight. That report mysteriously "disappeared," however, shortly after it was published. As did the engine's fuel control unit.

The NTSB ultimately took the position that losing the fuel control unit was no big deal, because it believed the engine hadn't failed. But plaintiffs introduced at trial substantial evidence that it had, including an audio recording made during the crash sequence which helped proved that one of the engines "rolled back," or shut down, just before the impact.

In December, 2010, the helicopter's operator issued a press release complaining that the NTSB proceedings were unfair. Given today's verdict, it makes for particularly interesting reading.

. . the facts clearly show that the primary cause of this accident was a loss of power to the #2 engine of the aircraft. There is a strong chain of physical evidence in the [NTSB's evidence] that indicates a high probability that a malfunctioning fuel control unit (FCU) caused a sudden loss of power as the aircraft transitioned to forward flight. Extensive independent real-world flight testing has confirmed that even [if overweight, the helicopter should] have had enough power to fly away from . . with two properly operating engines. The co-pilot has confirmed much of this evidence with his recent testimony. . . The NTSB has ignored his testimony in favor of supposition. . .

Unfortunately, early in this investigation the NTSB lost custody of several fuel control parts, and conducted a filter inspection incorrectly, which they have acknowledged. Since that time, the NTSB has chosen to ignore the physical evidence and flight parameters that indicate a possible blockage in the FCU. They repeatedly refused to participate in independent flight testing, and they have not given proper consideration to the copilot's direct testimony of conditions and available power just prior to the crash.

No post-crash fire in Arizona Helicopter Crash

Mike Danko — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 12:15:56 -0800

And everyone walked away.

The video is proof that if it has a properly designed fuel system, a helicopter need not catch fire after an otherwise survivable accident.

Hope the folks at the Robinson Helicopter factory take note.

Is the R44 the Ford Pinto of Helicopters?

Mike Danko — Tue, 28 Feb 2012 07:34:40 -0800

Can any question remain about the R44's tendency to roll over and catch fire? It happened again yesterday, in Glendale Arizona. This time, the helicopter had barely gotten off the ground.

Fortunately, no one was hurt. But the story is becoming all too familiar. According to the Arizona Republic:

A mechanic was testing the engine of the Robinson R-44 helicopter when he lost control and it came down on its side and caught fire.

Helicopters aren't supposed to catch fire in survivable accidents. But Robinsons do just that because their fuel tanks are defectively designed. This latest fire happened little more than a few weeks after an R44 accident killed filmmakers Mike deGruy and Andrew Wight. That crash led well-known aviation attorney Ladd Sanger to call the Robinson R44 the "Ford Pinto" of helicopters.

Seems as though there may be something to that.

Robinson R44 Fuel Tank Design Implicated in Filmmakers' Crash?

Mike Danko — Tue, 14 Feb 2012 07:34:46 -0800

Robinson Helicopter Company likes to say that its helicopters are safe in crashes. According to an excerpt from Robinson Safety Notice SN-10:

The R22 and R44 have demonstrated excellent crashworthiness as long as the pilot flies the aircraft all the way to the ground . . .The ship may roll over and be severely damaged, but the occupants have an excellent chance of walking away from it without injury.

As it turns out, that’s not quite true. When they roll over, Robinson helicopters, in particular R44's, have a tendency to catch fire and explode. That makes walking away from a crash pretty much impossible.

Robinson fixed the problem beginning with helicopters it manufactured in 2010 by installing better fuel tanks. But that didn't help Mike deGruy and Andrew Wight, who were aboard VH-COK, a 2004 model that crashed February 4 in Australia.

A photograph of the aircraft (above) shows that the ship rolled over on its side, just as Robinson says. There's little crush damage to the cockpit and so the crash looks survivable. Except for the devastating post-crash fire.

The photo of the deGruy wreckage looks remarkably similar to the wreckage of the September 2010 R44 crash in Mammoth, California (left). That helicopter rolled over and burned as well.

There's no reason for anyone to be burned in an otherwise survivable helicopter accident. Looks as though deGruy and Wright may be added to the list of those who died needlessly due to the dangerous and defective Robinson fuel system.

Ninth Circuit Says Insurer Need Not Pay For Pilot Error

Mike Danko — Fri, 10 Feb 2012 14:56:25 -0800

Some pilots believe that their insurance won't cover them if it's their own screw-up that causes an accident. They believe, for example, that if they inadvertently violate an FAA regulation, their policy will be "voided."

That's seldom correct. The purpose of insurance coverage is to protect the pilot who makes a mistake, regardless of how "stupid." When it collects the premium, the insurance carrier signs on to pay for pilot error.

But there are some situations where an owner or pilot can jeopardize his coverage. Like when he fudges his experience or training on his insurance application. Tell the insurance carrier that you are instrument rated when you aren't and you may find that the policy won't cover you even if your accident occurs on a perfect VFR day.

Pilot qualifications and training were at issue in a case just decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, Trishan Air v. Federal Insurance Company. In that case, a pilot ran a Falcon 900 jet off the end of the runway at Santa Barbara. It appeared that the accident was caused by the captain's error, plain and simple.

The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that the co-pilot was supposed to have received motion-based simulator training with respect to the aircraft but did not. His only simulator training was static-based.

The operator argued that the static-based simulator training the co-pilot had received was substantially the same as the motion-based training the policy specified. More importantly, the pilot who was responsible for the accident had received the specified training. And no one suggested that the co-pilot's training (or lack of training) had any role in the accident at all.

The court ruled that whether the co-pilot's training played a role was beside the point. The carrier had agreed to underwrite a certain risk only. That risk involved a crew that had received motion-based simulator training. The carrier would not have issued the policy without the training requirement or, at least, would have charged a higher premium.

To make the carrier pay for the accident would be to force it to cover a risk for which it did not bargain.

Pilot Charged With Involuntary Manslaughter

Mike Danko — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 16:18:55 -0800

Foreign countries routinely bring criminal charges against pilots after an accident. But in the US, criminal charges are very rare. And that's a good thing because "criminalizing negligence" usually does little to promote safety.

But perhaps there are exceptions.

Pilot Steven Fay bought his 1960 Cessna in June 2010. He crashed it after dark on New Year's Day 2011. He survived with minor injuries but, sadly, his 35 year-old daughter -- the passenger on the plane -- did not.

A Massachusetts grand jury has now indicted him for involuntary manslaughter, which carries a possible 20 year prison term.

Fay's Cessna, a Cessna 310, was a "multi-engine, complex, high-performance airplane." Trouble is that:

Fay was not licensed to fly a twin-engine aircraft;
Fay did not hold a high performance aircraft endorsement;
Fay did not hold a complex aircraft endorsement;
Fay's last night landing was ten years earlier, and thus he was not legally entitled to carry a passenger in any aircraft at all.

According to the NTSB report, neither weather nor mechanical problems played a factor.

Scruggs' Accident: Was Pilot's Warning Adequate?

Mike Danko — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 10:12:48 -0800

The pilot says he warned Lauren Scruggs away from his propeller. According to the NTSB's preliminary report:

After [the pilot] opened the door, [Scruggs] started to get out of the airplane. Upon noticing that she was exiting in front of the strut, the pilot leaned out of his seat and placed his right hand and arm in front of her to divert her away from the front of the airplane and the propeller. He continued to keep his arm extended and told [Scruggs] that she should walk behind the airplane. Once he saw that [Scruggs] was at least beyond where the strut was attached to the wing, and walking away, he dropped his right arm and returned to his normal seat position. The pilot then looked to the left side of the airplane and opened his window to ask who was next to go for a ride.

The pilot then heard someone yell, "STOP STOP," and he immediately shut down the engine and saw [Scruggs] lying in front of the airplane.

While the pilot apparently tried to keep Scruggs from the propeller, it wasn't enough. Sadly, the accident likely would have been avoided had the pilot followed the the general safety guidelines set forth here.

The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents. Unfortunately, the pilot elected to keep his engine running.

The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades. The pilot apparently failed to instruct Scruggs of the path to follow before she exited the plane. Once she had exited the airplane, given the noise, he was left to rely on crude hand signals to get his message across.

When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft. Apparently, in this case, the propeller was in the path of the deplaning passenger's travel.

NTSB to Quiz Air Show Industry Leaders

Mike Danko — Mon, 09 Jan 2012 10:38:55 -0800

The NTSB says that during tomorrow’s hearing, it will be looking to industry leaders to give it a “deeper understanding of regulations” bearing on the operation of the nation’s air shows. Of course, the only regulatory body that has the authority to control air shows is the FAA. But what the Board will find -- if it asks the right questions -- is that for the most part, the industry regulates itself. According to one veteran air racer, Howie Keefe, the FAA is more or less “hands off” when it comes to air show safety. From Martha Bellisle’s article in the Reno Gazette-Journal:

Keefe said the industry is largely self-regulated because the pilots and engineers are the most qualified to determine whether another pilot can handle a certain race or course or whether a certain design can handle the stress of a trick or race. ‘The classes themselves can say yes or no to a person who wants to race — if they can’t do a roll, they can’t race,’ Keefe said. ‘The FAA can’t do that. We rely on the expertise of the people in the industry to make the decisions.’

Perhaps a “hands off” policy is fine for the participants. But not so much for the spectators, who expect that if the FAA approves an event, it is overseeing the event’s safety in some meaningful fashion, and not merely turning the reins over to the event sponsors.

This Board says that the purpose of tomorrow’s public hearing is to help it investigate future air show accidents. But this Board is more assertive than past boards. There’s little doubt that it will find the FAA’s oversight lacking. The question is whether it will do anything about it.

Cirrus Crash at Scottsdale Raises Questions About Fuel System Design Safety

Mike Danko — Thu, 15 Dec 2011 14:37:32 -0800

Some say that Cirrus aircraft are improperly designed because they tend to catch fire on impact more frequently than other aircraft, such as those manufactured by Cirrus competitors, like Diamond or Cessna. And there are plenty of examples of post-crash Cirrus fires to talk about. Critics argue that those fires prove that the aircraft is unduly dangerous and defective.

An aircraft should be designed such that no one is burned to death in an otherwise survivable accident. At least, that’s the design standard in the auto industry. It became the standard when, during the 1970's, Bell Helicopters showed that some simple engineering enhancements could virtually eliminate post-crash fires in survivable Huey helicopter accidents. That technology has been around now for 40 years. The technology works in helicopters and cars, so there’s no reason for a properly designed, modern airplanes to catch fire either.

But the key is that the crash must be otherwise survivable. If the crash is not otherwise survivable, the post-crash fire is irrelevant to the fate of the occupants. To date, the Cirrus fires that critics point to (like this one, and this one) were accidents that likely would have been fatal regardless of whether there was a post crash fire. So from those accidents, no conclusions about the fuel system's safety can be drawn.

But this morning, everything changed. A Cirrus crashed in Phoenix while on approach to land at Scottsdale Airport. Both the pilot and the passenger survived the impact. But then a fire broke out. The fire killed one occupant and badly burned the other.

Unlike other Cirrus crashes, the Scottsdale crash was undeniably survivable. The post - crash fire raises legitimate questions about whether the Cirrus fuel system is as crashworthy as it should be.

Sundance Tour Helicopter Crash at Las Vegas and the AStar Hydraulic System

Mike Danko — Sat, 10 Dec 2011 08:54:34 -0800

Eurocopter's AStar is the most popular tour helicopter in the United States. But according to some tour operators, the helicopter is dangerous and defective. They use it anyway because it is the most profitable.

No, I’m not making this up.

Problems with the AStar 350?

One of Las Vegas' largest tour operators, Heli-USA, is run by Nigel Turner. Turner is himself a pilot. He operates the largest AStar fleet in the Western United States. And he feels that the design of the AStar's hydraulic sytem causes it to crash. Turner complains that the manufacturer refuses to fix the problems. But, like other tour operators he sticks with the AStar for one simple reason: money. According to a 2008 article in the Star Bulletin:

Turner said that despite the problems with the AStar, it will remain the helicopter of choice for his company because it's the only chopper with forward-facing seats that can fit enough passengers to make a tour profitable.

So what exactly do hydraulics and actuators do?

The actuators move the helicopter's rotor blades, allowing the pilot to control the flight of the aircraft. The AS350's hydraulics -- similar to a power steering system in a car -- help move the helicopter's actuators. If the hydraulic system fails, the pilot may find it hard to move the actuators and thus the helicopter can be difficult to control.

While a problem with the hydraulic system can make the helicopter difficult to control, a disconnected or broken actuator will make the helicopter impossible to control. That's what happened in 2007, when an AS350 just like the one involved in this accident crashed in Hawaii, killing four tourists. Days after that accident, Eurocopter issued a Special Airworthiness Bulletin (see below) prompted by two previous fatal accidents, warning of the consequences of loose servo control rod end fittings.

The Sundance Helicpter’s control system

NTSB board member Dr. Mark Rosekind says that the Sundance helicopter climbed and turned erratically just before impact. That's consistent with an actuator problem. And, just hours before the crash, one of the Sundance helicopter's main rotor actuators was replaced. Was the actuator defective? Was it installed incorrectly?

The NTSB has now recovered that actuator from the wreckage site. That's where the investigation will focus.

But given what industry leaders have to say about problems with the AStar’s control system, one has to wonder whether by continuing to use the helicopter the tour industry is simply placing profits ahead of public safety.

AS350BService Bulletin

Propeller Safety and Lauren Scruggs' Accident

Mike Danko — Tue, 06 Dec 2011 12:48:30 -0800

“Investigators aren’t sure why Scruggs didn’t see the propeller” she walked into last night.

Um, maybe because a spinning propeller is pretty much invisible? Especially at night?

News reports are that incidents such as Lauren Scruggs', who is a model and fashion blogger, are rare. Maybe, but it would depend on what one means by “rare.” Seems that someone is killed or seriously injured by a spinning prop every year. Some reports of incidents from my local area alone are here and here.

During the day, spinning propellers have a mesmerizing effect. People have been known to see them, yet walk right into them.

Of course, at night, propellers can be virtually invisible.

In almost all prop-strike cases, pilot error plays a role. A pilot needs to think carefully before allowing a passenger to deplane with the engine running. Here, apparently, the pilot allowed Scruggs to exit the aircraft with the engine running so that another passenger could take her seat. Certainly it would have been safer to shut down the engine of the Aviat Husky he was flying before allowing passengers to leave or approach the aircraft. “Hot loading” – allowing passengers to get into the aircraft with the engine running -- is safe only when the passengers have been carefully briefed on procedures. Even then, it's best permitted only with the help of a trained spotter who walks one passenger away from the aircraft and then walks the next passenger in.

Here are some common guidelines for propeller safety:

The aircraft engine should be shut down before boarding or deplaning passengers. This is the simplest method of avoiding accidents.

Boarding or deplaning of passengers, with an engine running, should only be allowed under close supervision. The pilot in command should have knowledge that either the company or the airport operator has ground attendants fully trained in their specific duties to board or deplane passengers from an aircraft with an engine(s) running. The pilot should instruct passengers, before they exit an aircraft with an engine(s) running, the path to follow to avoid the propeller or rotor blades.

When it is necessary to discharge a passenger from an aircraft on which an engine is running, never stop the aircraft with the propeller in the path of the passenger's route from the aircraft.

Helicopter Crash Leads to $10 Million Jury Verdict

Mike Danko — Thu, 01 Dec 2011 09:14:34 -0800

Power lines can be virtually invisible from the air. The trick to avoiding them is, paradoxically, not to try to find them. Instead, the pilot should look for the towers from which they are strung. Once the pilot has the towers in sight, he should choose one and fly directly over it, rather than between them. By flying over one of the towers the pilot can be assured of avoiding the wires, since no wires are strung higher than the tower itself.

In November 2009, a Piasecki helicopter struck hig h tension wires shortly after departing from Adelanto airport as it headed for an airshow in Riverside, California. The helicopter crashed and burned, and all three aboard were killed.

We represented Colleen Goble, the widow of one of the pilots on board the helicopter. Yesterday, a jury in San Bernardino county, California rendered a $10 million verdict in her favor against the estate of Joseph Pike, who was the other pilot in the helicopter and the helicopter’s owner. The jury determined that Pike was the pilot in command at the time of the accident.

Pike, a well-known flight instructor with over 12,000 hours of flight time, trained his students to never fly between electrical towers. Rather, he taught his student to pick one tower and fly over it. On the day of the accident, however, Pike chose to “split the towers” and ended up in the wires.

Pike’s estate had argued that forensic evidence showed that Goble, not Pike, was at the controls. Pike’s estate also argued that the lines’ owner, the city of Los Angeles, should have installed orange marker balls on the lines to make them visible. Pike’s estate had sued both Goble and the city of Los Angeles but dismissed both those claims shortly before trial.

Goble was a vintage helicopter buff. He worked for a medical technology company and held several patents. His work had been featured on National Geographic Television and had been displayed in the Smithsonian. He was 58. The couple lived in Connecticut and had no children.

The name of the case is Goble v. Estate of Pike. The judge was the Honorable Steve Malone.

Blue Hawaiian Helicopter Crash: Photo Tells the (Same Old) Story?

Mike Danko — Sun, 13 Nov 2011 14:26:41 -0800

The NTSB blamed the pilot for the last Blue Hawaiian helicopter crash into the side of a mountain. The NTSB concluded that while flying near bad weather, the pilot inadvertently entered clouds, became disoriented, and lost control of the helicopter. According to the NTSB, the probable cause of the accident was:

The pilot's inadequate decision by which he continued visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions. Also causal was his failure to maintain terrain clearance resulting in a collision with mountainous terrain. A contributing factor was the low ceiling.

One need only look at the low clouds in the photo taken shortly after Thursday's Blue Hawaiian crash on Molokai to wonder if weather and pilot decision-making played a similar role in this latest crash.

Hawaii’s micro-weather makes helicopter tours dangerous. We've written about it before here, and here. Spoken about it too. Yet, year after year, tour operators opt to collect the fares and fly when weather conditions dictate that they really should stay on the ground.

Did the pilot involved in Thursday's crash try to squeeze his Eurocopter between the weather and the terrain and lose control? Time will tell whether this accident should be added to the list of crashes caused by "improper VFR." But without significant changes in the industry, Hawaiian tourists will continue to lose their lives in completely avoidable weather-related helicopter accidents.

Mid-air Collision Near Newberg: Hillsboro Aviation Seminole Descends onto Bonanza

Mike Danko — Wed, 26 Oct 2011 18:52:49 -0800

It looks as though it was the twin-engine Seminole that caused the mid-air collision between it and a Beech Bonanza near Newberg, Oregon. The crash killed the the 58-year old Bonanza pilot. The Oregonian quotes sources saying that:

the larger Piper PA-44 Seminole was executing training maneuvers in the area, making a series of rapid ascents and descents shortly after 4 p.m., when it came down upon a Beech Bonanza V35. . . [cutting it in two].

The Seminole (N3062H) was owned by Hillsboro Aviation, a flight school in Hillsboro, Oregon. As it turns out, the crash was not the flight school's first. In fact, in recent years the school has been plagued with training accidents. The most serious of those was in September, 2009, when both a Hillsboro Aviation flight instructor and his student were killed while training in a Robinson R22 helicopter.

In addition to this week's fatal accident, and the one in 2009, Hillsboro Aviation aircraft have crashed in June 2008, June 2010, September 2010, and October 2010.

In August 2010, the FAA indicated its intent to fine Hillsboro Aviation $580,000 for numerous safety violations, including improper maintenance of its aircraft. Though the FAA investigation looked into the September 2009 fatal helicopter crash, the FAA ultimately decided to levy the fine for violations unrelated to that crash -- specifically for what it found to be Hillsboro's intentional falsification of various aircraft maintenance records.

Of course, Tuesday's crash may be entirely unrelated to the previous Hillsboro Aviation training crashes and the conduct for which the FAA cited the flight school. Nonetheless, the school's safety record is abysmal.

Yet, Hillsboro Aviation remains in operation.

Plaintiffs' Lawyers Uncover Smoking Gun that NTSB Missed in Colgan Air Crash

Mike Danko — Tue, 25 Oct 2011 01:14:37 -0800

The NTSB is underfunded and understaffed. So it investigates accidents using the "party system." That means the NTSB relies on those who may have caused the accident for help in investigating the accident's cause. Unfortunately, the "party participants" seldom point the NTSB towards evidence in their files that would tend to incriminate them. As a result, NTSB reports go easy on the industry players.

From time to time, I've offered examples of cases (like the ones here and here) where the real cause of the accident was found by plaintiffs lawyers -- sometimes well after the NTSB report is published.

Here’s yet another example, this time arising out of the crash of the Continental (Colgan) Flight 3407. According to a recent CBS News report, lawyers for the families uncovered emails showing that Colgan Air knew the captain was not qualified to fly the Q400, but put him in the left seat anyway.

According to an ABC report, in one of the emails a Colgan Vice President states that the captain

had a problem upgrading” and, taking that into consideration, “anyone that does not meet the [minimums] and had problems in training before is not ready to tackle the Q.”

The “Q” is a reference to the Bombardier Q400. Despite Colgan's concerns about the captain's ability to fly the Q400, they promoted him anyway. Just five months after that, the new Q pilot crashed his aircraft in Buffalo, killing 50.

This wasn't merely a case of "pilot error," it was the result of an airline that didn't take safety seriously enough. The newly released emails are critical to understanding why the accident happened, and how similar accidents can be avoided in the future. Yet, an NTSB spokesman confirmed that Continental did not provide these emails to the NTSB at any time during its year long investigation of the crash.

It looks like the company's emails tell the story of why Continental Flight 3407 crashed. And it was the plaintiffs' lawyers, not the NTSB, who found them.

Robinson R66 Helicopter Fleet Suffers Second Fatal Crash

Mike Danko — Fri, 21 Oct 2011 08:26:56 -0800

Philip, South Dakota is the site of the second fatal Robinson R66 crash. This time, only the pilot was on board the helicopter. The first fatal R66 crash, which happened in July, killed two.

How does the R66 safety record stack up so far?

Since there are only 41 R66's on the US registry, the record stacks up poorly.

Before the Robinson R66 came along, there were about 1.2 fatal turbine helicopter accidents for every 100,000 hours flown. For the R66 crashes to be in line with that norm, each of the 41 R66's in the fleet would need to have logged 4000 hours. Since Robinson didn't start delivering the R66 until November 2010, that's virtually impossible. More realistically, the average time on an R66 is less than 400 hours.

Though not a scientific analysis, as of now it looks as though Robinson's R66 is about 10 times more likely to be involved in a fatal crash than other turbine helicopters.

Sure, this is a small sample. Perhaps it's too soon to draw any conclusions. But should R66 owners and pilots be concerned?

Of course they should.

Reno Air Race Disaster: Airport Seeks to Influence NTSB Investigation

Mike Danko — Tue, 18 Oct 2011 11:28:58 -0800

The NTSB excludes family members from its accident investigations. But it allows those who may have caused or contributed to a crash to participate. That's an obvious conflict of interest. As a result, NTSB probable cause findings are not always impartial. Instead, they tend to favor the industry players.

The industry players have long argued that, while they may be allowed behind closed doors to assist the NTSB in their investigations, they would never seek to influence the investigation's outcome.

Yeah, right.

The Reno-Tahoe Airport Authority, which owns Reno-Stead Airport, has dropped the pretense of "just wanting to help the NTSB find out what happened." Rather, it has gone whole-hog in seeking to actually influence the investigation of the Reno Air Race Disaster. In fact, it has hired professional help from a Washington lobbying firm.

You won't find that information on the Airport Authority's website. But you will find it in papers filed in Washington, DC. According to The Hill:

The Reno-Tahoe Airport Authority has hired Gephardt Government Affairs to lobby on the “government investigation of crash at Reno Air Races,” according to new lobbying forms released this week.

An NTSB investigation is not supposed to be a political process. It's hard to imagine anything more inappropriate than hiring lobbyists to influence its outcome.

But that is what it has come to.

Thankfully, we still have the jury system. No lobbying allowed there. Everything has to be done in open court, for all to see.